I.e., when a ship docks, it is pulled into the harbor by ropes. And river-boats are sometimes pulled down the river by ropes. This is the interpretation of the Ri Migash. The Ramah interprets the term as referring to the oars.
See Rav Yosef Karo’s Kessef Mishneh, which resolves an apparent question that Bava Batra 73a would seem to present. For from a superficial reading of that passage, it appears that a beitzit and a dugit are one and the same. He explains that in Israel, where ships would travel on the Mediterranean Sea, they would have a larger auxiliary boat used to catch fish. In Babylonia, where ships would travel on the Tigris or Euphrates Rivers, there would be a smaller auxiliary boat used to bring the sailors to land. This interpretation is reflected in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:1).
Leather sacks into which merchandise is placed to protect it during the voyage.
For none of these are integral parts of the ship.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:3) which states that this applies only with regard to the sale of the carriage. If one hires out the carriage, the mules are included in the rental.
We have chosen the secondary interpretation offered by the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 5:1). His primary interpretation is the beams extending from the carriage, with which the carriage is drawn.
If, however, the mules (beams) are attached to the carriage, if one sells the carriage, one sells the mules (beams) [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:2)].
According to the Tur and the Ramah (ibid.), this applies even if the mules are attached to the carriage. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 220:7 explains the rationale for this ruling. One can detach the mules from the carriage and ride to one’s destination upon them.
There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries if this applies whether or not the oxen are connected to the yoke (i.e., whether or not the laws governing oxen are the same as those governing mules). See the Maggid Mishneh. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:4) rules that when the oxen are attached to the yoke, if one sells the yoke the oxen are also sold.
When; however, a particular phrase has a certain implication that is understood by all - or the majority - of the people in a locale, that implication is followed. See the concluding laws of both this and the previous chapter. See also the Ramah’s statements (Choshen Mishpat 220:8).
The Ra’avad and the Tur question the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that there is no rationale to explain it. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo tries to support the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that it probably reflected the language used at his time. In his, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:5), he quotes the Rambam’s decision, while the Ramah favors the opinion of the Ra’avad and the Tur.
See the Kessef Mishneh, which explains why this and the previous halachah are not redundant. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:6), who differs with regard to the previous halachot, differs in this instance as well.
See Halachah 5 with regard to the laws of ona’ah and the nullification of a sale.
Since a donkey is primarily used for riding, and these ·are the essential gear used when riding a donkey, they are included in the sale (Maggid Mishneh).
For these are appurtenances that are not fundamental to the donkey’s use.
I.e., if the article is worth one sixth less than the price paid, that sum must be returned to the purchaser.
If the difference in value is more than one sixth.
See Chapter 12.
Since the price the purchaser paid is within range of the value of the donkey, we assume that he intended to purchase it alone, and he gave the extra sum because of a misjudgment of the donkey’s value.
I.e., we assume that the purchaser knew the value of a donkey and did not err in evaluating it. Why then did he pay so much extra? Because he was giving the seller a present.
None of the money is returned to him. Indeed, the Tur writes that even if the purchaser has not paid all the money he promised, he is compelled to pay the entire sum.
By telling the purchaser that the maid-servant or the cow is pregnant, the seller obviously intends to include the fetus in the sale.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:10) quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that if a maid-servant or cow is sold when pregnant, the fetus is automatically included in the sale unless a provision against its inclusion is explicitly made.
For a maid-servant who is nursing can be used to nurse other infants, and a cow that is nursing can be used to provide milk. Therefore, describing it as nursing does not imply a desire to sell the infant or the calf.
I.e., not even to nurse another donkey colt (Rashba).
Since the life of the servant or the donkey is dependent on this organ, we consider it as if half the servant or donkey has been sold.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that he sees no source for the Rambam’s statements in the Talmud. The Rambam’s ruling is, however, cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:12) without objection by the other commentaries.
I.e., we see the value of the organ or limb in question with regard to work (Ramah, loc. cit.).
Thus, there is no implication that anything other than the head is being sold.
A cow or a bull.
Apparently, these were the practices commonly accepted in butcher shops in the Talmudic era.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Rashbam (Bava Batra 83b) state that the word “windpipe” in this context refers to the lungs.
A sheep or a goat.
Again this is a practice that was common in Talmudic times. The rationale for the difference is that the head (or the lungs) of a sheep or a goat is not large enough to be considered a significant entity.
Although this ruling contradicts that of an explicit mishnah (Bava Batra 5:3), Bava Batra 79b explains that the mishnah represents a minority opinion. The Rashbam, however, understands the passage differently and rules according to the mishnah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:16) cites the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah follows that of the Rashbam.
See the conclusion of the previous chapter.
