Shechenim - Chapter 6

See Halachah 5 for a definition of this term.

I.e., even if the majority of the inhabitants do not desire to undertake this expense, the minority – even a small minority – can compel them to do so [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 163:1)].

For the protection of the city is a need shared by all of its inhabitants. This applies even if the city is not situated on the border of the land, for there is always the possibility of marauding brigands. As reflected by Halachah 5, the inhabitants must also pay the salaries of the guards. This halachah, however, speaks only of capital investments.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 163:2 states that at present, when books are printed, it is necessary for the community to purchase only a Torah scroll. Individual who own other texts of study should be compelled to lend them to each other.

So that the city will be connected to all the surrounding towns. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not quote this law, implying that this applies only to Eretz Yisrael, and not to other lands.

See Hilchot Mechirah 21:22, which states:
The purchaser agrees to make a place for a fence in his portion, including a small trench three handbreadths wide behind the fence, but close to it, and a larger trench, six handbreadths wide, outside the fence, and to leave the width of a handbreadth between the two trenches. All of this is necessary to prevent a marten or the like from jumping [from one field to the other).

The Tosefta (Bava Metzia 11:9) also mentions the city’s mikvaot. These and the above are considered the fundamental necessities of the city.

I.e., he is responsible for capital expenses, but not for the ongoing communal needs of the city.

The fact that he owns property in another city does not give him any right to refrain from undertaking the responsibilities incumbent on the inhabitants of the city in which he lives.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes other opinions, which maintain that the wealth of the homeowners should be taken into consideration. A rich man who lives further from the wall has more to lose – and therefore must contribute more – than a poor man who lives near the wall. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163:3) mentions this view with the preface: “There are those who say....”

For if the wall fell, those whose homes are closer to it would be attacked first.

I.e., even if he is merely renting property. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 163:2) mentions an opinion that states that if a renter signs a 12-month lease, he is liable immediately. Similarly, anyone who indicates that he desires to be a permanent resident of the city is liable immediately.
See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 9:12, which mentions other measures of time with regard to becoming responsible to participate in the charitable enterprises of a city.

With the intention of living there. When a person buys a home in a city, we assume that he intends to live there, and he is held responsible immediately. In contrast, a person who inherits a home, is given one as a gift or receives it in payment of a debt, is not held Liable until he lives there for a year [Ramah (op. cit.); Sefer Me’irat Einayim 163:6].

The intent is orphans below the age of majority, who are not able to take financial responsibility for their property according to Scriptural Law. For this reason, they are not held liable for levies for charity, the building of a synagogue or the like. Nevertheless, in this instance, the orphans are liable, for they also benefit from the city’s protection. Hence, the court acts as the guardian of their property and requires them to participate in the expense. See the following halachah.

Sefer Chassidim, Section 1013, states that this applies only to Torah scholars “whose study is their livelihood,” and have no other occupation. Scholars who both study and work, by contrast, are required to pay their share of these taxes. The Siftei Cohen 163:14, however, states that this is not the widely accepted view.
See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:10, which states that Torah scholars are freed from various taxes and levies.

For they derive a direct benefit from such improvements.

Instead of hiring workers.

The Rambam does not say whether they are exempt from working entirely or are required to hire laborers in their stead. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 163:33 quotes opinions that state that they are not held responsible at all.

The rationale is that the adults are considered to have waived their right to the money they paid. Minors, by contrast, are not halachically able to waive their right to property. Hence, their money must be returned to them.

I.e., each of the inhabitants has the right to protest.

This refers to a lane that ends in a cul-de-sac, for otherwise, there is no control over the human traffic in the lane. Although the lane opens up to several courtyards – and thus every homeowner has a certain degree of privacy – since it ends in a cul-de-sac, there is generally not a large amount of human traffic, and opening up a new concern will disturb the local residents.
Courtyards Opening Up Into a Lane Ending in a Cul-de-sac
a) A courtyard
b) The cul-de-sac
c) The lane
[As will be explained, there are authorities who differ with the Rambam’s conception of this halachah and maintain that the prohibition stems from a different rationale. According to these authorities. this ruling applies even in a lane with openings to the public domain on either side (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:16).]

This applies even if the craftsman lives in that lane. For, as stated in Halachah 11, this increase the human traffic in the lane. This reflects the halachic precedent for zoning regulations – i.e., when a lane or a courtyard is used for residential purposes, a person cannot open up a commercial establishment within it.

As reflected by Halachot 11-12 and by Chapter 11, Halachah 5, even if they agreed at the outset, the inhabitants of a lane can complain at any time that a store or a craftsman’s business creates too much noise and commotion in the lane, and they can compel him to close his business on this account. Nevertheless, if they do not compel the first store owner or craftsman to close his business, they cannot prevent a rival from opening a similar concern in that lane.

Nor any of the other inhabitants of the lane.

For, according to the Rambam, as long as the person lives in the same city and pays taxes, he has a right to open such a business.

Hence, we do not assume that the opening of a new establishment will increase the human traffic in the lane. It is important to note that other commentaries on Bava Batra 21b, the source of this halachah, operate under a different understanding and maintain that the issue of concern is not the human traffic in the lane, but the threat to the success of the businesses operating there. Hence, their rulings are diametrically opposite to those of the Rambam. The Rambam’s opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:5), while the dissenting views are voiced by the Tur and the Ramah.

Since a plural form of the verb is used, the implication is that either the craftsman or any of the other inhabitants of the lane can prevent the person from the other city from establishing his business. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:16, however, explains that the reason for the protest in this instance is not the increase in the human traffic in the lane, but the fact that the craftsman’s livelihood is being threatened. Therefore, only the craftsman himself, and not the others, may issue such a protest.

Since this person pays the head tax, he is considered as an inhabitant of the city and has all the privileges of the other inhabitants, including the right to open a business where he desires.

Nor can the inhabitants of the lane in which he stops to sell prevent him from doing so.

Even if they do not pay the local taxes.

Although, as reflected by the previous and following halachot, since the merchant does not pay the taxes, the local merchants should be able to prevent him from doing so. Nevertheless, because of Ezra’s enactment, they cannot. It is, however, only merchants of this profession and the like who are given such privileges [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 156:6)].

Or one who teaches Torah to young children (Ibid.).

This special measure of consideration is granted Torah scholars so that the need to travel will not cause them to lose time from their studies.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinion of the Ri Migash, that this applies only when they are selling merchandise of the same quality as the local merchants at the same price as the local merchants. If they are selling merchandise of lesser quality at a lower price, or merchandise of higher quality at the same price, if the inhabitants of the city are Jewish, the merchants cannot restrict them. For the benefit of the inhabitants at large overweighs the benefit of the merchants. Although the Maggid Mishneh mentions views that differ, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 156:7) quote the view of the Ri Migash.

For they do not pay the local taxes, and by selling their merchandise they restrict the income of the local merchants.

For then people from other locales come to purchase merchandise, and so they can sell to these people. Nevertheless, since they are permitted to sell to the people from outside the city, they are also permitted to sell to the local people (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:20). Note, however, the Hagahot Maimoniot who state that the outside merchants may not sell to any of the local townspeople. This view is cited by certain later authorities.

For that is where the people from outside the city will go to purchase merchandise.

For then their sales will be directed primarily to local people.

I.e., they are the borrowers. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 156) interprets Bava Batra 22a as implying that the merchants are the lenders, and they are granted permission to do business in the city until the loan is repaid.

I.e., enough for them to repay the loan, support themselves during the time they are repaying it and make some profit for their future expenses. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:21; Siftei Cohen 156:6.

This apparently reflects the version of Bava Batra 21a possessed by the Rambam. The standard published text of the Talmud states “one of the inhabitants of a courtyard,” implying that if there were several courtyards in a lane, the other inhabitants of the lane have no say in what goes on in a particular courtyard. The version chosen by the Rambam compounds the question raised by the Kessef Mishneh cited in note 47. Significantly, although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:1) quotes the Rambam’s wording, the Tur and the Ramah mention the prohibition only with regard to a courtyard, and not with regard to a separate courtyard in a lane.

If, however, the lane opened to the public domain on either side, there would be no room for a protest. For then the inhabitants would have no control over the human traffic in the lane.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:4) and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:2 state that even if the person has already established himself in this profession, his neighbors can compel him to close because of the human traffic. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 8, this also appears to be the Rambam’s position.

We have interpreted the term rofeh uman as referring to one profession, for this is the version in the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. There are, however, opinions (see Rashi, Bava Batra 21a and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:3), which interpret them as referring to two different professions: rofeh as referring to a doctor or a mohel (one who performs ritual circumcision), and uman as a blood letter. This version appears correct from the second portion of the halachah and is supported by some ancient texts of the Mishneh Torah.

In contrast to teaching Jewish children, as mentioned in the following halachah.
From that halachah, however, it is clear that leniency is granted only when teaching Jewish children Torah. If one teaches them other subjects, the same restrictions apply. This understanding is reflected in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 2:3), which explicitly states that if a person teaches children mathematics or engineering, his neighbors may protest. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:1) changes the wording the Rambam uses here and speaks of: “One who teaches young children any subject other than Torah.”

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch emphasizes that the prohibition applies even when all but one of the neighbors consent. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:6 however, quotes an opinion that requires the majority of the neighbors to protest before a professional is required to close his concern.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that commentaries have questioned the Rambam’s statements in this halachah. For in Halachah 8, the Rambam states that whenever any professional opens up a business in a residential area, the neighbors may protest because of the increase in human traffic. Why then must he state that concept again in this halachah? And why does he mention only a select few professions?

The Rambam’s wording implies that the restriction is not only on the professional – he may not open up his business – but also on the homeowner. Since he knows that this person desires to open such a concern, in consideration of his neighbors he should not rent premises to him.
The Ramah 156:1 states that one is nevertheless permitted to sell a property to such a professional, provided he is Jewish and will heed the rulings of a Rabbinic court.

From the Rambam’s wording, one could conclude that a scribe who writes Torah scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot would be allowed to open a business concern despite the fact that this would increase the human traffic in the lane (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:4). This interpretation is borne out by the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:3) that: “Whenever [a profession] involves a mitzvah, the neighbors may not protest [because of the increased human traffic].”

The contrast to the second clause of the halachah appears to imply that even though the store has been operating for some time, the neighbors have the right to demand that it be closed. Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 156:2, which quote a different view.

As explained in the notes on the previous halachah, according to the Rambam’s position, these laws would also apply in a lane that ends in a cul-de-sac. The Rambam mentions a courtyard only to teach that, with regard to the final clause, even the residents of a courtyard may not protest against teaching children Torah.

At the outset, the neighbor may protest when a person sets out to perform such an occupation in a shared residential area, for the noise is considered an unfair disturbance. If, however, the neighbors did not protest at the outset the person establishes the right to perform this profession in his home, and he may continue to practice this occupation (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 156:2) quotes opinions that differ and maintain that as long as the person performs these tasks in his home or his store, his neighbors cannot complain unless they are unhealthy and the noise presents a hazard to their well-being.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, this applies only when he teaches them the Torah, and not when he teaches them other subjects. The leniency is granted because of the mitzvah involved.

Similarly, as stated in Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:7, a teacher who already has a school operating cannot protect against another teacher opening a competing school.

This refers to a situation in which two brothers divided an estate and agreed to this condition at the outset or a situation when a person purchased the cistern from the homeowner and made such a condition at the time of the sale (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 169:1).

Only during the daytime [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 169:1)]. Although his colleague originally agreed to grant him passage through his home, it can be assumed that he granted that consent only with regard to ordinary hours. He cannot be expected to get out of bed at night to allow his colleague to draw water (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 169:2).

For this is definitely an imposition against the owner’s wishes. No one desires another person’s animal to tread through his home. Since it is possible to avoid that, the owner of the cistern must undertake the additional effort.

So that one will not be able to enter without the other knowing.

So that the owner of the house will not steal it.

Lest she enter together with the owner of the cistern for immoral purposes. Moreover, even if the owner of the house himself has no suspicions about his wife’s virtue, he may desire to install a lock to prevent the possibility of rumors spreading among people at large (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 169:3).

For he will have the key.

This also represents a situation in which, at the outset, the owner of the outer garden consented to allow the owner of the inner garden to pass through his property.

I.e., during the day [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 169:2).

Who desire to buy his produce.

I.e., to take a shortcut through his colleague’s garden to another field belonging to him. The rationale for these restrictions is that any extra traffic in the garden damages the crops.

Even though the crops make it slightly more difficult for the owner of the inner garden to proceed, as long as he can reach his garden, the owner of the outer field is not under any further obligation to him.

Since the path was moved to the side, passage on it does not disturb the owner of the outer garden.

This increases the human traffic in the garden. The owner of the outer garden never granted him wholesale freedom to pass through his property. He merely agreed to allow him to reach his garden (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Batra 6:6).

Moving the path to the side can be understood as an agreement not to sow vegetables on it.