Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, when a sale is made conditional to a stipulation, if that stipulation is fulfilled, the sale is binding. If not, it is nullified.

See also Hilchot Mechirah 13:17, which states this principle with regard to the laws of ona’ah, deriving an unfair amount of profit from a transaction.

As explained in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 29, a minor, a mentally or emotionally incompetent person and a deaf mute are incapable of buying or selling property. Similarly, as explained in that chapter, a person under the age of 20 may not sell landed property; so, too, he may not rent it out.

This refers to situations where the object being sold has not come into existence or is not in the possession of the seller, as explained in Hilchot Mechirah, 22.

E. g., an instance where a father gives his property to his son “from today and after his death.” As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 12:13, the son becomes the owner of the property, but the father retains the right to benefit from its produce. Therefore, the father may rent out the property, but may not sell it.

The Shitah Mekubetzet quotes a responsum from the Rambam’s teacher, the Ri MiGash, which states that this law applies whether the contract was made in the beginning of the year or the middle of the year. If the contract is made on an annual basis, it runs until the same date the following year. From Hilchot Nedarim 10:4, it would appear that the Rambam follows his teacher’s ruling.

In which an extra month, Adar Bet, is added. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, Chapter 4.

This is speaking about a situation in the era when the court established the new months based on the testimony of witnesses. In that era, there was no fixed calendar and a leap year could be declared in the middle of the year.
Alternatively, it could also apply in the present era when neither the renter nor the borrower knew that a year was a leap year. This interpretation is supported by the fact that this law is mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 312:15) although we have long since adopted a fixed calendar.

I.e., he is allowed to live in the house for the same price as agreed upon, although another month is added to the year.

The tenant must pay the rent month by month even though he will have paid for thirteen months throughout the year.

And the tenant must pay for the extra month.

Since both months and years are mentioned, a doubt arises and we follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from its owner, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.”

Despite the fact that the owner rented it out, the ultimate right of possession is his.

Since the land belongs to its owner, he is granted the benefit of the right of possession. The tenant must prove any claims he has against the owner by producing a legal document or witnesses that support his claim.
A different rule applies with regard to movable property. In such an instance, the person who is in actual possession of the property is given the upper hand with regard to most disputes when doubt arises.

I.e., based on the same principle (Maggid Mishneh).

But rather indefinitely, on a month-to-month basis. Hence, the owner does not have the right to force him to move without giving him adequate warning, as the Rambam states in Chapter 6, Halachot 7-8.

He must produce a receipt or witnesses who state that he paid the rent. The rationale for this ruling is that the rent is not due until the conclusion of the rental period. There is a chazzakah, a prevailing assumption, that the tenant did not pay before his rent was due.
The Ra’avad explains that the intent is not necessarily 30 days. Instead, the intent is that the owner’s word is accepted until the conclusion of the rental agreement. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would also accept this ruling, and mentions 30 days, because we assume the rental was for such a length of time if no other stipulation was made.

Because of the chazzakah mentioned above, the owner is not required to take an oath before collecting the rent. Nevertheless, in respect of the tenant’s claim, this provisional ban of ostracism is issued.
With regard to a promissory note, [in contrast to the Rambam,] the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 78) rules that even if the debtor claims to have paid the debt before it becomes due, the creditor must take a sh’vuat hesset before collecting the debt. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 317:3 differentiates between the two instances, explaining that there are some people who will repay a loan before it is due, but it is totally out of the ordinary to pay rent before it is due. Siftei Cohen 317:2 accepts the distinction between the two cases, but offers a different rationale.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim (ibid.) states that the tenant may employ both measures: have a ban of ostracism issued and lodge a separate claim.

For Bava Metzia 102b indicates that it is customary for some tenants to pay as soon as the rent is due. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 317:4 states that this law applies even if the owner demanded payment at the beginning of the day.

E. g., witnesses who were with him the entire time and will testify that he did not receive payment.

The last day of the Jewish year.

And the witnesses to the contract have died and no one else is able to clarify the matter [Tur (Choshen Mishpat 317)].

This ruling follows the principle stated in Halachah 2, that the land is considered to be the property of its owner, and he is granted the upper hand when a doubt arises.

With the intent of benefiting from its produce.

I.e., the owner of the orchard took a loan and entrusted the orchard to the creditor, with the proviso that the value of the produce reaped each year be deducted from the debt. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, 6:7-8.

To the point that it no longer produces fruit before the time of the rental or the security is completed. As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 4, even though a field becomes dried out, the renter is still required to pay his rent.

Which becomes the property of the owner of the orchard.

The Ra’avad maintains that the prohibition against taking interest is not relevant to this instance, and the prohibition against taking the wood stems from other factors.

Therefore, they must sell the trees and purchase a field, as explained.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the creditor may not take the trees as payment for the debt, because - if he did so - the produce that he reaped until then would be considered to be interest. The debtor - the owner of the orchard - may not take the trees and pay the debt from other sources, for then the creditor's benefit would be considered to be interest. The Maggid Mishneh, however, is not satisfied with the latter explanation.

Literally, the owner of the produce.

Before the owner of the land called him to court.

In this instance, we do not follow the principle that in questions involving landed property, the benefit of the doubt is given to the owner of the land. The rationale is that in this instance, it is possible to clarify to whom the produce belongs through the testimony of the witnesses to the legal document. Accordingly, we do not expropriate the produce from the tenant and award it to the owner. For it is possible that later, when the witnesses come, we will have to expropriate the produce from the owner and award it to the tenant. In order to prevent the possibility of such unnecessary legal procedure, we do not expropriate the produce at the outset (Bava Metzia 110a).
From this explanation, the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 317) concludes that if the witnesses die or in some way would certainly be unable ever to testify, the produce is awarded to the owner of the land.

Who derives benefit from land given to him as security.

Once a person uses a property for three years and derives benefit from it, his word is accepted if he claims to have purchased it from the previous owner (Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 11:2).

And the claims will be verified on the basis of it.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on the principle of miggo - i.e., if the defendant desired to lie, he could have told a more effective lie. Instead of claiming that the property was rented to him for five years, he could have claimed that it was sold to him.
On this basis, the Maggid Mishneh [and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 317:4)] state that this law applies only when there are no witnesses to the original rental agreement or the owner did not tell people that the property had been rented from him within the first three years. If there were witnesses, the principle of miggo does not apply - for the tenant could not claim that he purchased the property. Hence, the decision would be made in favor of the owner, as in other cases of doubt concerning landed property.

Bava Metzia lOlb mentions this principle with regard to an instance where a man asked a woman to rent him a place to store his wine. She refused. He then asked her to marry him. She consented and then allowed him to store the wine. He then returned home and divorced her. She hired porters and ordered them to take the wine to the market place and paid them from the sale of the wine.

He may leave it there in the market place without caring for it. He may not, however, break the containers in which it is held (Chavot Yeir, Responsa 165).

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 319:2 states that the Rambam maintains that after taking the produce out to the market place, the watchman is obligated to notify the owner. If he does not notify him and the owner of the produce suffers a loss, the watchman is liable. According to the Sefer Me’irat Einayim, the Rambam’s opinion is accepted by the other authorities.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 319:1) differs and maintains that according to the Rambam, the watchman is not obligated to notify the owner of the produce at all and is not liable if he suffers a loss. The Ramah maintains, however, that Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the owner of the property must notify the court before removing the produce. All authorities agree that it is pious conduct to notify the owner of the produce first.

And buys bread from a baker rather than makes his own bread from flour. This explanation and the interpretation of the halachah are based on the gloss of Sefer Me'irat Einayim 318:3.

I.e., it is a situation where one person (the owner) benefits - i.e., he receives the rent for his property - and the (the renter) does not lose, for what difference does it make to him whether he is grinding for the owner or for someone else. Accordingly, our Sages required the renter to provide this benefit to the owner.
Not doing so is associated with the people of Sodom. For they were renowned for their selfishness and lack of consideration of others.

According to the Rambam, the owner may terminate the rental contract. According to Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, he does not have this privilege (Sefer Me’irat Einayim, loc. cit.).