Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

If the husband dies she is not divorced, because a divorce must take effect before death. If the get is destroyed, she is not divorced because it is the get that serves as the medium of divorce, and at the time when the get must take effect, it no longer exists.

The public domain was a marketplace with pillars on either side. At the side of the pillars, there was space that though ownerless, could be used to acquire property, because it was not common for people to walk in that space.

The Maggid Mishneh, the Kessef Mishneh and others contrast the Rambam’s ruling here, that the divorce is not retroactively effective from the time the husband gave the get, to his ruling in Hilchot Mechirah 2:9. That source states that a sale can be effective when made with the stipulation that it take effect after 30 days, only when the stipulation is that it take effect retroactively. The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the two instances, explaining that a sale requires an act of contract to bring about a transfer, and that act took place when the sale was originally made, not 30 days afterwards. In contrast, with regard to a get, the fundamental aspect of the divorce is brought about by the writing of the get.

Had the get been placed by the woman in the public domain itself, it would not be effective even if it existed when the time specified by the husband arrived. Since it left the woman’s domain entirely, the giving of the get originally performed by the husband is no longer considered significant. And, as stated at the beginning of these laws, one of the requirements of a divorce is that the get be given to the woman by her husband.

I.e., in this instance as well, there is a resemblance to the laws of a conditional divorce. Nevertheless, since different wording is used, the laws vary.

Moreover, the action specified by the husband may be something that does not require anything to be done by his wife. For example, he may tell her that the divorce will take effect after the first rainfall (Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 3:3).

Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

Halachah 3. If the get is not in the woman’s possession at this time, the divorce is not effective according to the Rambam. Nevertheless, other authorities have a different conception of these laws, and according to them, the status of the divorce would be doubtful (Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 146:3).

For their relations are considered adulterous.

For he did not preface his statements by saying: ‘‘This is your get,’’ or ‘‘You are divorced....’’ Hence, he is not considered to have given the get for the sake of divorce. Although such an intent could be deduced from his words, since his statements were not explicit, they are of no consequence.

I.e., he desires that the get not take effect until a specific time, but does not want the restrictions mentioned in the previous halachah to apply. This is not merely a theoretical situation. Such gittin were given frequently in previous generations when a man undertook an overseas journey and wished to spare his wife from having to remain unmarried if he was killed, kidnapped by pirates or in other ways prevented from returning against his will.

Gittin 30a cites an example of a man who divorced his wife on condition that he not return within 30 days. A river washed away the bridge leading to his city. Although he stood on the river banks and called to his townsmen: ‘‘See, I have returned,’’ our Sages ruled that he is not considered to have returned, and they considered the divorce binding.

According to Scriptural Law, a person who is prevented from fulfilling a condition by forces beyond his control is not considered as having failed to fulfill it. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the laws of divorce are an exception to this principle, because modest women might presume that their husbands were prevented from fulfilling their condition by forces beyond their control and never remarry (Ketubot 2b). The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinion of Tosafot (Ketubot 2b) and others, who state that this principle applies only with regard to events beyond mortal control that one could possibly foresee — e.g., illness or flood. It does not apply with regard to events beyond a person’s control that are totally unlikely — e.g., earthquakes. The Maggid Mishneh cites statements by the Rambam in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 19, which indicate that he would also accept this restriction.

As will be explained, this law applies when the husband stated ‘‘on condition that...’’ when giving the get.

Since ultimately the condition was fulfilled.

If he entered into privacy with her, the get would be nullified. See Chapter 3, Halachah 5; Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

In such an instance, if the woman were to say that she never agreed to her husband’s spending more than 30 days away from her, the get would be effective after the condition is fulfilled.

The husband gave his wife the get because he was going away on a journey and knew that she would not desire to be alone. If he was able to appease her and she was willing to remain alone for 30 days, he is able to nullify the get. Usually, once a get is given ‘‘on condition that...,’’ it cannot be nullified once it has been given. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the condition was made for the sake of the woman, if she is willing to forego seeing her husband, the husband may nullify the get (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., according to Scriptural Law, since the condition was fulfilled, and there is no evidence that the couple resolved their differences, the get is binding. Our Sages, nevertheless, disqualified the get for the reasons stated above.

Hence, the divorce is unacceptable.

And we assume that because of their familiarity, he knows how to appease her, and she is more willing to accept his overtures.

The Rambam’s decision is based on his interpretation of Gittin 76b. The Ra’avad interprets that passage more stringently and requires the husband to have accepted his wife’s statements as to whether or not he came as binding. Otherwise, we suspect that he came in secrecy. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:7) follows the Rambam’s view, but states that a priori, it is customary to include the condition mentioned by the Ra’avad.

If she desires to marry within the twelve months, she must undergo the rite of chalitzah first.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:8) quotes the Rashba, who states that even if a sick person does not specify that he die from the illness afflicting him, we assume that this is his intent.

I.e., the advantage of such a get would be to free his wife of the obligation of yibbum or chalitzah. Similarly, the subsequent halachot refer to gittin given for this purpose.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling. He maintains that the date of the get indicates that the husband desires that the get take effect retroactively. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:1) quotes the Rambam’s view, but mentions a minority opinion that takes the Ra’avad’s view into consideration.

The Hagahot Maimoniot quote Rabbenu Tam as stating that it is preferable for the person to say: ‘‘from the present time,’’ rather than ‘‘from the present day,’’ lest he die before the conclusion of the day. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:2) quotes this suggestion.

Therefore, if childless, she must perform the rite of chalitzah before marrying, and may not perform the rite of yibbum. As stated in Hilchot Ishut 18:25, such a woman is not entitled to receive support from her husband’s estate after his death.

For the get does not become effective until the morning. Since he died beforehand, a get cannot be effective after death.

For a get given ‘‘on the condition that’’ becomes effective retroactively from the time it was originally given, once the condition is fulfilled.

A get given according to the rules of conditional agreements is not effective until the condition is fulfilled.

As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:14, when a person who is mortally ill gives away all of his property as a present and then recovers, the present is automatically retracted, for we assume that his intent was solely to distribute his property after his death.

Thus, the two laws are in direct contradiction. A present given by a dying man does not take effect until after he dies and a divorce that he grants cannot take effect after he dies.

For the condition that he stated was not fulfilled (Gittin 73a).

On the one hand, he did not arise from his sickbed. On the other hand, there is reason to assume that his intent was that he is giving the get on the condition that he die from the illness afflicting him and this was not the case (Gittin 73a).

This applies even if he walks in the marketplace without any support. Since he did not regain his health entirely, it is necessary to determine whether or not he died from the first illness. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:26.

Note the Beit Shmuel 145:14, who states that, according to the Rambam, the man must still be afflicted with the first illness when he dies for the divorce to be effective. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:27.

I.e., he has none of the privileges of a husband — e.g., he is not entitled to her earnings, he may not nullify her vows, and if he is a priest, he may not become impure because of her in the event of her death. With regard to paying for the woman’s support, most authorities maintain that the husband is liable. There is no explicit statement from the Rambam regarding this issue.

In such an instance, we suspect that the couple may have engaged in marital relations and the husband nullified the get beforehand.

I.e., the requirement is not that the positive factor be stated first, but that it be stated before the negative factor. This is accomplished by restating the condition that would negate the get.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that fromhis previous decisions, it appears that unless the man says that the get will take effect retroactively me’achshav, ‘‘from this time onward,’’ the get is not effective, because it does not take effect until after the man’s death. Apparently, the Rambam maintains that the restatement of the condition resolves that difficulty, but this concept is not accepted by many other authorities. When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:5) quotes the Rambam’s wording, but adds the word me’achshav.

I.e., the colleague was not appointed by the wife to serve as an agent to receive the get. The husband appointed him as her agent, because he felt that she would not desire to marry her yavam. According to Torah law, one may perform an action on a person’s behalf without his knowledge if it is to his advantage — e.g., one may take possession of an ownerless object on behalf of a colleague without asking him. Hence, it is possible to assume that the agent can act on behalf of the woman without her knowledge (Yevamot 118b).

Because by writing it within this time, they deviated from the instructions with which they were charged (Gittin 76b).

I.e., although the wording of the Hebrew original could possibly be interpreted otherwise, the commentaries agree that the Rambam’s intent is that the get may be written immediately after the time specified and should not be written after a prolonged period has elapsed from that time.

The get is unacceptable because the husband’s words also imply a restriction, that the get should be written directly afterwards and not after a prolonged period.

The Rambam is referring to his statements in Chapter 8, Halachah 2. There, however, he uses the expression, ‘‘the status of the get is in doubt.’’

The commentaries question the Rambam’s decision, explaining that although there is a possibility that the couple engaged in marital relations and the husband consecrated her at that time (see Chapter 10, Halachah 18), it is also possible that this did not take place. Indeed, in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, with reference to a get given by a husband after he entered into privacy with his wife, the Rambam rules that after the fact, the get is acceptable.
[It is possible to differentiate between the two instances, because in that halachah, the husband himself gave the woman the get. This is a greater indication that he did not nullify it (Maggid Mishneh). Even after that explanation, however, the Rambam’s ruling in this halachah raises questions.]
When referring to this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:7) accepts the ruling that at the outset, the witnesses should not have such a get written, but follows the ruling of the Ramban and the Rashba, who maintain that if they had the get written and gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

This is the ruling according to Scriptural Law. See, however, Halachah 28.

There are many authorities who object to this ruling, maintaining that the scribe cannot sign as a witness to the get. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that even the Rambam agrees that at the outset, a scribe should not sign as a witness. After the fact, however, the Rambam maintains that his signature does not disqualify the get. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:18), Rav Yosef Caro writes: ‘‘One should be careful not to have the scribe sign as a witness, because there are authorities who disqualify this.’’

I.e., speaking to the people, he said: ‘‘One, two, three, four, write a get...’’ (Chelkat Mechokek 120:18).

According to the Rambam, it appears that not only must the signatures of the acceptable witnesses be first chronologically, but they must also appear first on the get. Other authorities do not make this requirement and maintain that it is only chronological precedence that is significant (Beit Shmuel 120:14).

The two witnesses whose signatures are required must sign the get on the day that it was written (Chapter 1, Halachah 25).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:9) states that they may sign the get to fulfill the condition even after it was given to the woman. The Rama adds that this may be done even after she has remarried.

Tosafot and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities differ and maintain that for the get to be valid, all the witnesses must be acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:10) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. The Rama follows Tosafot’s ruling.

Because the instructions that the husband gave concerning the get were not fulfilled.

See Hilchot Edut 5:6-7, which states that if persons who are unacceptable as witnesses signed a legal document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is disqualified, even if two acceptable witnesses signed it first. If, however, the persons who were unacceptable did not sign the document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is acceptable, even if the signature of the unacceptable person appears first.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15. With regard to other legal documents, the witnesses who sign the contract are of paramount importance, and they must all therefore be acceptable. The witnesses who observe its transfer are less significant. But with regard to gittin, it is the witnesses who observe the transfer who are of primary importance. Therefore, if the initial two signatures to the get are acceptable, we are not concerned with those who sign subsequently (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Edut).

These rules were instituted lest the husband tell a group of people that they all should write, sign or bring a get, and they not appreciate that they were all charged with this responsibility. Lest some of them fail to discharge this responsibility and thus cause the get to be void, our Sages required that whenever many people are instructed to be involved in a get, they all must take full participatory roles.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 24, based on Gittin 10b. If the witnesses do not sign in each other’s presence, the get is unacceptable (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 130:13).

The father and the son may not both sign as witnesses, because witnesses may not be related to each other.

The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s interpretation of Gittin 63b. Significantly, the standard published texts of the Talmud available to us follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s version. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:36) follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s conception and rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt. (See the notes of the Beit Shmuel 141:99, which explain the Rambam’s interpretation.)

And thus the get is not signed by witnesses.

According to the Rambam (Chapter 6, Halachah 4), the appointment of such an agent need not be observed by witnesses.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 24.

As long as there are witnesses who observe the transfer of the get, the agent’s actions are considered to be equivalent to those of the husband himself. Hence, just as a get given by the husband is acceptable after the fact if its transfer was observed by witnesses, even if the get was not signed, this same ruling applies when his agent gives the get.

For the wording the husband used implies that he is stipulating that the get must be given in that place.

From the contrast with the following clause, the Beit Shmuel 141:63 and others rule that, in this instance, the get is binding if it is given after that date. Note, however, the Mishneh LaMelech who differs and rules that the divorce is disqualified by the Sages.

By accepting the get from the agent in the place she receives it, the woman shows that she is not particular about where she receives it (Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 6, Halachah 4). The Rambam’s ruling indicates a slight textual difference from the popular version of Gittin 6:3, the source for this halachah. There is, however, no difference in principle between them.

If, however, the agent is not prevented from discharging his agency, he should not charge another person with that responsibility. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 4 and notes.)

For it is likely that he would not desire that anyone other than the person he designated be given his article to guard.

Since the second agent did not deviate from the husband’s instructions, the get is acceptable despite the fact that a person other than the one appointed by the husband gave the get to the woman.
Rabbenu Asher rules that even if the second agent takes the article before giving the woman the get, the divorce is not effective. Although Rabbenu Asher’s ruling is also mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:51) appears to follow the Rambam’s decision.

I.e., the husband was in effect saying, ‘‘Make sure you get the article before you give her the get.’’ Since the agent did not fulfill these instructions, the divorce is not valid. See the Beit Shmuel 141:66, who quotes opinions that state that if the husband’s wording does not indicate that he definitely wants the agent to secure possession of the article before giving the get, the divorce is binding.

For in this instance, there is no obvious advantage to the principal in having the agent give the get first.
As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Ramban differs and maintains that for thedivorce to be binding the woman must give the agent the article first.

According to the Rambam, the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives the woman the get. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 31, other opinions differ and maintain that in this instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

Needless to say, the second agent should not give the woman the get until the original 30 days have passed.
Rav Meir HaLevi states that we suspect that the first agent will not convey these instructions clearly to the second agent. Therefore, the first agent should entrust the get to the court, which will appoint a second agent after the 30 days have passed. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:37) mentions this view, it appears that the Rambam’s view is favored.

See Halachot 10 and 11.

See Halachah 9.