Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

See Halachah 2 of that chapter, which explains that there are four rules that govern all conditional agreements: a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement]; b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect; c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the action that one desires to make conditional; d) the stipulation must be something with which it is possible to comply. If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there were no condition at all.

This is relevant if the couple is childless and the woman is obligated to fulfill either the rite of yibbum or of chalitzah.

With regard to the first clause, a get can be effective only when the husband granting the divorce is still alive. If he dies, the marriage bonds are already rent by his death. With regard to the latter clause, since the get takes effect only when the condition is fulfilled, the get itself must be intact at that time. If it is not, there is no medium through which the divorce takes effect (see Gittin 74a).

Lest the husband die or the get be destroyed, and thus the divorce be nullified.

The Rambam’s ruling is clarified by his statements in Chapter 9, Halachah 5, in which he states that a conditional divorce begins when the get is given and is not concluded until the condition is fulfilled. This conception has aroused objections among the commentators who maintain that the woman is like any other married woman until the condition is fulfilled. She cannot be consecrated, and marital relations with her are considered adulterous.

E. g., her husband made a condition that she give an article to his father and his father dies.

I.e., the husband uses this expression rather than saying: ‘‘If you do such-and-such, the divorce is effective. If you do not do such-and-such, the divorce is not effective.’’ The Rama (Even HaEzer 144:3) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4) mention opinions that do not equate ‘‘on the condition that’’ with ‘‘from now onwards.’’

The Rama (Even HaEzer 143:2) quotes opinions that maintain that even when a condition is stated using the wording ‘‘on the condition that,’’ the husband has the right to nullify the get until the condition is fulfilled.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this ruling and declares that the woman should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled. There is, however, one exception: a condition that requires the woman to refrain from performing a particular activity before the divorce takes effect.

I.e., we do not suspect that she will fail to do what is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of her second marriage because of the severe consequences this will bring upon her.

For entering into privacy with a woman in the presence of witnesses is considered equivalent to actual relations. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 18.)

See Chapter 10, Halachah 19, which explains that when there is a possibility that a man has had marital relations with his divorcee, we assume that he consecrated her again, rather than conducting these relations in a licentious manner. (See also Chapter 9, Halachah 25.)

This is unacceptable, as explained in the following halachah.

See the Beit Shmuel 147:1, which states that in a situation of difficulty in which the husband cannot wait until the get is written, we rely on more lenient views that differ with the Rambam. According to these views, the husband may instruct the scribe and the witnesses to write a get in the usual manner and to give it to the agent and before it is written, instruct the agent to give it to the woman conditionally.

I.e., a condition that is acceptable (Beit Shmuel 147:2).

I.e., the man’s name, the woman’s name, the date and the sentence: ‘‘Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man,’’ as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 17.

I.e., using acceptable wording, as opposed to the wording described in the following halachah.

This ruling is questioned by the commentaries. Gittin 84b states that such a get is pasul, ‘‘unacceptable.’’ Unlike the Rambam, for whom this term has an explicit meaning (see Chapter 10, Halachah 20), in the Talmud, the interpretation of the term is somewhat ambiguous. In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that since — as mentioned in the previous halachah — the difficulty concerns a point of Scriptural Law, and yet the Talmud did not rule the get to be void, he maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam interprets the ruling as dependent on the principle of bereirah, that retroactively, when the condition is fulfilled, it becomes apparent that the get did sever the connection between the husband and the wife. Since our Sages did not determine whether or not the principle of bereirah applies with regard to questions of Scriptural Law, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Other authorities differ and maintain that if the condition was stated properly before the essential portion of the get was written and fulfilled, the get is acceptable. If the condition was written in the get itself, Tosafot, the Ramban and the Ra’avad maintain that the get is acceptable, while Rabbenu Nissim states that such a get is deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic decree.
At the outset, all the authorities maintain that the rules stated by the Rambam should be followed. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 147:2) also quotes the Rambam’s ruling that the status of the divorce is in doubt. In a case of hardship, however, the Beit Shmuel 147:2 states that the more lenient views can be relied upon.

Needless to say, according to the Rambam, when any of the following conditions is binding, it invalidates the get if it was made or stated before the essential portion of the get was written. The difference between these conditions and those stated in the previous halachah is that those conditions can be fulfilled through a specific activity, and once they are fulfilled the marriage bond is severed entirely. The conditions mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, remain binding throughout the woman’s life. Thus, her connection to her husband is never severed entirely.
The authorities which differ with the Rambam in the previous halachah, also differ in this instance, and maintain that if this condition is written in the get itself, the get is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, but disqualified by Rabbinic decree. See Beit Shmuel 137:3.

Because of the prohibitions involved, there is no possibility of the woman’s establishing a marriage bond with these individuals (see Hilchot Ishut 4:14-15), and therefore, her husband’s statements are of no consequence.

Note, however, Chapter 10, Halachah 1. Rabbenu Nissim and other authorities rule more leniently and maintain that such a get is acceptable according to Scriptural Law and was deemed unacceptable only by virtue of Rabbinic decree.

In such instances, even though marital relations violate a prohibition, a marriage bond can be established (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).

For ultimately, the minor will attain majority. Rabbenu Chanan’el differs and states that with regard to a minor, the status of the divorce is doubtful. The difference of opinion is dependent on the text of Gittin 85b, of which two versions exist.

In all these cases, the divorce does not totally sever the relationship between the husband and the wife. Nevertheless, our Sages were not certain that the rights retained by the husband were sufficient to render the divorce void.

I.e., the husband is a priest, and while married his wife may partake of terumah, although she is the daughter of an Israelite.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an instance where the husband takes the get back from the woman and gives it to her again, making the latter statement. This conception is also reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:1).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 137) differs with the Rambam and maintains that in this instance the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps the intent of his latter statement was to permit her to Reuven and Shimon, but to forbid her to everyone else. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:4) accepts the Tur’s ruling. All authorities agree that if the husband says: ‘‘You are also permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon,’’ the get is acceptable.

Rabbenu Asher and the Rashba differ and maintain that in such an instance, the divorce is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:5) follows the view of Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.

There is a factor, the prohibition against drinking wine, that always maintains the connection between them.

The Rashba differs with this ruling, explaining that since the other person may die, this can be compared to an instance where the husband makes a condition that his wife not drink wine during the duration of another person’s life. Just as that condition is considered to be having a limit, so too, should this condition be considered to be limited.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro defends the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that in the instance at hand, the woman will never be able to marry the man specified in the condition. As such, the condition is not considered limited. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:22), he quotes both opinions and states that the stringencies required by both views should be observed.

I.e., the condition is one that binds a woman to her husband for her entire life.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum of the Rashbatz that states that the intent is that the marriage will be forbidden for a period longer than the woman is expected to live. Thus, though the husband has in effect prohibited the woman from marrying the other man forever, since this is not explicitly stated, the condition is considered to be limited in scope.

According to the Rambam, it appears that the woman is free to marry another man immediately, for we assume that she will abide by the condition, rather than place herself in a compromising situation. There are, however, other opinions that state that she is not allowed to remarry until the person specified dies. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:16) quotes both opinions without appearing to favor either one.

I.e., it is considered as if the original marriage bond had never been severed. Any children born to her between the divorce and its nullification are deemed illegitimate.

This would compromise the entire image of Jewish divorce. (See Rashi, Gittin 84a.)

The requirement for the woman’s second husband to divorce her is a Rabbinic decree, instituted lest people see a woman who appears married leave her husband without a get. According to Scriptural Law, a get is not necessary (Maggid Mishneh).

Since the husband maintains possession of the paper on which the get is written, the couple’s marriage relationship has not been totally severed. Rashi (Gittin 75b) offers a different interpretation of this ruling.

When she receives the get, the paper belongs to her. Afterwards, she willingly gives it back. This follows the principle that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered to be a valid present (Rashi, Gittin 20b).

Gittin 20b explains that the fact that the same article serves two purposes — bringing about the divorce and providing remuneration for the woman’s marriage contract — does not prevent it from being effective.

Since the get was written in an unacceptable manner, there is reason to maintain that the get can never be acceptable. This applies when the unacceptable condition was written before the essential portion of the get.
The wording used by the Rambam is, however, questionable. The Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 9:1) and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on this halachah use the word pasul ‘‘unacceptable,’’ rather than ‘‘the status of the divorce is in doubt’’ to describe such a get. Perhaps here, the Rambam uses the term ‘‘the status of the divorce is in doubt,’’ because, as cited above from the Rambam’s responsa, according to the Rambam, the question in these situations is whether the get is written for the sake of severing the marriage bond. And a question of Scriptural Law is involved (Rav Kapach).

The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to a condition stated after the essential portion of the get was written. If such a condition was stated before the essential portion was written, the get is unacceptable, because it was not written with the intent of severing the marriage relationship. See Halachah 4 and notes.

The Sages decreed that unless the get is returned, it not effective, even if the condition was nullified. Since the original giving of such a get has a permanent effect — the woman is forbidden to marry a priest (or to remain married to her husband, if he is a priest), as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 1 — the only way such a condition can be nullified is by returning the get to the husband, and having him give it again without any condition.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to an instance where the condition was stated in a twofold statement: ‘‘If you do such-and-such, the get is effective, but if you do not do such-and-such, the get is not effective.’’ In such instances, since the divorce is not effective until the condition is fulfilled, the husband may alter the condition. When, however, a get is given ‘‘on condition that...,’’ the divorce is retroactively effective from the time the get was given. Hence, the condition cannot be changed.
Rashi (Gittin 76a) offers a different interpretation of this passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:10) follows the Rambam’s interpretation, while the Rama follows that of Rashi.

For each of the conditions is considered to be a separate matter.

This ruling reflects an interesting halachic judgment on the Rambam’s part. Gittin 75b explains that the ruling cited by the Rambam was authored by Rav Ashi. Although the Gemara poses questions on Rav Ashi’s view that are left unresolved, since his position was not refuted, according to the Rambam, the halachah follows his view.
The Tur follows a different view and maintains that the woman must serve her husband’s father for the duration of the father’s life and nurse the son for the entire two-year period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Rama cites that of the Tur.

For the condition has not been fulfilled.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and states that since the woman did not prevent the condition from being fulfilled, the get is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) does not accept this view. The Rama states that the more stringent view should be followed.

As reflected in Halachah 23, a husband can nullify a condition that he makes to a get. In this instance, however, he is not nullifying the condition, but rather trying to have it satisfied in a way other than that which he originally intended. This is not acceptable; the divorce is not effective unless he nullifies the condition entirely (Gittin 74b; Maggid Mishneh).

Thus, if the husband dies without children, she is required to perform either the rites of yibbum or chalitzah.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and explains that the husband has the option of accepting the money in lieu of the object originally mentioned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:6) mentions both views, it appears to favor that of the Rambam.

I.e., he tells the woman, ‘‘This is your get; there are no conditions attached.’’ He does not have to take the get back from the woman.

The Beit Shmuel 146:5 states that this applies when the husband gave the get ‘‘on the condition that...,’’ for in such an instance the divorce is effective retroactively from the time the get was given. (With regard to other conditions, see the notes on Halachah 1.)

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s decision and maintains that since it was possible for the woman to have fulfilled the condition, we suspect that perhaps she did in fact fulfill it. Therefore, she is forbidden to remain married to her first husband. It is the Rambam’s view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4).