Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

In contrast to temporary blemishes which do not disqualify a firstborn animal from being sacrificed forever. (As long as the temporary blemish remains, however, the animal cannot be sacrificed.)

As stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:10, it is a mitzvah to redeem consecrated animals that became blemished.

I.e., whether in Eretz Yisrael or in the Diaspora.

Chapter 2.

For the firstborn offering applies only to male animals, a stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:6 states that there are 73 blemishes that disqualify an animal. However, six of them are not applicable to male animals.

Ibid.:8; these represent ailments that detract from the animal’s appearance, but not substantially enough to disqualify it.

Only then is it permitted to slaughter it.

lbid.:6-7.

I.e., a man or a woman performed a sexual act with it.

Were two witnesses to observe a human performing a sexual act with an animal or it killing a person, it should be executed. (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:17; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:1). In this instance, the testimony is not sufficient for that punishment.

Even though it was not actually worshiped.

It is considered unfit to be offered as a sacrifice.

Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:9.

Since it did not emerge through the womb, it is not given the status of a firstborn. Parallels to these rulings exist with regard to humans; see Hilchot Bikkurim UMatanot Kehunah 11:16.

Thus it cannot be considered as the firstborn.

I.e., it has both male and female genital organs.

I.e., it is not considered as a blemished firstborn, nor is there a doubt about its status. The rationale is that in this context, it is considered as an independent type of being (Bechorot 41a).

Activities forbidden for a firstborn (Hilchot Me’ilah 1:9).

I.e., a mound of flesh covers its genitals and its gender cannot be determined.

I.e., because of the possibility that it is a firstborn, work may not be performed with it and it must be left to pasture until it contracts a blemish that disqualifies it. Nevertheless, once it contracts such a blemish, there is no obligation to give it to a priest, for perhaps it is not a firstborn. On the contrary, we follow the principle that if someone (in this instance, a priest) desires to expropriate property (the firstborn) from another person (the owner), the burden of proof is on the former. Since he cannot prove that it is a firstborn, the owner is allowed to retain possession. See Chapter 5, Halachah 3.

The phrase could also be read as “the firstborn ox,” thus allowing for the interpretation cited by the Rambam. The verse continues to speak of “the firstborn of a sheep” and “the firstborn of a goat,” indicating that the same rule applies to these animals.

An offspring of a sheep that resembles a goat, or the offspring of a goat that resembles a sheep.

And must be given to a priest.

Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:5.

There is no obligation to redeem it as a donkey must be redeemed (Hilchot Bikkurim UMatanot Kehunah 12:18). The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Talmud derives both these concepts from the same verse and questions how the Rambam can accept both interpretations.

With regard to the permission to partake of such an animal, see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:4.

For a firstborn donkey must be redeemed by exchanging it for a lamb, as Exodus 13:13 states: “The first issue of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb. See Hilchot Bikkurim UMatanot Kehunah, ch. 12.

The rationale is that the same principle cited in note 21 in support of the owner can now be cited in support of the priest. Since there is a question regarding the animal’s status and it is not certain that it is a firstborn, a priest may not take it. On the other hand, once the priest took it, that argument can be reversed: It is not certain that it is not a firstborn and it is now in the possession of the priest. Therefore if someone (in this instance, the owner) desires to expropriate property (the firstborn) from another person (the priest), the burden of proof is on the former. Since he cannot prove that it is not a firstborn, the priest is allowed to retain possession.
Many have questioned the Rambam’s decision. Indeed, volumes have been written about this issue. With regard to practice, there is a difference of opinion regarding the matter between Sephardic and Ashkenazic authorities. The Sephardic authorities (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 315:1) follow the Rambam’s view and allow the priest to maintain possession. The Ashkenazic authorities (Tur, Rama, loc. cit.) follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who states that since the priest had no right to take the animal, it is expropriated from his possession.

Rashi (Bechorot 34a) interprets this as referring to a priest to whom the firstborn animal was given. It could, however, be understood as applying to an Israelite as well. He would prefer that the animal be blemished, so that he could give it to the priest and cease caring for it.

As stated in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 97) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 287) (see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:7), one of the Torah’s 365 prohibitions is causing a sacrificial animal to incur a blemish.

And not given the opportunity of benefiting from his transgression.

Compare to Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:5.

Compare to Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 7:4; Hilchot Shemitah 1:13; Hilchot Choveil 7:3.

See Halachah 12.

He did not give the gentile instructions, nor did he know what the gentile would do.

This is a decree, enacted as a safeguard so that a person will not perform an act that directly causes a firstborn to be blemished.

Indeed, the example given by the Rambam reflects a story that transpired concerning a firstborn owned by Rabbi Tzadok, one of the foremost Sages of the time. He protested that as a Sage, leniency should be granted him for he would never blemish a firstborn by hand. The Sages, however, did not accept his argument and prohibited him from slaughtering the animal.

And not at this immediate time.

Even though he intentionally kicked the animal, his intent was not to cause a blemish, but to prevent it from pursuing him.

Bechorot 5:3 relates that children were playing with animals and tied their tails together. The animals ran in opposite directions pulling the tail off an animal that happened to be a firstborn. The court ruled that the firstborn could be slaughtered. When the children heard the ruling and saw the owner was happy, they did the same to other firstborn animals. Since they purposefully acted to blemish the firstborn, those animals were not permitted to be slaughtered.

That same source relates that a gentile saw a firstborn animal that was not cared for and asked its owner why it was left in that condition. The owner explained that he was waiting for it to become blemished. The gentile then hacked its ear. The Sages ruled that it was permitted to slaughter it. When the gentile heard their decision and saw that the owner was happy, he blemished other firstborn animals. The Sages ruled that it was forbidden to slaughter them, because the gentile acted for the benefit of the Jews.

We have freely translated an idiom used by Bechorot 5:3, et al. It refers to a condition where the animal turns dark red and its temperature rises. If it is not treated quickly, it could die.

Even though the person intentionally let the animal’s blood, since he did not intentionally plan to blemish the animal, the Sages did not forbid making use of the animal.

I.e., while it is in its mother’s womb, one of its limbs may be maimed so that it will emerge blemished. Until the animal emerges from the womb, the sanctity of a firstborn animal is not conveyed upon it. Hence causing it to become blemished does not violate a Scriptural prohibition.

And in this way, the animal will be prevented from being offered as a sacrifice.

Although generally, second hand testimony is not accepted, leniency is granted in this instance, because all that is involved is a Rabbinic safeguard.

Whose testimony is not accepted according to Scriptural Law and even with regard to almost all questions of Rabbinic Law.

This is also somewhat of a leniency, because besides the fact that only one person is involved, a shepherd is often not acceptable as a witness.

We do not suspect that the shepherd will perform the transgression of blemishing an animal so that it will be ordinary property in the priest’s possession and perhaps, the priest will give him a portion (Rav Yosef Corcus).

I.e., during the time the firstborn is kept in its owner’s possession, before it is given to the priest. See Chapter I, Halachah 14.

The Rambam’s decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 314:2. The Ashkenazic authorities (Tur, Rama, Zoe. cit.) follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that the word of a shepherd who is a priest can also be accepted. Since we see that the word of a priest’s own family is accepted with regard to such matters (see the following halachah), certainly, the priest’s word should be accepted in this instance. The Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus explain the Rambam’s interpretation of Bechorot 35a and in that manner, substantiate his ruling.

I.e., that one will testify on behalf of the other at a later date. This reflects a general principle applicable in other contexts; see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 18:17, 20:11; Hilchot Ma’aser 12:7.

The Kessef Mishneh suggests that the word “all” is included to refer even to priests who are Torah scholars and observant with regard to other matters.

Even though this involves the violation of a transgression.

From the Rambam’s words, it appears that this suspicion applied even in the era of the Temple. Although the firstborn would be given to the priests in all instances, it was suspected that the priests would rather partake of it as ordinary meat, than take the trouble to bring to -Jerusalem and offer it as a sacrifice.

This also is a general principle applicable in other contexts; see Hilchot Ma’aser 12:17.

See Hilchot Edut 13:6.

His word is accepted as stated in Halachah 15.

And was not brought about with the knowledge of the priest.

An expert who is knowledgeable whether a blemish is permanent or not, as explained in the following chapter. Rav Yosef Corcus states that it is not necessary for the priest to name the expert who rendered the lenient ruling. Mentioning the identity of the expert would be sufficient to permit the slaughter of the animal in its own right. Nevertheless, since the priest is not suspect to violate the severe transgression of slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple Courtyard, there is no need for the expert’s name to be mentioned.
This perspective is not accepted by all authorities. Rabbenu Asher differs and requires that the name of the expert be stated. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 314:7) follows the Rambam’s perspective and does not make such a stipulation, Although the Tur (op. cit.) follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher, the Rama does not mention that view.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:2-4; see also Hilchot Shegagot 1:2-4. Although Halachah 17 states 11 priest is suspect of causing a firstborn to become blemished, that transgression is not punishable by karet. Hence that ruling is more stringent.

Rav Yosef Corcus states that it would appear that it _is necessary for the priest to mention the name of the Israelite who gave him the firstborn animal. Otherwise, it is not that likely that the matter would be revealed. He states, however, that there is no indication in the Rambam’s words that this is in fact necessary. He explains that perhaps no such requirement was made, because people will have known who was the owner of the firstborn, because it was in his possession for several weeks.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro notes this issue and states that Rabbenu Asher differs and requires that the Israelite be named. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 314:8), he quotes the Rambam’s ruling. In this instance, as well, although the Tur (op. cit.) follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher, the Rama does not mention that view.

See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 3:14; Hilchot Gerushin 12:15; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 3:5, where this rationale is also stated.