Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

This term is used because of the contrast to the adjustable guilt-offering mentioned in Chapter 10.

Those mentioned in Chapter 1. In contrast, one is not liable for a provisional guilt-offering if he is unsure whether he violated those transgressions for which a definitive guilt-offering is brought, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 5.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 70) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 128) include this commandment in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

I.e., it shields him from Divine retribution, but does not bring complete atonement (Rav Yosef Corcus).

The measure for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

I.e., he definitely partook of a forbidden substance. His doubt is whether or not he partook of a measure sufficient to require a sacrifice.

I.e., he was certain that a forbidden substance was present; he was unsure whether or not he partook of it.

Who is in a state of ritual purity. See Halachah 5.

With whom he is forbidden to be intimate.

Rav Yosef Corcus questions the Rambam’s ruling, for although it is always forbidden to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, it is difficult to say that the prohibition is established, because on a weekday, there is no prohibition. He explains that the intent is that the person performed a forbidden labor in the twilight hours (bein hashamashot) of Saturday night. In this instance, we are unsure whether that time is considered as part of the Sabbath or part of the weekday.

This is the version found in the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text (and the version possessed by the Kessef Mishneh) reads “He performed a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, but did not know which category of forbidden labor he performed.”
According to the version in our translation, there is a definite prohibition, because the prohibition against forbidden labor on the Sabbath is constant and the person is unaware whether he committed a prohibition. According to the standard published text, he is certain he performed a forbidden labor, but since he does not know which forbidden labor he performed, he is not able to bring a sin-offering in atonement and hence, should mitigate his guilt with this offering. Based on Halachah 5, the commentaries question the version of the standard text. Seemingly, if the person knows that he performed a transgression, he is not able to bring a provisional guilt-offering.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:13, the Rambam defines this term as “A hybrid that comes from the mating of a kosher domesticated animal and a kosher wild beast.” In his gloss to Hilchot Bikkurim 9:5, Rav Yosef Caro explains that the Rambam understands the term ko’i as referring to an independent species that we do not know whether to classify as a domesticated animal or as a wild beast. He maintains that the proper version of Hilchot Ma’achalat Assurot is “any animal whose classification as a domesticated animal or as a beast is doubtful is a ko’i” and he maintains that Hilchat Shechitah 14:4 serves as proof of this interpretation.

It is not known whether such an animal is classified as a beast, whose fat is permitted, or a domesticated animal, whose fat is forbidden.

With regard to a man who is intimate with a woman who is unsure whether she is married or not, see the following halachah.

As stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:14, according to the Rambam [i.e., this stringency is not required by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 186:1)], a woman should carry out an internal examination before and after intimacy to make sure that she did not menstruate during intimacy. If she carried out such an examination and discovered blood, but did so after waiting more than the time it takes to stretch her hand under the pillow to take an examination cloth (see Chapter 5, Halachah 6), we are unsure whether a transgression was involved or not. For it is possible that she did not begin to menstruate until after relations were completed.

His brother’s childless widow whom he is obligated to marry, as stated in Deuteronomy, ch. 25; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah, ch. 1.

A woman is required to wait this amount of time to remarry after she is divorced or widowed in order that no question will arise regarding the parenthood of her offspring. For we assume that within three months, it will be apparent whether the woman has conceived or not.

Since the woman was forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, the prohibition against intimacy with her is considered to have been established. Hence until it is definitely clear that she is not pregnant, the brother who is alive is forbidden to engage in relations with her. On the other hand, since it is not definitively known that the offspring is his brother’s, he cannot be required to bring a sin-offering.

If the woman conceived the child with her first husband before his passing, the prohibition against the man marrying his brother’s wife remains in effect and every time, he is intimate with her, the couple transgress. If she conceived with her second husband, their relationship is permitted.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that Yevamot 35b appears to state that a provisional guilt-offering is required in such an instance, but explains that, according to the Ram barn, that passage does not reflect the halachah. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 4:2).

The simple explanation is that once the first witness testifies, it is considered as if the prohibition has been established. Hence the second witness’s testimony cannot override that. It can, however, be explained that this principle is accepted as a given. Here we are speaking about a situation where both witnesses testify at the same time. Nevertheless, since one witness testifies that the fat is forbidden, it is considered as if the prohibition has been established (Tosafot, Keritot 11 b).

Who is not acceptable as a witness.

Although neither are acceptable witnesses, the testimony of the first is considered powerful enough to establish the identity of the object. For a woman's testimony is significant with regard to matters involving the Torah's prohibitions (Sifra, Parshas Vayikra).

If, however, the person contradicts or supports the statement of the witness and maintains that the fat was permitted or forbidden, he is not liable for a provisional guilt-offering.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this issue, maintaining that since there were conflicting testimonies at the outset, the existence of the prohibited substance is not considered to have been established. He offers one possible solution: the first witness told the person that he partook of forbidden fat together with permitted fat and the second witness stated that he partook only of permitted fat. The Kessef Mishneh states that it is possible that the Rambam also had that intent, but it is more likely that the Rambam maintains that the same law applies even if the lack of agreement between the witnesses’ testimony concerns only one piece of fat. Rav Yosef Caro debates both possibilities.

Thus it had been established that she was forbidden to other men.

In which instance the prohibition against relations no longer applies.

Since it was originally established that the woman was married, we continue operating under this proposition. Although the testimony of one witness is sufficient to enable a woman to remarry, that is when there are no other witnesses who contradict him. Similarly, in Hilchot Gerushin 12:19, the Rambam writes that in such a situation, a woman cannot remain married to her second husband.

It had been established that the woman had been married and thus forbidden to others. The question is whether that prohibition was lifted because of divorce. See Hilchot Gerushin 12:6.

For it was never definitively established that she had been married and thus, we do not operate under the premise that relations with her are adulterous.

One might think that the Jew would be exempt, because there was only one piece of fat before him. Nevertheless, since originally, there were two and one was known to be forbidden, it is considered as if the existence of the forbidden entity was established.

In which instance, were he to have eaten the forbidden fat, he would not be able to atone by bringing a sacrifice.

Here also, the point is that at the time that the inadvertent violation was committed, there was only one piece of fat in front of the person. Also, we are certain that he partook of the forbidden fat. Nevertheless, since we are unsure of which he ate inadvertently and which intentionally, he is liable for a provisional guilt-offering and not a sin-offering.

For he definitely partook of forbidden fat inadvertently. The fact that he did not know which piece was forbidden is not significant. See Halachah 9.

For it had been established that a piece of forbidden fat was present and both are unsure whether or not they partook of it.

Sacrificial meat left over after the time that it is permitted to partake of it, in which instance, partaking of it constitutes a prohibition. Note the distinction between this halachah and Chapter 9, Halachah 13.

We are uncertain whether twilight is considered as part of the previous day or the following day.

Chapter 2, Halachah 3.

Although this principle was stated in Halachah 1, the Rambam restates it as an introduction to the statements that follow.

Sacrificial food that was offered with an improper intent concerning time.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 2.

For each of those deeds requires such an offering.

I.e., if one partook of two olive-sized portions of fat in one lapse of awareness, but became aware of the first transgression before he became aware of the second, he is required to bring two sin-offerings, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 9.

For he has certainly eaten the piece of forbidden fat.

See Halachah 4.

Because he is unsure of whether or not he committed that transgression. Even though he is also unsure whether he misappropriated a consecrated article, he does not bring a sacrifice on that account, as explained in Chapter 9, Halachah 11.

For his becoming aware of the transgression creates a distinction with regard to partaking of forbidden fat. Thus he is obligated for two sin-offerings for that transgression and one sin-offering for partaking of notar. The prohibition against notar falls upon forbidden fat, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 2.

For he partook of consecrated food.

As stated in the first clause.

For the same logic obligates the second person as well.