Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

We have translated the verse as it appears in the Torah. The standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah include several additional words.

Bava Kama 54b explains that although the verse mentions only an ox and a donkey, the obligation to rest refers to all animals. “The Torah referred to common circumstances”—i.e., since these animals are generally those used for work, they were the ones mentioned specifically.

I.e., the positive commandment of resting on the Sabbath also implies not having one’s beasts perform labor.

See Halachah 6 and notes.

This is the prohibition against working on the Sabbath mentioned in the Ten Commandments.

This principle (which has its source in Makkot 13b and which the Rambam quotes in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2) generally means that if a person transgresses a prohibition punishable by death, but for certain reasons that punishment cannot be administered, he should not be lashed instead. The rationale is that the only punishment which the Torah prescribed for this transgression is execution. There is no source in the Torah which prescribes a lesser punishment. Nevertheless, within the context of this principle is also the concept that if a certain dimension of a prohibition involves capital punishment, the punishment of lashes is not given to a person who violates another act that is included in this prohibition, but is not punishable by death.
To apply these concepts to the case at hand: Working with an animal is the subject of a Torah prohibition. When a person works with an animal, however, he is not punished by lashes as are others who violate Torah prohibitions. Why? Because there are certain instances when working with an animal is punishable by death—i.e., when the activity is performed by a man and the animal together—for example, plowing. Therefore, even when the labor a person has the animal perform does not cause that person to incur the death sentence—for example, leading it while it is carrying a burden—he is not punished by lashes. This is the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh.

Although the Jew is not making the animal work himself, he is not fulfilling the Torah’s command that his animal rest.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3), the Rambam emphasizes that there is no difference in this instance whether the gentile is an idolater or not.
Based on the rulings of the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 151:4) states that it is customary not to enforce this prohibition in the present age. The Siftei Cohen 151:12 states that the socio-economic conditions under which our people live have changed, and substantial losses would be sustained if the prohibition were observed. Furthermore, the reason for the prohibition is no longer applicable, for it is uncommon for a Jew to lend or hire his animals to a gentile.

The Kessef Mishneh and others note that Avodah Zarah 15a mentions another reason for this prohibition: A Jew who sells an animal to a gentile on Friday afternoon may be required to assist him in training it to follow its new master. This activity may be prolonged past the commencement of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since this is an infrequent possibility, and the Jew is not performing this task entirely by himself, the Rambam does not mention this matter here. (Significantly, however, he does mention it in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Pesachim, loc. cit.)

Note the parallel in Hilchot Avadim 8:1. Significantly, in that halachah, the Rambam states that if the gentile demands a price greater than this figure, the Jew has no further obligation.

And is unfit for most labor. Since, however, there are tasks that it can perform, the prohibition is not nullified (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that the Jewish owner must not be present while the broker is making the sale.

Note the differences between this ruling and the Rambam’s statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3). The Rambam interprets that Mishnah to be referring to a specific type of horse that is used for transporting birds and not humans. Nevertheless, even according to the Commentary on the Mishnah, ordinary horses are primarily used for human transport.

Note the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 151), which states that even though it is now customary to perform other tasks with horses, since our Sages did not apply the prohibition to them originally, the scope of their decree need not be extended in the present age. See the notes on the previous halachah.

See the explanation of this principle in Chapter 18, Halachah 16.

Note the parallel in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:8.

The Lechem Mishneh and others question if this prohibition applies when one sells an animal to a gentile butcher as well. Even if the butcher does not slaughter the animal in one’s presence, it is clear that he did not purchase it for the sake of labor.

E. g., a sheep or a goat.

The Siftei Cohen (based on Rashi, Avodah Zarah 14b) explains that the reason for the prohibition is our suspicion that the gentile may sodomize the animal, and there is no relation to the Sabbath prohibitions at all.
Work is generally not performed with a small animal, nor would it be proper to forbid the sale of a small animal lest one sell a latge animal. The sale of a large animal is only a Rabbinic prohibition. Accordingly, instituting another prohibition
because of it would be improper, since the Rabbis did not “institute a safeguard for a safeguard.”.
Note, however, the Sefer HaKovetz, which differs and maintains that the prohibition against selling a small animal is a safeguard for the prohibition against selling a larger one. Were this not so, the Rambam would not have mentioned the prohibition against selling a small animal in these halachot.

Although we are forbidden to ask a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on our behalf on the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 6, leniency is granted in this case. We suspect that if the person was required to abandon his money on the Sabbath, he would disobey the law and carry it himself instead. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 24:1.)

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:4, which states that this ruling applies only when the animal belongs to him, for the verse mentioned at the beginning of the chapter states “and thus your ox and your donkey may rest.” When the animal belongs to another individual, it is preferable to have the animal carry the purse. Although we are forbidden to perform a forbidden labor with an animal (Halachah 2), that prohibition can be avoided by making sure the animal does not perform the akirah or the hanachah. There is also a Rabbinic prohibition against working with an animal that belongs to another person. That prohibition is, however, less severe than the prohibition against asking a gentile to perform labor on one’s behalf.

The Mishnah Berurah 266:7 explains that the prohibition against working with an animal also mentions the term melachah. Accordingly, it is the same activities that a man is prohibited from performing on the Sabbath that are forbidden to be done with an animal.
As mentioned previously, the forbidden labor of transferring involves akirah, removing the article from its previous position, and hanachah, placing the article down in a new position. When a person—or an animal—who is carrying an article begins walking, he is considered to have performed an akirah, and when he stops he is considered to have performed a hanachah. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 8.)
Accordingly, were a person to place a burden on an animal while it is at rest and remove it from him after the animal has come to rest again, he would be considered as having performed labor with the animal, for the animal will have performed both the akirah and the hanachah.
If, however, one follows the course of action suggested by the Rambam, the animal will have performed neither of these acts. Since the article was placed upon the animal after it began to walk, it is not considered to have performed the akirah. Similarly, if the article was removed from the animal before it halted, it is not considered to have performed the hanachah.

The Rashba and others question the Rambam’s ruling in this instance, arguing that since the animal does not perform the akirah and the hanachah (as explained above), what difference does it make whether one leads the animal or not? There is no possibility of the animal’s performing a forbidden labor. The Rambam, however, maintains that leading an animal carrying a burden is also forbidden. Otherwise, the license granted a person would be too extensive (Maggid Mishneh).

Shabbat 17b.

As the Rambam states in Chapter 6, Halachah 16, we are not commanded to see that a gentile rests on the Sabbath, while we do have such an obligation with regard to our animals.
(See also Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:6, which state that the above rules also apply when a person is accompanied by a gentile whom he does not trust.)

These three types of individuals are often mentioned together in the Talmudic literature. They are all considered to be lacking the intellectual capacity to control their conduct. Hence, they are not obligated to observe the mitzvot.

Rashi (Shabbat 153a) adds that if one of these individuals were allowed to carry the purse, one might err and think that an ordinary Jew is also allowed to carry.

The deaf-mute has a minimal amount of understanding, and thus, were he to carry an article on the Sabbath, the potential for making an error and thinking that all are allowed to carry is greater (ibid.).

The Rashba, the Ramban, Rav Moshe Cohen, and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that one should should give the individual the purse while he is walking, and should remove the purse from him before he stands (as explained in the previous halachah), so that the individual carrying the purse will perform neither the akirah nor the hanachah. They maintain that although a mentally incompetent individual (and similarly, the others mentioned) are not obligated to observe the mitzvot, it is forbidden to “feed him non-kosher food with one’s hands.” (See Hilchot Ma’ achalot Asurot 17:27.) Similarly, in this instance it is forbidden to give these individuals an article and tel1 them to carry it. See also Chapter 24, Halachah 11, and notes.
This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:6) and accepted by the later authorities. There is. a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether the above law applies if one gives the article to one of these individuals before the commencement of the Sabbath. On the one hand, it is obvious that one’s intent is to have the individual carry the article on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since one gives the article to him before the commencement of the Sabbath, one is not considered to be “feeding him non-kosher food with one’s hands.” (See the glosses of the Ramah and the Magen Avraham on that law.)

Since the child will ultimately become obligated to perform mitzvot, it is preferable that he not violate them in his childhood.

Shabbat 153b explains that on the one hand, it is preferable to give it to the child, because when the deaf-mute carries, the impression will be created that an adult may carry on the Sabbath. Conversely, however, there is a disadvantage in giving it to the child, for he will ultimately mature and become obligated to observe the mitzvot.
The Be’ur Halachah 266 emphasizes that when the minor is one’s own son, it is definitely preferable to give the purse to the deaf-mute, for a person is obligated to train his children in the observance of the mitzvot.

As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 15 and 19, a person is permitted to carry within a space of four cubits. Thus, each time he stops, the four cubits in which he is allowed to carry become redefined, and in this manner he can carry the article several miles on the Sabbath. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 10, and Chapter 6, Halachah 22.)
It must be emphasized that transferring the article less than four cubits at a time is permitted only when carrying the article in the public domain, but not with regard to transferring the article into the private domain. This must be accomplished by throwing the article in an irregular manner (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:12; Mishnah Berurah 266:17).
Significantly, in contrast to Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam does not say that the person should run without stopping until he arrives home. lt is possible to differentiate between the two instances by explaining that the present halachah refers to an instance when the person had stopped after the commencement of the Sabbath, while the halachah cited refers to an instance when the person had continued walking.

The leniencies granted to allow a person to maintain possession of his own property do not apply to a lost object that he discovered, since he will not suffer a loss by leaving it. Nevertheless, once a person has already taken possession of the lost object, it is considered to be his own property.

I.e., if there is a danger, because of thieves or the like

According to the Rambam, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, there is no prohibition against carrying an article less than four cubits at a time. Most authorities, however, differ with him on this issue and maintain that this is a leniency that is permitted only in rare instances. Hence, in the case of a lost article when a person will not suffer a loss, the leniency is not granted. It is the opinion of these authorities that is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:7).

The bridle and reins are not considered muktzeh, because the person had the intent of using them before the Sabbath. One must, however, be careful not to lean on the animal when putting the bridle and the reins on it, for it is forbidden to make use of a live animal (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:1 and commentaries).

This halachah revolves around the following principle: A restraint that is necessary to control an animal is not considered to be a burden and may be borne by the animal on the Sabbath.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:1), the Rambam writes that female camels are more powerful than males and need stronger restraints. The rope used to tie a male camel is, however, apparently different from that mentioned later in the halachah in regard to a horse.

A person who leads an animal into the public domain with such a restraint is thus considered as having violated the prohibition against having an animal work on the Sabbath.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions “a very excessive restraint”—i.e., we are not expected to measure exactly the strength of the animal and the restraint. As long as the restraint is more or less appropriate for the animal, it is not considered to be a burden.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 305) appears to differ and to allow one to lead merely one camel at a time.

If the rope extends longer, it might appear that one is carrying the rope and not using it as a restraint for the animal (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:3).

If the rope hangs lower, it does not appear to be a restraint for the animal, but rather an unnecessary burden (Rashi, Shabbat 54b).

Shabbat 54a states that a person leading a group of camels appears as if he is going to a.אגנח The Rambam, based on the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan’el, interprets that term as having both the meanings mentioned above. lt appears to refer to a country-fair that was an occasion for both commerce and celebration for the populace at large.

A bell will make the animal look more attractive (Rashi, Shabbat 54b).

Rashi and Tosafot (Shabbat 58a) states that the reason stated in the previous halachah—that one appears to be taking them to a fair—applies in this instance as well.

Identifying it as belonging to its master.

This prohibition applies even if the seal is woven into the animal’s covering (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:15; Mishnah Berurah 305:45).
From the context here, it would appear that the reason for the prohibition is that the seal is considered to be an unnecessary burden. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.), which states that the prohibition was instituted lest the seal fall and the owner pick it up and caו;ry it.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4, based on Shabbat 54b), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a leather strap tied around the hoof of an animal that has been wounded.

This refers to wooden restraint placed on the animal's neck to prevent it from being able to turn its head backwards. Such a restraint would be placed on an animal to deter it from chewing on a wound on its back.

Shabbat 53a states that a donkey is always cold, and hence, a saddle-cloth is necessary, even in the summer, to keep it warm. Accordingly, the saddle-cloth is considered to be a garment and not a burden.
The saddlecloth must be tied to the animal, lest it fall and its owner carry it on the Sabbath. It must be tied before the Sabbath, because there is no way that it can be tied on the Sabbath itself without leaning on the animal, which is a forbidden act. Our Sages prohibited a person who violated their decree and tied the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath from taking out his donkey on that day (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2).
Other commentaries explain that if the saddle-cloth was not tied to the animal nסFriday, we can assume that it does not suffer from cold so seriously. Hence, it is forbidden for it to wear the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath.

A patch is used as a sign of identification or for superstitious reasons (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah).

Our translation is based on Rav Kapach’s commentary.

Our translation is based nס the Rambam’s Commentary nס the Mishnah (loc. cit.).

I.e., one of its back feet to one of its front legs, so that it can walk on only three legs (ibid.). In both these instances, the animal is able to walk, but cannot walk fast.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this applies to both male and female chickens.

Attached to their feet for the purpose ofidentification (ibid., based on Shabbat 54b).

The Rambam (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to straps that hang loosely from a chicken’s feet. He does not explain their purpose. Others (based on Shabbat 54b) explain that these straps served as a restraint.

The Rambam explains that this refers to a unique species of rams. When they are fattened, all the fat collects in the fat tail, which swells in size. Because of its size, the ram is unable to lift it easily. Therefore, a small wagon is constructed and attached to them to support their tails and prevent them from dragging on the ground and becoming bruised and cut. The Rambam states that he was familiar with such a species of rams.

The Rambam (ibid.) states that this refers to chips from the yachnun tree. Based on Shabbat 54b, he explains that these chips were not necessary for rams. Since they butt each other frequently, this would dislodge the worms from their heads.

Significantly, Shabbat 54b singles out the species yalei, which Tosafot (based on Bava Batra 4a) identifies as the hedgehog itself. The Biblical name for this species anaka (Leviticus 11:30) resembles the word yenikah, “sucking,” and refers to this species’ tendency to suck milk.

The sharp prickles of the hedgehog skin will annoy the crawling animals and prevent them from sucking the cow’s milk (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., based on Shabbat 54b).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (based on Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah had a neighbor who let his cow go out with a strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar did not rebuke him for this act, and hence the responsibility for this transgression was considered his. The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 5:4) relates that as penance, Rabbi Elazar fasted until his teeth became black.

Shabbat 53b offers both these interpretations for the word ןיבובל in the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2. The Rambam interprets them as not being mutually exclusive and hence cites both of them as halachah. See also the following note.

The Ra’avad, however, objects to this particular interpretation, explaining that, as obvious from the ruling in the previous halachah regarding a strap tied between a cow’s horns, any article placed on an animal for the purpose of ornamentation is considered to be a burden and forbidden. The Maggid Mishneh offers an explanation that can resolve this difficulty. An ornament that an animal wears during the week is also permitted on the Sabbath. The ornaments that are forbidden are those that are placed on the animal for the Sabbath day alone.

In his Co1nmentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:2), the Rambam states that these coverings are placed over ewes and not over rams, because ewes’ wool is softer than that of rams.

This may be done to change the goats’ hormonal balance so that they will conceive faster.

Rabbenu Yonah explains that the goats’ teats were tied for this purpose on the Sabbath and not during the week. During the week, they would be milked in the morning and in the evening, and there was little chance of sufficient pressure building up to cause the milk to ooze out. On the Sabbath, by contrast, they could not be milked from sunset until after nightfall on the next day, and the possibility existed that extra milk would ooze out.

Although a donkey may go out wearing a saddlecloth, as stated in Halachah 10, a saddle itself is considered a burden.

Rashi (Shabbat 53a) explains that this was used as a talisman to ward off the evil eye.

Because it is an unnecessary ornament and therefore considered a burden. See the notes on the previous halachah.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 305:41, which states that this restriction does not apply to iron horseshoes that are permahently affixed to the animal’s feet.

Even if an amulet has proven its efficacy for a human, as long as it has not proven its efficacy for an animal, we are in doubt of its usefulness. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:21 states that a human being has angels and spiritual forces that will assist his recovery, and an animal lacks these. Therefore, the amulet used by a human need not bt: as powerful.

Chapter 19, Halachah 13 grants a person license to go out with a bandage on a wou’nd. The same concept applies regarding an animal.

So that it will set in place and heal (Maggid Mishneh).

The bell must be plugged, since it is forbidden to ring bells on the Sabbath as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 4.

In this and the following instance, the leniency is granted in a courtyard, but not in the public domain.

The saddle cloth may not be tied, since by doing so one would be making use of an animal. (See the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:8 and the notes on Halachah 10.)

This leniency applies only to a donkey that chronically suffers from cold, as explained in the notes on Halachah 10, and not to a horse or other similar species (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:10) mentions that, in a courtyard, a feeding bag may be attached to calves and ponies which do not have long necks and find it uncomfortable to eat by themselves.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, explaining that since the servants are themselves obligated to observe the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, of what purpose is the prohibition imposed on their master? The Maggid Mishneh and Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1525) explain that the servants may be lax in their observance. Therefore, an additional command is given to their master.

In Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14;9, the Rambam explains that a Cana’anite servant goes through a process similar to that of conversion when purchased by a Jewish master. This process includes circumcision, immersion in the mikveh, and the acceptance of mitzvot. Once this process is completed, the servant is bound to observe all the mitzvot that are incumbent upon Jewish women.

These seven universal laws include the prohibitions against the worship of false gods, cursing God, killing, stealing, incest and adultery, eating a limb torn from a living animal and the obligation to set up courts of law to judge civil matters. The Rambam explains these laws in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 9 and 10. A servant may temporarily refuse to accept the mitzvot incumbent upon Jewish servants. In this instance, he does not undergo the process of circumcision and immersion and is given twelve months to decide whether to accept Jewish observance or not. If he refuses, he must be sold (Hilchot Avadim 8:12). In the interim, this servant must accept the observance of these seven universal laws. If not, he should be killed immediately (see Hilchot Avadim 1:6 and commentaries).

But not for the sake of a Jew. In Chapter 6, it was explained that there is a Rabbinic prohibition preventing a Jew from instructing a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on his behalf. This halachah emphasizes that when a gentile is the Jew’s servant, the Jew is violating a positive commandment of the Torah itself by having the gentile work for him on the Sabbath. See notes 87 and 88 below.

As explained in Hilchot Shemitah V’Yovel 10:9, there are many mitzvot whose observance is dependent on the observance of the yovel, the Jubilee year. The observance of the Jubilee year itself is dependent on the proportion of the Jewish people living in Eretz Yisrael. Only when the majority of our people live in the holy land is this mitzvah observed.

The intent of this question is not directly obvious in a translated text. The Hebrew word גֵּר has two meanings in Halachic terminology: a convert—גֵּר צֶדֶק—and a resident alien—גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב. Since, as the Rambam indicates, the verse does not appear to refer to either of these individuals, what is the intent of the word גֵּר in that verse?

The Maggid Mishneh states that this positive mitzvah prohibits not only one’s servant or one’s hired hand, but any gentile who has accepted the observance of these seven universal laws, from working on one’s behalf on the Sabbath. For as soon as the gentile agrees to perform the forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew, he is considered as the Jew’s hired hand.
The question may arise: Concerning whom is the Rambam speaking in Chapter 6 when he states that asking a gentile to work on our behalf is prohibited merely by virtue of Rabbinic decree? A gentile who has not accepted the observance of any mitzvot at all.

Thus, according to the Rambam, the verse quoted above contains two prohibitions: one requiring one to watch that any servants who have accepted the mitzvot observe the Sabbath laws, and another, prohibiting us from benefiting from any work done on our behalf by a gentile who has not accepted these mitzvot.