Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

He would not be obligated to announce his discovery if he found it at the present time (Chapter 11, Halachah 12). Nevertheless, since he was obligated to announce its discovery at the time he took it into his possession, that obligation does not cease because of its decrease in value.

This point is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, Bava Metzia 28b. Rav Yehudah maintains that one should mention merely that one found a lost object, lest one give a dishonest person a clue to the object’s identity. The halachah follows the view quoted by the Rambam to prevent inconvenience to the finder and the owner of the lost article.

See Halachah 5 and notes.

As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, there are three types of marks:
a) simanim muvhakim b’yoter, extremely distinctive marks - e.g., there is a hole next to a letter on a document. These are considered proof of identity even according to Scriptural law.
b) simanim muvhakim, distinctive marks - e.g., the weight of an object or its measure. There is a difference of opinion among our Sages (Bava Metzia 27b, 28a) if these are considered proof of identity even according to Scriptural law, or merely according to Rabbinic law. (See also the following halachah.)
c) simanim g’ru’im, “unsatisfactory marks” - e.g., an object’s color or whether it was large or small. These are never considered proof of identity.
As the Ra’avad mentions, the Rambam is speaking in this clause about simanim muvhakim, and excluding simanim g’ru’im.

We fear that the deceiver will know of a person who lost an article, and the deceiver will be able to identify the article with marks and thus take it as his own.

The Ra’avad and the Maggid Mishneh interpret this to mean that even if the deceiver identifies the article with simanim muvhakim b’yoter, we do not return the article to him unless he brings witnesses. Based on the statements of the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:6), Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:8 and other commentaries maintain that if a deceiver can provide a siman muvhak b’yoter, we should return the article to him even if he does not bring witnesses. This leniency is not, however, accepted by the Siftei Cohen 267:2 and others.

Sifre on the verse; Bava Metzia 28b.

I.e., “your brother” can be interpreted as the object and not the subject of the asking. We enquire about the person s honesty.

After our Sages’ decree, although it is not necessary for an ordinary person to bring witnesses who testify that the article belongs to him, he must bring character witnesses who testify to his honesty.
See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:9, which states that a person who is known as a Rabbinic sage need not bring character witnesses. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:6) says that a person who identifies an article with a siman muvhak b’yoter need not bring character witnesses.

I.e., not only with regard to the identification of a lost object, but also to return a bill of divorce to a woman, or to identify a man as dead and thus enable his wife to remarry (Bava Metzia 27b).

The Rambam’s statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries. For in Hilchot Gerushin 13:21, the Rambam writes:
If, however, any one of these identifying factors is missing, even if there are marks [through which he can be identified] on his body and on his personal artifacts, even if one of those marks is a mole, testimony concerning his death should not be offered.
This appears to indicate that marks that would be acceptable with regard to the identification of a lost object would not be acceptable with regard to the identification of a corpse. Seemingly, this contradicts the Rambam’s statement here that “distinctive marks are relied upon... in all matters.”
The Kessef Mishneh claims that the Rambam’s intent is that simanim muvhakim b’yoter are acceptable with regard to all matters, even the identification of a corpse, while ordinary simanim muvhakim are acceptable with regard to monetary matters.
See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:3, which explains that when a corpse is identified by marks, his property is transferred to his heirs despite the fact that license is not given to his wife to marry.
The Radbaz (Volume II, Responsum 798) differs and explains that the Rambam maintains that, as indicated by the simple interpretation of his words here, ordinary simanim muvhakim are acceptable with regard to all matters, even Torah prohibitions. The intent of the term “marks” in Hilchot Gerushin is simanim g’ru’im.

I.e., in contrast to the instances mentioned in the following halachah, where one person identifies the article with more distinctive marks than the other.

He should treat the lost article as any other whose owner has not been identified.

I.e., it is not necessary for the witnesses to testify that they saw the person lose the article. Knowledge of his prior ownership is sufficient [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:9)].

This applies even if the article is identified by simanim muvhakim b’yoter. Witnesses are still considered a more effective means of identification (Siftei Cohen 267:7).

I.e., an oath is not required of the other claimant (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:12). The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:10) differ and maintain that the other claimant must take an oath.

For the fact that the article was woven for the person is not proof that he was the final owner of the article and that it fell from his possession.

For the length of an article, though more difficult to estimate than its width, can also be deduced from careful observation. The article’s weight, by contrast, cannot be determined by observation.

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the term גמיו used by Bava Metzia 28a. See his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nega’im 11:10), where he defines the Hebrew term used in this halachah with Arabic words that refer to ornamental fringes placed on a garment.
Rashi interprets that term as meaning “area” - i.e., he states the total area of the garment, without mentioning its exact width or its exact length. In both his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:14), Rav Yosef Karo refers to Rashi’s interpretation.

At the stone outside Jerusalem mentioned in Halachah 1. The entire Jewish people gathered in Jerusalem for the pilgrimage festivals, and this was thus the most appropriate occasion to notify anyone who might have lost the article.

For the Hebrew words for second and third begin and end with the same letters. Were the person to think the article was being announced only for the second time, he might not appreciate the urgency of the matter and might not hurry home to check if he had in fact lost an article or not.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:6), the Rambam states that this refers to the eighth day of the holiday. The finder would make the first announcement on the first day of the holiday and wait until the final day (or the day after the holiday on Pesach or the day after the days of compensation on Shavuot) before leaving.

Although many Jews lived more than three days distance from Jerusalem, our Sages did not trouble the finder to wait longer than seven days.

And the Jews no longer would gather in Jerusalem as a unified people.

For these are places where many people congregate, and the word of the lost article would be circulated widely.

Bava Metzia 28a relates that the Persian rulers of Babylon had such a rule and would punish severely all those who disobeyed it.

At present, it is customary to make announcements in synagogues and houses of study. In many Jewish communities, there are also organizations that keep lists of lost objects that have been discovered. Anyone who loses an object thus has an address to turn to.

I.e., since it has a mark with which it can be identified, it never becomes the property of the finder. The finder must guard it until the owner comes, or until the arrival of Elijah, who with his holy vision will clarify all doubts that exist.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:16) differ and maintain that a person caring for a lost article is considered an unpaid watchman and is freed of all responsibility, except the loss of the article due to negligence.

E. g., to give charity to a poor person. This is worth at least a p’rutah and thus it is as if he has received a wage for his efforts. The differing opinions follow the approach of Tosafot (Bava Metzia 29a), who maintains that it is unlikely that the finder will be approached by a poor person at the time that he is caring for the lost article. Therefore, he is not considered to have received any benefit from caring for the lost article.

See the Siftei Cohen 267:15, who debates whether the finder’s responsibility is to prevent the article from decreasing in value, or whether he is obligated to cause its value to increase.

To air it out, so that it will not become mildewed. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:19 states that one should not air it more frequently, lest this recurring use cause its value to diminish.

Lest it rip.

E. g., to air it out.

E. g., to cover a couch while it is being aired out. The rationale for the prohibition is that the finder may accidentally leave the garment there, and it will be stolen (Sefer Meirat Einayim 267:21). This rationale indicates that. there is no intrinsic difficulty in the finder’s benefiting from the use of the article. He simply must take care to use it in a way that does not cause it damage.

I.e., these three types of substances will not benefit from being used, and it is possible that they will be damaged. Hence, they should not be used at all.

See Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 7:4, which states that this responsibility applies only when the owner goes on a long journey. In that instance, caring for the entrusted object is considered like returning a lost article, for the owner has no means of caring for it himself. If, however, the owner of the entrusted article is located in the same country as the watchman caring for the article, the watchman is not obligated to undertake these responsibilities.

For it is common for a student to fidget with the scroll from which he is studying a new subject, which requires his concentration.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:28 states that this applies only with regard to texts like the Prophets or Scriptures, which are difficult to comprehend the first time, but can be readily understood by one who is familiar with them. ln contrast, the tractates of the Talmud always require thought, even by a person who is familiar with them. There is thus no difference whether or not one is studying the subject for the first time.

Rashi, Bava Metzia 28b, reverses these rulings, for in his opinion it is more likely for the scroll to be torn if read in this fashion. The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:20).

In such an instance, it is surely possible that the scroll will tear.

I.e., take them as his own.

I.e., they are not considered pieces of art, each of which has a unique importance and value. For this reason, the value of tefillin can be readily assessed and a replacement purchased easily.
Today, when writing tefillin has become a highly competitive profession, and there is no small difference in the prices charged by various scribes, it is questionable whether this law would still apply (Kin’at Eliyahu).

The finder should not sell the animal immediately, for a person who has trained an animal desires that the animal which he trained be returned to him so that he will not have to begin retraining another.

Implied by the Rambam’s wording is that the finder cannot hire out the animals for his own use; he must hire them out to others. This is a safeguard against his using the animals and paying less than their true value.

I.e., the money received for their hire should be used for their care. In this way, the finder will not suffer loss.

I.e., the finder is not obligated to care for the lost object for a longer period without receiving recompense for his efforts.

By a court, as in the following halachah.

The finder receives half of the increase in value as payment for his efforts. See Hilchot Shutafim 8:3.

I.e., they are too small to perform useful labor, but pasture on their own and do not require much effort to feed.

Who scavenge for their own food (Kessef Mishneh).

See Rashi, Bava Metzia 28b, who reverses these decisions. Larger fowl that require more food should be kept for only three days. Smaller fowl that do not eat as much should be kept for 30 days. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:24) quotes the Rambam’s rulings.

This ensures that he will seek a fair price for them.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit.) differ and maintain that since the price of animals is usually standard, it is not necessary that they be sold in the presence of a court. Like the tefillin mentioned in Halachah 14, all that is necessary is that the finder evaluate the price, and he may then take the article as his own.

Bava Metzia 38a records a difference of opinion among our Sages, when produce that a person entrusted for safekeeping begins to rot. One opinion maintains that it should be sold to protect the owner’s interests; the other maintains that if the owner wants it sold, he should order its sale himself. With regard to a lost object, by contrast, all agree that in such a situation it should be sold, for there is no way the owner could order its sale.

The loan is due as soon as the original owner comes to claim the lost article.

Note the contrast to Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 7:5, and the notes of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.

And a borrower is liable even if the borrowed object is destroyed by forces beyond his control. The license to use the article is sufficient to lift his level of responsibility.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 267) differs and maintains that until the finder actually uses the money, he is considered merely a paid watchman and is not responsible for the loss of the money by forces beyond his control. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:38 states that the Ramah accepts this ruling. All authorities agree that once the finder does make use of the money, he is considered a borrower.

Our Sages assumed that the original owner of the lost article would willingly give the finder this privilege in return for his care for the article.

Since he did not have to care for the found object, he is not given any added privileges.

See Halachah 10. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that the finder is considered an unpaid watchman.

This expression is usually employed by the Rambam to indicate a ruling for which he has no explicit source in the rulings of the Sages of the Talmud.

Generally, it would be fit to require the finder to substantiate his claim with an oath. Indeed, we find that even when a person is entitled to incur expenses on another person’s behalf, he must support his claim with an oath (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:40).

For otherwise, because of the general reluctance to take an oath, no one would care for a lost article, as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., if the original owner claims that the lost article was not returned to him in its totality, the finder is not obligated to take an oath to support his claim. Even a Rabbinic oath, a sh’vuat hesset, is not required of him.

Because of the severity of the prohibition against taking false oaths, people were reluctant to take oaths at all, even if they were true.

The Ra’avad notes that the Rambam’s ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in Gittin 51b. He states that this decision is not accepted by all authorities. Despite his objections, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:27) both accept the Rambam’s rulings.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:42 states that if the owner declares that he saw the finder pick up both wallets, an oath is required.