Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

From Halachah 16, it is apparent that here the Rambam is speaking about an unlearned person whose level of observance is a matter of doubt. If, however, it is known that a person is lax with regard to the separation of tithes, his word is not accepted even on the Sabbath.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:1) emphasizes that this leniency is granted only when a person failed to tithe out of forgetfulness. If he intentionally did not tithe the produce, there is no leniency upon which he can rely to partake of it on the Sabbath.

Hilchot Shabbat 23:9, 14; Shvitat Yom Tov 4:26.

Because of the holiness of the day, the unlearned people regard transgressing on the Sabbath as more severe than transgressing on other days [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 4:1)].

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam notes that there is a general principle (Kiddushin 63b) that a person will not sin unless he personally benefits. Thus one might think that we could rely on this person’s word, even during the week. Hence, it is necessary to explain that we rely on his statements only on the Sabbath. The rationale is that the presumption that he will not lie applies to most people. There are, however, some that will lie even on the Sabbath [the Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:1)].

The Rambam is clarifying that the statement made in Halachah 2: that we trust that the unlearned person will not lie on the Sabbath is conditional. It is a leniency accepted to allow a person to honor the Sabbath alone.

I.e., the festival fell on Friday or on Sunday.

This leniency is granted even though the two days are not considered as a single continuum of holiness (see Hilchot Eruvin 8:5).

I.e., he takes an oath that he will never benefit from him unless he partakes of his hospitality [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 4:3)]. (Although the mishnah speaks of taking a vow, the Rambam speaks of an oath.) The oath is taken to emphasize to the colleague that the failure to accept his hospitality is a sign of serious enmity between them. Hence, this leniency was granted to encourage feelings of closeness.

Whether the tithes were separated or not.

I.e., the terumat Ma’aser fell in a manner in which it was distinct and could easily be separated from the store of produce.

As stated in Halachah 2.

Produce into which terumah or terumat ma’aser has been mixed. The rationale is that partaking of such substances is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer interpretations that substantiate the Rambam’s ruling.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:1) explains the logic: If he is willing to separate the first tithe which is given to a Levite, he is certainly willing to separate the second tithe which remains his own (but must be eaten in Jerusalem). See Halachah 15.

While the first tithe must be given away as above.

The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, stating that it is not necessarily a logical continuation of the ruling in the previous clause.

I.e., terumah and terumat Ma’aser, if he said that he made these separations (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., both the first tithe and the second tithe.

This bracketed addition represents the resolution offered by the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh to the Ra’avad’s objection.

I.e., even the amount separated as terumat ma'aser. For although we are stringent and do not accept his word, we do not reject his statements entirely. Certainly, he himself must bear their consequences and consider the separated produce as if it is required to be redeemed (Radbaz).

Since he is not trustworthy in this regard, his word is not accepted with regard to others as well. Even though one might say that he would not lie since his falsehood could easily be revealed, for it is possible to ask the identity of the seller and determine if he is trustworthy, the agent could always excuse himself by saying: “I thought he was trustworthy” (Radbaz).
Although one might argue that there is no reason for him to sin, for he will not benefit from it, that argument is not accepted. For the ease the person experiences in bringing the produce from a close person could be considered enough of a benefit to influence him to lie.

And the lie be detected.

Because he would personally benefit from the wayfarer’s acceptance of his statements.
The Ra’avad clarifies the Rambam’s ruling, noting that his text of the Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:5) states: “In the presence [of the person being recommended], his word is not accepted. In his absence, his word is accepted.” The Radbaz states that this concept is implied by the Rambam’s words, since “so-and-so” implies that the person is not present. The Kessef Mishneh interprets the standard version of the Jerusalem Talmud as follows: “If he says he is not trustworthy, in his presence, he is not considered trustworthy (for he would not say so unless it was true). If he says so in his absence, he is considered trustworthy (for the other person’s statements are considered as slander).” This interpretation fits the Rambam’s ruling.

Because we follow the principle that a person will not sin unless he personally benefits (Kiddushin 63b). This, however, is a leniency, granted to the person, because he is a wayfarer [Rambam’s Commentary to Demai 4:7].

And thus could be lying. See parallels in Hilchot lssurei Bi’ ah 20:11.

The Ra’avad qualifies the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it applies only when the person he knows is trustworthy. If he is not trustworthy, his recommendation cannot be relied upon. Rav YosefKorcus states that this is also the Rambam’s intent.

In the present age, this problem is solved by Rabbis and/or institutions giving kashrut certificates that are hung in the respective stores or institutions.

For after 30 days have passed, the person has had ample time to familiarize himself with the place and there is no need for further leniency. He will certainly have found a place that will offer him hospitality (Radbaz).

The rationale for the leniency is that the majority of the unlearned people do separate tithes. The laws of demai are merely an additional stringency.

For the unlearned people are generally lax in observance of these prohibitions.

Who bring produce from other places to a city for sale.

The Radbaz asks: Why are we more suspicious here than in the situation mentioned in Halachah 7? In resolution, he explains that people coming to sell their merchandise from another place are more likely to act in collusion than two businessmen in a city.

And was purchased from a common person so that the restrictions associated with demai apply.

The fact that they have been taken out of Eretz Yisrael is not significant.

And tithing is not required.

This is a general principle applicable in many areas, both in Jewish business law and with regard to the Torah's prohibitions. When our suspicions are based only on one person's statements, if that person makes a statement that allays those suspicions, we accept it. For our knowledge of the suspicious factor stems from his statements alone; there is no other evidence of such (ibid.). The rationale is that had he desired to lie, he would not have mentioned the factor that arouses the suspicions at the outset.

I.e. “from my field in Syria;” i.e., a place from whose produce tithes must be separated according to Rabbinic decree and he does not say that he tithed the produce.

Were he not to have said that they were from his own field, there would be no obligation to tithe the produce, because we would have assumed that it came from a gentile’s field.

I.e., even if he does not say specifically that they are his.

Even if they are common people whose word is not ordinarily accepted with regard to tithes.

Presents given the poor that are exempt from the obligations to tithe (Chapter 2, Halachah 9).

In which instance we would assume that the terumot and the first tithe were also separated.

I.e., in the third and sixth years of the seventh year agricultural cycle.

I.e., what is meant by the last statement that the ruling depends on whether it is common for people to give such articles as leket, shichachah, pe’ah, or as tithes to the poor.

Pe’at HaSadeh states that the Rambam’s words are chosen carefully. It is customary to give leket, shichachah, and pe’ah in the field. Hence, it is not likely that they were given as flour. The tithes for the poor, by contrast, are generally given from the home (see Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 6:10). Hence it is possible that flour was given to a poor person in fulfillment of that mitzvah.

For it is common for people to leave grain as leket, shichachah, and pe’ah, but not to process the grain any further before giving it [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe’ah 8:3)].

I.e., ifhe says that a homeowner gave him flour, his word is not accepted. If, however, he says that he was given grain and he had it ground into flour himself, his word is accepted

Because it is not common for a person to have grain ground into flour and then give the flour to the poor.

For it was customary for people to give presents from rice while the kernels are still in their husks and not when they have been processed [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.)]. Our interpretation of the following clauses is also based on that source

Which are left for the poor. We do not accept their word in this instance, for it is not common for a sufficient quantity of such olives to be left to make oil.

I.e., we accept his word based on the principle of miggo; were he to have desired to lie, he could have chosen a more plausible falsehood.

Even if he is an unlearned person.

In contrast to leket, shichachah, pe’ah and the tithe for the poor concerning which the poor person’s word is accepted only at certain times.

I.e., the Levite’s word is accepted if he says that he separated terumat ma’aser from the tithes that he was given.

Chapter 9, Halachah 1. In both cases, the transgression is punishable· by death at the hand of Heaven.

Unless he is a chavair.

I.e., if an Israelite purchases produce from a Levite who is not a chavair and the Levite states that the produce has been tithed and also the second tithe has been separated, the Levites word is not accepted. Although an Israelite’s word is accepted regarding the second tithe when we see that he has separated the first tithe (Halachah 5), this does not hold true for a Levite. The rationale is that an Israelite makes a sacrifice when separating the first tithe, but a Levite does not.

I.e., that produce could be purchased from an unlearned person and the separations made afterwards. This concept applies also with regard to the subsequent laws mentioned in this chapter. See similar concepts in Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 8:14.

For if terumah was mixed with the produce, the prohibition is much more severe.

And we fear that the oil might be terumah or mixed with terumah.

I.e., if the Rabbis would discover that such a mixture would be made, they would declare his entire store of produce forbidden.

That has not been redeemed.

The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the word of a person who is suspect is never accepted even when he testifies with regard to the produce of another person. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s view.

For his word is accepted more readily than that of one who is suspect.

For in these instances, his statements do not enable ordinary produce to be eaten.

But not with regard to his own.

In Halachah 10.

Which was slaughtered before it was clarified that it possessed a disqualifying blemish. Thus it is forbidden to partake of it and it must be buried.

And is hence, forbidden and must be destroyed.

I.e., the seller claims that the sale was made in error. He wants to nullify the sale so that he can fulfill the mitzvah of tithing the produce and destroying the forbidden produce. Since the objects have already left the seller's hand, his word is not accepted whether he is a chavair or not.