Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

I.e., with a gate that can withstand an ordinary wind. According to the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:1), this halachah is speaking about guarding the animal in an inferior manner as explained in the notes to Chapter 4, Halachah 4. If the animal is guarded in an excellent manner, there is no liability.

According to the Rambam, the owner is not liable for even half the damages. Rabbenu Asher and others differ. According to their view, since he did guard the ox to some degree, he is not liable for the full damages. He is, however, liable for half the damages, for there is no reason why the laws governing him should be more lenient than those governing an ordinary ox. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 396:1.

Note the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama, conclusion of Chapter 4), which states that since this ox frequently gores, it is a mitzvah to slaughter it.

Since the ox is considered to be a tam with regard to one element of goring, the owner is never freed from the obligation to pay the half damages that the owner of an ordinary ox would pay.

Although these principles are stated in the Torah explicitly with regard only to damage done to another animal, Bava Kama 33a explains how an equation to human injury is derived.

For Leviticus 24:19, the source for the laws applying to human injury, states: “When a man will cause a blemish to a colleague.... “Implied is that these laws apply only when the injury is caused by another man.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:1,9.

A human being is not liable in these instances. The rationale is that he is liable for capital punishment for injuring his parents or desecrating the Sabbath. Whenever a person incurs both liability for capital punishment and monetary restitution with the performance of a single deed, he is freed of responsibility for the monetary claim. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:5,7.

The words “as if it had gored in the public domain” refer to the fact that the owner of an ox that is tam pays for only half the damages. One might draw a comparison to the damage caused by eating or treading, in which instance the owner of the ox is not held liable for damage caused in the public domain, but he is liable for the entire amount of damages caused in the domain of the owner of the produce. To counter this hypothesis, the Rambam emphasizes that with regard to goring, one is liable “as in the public domain,” but not more.

E. g., the ox was covered with filth at the time it fell into the cistern.

E. g., the ox spoiled it with its wastes.

See Chapter 13, Halachah l.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that, as stated in Chapter l, Halachot 8-9, when an ox causes damage in a courtyard belonging jointly to its owner and another person, the owner of the ox is liable for the damage it causes. Why then, asks the Ra’avad, is the owner of the ox not liable in this situation? The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 398:5), however, quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 3, Halachot 13-15, the Tur differs with Rambam and maintains that granting the owner of the ox permission to bring his ox into the courtyard is equivalent to accepting responsibility for any damage to it caused by the owner or his property. With regard to damages caused by others, however, the owner of the courtyard is not liable unless he accepts responsibility. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s wording, while the Ramah follows the perspective of the Tur.

The Maggid Mishneh and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 398:2 state that the owner of the courtyard is generally not liable for the injury another person suffered because of these pits, since he can always claim: “Who gave you permission to enter my property?” Only when the owner gives up ownership of his property or gives others the right to enter is he liable.

This phrase has attracted the attention of the commentaries, for it implies that if the owner of the courtyard knew that the animal had entered his property, he would be liable even when he caused the damage accidentally. From Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:16, 6:3, however, it appears that he would not be liable in such an instance. See Migdal Oz, Lechem Mishneh.

Note the contrast to Hilchot Geneivah 1:15. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 403:1.

The Tur maintains that the time that is significant is not the time of the animal’s death, but the time when its owner is notified regarding its death. Until that time, the one who caused the damage is responsible for the loss. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 403:2) mentions this view.

And not 120.

I.e., the 100 zuz that the owner of the ox lost, minus 10 zuz, which is the share of the profit given to the person who caused the damage.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 403:2) emphasize that although the person who caused the damage is given a share in the value of the dead ox, this applies only with regard to the loss. If the price of meat rises to the extent that the meat of the ox is worth more than the ox was worth when it was alive, the one who caused the damages is not given a share of the profits.

I.e., the price of cattle increased.

I.e., 50 zuz if the ox was mu’ad. With regard to the larger sum, the matter is considered one of grama, an indirect cause of damage. Therefore, the owner of the ox is not liable (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 404:2).

Tosafot, Bava Kama 10b draws a distinction between this instance and Halachah 8, which states that the increased loss to the carcass is suffered by its owner. The rationale for this distinction is that once the ox died, its owner should have sold it immediately. In this instance, since the ox was still alive, its· owner thought that it would recover and that the loss would be less.

This increase is significant, because the owner of the ox that was damaged can collect the payment (half of the damage) for the damages, only from the body of the ox that caused the damage. Thus, if the damage to an ox was 200 zuz, and the ox that caused the damage was worth only 80 zuz, the fact that its value increased to 100 zuz could affect the amount the owner of the damaged ox receives.

I.e., in the above instance, the payment would be only 80 zuz. The rationale is that the owner of the ox who caused the damage will say: “Did I fatten my ox so that you will take the profit?”
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 404:2) differ and maintain that if the increase in the value of the ox exceeds the cost of fattening it, the cost of fattening it is deducted from its value, and the person whose ox was damaged receives half of the difference.

I.e., in the above instance, the payment would be 100 zuz. The rationale is that since the body of the ox that caused the damage is on lien for the damages, and now that body is worth 100 zuz, the entire amount may be expropriated. Note the Or Sameach, who emphasizes that although the payment is taken from the body of the ox that caused the damages, the lien is not established until the time of the trial. Thus, if the owner of the ox that caused the damage consecrates it, it is consecrated, and the owner of the damaged ox receives no payment at all.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 403) writes that although the responsibility to raise the ox is that of the owner of the cistern, if the owner of the ox becomes aware that his ox fell into the cistern, he must raise it and then bill the owner of the cistern for his costs. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 403:8 quotes this ruling.

It is as if the verse reads “He shall give monetary recompense and the carcass to the owners” (Bava Kama 10b).

Halachah 8.