Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

This latter point requires qualification as the Rambam proceeds to state.

For a Scriptural prohibition is involved and we follow the general principle: Whenever there is a question regarding a point of Scriptural Law, we rule stringently. Hence, even though her husband is liable to provide her with her sustenance in such a situation (Hilchot Ishut 5:13), he may not give her terumah.

This is a corollary to the point mentioned beforehand. Since a woman is forbidden to partake of terumah whenever there is a doubt that she was divorced, she is forbidden as soon as she appoints her agent, for he may receive her bill of divorce at any time. Even though the matter is not entirely in the agent’s hands, for the bill of divorce must be given on the husband’s initiative, we follow the presumption that the agent will fulfill the mission with which he is charged (Radbaz).

For the bill of divorce is not effective if given elsewhere (Hilchot Gerushin 9:34).

For in this instance, the agent is acting in place of the husband and the divorce is not completed until he gives the woman the bill of divorce (ibid. 6:5).

Such an arrangement was often made when a couple were childless so that if the husband died, the woman would be free of the obligation of ytbbum.

For we fear that he might die at any moment. Hence, from the previous hour onward, she would have partaken of terumah without having the right to do so.

And if they are priests, their wives may continue partaking of terumah.

We are speaking about a caravan journey through the desert. Although there is a certain amount of danger to the travelers, we operate under the presumption that they are alive until we receive information otherwise.

We presume that the officers of a gentile court are likely to accept bribes. Hence, the fact that one was sentenced to death is not necessarily proof that he died.

In these situations, there is a high likelihood - but no definite proof that the person died. Hence, his wife must assume that he is dead and accept all the stringencies which that state would imply. At the same time, she cannot act on the assumption that he is dead and remarry. The Rambam proceeds to explain the implications of this status vis-a-vis terumah.

She must presume her husband is alive and may not partake of tenunah for that reason.

She must presume her husband is dead and may not partake of terumah for that reason.

A person sentenced to be executed may be given a reprieve from execution if a redeeming factor is found for him (Hilchot Sanhedrin 13:1). Nevertheless, once he has already been brought to the place of execution, it is very unlikely that this will happen (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., if she is the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest. If she is the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, she may partake of terumah.

Hence, the daughter of the Israelite may not partake of terumah. On the other hand, not all die. Hence, since a daughter of the priest married to an Israelite was not partaking of terumah beforehand, this is not considered sufficient reason to allow her to do so (Radbaz).

Hilchot Gerushin 12:16 states that, if no one contradicts the testimony, whenever a witness testifies that a woman's husband died, his or her word is accepted with the exception of five women: another wife of that man, a woman who is her husband's yevamah, the woman's mother-in-law, her mother-in-law's daughter, and her husband's daughter from another wife. In all these instances, we fear that there is enmity between these women and the man's wife and they will testify falsely so that she will marry another man and hence, be forced to accept a divorce from her husband.

The Ra’avad does not accept the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that even though the woman is not allowed to remarry, she should not be allowed to partake of terumah. For perhaps these women are telling the truth. The Radbaz supports the Rambam’s ruling.

The Rambam’s wording allows for the interpretation that this ruling applies whether he gives the bill of emancipation to the servant or to another person on behalf of the servant (see Hilchot Avadim 6: l).

The formal legal contract freeing him from slavery.

As stated in Hilchot Avadim 5:4, et al, there are certain situations where a servant is deserving of his freedom. Nevertheless, he does not receive the status of a freed servant until he receives his bill of emancipation. Even so, he is forbidden to partake of terumah from the time he becomes worthy of freedom.

In such a situation, we say that since generally, it is considered desirable to receive a gift, the intended recipient acquires the property unless he lodges an objection at the time he hears about the gift. See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2.

I.e., that he never desired to receive the present and thus it never left the domain of its initial owner (ibid. :3).

And thus, he is considered to have acquired the property and the servants - and then to have renounced ownership of it and them.

The recipient of the present.

For in either situation, there is a possibility that their present owner is an Israelite.

Because the rental does not interrupt the priests’s ownership. The Israelite must, however, transfer ownership of the terumah to the priest before feeding it to the animal

There are, however, contexts where rental is considered equivalent to purchase. See Hilchot Sechirut 7:1.

This was a popular arrangement in the Talmudic era. The owner of livestock would give it to a shepherd to fatten. The shepherd would have it evaluated and accept responsibility for its value although he did not actually pay the priest anything. Afterwards, when it has been fattened, the value which the shepherd accepted responsibility for is returned to the owner and the two share the profits equally. See Hilchot Shluchin VeShutafim 8:1-4 and Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 8:12 for more details concerning this arrangement.

And thus the law mentioned in the first clause of Halachah 7 applies.

A type of legume used as animal fodder.

Even a priest may not feed his doves terumah, for terumah may only be given to domesticated animals. Nevertheless, everyone, even Israelites, need not take precautions against an animal eating vetch that is terumah on its own initiative. The Radbaz explains that the rationale is that the obligation to separate terumah from vetch is merely Rabbinic in origin. Implied is that if the obligation was Scriptural in origin, one could not take such leniency. It must be noted, however, that not all authorities consider the obligation to separate terumah from vetch as Rabbinic..

This introduction precedes a law which the Rambam derived through his own process of deduction without an explicit source in the previous Rabbinic literature.

Hilchot Mechirah 3:1. There it is explained that the Rabbis required the purchaser to draw the article into his possession for the transaction to be completed.

And thus completes the transaction.