Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

He need not seek the release of the oath (Radbaz). This law applies with regard to vows as well.

Even though the father dies or repents after the vow was taken, with his death or repentance, the vow is nullified, because the conditions under which it was taken no longer apply.

If, however, she was ugly at the time the vow was taken, but was made beautiful, the vow takes effect [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 232:6)].

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, which states that such vows are not binding.

As described in the first two halachot.

I.e., the previous halachah describes an instance where one explicitly stated the condition under which he took the vow. This halachah, by contrast, describes a situation where the condition is not stated, but is self-apparent.

Which would cause them to be forbidden to eat the figs.

And thus the vow was taken in error.

And everyone in the city needs the scribe to compose legal documents for him. Hence, he no longer desires to be forbidden to benefit from him.

And everyone desires to be able to enter the local synagogue.

Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:5, 12. As stated there, the vow was not made initially in error, for at the outset, he did not desire that the person become the scribe. Hence, the oath takes effect. The Ra’avad suggests that the statement from Halachah 3: “This does not resemble an instance where the vow was made dependent on a stipulation and that stipulation was not kept” should be included here, for this is a different category of vows than those mentioned in the previous halachot.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 1:1 derives this principle based on the exegesis of Numbers 30:3: “He shall do all that he utters from his mouth.” Implied is that everything that he utters must be fulfilled or the vow does not take effect. Rabbenu Nissim gives a logical explanation for this concept. At the outset, his intent was that the vow would be kept in its entirety. If a factor arose that prevented that from talcing place, it is as if the vow was taken in error.

As explained in Halachah 4.

Because the prohibition against them was mentioned in the same vow.

Because the vow was taken against all of the persons together. Hence, it cannot be nullified only in part.

For even when qualifying his statement, he still says that all of the individuals are forbidden, indicating that he did not desire to retract his original statement (Kessef Mishneh). In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 232:8), Rav Yosef Caro appears to follow a slightly different rationale.

I.e., that the prohibition would not include his father.

I.e., forbidden.

The portion of the vow involving vintage wine is nullified, because it was taken in error. And accordingly, the portion involving fresh wine is also nullified, based on the principle stated in the previous halachah.

For he did not seek to nullify his former vow, merely to qualify it, as stated in the conclusion of the previous halachah.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 218:1) emphasizes that this applies when a person takes a vow on his own initiative. If, however, he takes a vow in response to wording chosen by a colleague, we follow the meaning of that wording.

For it is desirable that a person marry his relatives (see Yevamot 62b).

The Radbaz states that he is even permitted to enter his home at the time of the feast.

For it is no longer the colleague’s house or field (Siftei Cohen 216:10).

As emphasized by the fact that he said: “Your house” and “Your field.”

For in this instance, the vow was not associated with the owner of the property, but with the property itself. Compare to Chapter 5, Halachot 4-5.

As an expression of resentment for the owner’s refusal (Kessef Mishneh).

Since he is accustomed to plowing his field himself, we assume that his vow applied only to his own actions.

Since he is not accustomed to plowing his field himself, we interpret his vow as meaning that he would never have another person plow the field with it.

Although the standard published text of Bava Kama 80a mentions purchasing a house or marrying a woman in Eretz Yisrael, the commentaries [nor the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 219:1)] see no reason why the Holy Land is different from other places in this regard.

By giving me a present in public.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 332:20) states that the person who administered the vow need not explicitly agree to this interpretation. Even if he remains silent, we accept it. The Siftei Cohen 332:46 states that if the person specifically says that he administered the vow so that he would receive honor by having the other person receive a gift from him, his word is accepted and a sage must be approached to have the vow released.

For people seeing that I demur will respect me more.
1. The Rambam’s rationale is that since everything depends on the person’s intent, it is logical to assume that the meaning of his statements follows the usage common at that time and place. See also Halachah 13. One might ask: If so, why in the halachot that follow does the Rambam set out guidelines with regard to vows. The Radbaz (in his gloss to Halachah 13) explains that these guidelines should be followed only in places where there is no clarity regarding the expressions commonly used. 2. I.e., boiled without spices (Rav Avraham MinHaHar). 3. Although the Rambam’s ruling runs contrary to the statements of the Mishnah (Nedarim 6:2), the Rambam relies on the principle that the determinant factor in values is the meaning attached to the terms used by people at that time and in that place. The ShulchanAruch (Yoreh De’ah 217:3) follows the Rambam’s approach.