Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

See Chapter 1, Halachah 14; Chapter 2, Halachah 8.

It is as if Reuven designated his property as consecrated with regard to Shimon (Or Sameach).

And the prohibition which Reuven established does not make Shimon liable. If, however, Shimon said Amen, he would be liable, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
See Chapter 10, Halachah 12, from which it is apparent that if Reuven voluntarily allows Shimon to benefit from his property, Reuven is liable for lashes, for he is desecrating his own vow. As indicated by Hilchot Meilah 4:9, even though the person is not liable for lashes, he is liable to bring a sacrifice for atonement, since with regard to him, it is as if he benefited from consecrated property.

Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

For there is no way that he can acquire it in a permitted manner.

I.e., once he dies, the loaf no longer belongs to him.

The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 216) states that this applies when the person taking the vow says: “During my lifetime and after my death.” From the Rambam’s words and a comparison to Halachah 6, it is apparent that he need not make such a specification. See Turei Zahav 216:10 which discusses these two perspectives.

For that is the implication of the term “my.” Compare to Chapter s; Halachah 11.

See Halachah 8 which explains that the estate does become the son’s property and he may use it in certain ways.

And specifies that this applies after his death as well, as in the previous halachah.

This is speaking about a situation in which the grandson is not born yet or is still a minor in which instance, the grandfather cannot transfer the property to him directly. Alternatively, he is not yet a Torah scholar (Radbaz).

The Ra’avad and others question the Rambam’s ruling, for seemingly, it does not involve any new concept. The son becomes the owner of the estate regardless. Although he is forbidden to benefit from it, he has the right to give it to his son whether he is a Torah scholar or not, as stated in the following halachah.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that ordinarily, the son may use the estate to pay a debt or to give it to his brother as a present. If, however, the grandson is a Torah scholar, this is forbidden and it is as if the estate was transferred to him directly and the father cannot use it for other purposes. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation where the father had two sons and if this son’s son was not a Torah scholar, he would give his entire estate to the other son.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that the estate. will be given to the grandson. The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De’ah 223) explains that implicit in the grandfather’s statement is the stipulation that if the grandson is not a Torah scholar, he - like his father will be forbidden to benefit from the estate. See Siftei Cohen 223:4.

Here also, the son must tell the recipients that they are receiving property that he is forbidden to benefit from. Implied is that the estate becomes the son's property. He is forbidden to benefit from it. Nevertheless, as indicated here, he may receive indirect benefit, for certainly the recipients of his gifts will be thankful to him and repay him in some way or other.

For this also considered as another debt.

Chapter 6, Halachah 4. The person is not considered to have received benefit from the payment of his debt, since holding back a creditor from pressing claim is not considered as benefit (Radbaz).

For his vow involved only the food itself - i.e., something that people would have in mind when using that term - but not its flavor. It does not become like forbidden food, in which case, even the flavor is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

That produce is considered as if it was inherently forbidden and hence, even its flavor is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., a person who had not taken the vow tasted the food and said that the flavor of the forbidden food could not be detected. Alternatively, there was more than 60 times the amount of the forbidden food.

I.e., designating a particular piece of meat or quantity of wine.

For these other entities will derive the flavor of the meat.

The Or Sameach emphasizes that the Rambam is speaking about a vow which a person made himself, for he can have such a vow released. If, however, he responds to another person, he cannot ask for the vow’s release.

If, however, the wine becomes mixed with a liquid of another type, its presence becomes nullified if its taste is. no longer detectable (Turei Zahav 216:13).

Chapter 15, Halachah 10. The rationale is that since the prohibition can be released, it is preferable to do that rather than have the prohibition nullified.

I.e., just as he may not partake of a sacrifice with his mouth, he may not partake of this produce.

I.e., if the produce forbidden because of the vow was sown and other produce grew from it, that produce is also forbidden. Since the produce forbidden by the vow is equated to a sacrifice, like a sacrifice, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from it (Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra’avad (in his gloss to Halachah 16) asks: Why is the produce that grows from the forbidden produce prohibited. Se. emingly, we should follow the principle: Zeh vizeh goraim mutar, when an entity is produced by two factors, one permitted and one forbidden, it is permitted. Here as well, since the second generation produce was produced by the forbidden produce and also by the earth, it should be permitted:.
The Radbaz explains that since a vow is involved, we follow the principle mentioned in Halachah 12, that since the prohibition involved can be released entirely, we do not consider it nullified because. another factor is also involved.

For his vow specified only eating or tasting the produce, not benefiting from it. Nor is there any taste of the original produce in the produce that grows from its seeds.

For the second generation produce is not the same substance concerning which the vow was taken.

The onion or the garlic head is put in the ground and a new plant grows from it.

For ultimately, even the third generation produce has the flavor of the first generation produce. As the Rambam explains at the conclusion of Halachah 15, we do not say that its flavor will be nullified because the greater portion of the substance of the new produce is permitted, because, as stated in Halachah 12, the forbidden fruit is an entity whose prohibition could be released.

Nedarim 52b leaves unresolved the question whether in this context the juice produced from the fruit is considered as the fruit or not. Hence, because of the doubt, one is forbidden to partake of it, but cannot be held liable for punishment. This refers to fruits other than grapes or olives. In the latter instances, the liquid is considered as the fruit.

The Siftei Cohen 216:8 states that we are referring to an instance that the husband uses wording similar to that suggested in Chapter 3, Halachah 11; alternatively, that he is referring to work which his wife already performed. Otherwise, there would be a difficulty because a vow is not effective unless the object concerned already exists.

I.e., if she planted a tree, he is forbidden to partake of its fruit. The Rambam (based on Nedarim 57a) is restating the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah in a different context.

See Halachah 12 which explains that he has the potential to have his vow released.

The Ra’avad protests the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that based on Nedarim 47a, it appears that the produce grown from the fruits of his efforts is definitely forbidden. The Radbaz, however, explains that the Rambam has a different way of understanding that Talmudic passage.

Nedarim, loc. cit., explains that the question is: Since these entities have not come into existence as of yet, can he cause them to be forbidden to his colleague.

I.e., he is not liable. Firstly, lashes are not given when an unresolved question is involved. Also, as stated in Halachah 1, when a person becomes forbidden because of another person's vow, he is not liable for lashes unless he responds Amen.