Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Both movable and landed property, as the Rambam continues to state.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the person’s property is considered “a guarantor.” For that reason, as the Rambam continues to explain, the creditor must first demand payment from the borrower. If he is unable to make restitution, he should demand payment from the “guarantor” - i.e., the borrower’s property. See also Chapter 11, Halachah 4 and notes.

He may not, however, take the property from the lender by force without first bringing the matter to the court.

With this statement, the Rambam emphasizes that first, the borrower’s property is expropriated. Only if he does not have sufficient resources to pay the debt is the property that he sold attached (Maggid Mishneh).

When a loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone, the borrower’s property is also on lien to the debt. In such an instance, however - as explained in Chapter 11, Halachah 4 - even if the loan is still outstanding, the lender cannot expropriate the property that he sold from the purchasers. The rationale is that they can claim that the loan was never public knowledge, and thus they were not aware that the property was on lien. When, by contrast, a loan is supported by a promissory note that is signed by witnesses, it is assumed that the matter has become public knowledge.

As mentioned by Bava Metzia 14a (see Hilchot Mechirah 19:3), even if the promissory note did not explicitly state that the borrower’s property is on lien to the debt, that lien is considered to have been established.

If, however, it is still in the possession of the borrower, it may be expropriated (Maggid Mishneh).

See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on Chapter 23, Halachah 2.
The Rashba does not accept the latter principle, but instead maintains that even if this stipulation is not explicitly stated in the promissory note, we assume that this was the borrower’s and lender’s intent. The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 112:1), while that of the Rashba is cited by the Tur and the Ramah.
The Siftei Cohen 112:1 explains the positions as follows: When a person gives a loan, he wants to be secure that he will be repaid. Hence, it is a foregone conclusion in his mind - and hence, in the mind of the borrower - that if the borrower cannot pay him, he will expropriate property belonging to the borrower. Therefore, even if it was not stated that the borrower’s property is on lien to the loan, it is considered to be on lien.
This, however, applies only with regard to property that was in the borrower’s possession at the time of the loan. With regard to property that is not in his possession, since it is not at hand at present, unless an explicit stipulation that it is on lien is made, a lien is not established. For one would not automatically conclude that the lender - and the borrower - have it in mind.
Nevertheless, when a lender takes the trouble of having a promissory note composed with all the technicalities required of a legal document, we presume that he will do everything in his power to secure his money. Hence, it can be assumed that he will also have in mind to collect the debt from property that has not yet been acquired.

The rationale is that since the movable property could have been hidden or lost, the lender never really took seriously the possibility of expropriating such property as payment for the debt (Rashi, Bava Metzia 67b).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 113:1) states that this law applies even when the property is sold after the creditor warns potential purchasers that he desires to collect his debt from it.

I.e., to encourage the creditor to make the loan, the debtor gave him greater rights than he would ordinarily receive.

Hilchot Mechirah 3:9 states that the ownership of movable property can be transferred via the acquisition of movable property (kinyan agav). In this halachah, the Rambam explains that this concept also applies with regard to the establishment of a lien on the movable property.

As explained in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, the term asmachta refers to a stipulation conditional on a specific occurrence to which the principal agreed verbally, but never took seriously, because he did not expect that the occurrence would in fact take place. Because he never made a genuine commitment to the stipulation, it is not binding upon him.
Similarly, in the present instance, one could say that since the borrower never intended not to have the money available to repay his debt, he did not make a genuine commitment to place his movable property on lien. To nullify such a supposition, the borrower must explicitly make such a statement in the promissory note.

There are scribes who carry with them promissory notes that have already been written up, and all that is necessary is to add the names of the principals, the sum, the date and the place where the loan was completed. Such a standard form may state that the lien will be extended to movable property - or to movable property that will be purchased in the future. Since this stipulation is not binding unless the borrower has explicitly agreed to it, the above expression is added to clarify that he did in fact consent (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if the movable property was purchased after the landed property was sold. This concept is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

I.e., although the lien would not ordinarily be extended to such a great extent, since the borrower agreed to this stipulation, it is binding upon him and his property.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 60:1, 113:3) write that in the present age even though one composes such a promissory note, movable property is not expropriated from purchasers. This institution was ordained because otherwise people would never purchase movable property out of fear that it would be expropriated from them. The Siftei Cohen 60:4, however, disputes this ruling.

Ipotiki is a composite of three Aramaic words, whose connotation is “From here, you shall collect your debt” - i.e., the property is designated to be given to the creditor in payment of the debt owed him or to the women in place of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that they should benefit from the field, subtracting a specific amount each year as payment for the debt.

Washing away the topsoil and reducing its value.

We do not say that it is the creditor’s loss and the debtor is under no responsibility to him.
This ruling does not imply weakness in the creditor’s hold on the field. On the contrary, as long as the field is in the creditor’s possession, the debtor cannot compel him to accept another property in its stead [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 117:1)].

For in this instance, the creditor must suffer the disadvantages as well as the advantages of such a designation. Since the field was singled out for him, he is required to suffer the loss.

I.e., this stipulation must be explicitly stated in the promissory note. If the note does not mention the subject of a lien at all, the lien is established, for we assume that the lien was not mentioned as a result of a scribal error.

As stated above, any condition a person makes with regard to financial matters is binding.

Since it is possible that the creditor will be paid from other resources possessed by the debtor. This applies to an ordinary ipotiki. If, however, the debtor specified that the creditor should not derive payment from any place but this, the sale is nullified even when there are other properties that he could expropriate.

This applies even if there are other properties that the debtor sold after the designated property. Although a creditor must normally expropriate the last field that the debtor sold as payment for the debt, in this instance an exception is made, because the field was originally designated an ipotiki (Maggid Mishneh).

This applies both to an ipotiki that is explicit (i.e., the debtor told the creditor that he should expropriate payment only from this field) and to an ordinary ipotiki.

I.e., the debtor sold the field until the time it would be expropriated.

I.e., without informing the purchaser that it could be expropriated from him because it was designated an ipotiki.

Because the transaction was concluded under false premises. Had the purchaser known this, he never would have purchased the field.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it is based on a mistaken interpretation of a passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Shivi’it 10:1). The commentaries explain that he understands the Rambam as implying that even when the ipotiki is explicit, the creditor can expropriate only when the debtor has no other property. To this he objects, maintaining that the debtor can expropriate this field in all circumstances.
Similarly, according to the Ra’avad’s interpretation, the sale is binding - even when the ipotiki is explicit - until the creditor comes to collect the debt.
The Maggid Mishneh acknowledges that other Rishonim also interpret that passage differently from the way that the Rambam does. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:1) quotes the Rambam’s view, but the Tur and the Ramah quote that of the Ra’avad.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 107:8 explains that the Rambam also agrees that a creditor with an explicit ipotiki can expropriate the field from the purchaser in all situations. It is only with regard to the last point that there is a difference of opinion.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries regarding whether this applies only with regard to a creditor whose claim is supported by a promissory note or even with regard to a creditor whose claim is supported by a verbal commitment alone. The Maggid Mishneh expresses the first view, stating that when a loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone, property that has been sold is never expropriated.
The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 117, based on the statements of Rabbenu Asher, Responsum 86:11), by contrast, maintains that this is an exception. The reason why a person cannot expropriate property from purchasers when a loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone is that the matter did not become public knowledge. In this instance, even when the ipotiki is not stated in a promissory note, it will become public knowledge, because the servant himself will spread the report. He will tell everyone that his master designated him as an ipotiki. Hence, even if he was sold, he can be expropriated, because the purchaser could have had knowledge of the matter. The Siftei Cohen 117:4 cites a commentary of Rabbenu Asher that echoes the Maggid Mishneh’s view.

This applies when the debtor does not have any other property - if we are speaking about an ordinary ipotiki - or even if he has other property if we are speaking about an explicit ipotiki (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., it would become public knowledge that this servant was designated an ipotiki. Hence, a person purchasing the servant should have inquired before making the purchase. If he did not, the loss is his own responsibility.

Articles of movable property are not distinguished as individual entities. Hence, the purchaser will not necessarily be able to know that the article was designated an ipotiki.

This applies even if the matter is recorded in a promissory note and the purchaser was aware which article was designated an ipotiki, for our Rabbis did not make distinctions when making their decrees [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:3)].

As a donation to the Temple treasury.

I.e., the prohibition against possession of leaven on Passover. If a Jew placed a lien in favor of a gentile on leaven that he owned, and the Passover holiday arrives, the leaven becomes forbidden and must be destroyed, despite the gentile's claim to it.

If a person consecrates property to the Temple treasury, the consecration is effective even if the property was on lien to a debt.

But not from the time of the first promissory note. This is a loss that the creditor incurs, because if the debtor sold property in the interim, the creditor is not entitled to expropriate it. Since the servant was designated an ipotiki in the previous promissory note, it is considered as if that promissory note has been paid. The debtor, however, established a new obligation by freeing the servant. The lien created by that obligation, however, takes effect when the creditor frees him.

By freeing the servant who was designated as the creditor’s property, he caused the creditor a loss.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:13.

I.e., the creditor who should have acquired the servant.

I.e., there is no legal obligation for the creditor to free the slave, for he never really became his property. Our Sages, nevertheless, compelled him to do so for the reason stated by the Rambam.

This applies not only to animals that are consecrated for the Temple sacrifices - and thus they themselves become sacred - but also to objects dedicated to the Temple treasury that by and large will be sold, and the proceeds used for the Temple.
In Hilchot Arachin 7:14, the Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining only that articles that are themselves consecrated for the Temple worship lift the lien of an article. According to his view, even while the field is in the possession of the Temple treasury, it is still on lien to the creditor. The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on our halachah states that most authorities follow the Ra’avad’s perspective. In his Kessef Mishneh in his gloss on Hilchot Arachin, Rav Yosef Karo supports the Rambam’s position, yet in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:7), it appears that he follows the other view. The Tur and the Ramah explicitly state that the Ra’avad’s position should be followed. i’,

Hilchot Arachin 7:14-16. There the Rambam explains that the person who redeems the field is required to pay the creditor or the woman the money owed them, and he must pay at least a minor sum to the Temple treasury for the right to redeem the field. This applies when the value of the field is equal to - or slightly less than - the amount owed. For in such a situation, it is probable that another person will be willing to redeem the field. If, however, the debt is much more than the value of the field, the lien is lifted from the field entirely, for otherwise no one would ever desire to redeem it.

I.e., if both the purchaser and the creditor desire the field, the purchaser is given priority and he may pay the debt and retain possession of the field. The rationale is that the purchaser originally bought the field, while the creditor originally gave money. Hence, the purchaser is allowed to retain possession of the field, and money is returned to the creditor.
See Chapter 22, Halachah 16, which states that even if the field was already expropriated from the purchaser’s possession, he can reclaim it by paying the creditor his due. Many other authorities do not accept this principle. See Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 114:3) and the gloss of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 114:4.

Who is also the debtor.

On the basis of Bava Metzia l5b, the Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers only to an explicit ipotiki - e.g., the debtor told the creditor: “You will receive payment from this source alone.” If, however, it was merely designated as an ordinary ipotiki, the creditor’s claim may be eliminated through payment.

The fact that the field was designated as an explicit ipotiki indicates that the creditor was also concerned with receiving the land. Hence, since his lien was established first, his claim is given precedence over that of the purchaser.

This is a description of an incident that took place in Babylon and was recorded in Ketubot 91 b.

100 zuz.

And return the field to me that you expropriated.

Because Shimon had the option of being paid the entire amount that he was owed.
If, however, the field was designated as an explicit ipotiki for Shimon, this law does not apply (Maggid Mishneh).

For that is all that he paid for it.

As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 8.

. As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 7, movable property inherited by heirs is not on lien to the creditor. Therefore, when the heirs make such a statement, it is as if they are stating that they are repurchasing the field from the creditor with their own funds. Hence, neither he nor any other creditor can expropriate it from them (Maggid Mishneh).
The Siftei Cohen 107:9 states that the law stated by the Rambam applied in the era of the Talmud. In the present era, however, different rules apply. As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 11, the Geonim already ruled that the movable property left in an estate is on lien to the deceased’s debts. Hence this halachah is no longer relevant.