Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

The term literally means “people of the land,” i.e., common people who are generally given over to mundane pursuits.

An article on which a zav or one who imparts a similar impurity sat or lied upon, or was supported by in another way. In this instance, we fear that the unlearned person’s wife sat on the person’s clothes while she was in the nidah state (Chulin 35b).

If, however, he touches it from the outside, it is insignificant, because an earthenware container contracts impurity only from its inside. See Chapter 8, Halachot 3-4, and notes.

As is impure terumah.

I.e., we are not certain that the unlearned person is impure. Now, there is a prohibition against destroying pure terumah unnecessarily. For that reason, generally, if there was a question whether terumah contracted ritual impurity, it was put aside and not burnt until it is certain that it contracted impurity. Nevertheless, in this instance, our Sages decreed that the terumah should be burnt. From here, we see the intent is that the Sages did not merely suspect that the unlearned people were impure, they assumed that they were impure (Likkutei Sichot). See further discussion of this issue in Hilchot Sh’ar Avot HaTum’ah 13:13.

l. e., whether the articles contracted impurity or not.

F oods or utensils.

l. e., we do not suspect that the person would lie. Instead, the likelihood is that he or she will simply be unaware that a food or a utensil became impure.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 2:3), the Rambam explains that this term is used because, as indicated by the following halachah, the term refers to Torah scholars. Chavair means “friend.” This term is appropriate to be used with regard to Torah scholars. Since their friendship is based on the Torah, it is true friendship, for its motivation is for the sake of heaven.

Until produce was touched by water, it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Hence it is permissible to take produce that is dry from an unlearned person. Similarly, there is no restriction against selling him such produce (see Kessef Mishneh).

In a place where it is obvious that he is carrying out these deeds as a result of a genuine commitment and not out of a desire to impress others.

I.e., he will wash his hands in the ritual manner before touching terumah.

For this is the primary aspect associated with eating ordinary foods in a state of ritual purity. Indeed, it is of such great importance, the person is not considered to have “accepted all the restrictions of a chavair except one,” because any and all matters that are not included in this restriction are secondary in nature (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., even in the era after the destruction of the Temple, such a person could be relied on even though it was unknown whether he formally accepted these restrictions.

For a person would not be accepted into the academy unless he agreed to accept these restrictions.

He has no choice, for he will not be able to maintain his observance of these precepts unless it is shared by the members of his household.

I.e., their conduct indicates that they are no longer mindful of these restrictions.

Or his divorcee.

The acceptance must be formalized in the presence of three chaveirim and there is a 30 day interim period for them to become familiar with these practices.

We assume that they will continue observing the practices that they followed previously.

I.e., in the time when he had not yet achieved the status of a chavair, other unlearned people had also touched these pure articles. He was familiar with their personal circumstances and relied on their word that they had not imparted impurity to the pure articles.

I.e., considered impure. For the word of an unlearned person is not accepted by a chavair.

l. e., if he knows that he was pure at the time that he was involved with them, even after his status changes, he may rely on that knowledge and consider the articles as pure.

l. e., other chaveirim must regard the foods as impure, because their status is dependent on the knowledge of a person who was “unlearned” at the time.

Although in other contexts, e.g., whether his firstborn animals have contracted a disqualifying blemish, a scholar is not allowed to issue halachic rulings with regard to his own possessions, in this instance, we accept his rulings (Bechorot 31a).

This term refers to a practice common in the Roman era in which a person would pay the tax duty for a particular region to the king in advance. He would then collect that duty—and more—from the inhabitants of that region. Since he is making a profit, and in most instances, an inordinate profit, from the inhabitants, he is considered as a robber and disqualified as a witness (see Hilchot Edut 10:4). The Sefer Me'irat Einayim, Choshen Mishpat 34:34 interprets this term slightly differently, explaining that it refers to customs collectors and income tax collectors. Since the rules governing these duties are not so clear cut and it is possible for the collector to overcharge, it is suspected that he will do so and keep the remainder for himself.

The collectors of a fixed head tax or property tax.

l. e., he does not revert to his initial status automatically. Instead, he must make a formal acceptance of these practices and go through an initial period of acclimatization before his word is accepted, as stated in Halachot 2 and 5.

l. e., there was reason to suspect that he did not observe a certain dimension of the laws of ritual purity.

He is not suspect to have abandoned the observance of ritual purity entirely.

If he is willing to violate a more severe restriction, his fear of heaven will not be strong enough to prevent him from violating a lesser one.

For we assume that his fear of heaven will prevent him from such a violation.

With regard to any matter of ritual purity.

As long as it is not known that he violated a prohibition punishable by lashes, in which instance, his testimony is disqualified, as stated in Hilchot Edut 10:2.

Hence although he might violate the transgression involved for his own benefit, we do not cast aspersions on his testimony or judgment with regard to others. This is a general principle, applicable in many different contexts in Jewish Law; see, for example, Hilchot Ma’aser 12:17, Hilchot Shemitah 8:17, Hilchot Edut 11:8.
In those sources—and here—the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and cites sources which appear to indicate that the suspect person’s word is not accepted at all, not with regard to his own matters, nor with regard to those involving another person. In the places cited, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh provide explanations that justify the Rambam’s ruling.