Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

So that they become ritually pure. The rationale is that a certain amount of liquid flows from the grapes when they are picked, causing them to be fit to contract ritual impurity.
Hence, if they are touched by an impure person at that time or afterwards, they are ritually impure [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 10:3); see also Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 1:1, 11:1].

Those who harvest the olives need not, because the liquid that flows from the olives is not significant.

As would be necessary had they contracted impurity.

According to Scriptural Law, for them to cause other Keilim in the olive-press to be impure, they would have to have touched the other Keilim while they were moving the Keilim with midras impurity. If they had already placed down the Keilim that were impure, they do not impart impurity to other Keilim. Nevertheless, the Sages were stringent and ruled that they impart impurity to other utensils even if they had already placed down the Keilim that had contracted midras impurity. See Chapter 6, Halachah 2.

Talmudic measure equivalent to a kilometer according to Shiurei Torah.

Which implies that he is not following immediately.

That imparts impurity to it.

Because he intended to guard it entirely. Even though the pitchfork contracts impurity, it does not impart that impurity to the basket, because one k’li does not impart impurity to another (Chagigah 20a; Hilchot Tum’at Meit 5:7).

I.e., even if one desires that the ordinary food remain pure, he will not guard it with the same degree of attention as terumah, for eating impure terumah violates a Scriptural prohibition.

Hence even though he was careful that they did not contract impurity, he cannot rely on them for the Sabbath, because the standards of purity observed on the Sabbath are higher. This relates to the concepts mentioned above: that guarding ordinary food is not the same as guarding food that is terumah. See Me’iri to Chagigah 20a.

The rationale is that the owner diverted his own attention from it when he asked his colleague to guard it for him and that colleague did not guard it from impurity, because he was not explicitly asked to.

This is a stringency enacted because, generally, no loss will be incurred through considering the Keilim impure, because they can be purified. Although earthenware containers that are considered impure cannot be purified, once the Sages enacted a decree, they applied it to all Keilim.

As explained in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 16:1, when a person performs sacrificial service with the intent of partaking of the sacrifice or offering it on the altar at times other than those prescribed, the sacrifice is considered as piggul and it is forbidden to be offered or eaten.

We assume that if the matter was true, he would have informed him at the earliest possible opportunity. The Ra'avad mentions that if the other person was paid to work with him, his word is accepted. Since his word is accepted with regard to his own wages (that his employer does not owe him for his services), his word is accepted with regard to the sacrifices or the pure articles. cf. Hilchot Tefillin 1:18,.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 96) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 161) include the laws governing this impurity as one of the commandments in their reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

I.e., in contrast, to the substances mentioned in Halachah 7.

As stated in Hilchot Tum'at Meit 1:5; 6:3; Hilchot Keilim 13:1, et al, earthenware containers contract impurity only when impurity enters their inner space or when they are moved by a zav or the like.

See Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 6:2.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 12, which explains that this is exception to the general rule.

Not only the clothes he was wearing, but also any other k’li (other than an earthenware container) he touches also becomes impure [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 1:1); Sifra to the prooftext cited].

But not after he puts down the carcass. By carrying the carcass, he contracts impurity even if he did not actually touch it.

I.e., immerse in a mikveh to purify from ritual impurity.

In which instance, it would be forbidden to partake of them and in the case of consecrated animals, even to benefit from them (Hilchot Shechitah 2:2; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:3).

Or touched.

Hilchot Shechitah 3:18.

In this context, there is a difference between the laws governing ritual impurity and those pertaining to partaking of non-kosher food. In that context, as stated in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:17, non-kosher meat from a kosher species can not be combined with meat from a non-kosher species to comprise an olive-sized portion of a prohibited substance.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 1. The Rambam’s ruling here implies that the blood of a carcass does impart impurity according to Rabbinic Law [see his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ediyot 8:1)]. Nevertheless, such blood does not make foods susceptible to ritual impurity, as stated in Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 10:3.

The verse mentions a domesticated animal explicitly and the license applies to it and not to a kosher wild animal.

This is the literal meaning of the term tereifah. It also refers to any animal that dies — or would die — because of sickness or infirmity.

The statement that it can be used for any purpose implies that it can also be used in the Temple. Thus one can infer that it does not impart ritual impurity [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:9) based on the Sifra to Leviticus 11:27].

And not to an entity that is inherently unacceptable like a non-kosher animal.

See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 1:2.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) which explains that for the fat to become impure, it need not come into contact with a source of impurity, but is inherently considered as impure food. As the Kessef Mishneh states in his gloss to Chapter 3, Halachah 14, many authorities differ and maintain that it must come in contact with a source of impurity.

In Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13, the Rambam defines this term as "A hybrid that comes from the mating of a kosher domesticated animal and a kosher wild animal." In his gloss to Hilchot Bikkurim 9:5, Rav Yosef Caro explains that the Rambam understands the term ko'i as referring to an independent species that we do not know whether to classify as a domesticated animal or as a wild animal. He maintains that the proper version of Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot is "any animal whose classification as a domesticated animal or as a wild animal is doubtful is a ko'i" and he maintains that Hilchot Shechitah 14:4 serves as proof of this interpretation.

Since the classification of a ko’i is a matter of question as stated in the previous note, it is not known whether its fat is considered as the fat of a domesticated animal (and is thus pure) or the fat of a wild animal (and impure).

As is appropriate when these substances definitely contract Scriptural impurity.

As he would be liable if he had definitely contracted Scriptural impurity.

I.e., the impurity associated with a dead animal. For it is the meat of the carcass that imparts impurity and these parts of the body are not considered as meat. In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:18, the Rambam states that these parts of the body are not considered as meat within the context of the prohibition against eating non-kosher meat. Here he states the same concept with regard to the laws of ritual impurity. It must, however, be noted that they could be considered as a component of the olive-sized portion that contracts the impurity associated with foods (Chulin 9:1).

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 9:1).

As the Rambam states in the above source, giddim is a general term including blood vessels, nerves, sinews, and cartilage.

I.e., when attached to the carcass, they are considered as a “handle” of the carcass and governed by the same laws.

For as stated in Halachah 1, there must be an olive-sized portion of meat for it to impart impurity.

An animal ate the meat of the carcass and left small portions stuck to the hide.

When skinning the animal, as explained above.

I.e., if there is slightly less than an olive-sized portion of meat from an animal carcass and the meat that stuck to a hide would have enabled an olive-sized portion to be comprised, that meat is not considered significant and is considered as if it does not exist.

Since the person collected the pieces, he shows that to him, they are considered as important and hence, impart ritual impurity (Rashi, Chulin 117b).

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:21 which mentions these — and other hides — within the context of the prohibition against partaking of the meat of forbidden species.

The hide of a wild boar, by contrast, is too tough to be eaten.

The Mishnah (Chulin 9:2) mentions several other types of hides as well. Nevertheless, as the Rambam mentions in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the majority of the Sages did not consider those hides as meat.

Because they are considered as meat, they are considered as impure.

I.e., they are considered as pure, because they are obviously no longer considered as food.

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.).

Like a sheep or a goat.

Like a cow.

In which instance, one would slit the hide from the neck to the tail and then peel the hide from the meat (ibid.:3).

At which point it could be considered as an independent entity.

A handbreath is approximately 3.6 inches according to Shiurei Torah.

And is thus impure unless the animal was killed through ritual slaughter.

In this instance, the hide is cut from leg to leg and then cut or peeled away [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 9:3)].
We have translated the term according to its accepted meaning. In this instance, however, since one is using the skin of the entire animal, it appears the intent is a very large flask or a sack.

And thus conveying ritual impurity.

As the Rambam explains (ibid.), there was a unique technique in which a sheep was skinned by cutting open the hide only at the feet and the entire animal was removed through that hole. Thus all of its flesh remained intact. Such a technique was used when the hide was intended to be used as a flask.

The eight species of crawling animals whose flesh imparts ritual impurity, as will be explained in ch. 4.

I.e., one skinned the entire hide except the portion around the neck.

And thus its meat does not impart ritual impurity and can contract ritual impurity, as other foods can.

As if it had been touched itself. Conversely, if the hide was already considered as separated, even though it was actually attached—e.g., one was skinning the hide to use as a mat—the fact that impurity touches the portion that has been skinned does not change the status of the meat [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].

That preyed on the carcass. Since there is a significant portion of meat left, it is not ignored.

I.e., a person skinning the hide. Since it was ignored by the person skinning the animal, it is considered as insignificant.

Even though together, they would be considered as of significant size, since they are separate, they are considered individually and each is considered as insignificant.

Even if the person would touch both pieces at the same time, he would not contract impurity, because neither alone is considered as significant and touching each one is considered as a separate act. Therefore it is of no consequence.

Although when carrying the hide, one is carrying an entire olive-sized portion, since they are separate and each one is considered insignificant, they do not impart impurity.

When the conditions the Rambam proceeds to mention are met, the two pieces are considered as a single entity with regard to being carried.

See Hilchot Tum ‘at Meit 4:5 for another example of the expression of this concept. From the precise wording of that halachah: “It does not impart impurity when one touches a portion of it,” Rabbi Akiva Eiger infers that if one does touch an olive-sized portion of meat, even if it is from separate pieces, he contracts impurity. See also Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 6:17.

I.e., when one picks up one of the pieces, the other will remain attached.

For it is no longer considered as meat. If, however, it is fit for a dog to eat, it imparts impurity, even if it is not fit for human consumption.

"Flesh that has decomposed and turned into a putrid liquid mass, provided the liquid mass that resulted from the corpse coagulates" (Hilchot Tum'at Meit 2:1).

An olive-sized portion of the netzel of a human corpse imparts impurity (ibid.). Nevertheless, since the impurity associated with an animal carcass is dependent on it being basar, meat, there is a question whether that impurity applies once it has decomposed.

Compare to Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:1 where the Rambam rules that the flesh of a human corpse that has become dry like a shard retains its impurity.

Our text is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text has a slightly different version.

Impure foods impart impurity when touched, but this dried meat does not.

I.e., the animal died while pregnant.

For most people do not consider it as fit for consumption [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 4:7)].

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Chasdei David, Chulin, ch. 8. The stomach itself is considered as meat and imparts impurity,

For they are also considered as waste products, unfit for human consumption. See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:19 where the Rambam states the same concepts within the context of the prohibition against partaking of forbidden meat.

It is thought that there was a fetus that was crushed and dissolved in the blood that was discharged. Hence, the next offspring the mother animal bears is not considered the firstborn.

I.e., even though it is thought that there was a fetus dissolved in the blood, it is not considered as meat and hence, does not impart impurity.

Note the contrast to the following halachah, as explained in its notes.

There are those who maintain that this applies only when he touched only one piece. If, however, he touched all the pieces, he does contract impurity. Their logic is that, seemingly, the same logic that applies with regard to carrying would apply to touching (see Rashi, Bechorot 23a). The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam differs and considers the person pure even if he touches all the pieces.
Why is touching different from carrying? Rav Yosef Corcus explains that each piece he touches is judged individually. Since it cannot be identified and the carcass is nullified, with regard to each judgment, the person is considered as pure. When carrying, by contrast, he is carrying the entire amount together and within that amount, the impurity is certainly present.

For he certainly carried the meat from the carcass. Even though it cannot be identified and therefore its existence is considered nullified with regard to touch, since the meat from the carcass is present and it is being carried, it imparts impurity (ibid.). For it to impart impurity, at least one piece of the carcass must be the size of an olive, as evident from Halachah 12.
The Kessef Mishneh questions how this situation is different from the discharge of blood mentioned in the previous halachah. For there, a person carrying it does not become impure. In resolution, he quotes Rav Yosef Corcus who explains that, in that situation, the fetus was dissolved. Hence, it is considered as if it did not exist. In this instance, by contrast, the meat from the carcass obviously exists. It is merely not recognized.

The Ra’avad objects to the inclusion of this rationale, stating that, from Menachot 23ab, it appears that this rationale is offered only according to Rabbi Yehudah’s approach. He maintains that a substance can never be nullified when mixed together with another substance of the same type. Therefore this rationale is required to explain why an exception is made in this instance. According to the majority opinion, which maintains that a substance can be nullified when mixed together with another substance of the same type, seemingly, this rationale is unnecessary. The Kessef Mishneh explains that perhaps the Rambam included this point merely to satisfy the proponents of the minority view.

Since it is from a non-kosher species, even if it was slaughtered in a kosher manner, that fact is insignificant in this context. Although a kosher animal is considered as dead after ritual slaughter, this does not apply with regard to a non-kosher animal.

I.e., after an animal is slaughtered, it still makes convulsive movements before its soul actually departs. As long as a non-kosher animal makes such movements, it is considered as alive and it does not impart impurity.

If its head is cut off, it is considered to have died and imparts impurity as a carcass does, even if its body continues moving.

I.e., if it contracts impurity from another source. Since such slaughter would enable a Jew to partake of a kosher animal, it is considered significant enough for a non-kosher animal to be deemed as food.

The rationale is that killing a kosher animal in this manner does not cause it to be considered as food. Hence, when a non-kosher animal is killed in this manner, it is also not considered as food. See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 3:4.

No matter how it was killed, even if it was slaughtered in the ritual manner (Hilchot Melachim 9:12).

One of the Seven Universal Laws Commanded to Noah and His Descendants is the prohibition against eating meat or an organ cut off an animal while it is alive (ibid. 9:1, 10-13). In this halachah, the Rambam is emphasizing that even though slaughter has been performed on an animal, it is still considered alive with regard to this prohibition.
This is not merely a theoretical argument. At present, many slaughtering plants are highly automated with animals slaughtered and then cut up while they are on a conveyor belt. It is not infrequent for the operators of the plant not to be willing to wait the short amount of time it would take for these convulsive movements to stop before having the animal cut in pieces. Thus the meat and organs severed in such a manner are forbidden to a gentile.

I.e., the windpipe or the esophagus.

I.e., since slitting only one of the signs does not cause an animal to become acceptable to be eaten, it is not considered as food until it actually dies.

See Hilchot Shechitah 3:19; Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:13.

I.e., the meat surrounding the hip bone.

I.e., no longer alive.

The rationale is that as long as it is in its mother’s womb, it is considered as part of her body and not as an independent entity. This is borne out by the ruling that if the mother animal was ritually slaughtered, it would be permissible to partake of the fetus. Although this ruling applies only to a kosher species, Leviticus 11:39 makes an association between kosher species and non-kosher species [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 4:3)].

See the parallels in Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:3.

Even in part.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:2.

I.e., if they are separated from a living animal, they do not impart impurity at all.

An animal was injured or maimed and a part of its flesh or limbs was not severed from its body, but hung loosely and was not functional. Note the parallels with regard to the prohibitions of partaking of such a limb, as stated in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:6.

Rav Akiva Eiger mentions that this applies only if the animal is healthy. If it is a tereifah, i.e., it will die within twelve months, flesh separated from it during its lifetime is considered as having been separated from a carcass.

I.e., even during the animal’s lifetime, they are already considered as food and can contract impurity. As Rav Yosef Corcus emphasizes, this is the fundamental concept taught by this halachah.

Through contact with liquids, as explained in Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:1-2.

Like food. The blood that flowed from the animal at the time of slaughter makes the limb fit to contract impurity [Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 2:6; the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 9:7)].

As stated in Halachah 3. It is only a limb that is intact that imparts impurity.

I.e., a complete limb, regardless of the size, as stated in Halachah 3. Some manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah follow a different version, stating: “In both instances, there is no minimum measure.” The Kessef Mishneh suggests that this is the proper version.

I.e., possessing an infirmity that will cause it to die within twelve months. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4:7-9; Hilchot Shechitah, chs. 5-11.

I.e., the ritual slaughter is effective in this regard.

I.e., the fetus is not considered as an independent entity, but as one of the limbs of the mother. Since the mother was slaughtered in an acceptable manner, all of its meat, including the fetus, does not impart ritual impurity. In his gloss to Halachah 7, the Kessef Mishneh states that this leniency applies even if the fetus would itself be con-sidered as tereifah.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that we are speaking about an instance where the mother animal was tereifah or slaughtered unacceptably. If the mother was kosher and slaughtered in an acceptable manner, the fetus is considered as one of the limbs of its mother. If it is alive- regardless of the month of its gestation- it may be eaten without being slaughtered itself and does not impart impurity according to Scriptural Law. (There are certain restrictions according to Rabbinic Law.)

Like a human (see Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:14, et al), an animal fetus that was born after eight months of pregnancy is not expected to live. Hence it is deemed a tereifah and is forbidden to be eaten even if it was slaughtered in an acceptable manner. While it is alive, it does not impart impurity, but when it is slaughtered—even acceptably—it does.
Alternatively; the phrase “after it was deemed tereifah” could refer to the mother, i.e., after the mother was deemed a tereifah and the fetus ripped from its womb (Kessef Mishneh).

Before an animal from a kosher species became a tereifah, there was a time when it could have been slaughtered and been kosher. This fetus, however, never had and never will have a time when it could be considered as an independent kosher entity.

Until an animal that was born without going through a full term of gestation lives seven days, we are not certain that it is a viable offspring and it is forbidden to partake of its meat even if it was properly slaughtered (see Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4:4).

From Shabbat 134b and Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot, op. cit., it appears that it is questionable whether it is viable or not. Hence, we are stringent and apply the principle stated previously, that since this animal never had a time when it was considered as an independent kosher entity, ritual slaughter is not effective for it at all, not even to prevent it from being considered as a carcass. Nevertheless, if it was slaughtered, the impurity it imparts is only of questionable status. Rav Yosef Corcus states that this is hinted at by the phrase “like a non-viable offspring,” i.e., that it is comparable to an animal of that status.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:14, 7:3.

I.e., the period of gestation was full term.

I.e., it is permitted to eat its meat, regardless of how it was killed.

According to Scriptural Law, even if it steps on the ground, it does not require ritual slaughter. Slaughter was required by the Sages as a decree, because of the impression that might be created (Chullin 75b).

I.e., after the mother was slaughtered, its body came in contact with a source of impurity.

Because from the slaughter onward, it is considered as an independent entity.

In this instance as well, it is considered as an independent entity, and not as part of its mother.

See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 2:6; Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:14.

See Hilchot Shechitah 12:10; see also Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:12.

I.e., even if it dies without ritual slaughter, it is not considered as a carcass, because it was considered as one of its mother’s limbs at the time the mother was slaughtered. This applies even if the offspring was tereifah (Kessef Mishneh).

This applies whether the mother animal was kosher or tereifah. If, however, the mother was tereifah, the offspring is forbidden to be eaten even though it does not impart ritual impurity (ibid.). This leniency applies only if the slaughter of the mother was acceptable. If the slaughter of the mother was not acceptable, as soon as the fetus dies, its meat imparts the impurity associated with a dead animal.

As stated in Halachah 6.

As is a limb severed from a living animal, as stated in Halachah 3.

For it is purified through the slaughter of its mother, as stated in Halachot 6-7. This applies provided it does not come in contact with the limb that was cut off. (Moreover, if it comes in contact with that limb, it contracts the impurity that stems from contact with impure foods.)

Since the limb was extended outside the body before the animal was slaughtered, it is considered as tereifah. The rationale is that, included in the definition of tereifah is any animal, or part of an animal, that before slaughter was found in an inappropriate place (Chulin 68a, Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 5:9). There the Rambam states: “Even if [the fetus] returns the limb to the womb of the mother and afterwards, [the mother] was slaughtered or the fetus was born and lived for several years, that limb is forbidden as a treifah.”

As stated in the previous halachah.

As mentioned, for ritual slaughter to be acceptable, one must slit both the windpipe and the esophagus. In the interim, between the slitting of the two, the fetus stuck out its foot.

I.e., it is considered as if the fetus stuck out its foot after the slaughter of the animal.

This applies even if the animal is slaughtered according to all the laws of ritual slaughter, as the Rambam proceeds to state.

I.e., when carried, and, of course, when touched (Chulin 13b). This lends credence to the concept that the impurity the animal imparts is a Rabbinic decree.

The term Samaritan- Kuti (“Cuthean”) in classical Hebrew—denotes the people whom the invading King of Assyria settled in the northern part of Eretz Yisrael (Samaria) in place of the exiled Ten Tribes. These people converted to Judaism, but were selective in their observance, and hence were never accepted as an integral part of our people. Indeed, the early Talmudic Sages questioned whether their conversion was halachically effective or not. By the time of the later Sages, it had been discovered that they were idolaters, and they were deemed to be outright gentiles.

I.e., if a gentile accepts the observance of the Seven Laws Given to the Descendants of Noah, he is granted the right to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6; Hilchot Melachim 8:10-11. Nevertheless, in this context, his status is no different from that of other gentiles.

The Ra’avad rejects the Rambam’s ruling outright, for the Rambam seems to be implying that the gentile’s slaughter is significant and it is only the Sages who disqualify it. The Ra’avad, by contrast, maintains that the gentile’s actions are entirely insignificant. The Kessel Mishneh also questions the Rambam’s ruling, however, stating that the Tosefta (Chulin 1:1) cites a verse from which it is derived that the slaughter of a gentile is of no consequence whatsoever. The Kessef Mishneh, however, states that according to the Rambam, the reference to the verse could be interpreted as an asmachta, the use of a verse by the Rabbis as support for their own decree.

Chapter 6.

And gentiles as a whole, as implied by Exodus 34:15; see Avodah Zarah 29b.

For it can be assumed that the gentile has his false deity in mind [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 1:1)].

See Hilchot Shechitah 4:11. From Halachah 12 of that source, however, it appears that the Scriptural prohibition only applies when the animal was slaughtered by an idolatrous gentile. If the gentile did not serve false deities, his slaughter is forbidden only by Rabbinic decree.

As stated in Halachah 6.

As mandated by Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash3:12-13; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:13-15.

I.e., the bare bone, without an olive-sized portion of meat on it.

Although the bone contains marrow which is considered as meat, as long as it is intact, it does not impart impurity.

Even though he is carrying the marrow, since the bone is intact, it does not impart impurity.

Because the marrow it contains is no longer enclosed.

I.e., it has dried out and is no longer connected to the bone.

Were the animal to be alive.

If there is sufficient marrow inside a bone, it has the potential to regenerate flesh that had been peeled off the bone.

I.e., it is considered like a limb severed from a living animal, because the marrow will cause it to regenerate. If, however, the marrow has already dried out, it is only considered as flesh from a carcass.

Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:5.

I.e., there is room to say that since the act of perforating the bone is minimal, from the time the person had the intent of perforating it, it is considered as if it had been perforated entirely. The Kessef Mishneh notes that the standard published text of Chulin 126b does not leave this question unanswered and rules that the bone is considered to have been perforated already. He suggests that the Rambam had a different version of that text. Rav Yosef Corcus states that since the Talmud debates a similar issue in another source, it appears that a final ruling on the subject had not been reached.