Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 71) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 129) include this commandment in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:13 defines the term shifchah charufah used by Leviticus 19:20 and the Rambam here as “a woman who is half a Canaanite maid-servant and half a free woman who is consecrated by a Hebrew servant.”

As will be stated in Halachah 7, the intent here is not robbery alone, but any type of misappropriation of a colleague’s money.

The Rambam’s wording is somewhat general, because the purification of a person afflicted by tzara’at does not involve a transgression and a nazirite may have contracted ritual impurity against his will and thus, he is not considered to have transgressed.
In this chapter, the Rambam discusses the liability one incurs for the three transgressions mentioned. He discusses a nazirite’s liability for a guilt-offering in Hilchot Nizirut 6:11 and the liability of one who is purified from tzara’at in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2.

Above the age of twelve so that she will be liable for her actions.

In contrast to one who is compelled to transgress against her will or who sinned inadvertently.
This represents a change of mind for the Rambam. In one of the versions of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam writes that a consecrated maid-servant is liable even if she sinned inadvertently.

In contrast to anal intercourse.

I.e., the person liable for relations with her inserted his entire male organ. All of the latter points are derived from the term necherefet which has all of these implications (Keritot 11a).

This explains why the woman must be “past majority, aware of the transgression, [and] willfully participating.”

The literal meaning of the Rambam’s words is “nine years and one day old.” Nevertheless, the intent is that from nightfall on the day of his ninth birthday, he is considered as nine years and a day old, because any portion of a day is considered as a full day. From this age on, relations with such a youth are considered significant (Hilchot Ishut 11:3).

For she is past majority and is responsible for her conduct.

Even though generally, a minor is not held responsible for his conduct, in this instance, the youth is not being given punishment; he is being required to bring a sacrifice for atonement. And atonement is relevant even for one below majority.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, for he had an incorrect version of the Mishneh Torah in which it was stated that the youth receives lashes (Kessel Mishneh; see also the Ra’avad’s gloss to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, ch. 3).

See Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:5 which states that sacrifices should be brought only when a person consciously brings them. A youth of nine is not considered as intellectually mature. Thus a sacrifice that he brings is not considered as having been brought willfully.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:13, 15.

Both the maid-servant and the one who engages in relations with her.

This interpretation is not a contradiction to the testimony of the witnesses, for the witnesses would not necessarily observe this matter.

The maid-servant, however, receives lashes for every time they engage in relations (ibid. 3:14).

With regard to ordinary sin-offerings, becoming aware of a transgression would create a distinction between it and other transgressions and require the violator to bring a second sacrifice.

If his relations with the woman are considered as having been carried out under compulsion, he is exempt, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 8.

For the different bodies create a distinction.

Anything less than a p’rutah is not halachically significant (see Hilchot Sh’vuot 7:16, Hilchot Gezeilah 7:7, et al).

I.e., he stood in the open and took money from another person by force (Hilchot Gezeilah 1:3).

I.e., he stole money from another person without that person knowing (Hilchot Geneivah 1:3).

He found an object lost by a colleague; he withheld wages, or the like (see Hilchot Gezeilah 7:2).

This is an exception to the rule. Generally, one does not bring a sacrifice to atone for the intentional violation. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 2:2), the Rambam explains that the person’s liability in this instance is derived from a gezerah shevah (textual association) with the oath taken in connection with testimony. Significantly, in Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:9, he offers a different rationale.

Leviticus 5:21-25. There it is explicitly stated that he must return the stolen object and afterwards, it is stated he must bring a guilt-offering. Our Sages learn that the sequence is an absolute requirement. First, he must return the stolen object and then bring the sacrifice.

Leviticus 5:24 states that in addition to making restitution, the offender must add an additional fifth (more precisely, one fifth of the new total) to the principal.

Hilchot Sh’vuot, chs. 7-8.

If, however, he intentionally derived benefit from consecrated property, he receives lashes as punishment and must make restitution for the principal (Hilchot Me’ilah 1:3).

In this instance as well, anything worth less than a p’rutah is not considered as significant enough to warrant punishment (see ibid. 7:8).

Ibid. 1:4.

Thus it is considered as if he violated the prohibition against misappropriating consecrated property several times and must atone for each transgression individually. As the Rambam proceeds to explain, this is a stringency that applies with regard to the prohibition against misappropriating consecrated property that does not apply with regard to other prohibitions, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 1.

Here the intent is not karet per se, but rather the obligation to bring a sin-offering for transgressions for which one is liable for karet. In such a situation, a person is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

I.e., if one person gives another consecrated food to eat, the person who gave his colleague the food is liable for misappropriating consecrated property and not the person who actually partook of the food (Hilchot Me'ilah 5:3-4). With regard to other transgressions, the person who partook of the forbidden food would be liable, as Kiddushin 43a states: "With regard to the entire Torah, there is no situation where one benefits and another is liable."

I.e., if a person ate half of an olive-sized portion from consecrated food one day and the other half on a later date, he is liable (Hilchot Me’ilah 6:1). With regard to other transgressions, a person who partakes of forbidden food would not be liable unless be completes partaking of an olive-sized portion within the time it takes to eat three egg-sized portions of bread [several minutes; the exact measure of time is the subject of a debate between the authorities (see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:8)).

See Hilchot Me’ilah 7:1-2. With regard to other prohibitions, by contrast, we follow the principle (Kiddushin 42b): “The concept of agency does not apply with regard to a transgression,” and the person who actually performs the transgression is liable.

Although there is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Shabbat 71b-72a, the Rambam follows the perspective that equates the guilt-offering with a sin-offering.

The High Priest, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.

In contrast, they must bring different offerings for the violation of sins that require a sin-offering, as explained in Chapter 15 and the conclusion of Chapter 1, Halachah 4. And, as stated in Halachah 6 of that chapter, a High Priest is not required to bring a provisional guilt-offering. See also Chapter 10, Halachah 7.

I.e., in contrast to sins for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering. See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

Hilchot Me’ilah 1:5. Perhaps the Rambam singles out the misappropriation of sacred property, because there is a difference of opinion among the Sages concerning this issue in Keritot 22a and there, the discussion focuses on this transgression.

As stated in the previous halachah.

For he has certainly partaken of sacrificial meat.

Because the laws explained in the previous halachah apply to both of them. Note the contrast to the laws mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter 8.

He is not, however, required to bring a sacrifice to atone for the possibility that he partook of the sacrificial meat, as stated above.

Because of the possibility that he partook of the forbidden fat. Even though both prohibitions have been violated, since it is not known who violated which prohibition, each one is liable only for one provisional guilt-offering.

Because he definitely ate a piece of forbidden fat. He is not, however, required to bring a sacrifice to atone for the possibility that he partook of the sacrificial fat, as stated above..

Because his becoming aware of the prohibitions at different times creates a distinction between them and requires him to offer a second sin-offering

A sin-offering is required, because they both partook of forbidden fat. Neither is, however, required to bring a sacrifice to atone for the possibility that he partook of the sacrificial meat even though it is certain that this prohibition was violated, as stated above.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 14:18-19; see also Chapter 6, Halachah 4, above.

It is considered an issur mosif, i.e., it expands the scope of the prohibition, because forbidden fat is prohibited only to be eaten, while it is forbidden to both eat and benefit from consecrated food.

Although the mishnah (Keritot 2:3) mentions five categories when describing this sacrifice, that is because it includes the last two - an impure person who partakes of consecrated food and one who enters the Temple - in the same category.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 72) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 123) include this commandment in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

A skin affliction commonly - but incorrectly - identified as leprosy that results from speaking improperly about others. See Leviticus, chs. 12-14; Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at. When one afflicted by tzara’at regains ritual purity, he must bring sacrifices, as described in Halachah 3. See also Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:3.

As stated in Leviticus 12:6-8, after a woman gives birth, she is ritually impure for a given period and then she must bring sacrifices as described in Halachah 2. See also Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, foe. cit.

As the Rambam explains (Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:12, in explanation of Leviticus 5:1-7), one of the types of oaths mentioned by the Torah refers to a situation where a person could testify in support of a colleague’s financial claim, but refrains from doing so. His colleague requests that he testify and he refuses, taking a false oath that he does not know anything concerning which he could testify. He is required to bring a guilt-offering to secure atonement.

Keritot 9a explains that all the other passages requiting a guilt-offering use the term vene’alam, “it became hidden,” implying a lapse of awareness. Since that term is not used with regard to this oath, one can infer that he is liable even if he transgresses intentionally.

The term sh’vuat bitui refers to an oath regarding an activity that a person performed in the past or will perform in the future (“I ate this food,” “I did not eat it,” “I will eat it,” or “I will not eat it”), as stated in (Hilchot Sh’vuot 1:3, in explanation of Leviticus, op. cit.).

For the term vene’alam is used in this context.

The prohibition against partaking of consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity is mentioned in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:13.

The prohibition against entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity is mentioned in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:12. See Halachah 5 for an explanation of the derivation of the obligation to bring these sacrifices.

The wine, flour, and oil brought together with an animal sacrifice, as stated in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 2:2,4.

The conclusion of Chapter I, Halachah 4.

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 12.

This refers to a person who takes a false oath regarding testimony.

As will be explained, this is interpreted as referring to partaking of consecrated food or entering the Temple in a state of impurity even though these transgressions are not explicitly mentioned in the verse.

This refers to a person who takes a false sh’vuat bitu’i.

See Sh’vuot 6b-7a.

This refers both to sacrifices she must bring to regain ritual purity and sacrifices she must bring to secure atonement. As the Rambam explains in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nega’im 14:12), this refers even to sacrifices for which a woman was obligated before she was married. The halachah is emphasizing that if a woman’s financial status changes due to marriage, she brings a sacrifice according to her present status, whether it rises or falls. In contrast to the others mentioned in the following clause, a man’s wife is considered as his own person and his and her status are considered as the same.
Rav Yosef Corcus mentions that even if a man divorces his wife, he must bring all the sacrifices for which she was obligated beforehand.

This applies even if he personally is wealthy. Since he is bringing sacrifices on behalf of another person, the Torah did not obligate him to bring them according to his financial standing, if they are poor.
A person may also bring sacrifices on behalf of other people even though they are not members of his household like the individuals mentioned here.

This refers both to his Hebrew and Canaanite servants and maidservants. For certain types of impurity [e.g., tzara’at (Hilchot Tzara’at 9:1) and zivah (Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 1:4)] apply also to Canaanite servants and they must bring the appropriate sacrifices to regain ritual purity. It is reasonable to think that a person would desire to have his family and servants regain ritual purity so that he would not have to worry about them causing consecrated food to contract ritual impurity.

The High Priest.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam, stating that a king is not liable for an oath regarding testimony and a High Priest is not liable for entering the Temple or partaking of consecrated foods in a state of impurity. The Rambam’s ruling depends on his interpretation of Horiot 2:8 which differs from that of most other commentaries.
This matter was obviously a matter of question for the Rambam himself. He originally subscribed to the understanding followed by most commentaries (and that understanding is reflected in the original text of his Commentary to the Mishnah). Afterwards, however, he changed his perspective (as indicated by Rav Kappach’s text of that work) and amended it according to the understanding reflected in this halachah. Even after that emendation, however, there is still a certain lack of clarity in our understanding of the Rambam’s position.

The conclusion of Chapter 1, Halachah 4. See also Chapter 9, Halachah 10, and Chapter 15.

Chapters 4-6, 9-10.

Chapters 1,4.

These include oaths regarding testimony (Halachah I), relations with a consecrated maidservant (Chapter 9, Halachah I), and oaths regarding stolen property (Chapter 9, Halachah 7). Keritot 9a mentions that even in such a situation, a nazirite is liable for a sacrifice. The Rambam does not mention that concept here, because he has already stated it in Hilchot Nizirut 6:3 (Kessef Mishneh).

Since his transgression came as a result of coercion, there is no need for him to secure atonement.

On the basis of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 6:8), it is apparent that here, the Rambam is speaking about a sin-offering which is a component of an adjustable guilt-offering and not a fixed sin-offering. This is also reflected by a comparison to Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 5:9.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the leniency of transferring money is granted only in a situation of need and not under ordinary circumstances.

Which usually costs less than a ewe.

When a person transfers holiness from a consecrated entity to a non-consecrated one, their status is reversed. The consecrated entity loses its holiness and the non-consecrated entity becomes consecrated whether they share the same worth or not.

This is speaking about a situation when the price of she-goats rose above the price of ewes and the person transferred the holiness of the money set aside for a she-goat to the ewe.

This is also speaking about an adjustable guilt-offering. Originally, the person was liable for the sacrifice of a wealthy person, but his financial status declined and at the time he brings his sacrifice, he is liable for a lesser offering.

He is no longer obligated to bring the sacrifice of a wealthy man and should bring the lesser offering.

I.e., through the transfer of holiness, the consecrated quality of the money is imparted to the fowl and the remainder of the money is considered as ordinary funds.

And may bring the sacrifice of a poor man even though in the very near future, he will become wealthy. Moreover, in his original version of Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 4:3; preserved in the standard published version of the text), the Rambam writes that even if the person did not bring the offering before his testator’s death, since he was poor at the time he was obligated to bring the sacrifice, he may bring a poor man’s offering even if he brings it after he takes possession of the estate. Nevertheless, in a later version (reflected in Rav Kapach’s translation of the text), he emended the text to reflect the concepts stated above, i.e., that if he became wealthy, he must bring a rich man’s offering.

He need not, however, take physical possession of the estate. Once the testator dies, it becomes the heir’s property automatically.

That disqualified it from being offered as a sacrifice.

The Rambam’s wording leads to the inference that, if he desired, he may bring the offering of a rich man. Even though his financial status has declined, he is not required to bring a poor man’s offering.

See Hilchot Issurei HaMizbeiach 3:1 which speaks about the situations in which a fowl can be disqualified. Most of the blemishes that disqualify an animal do not disqualify a fowl.

As explained in ibid. 6:4. Instead, the fowl must be left to die.

In which instance, a meal-offering is not sufficient.

Until a meal-offering is placed in a sacred container, its physical substance has not been consecrated, only its value. Hence there is no problem in redeeming it and using the money for another purpose (Hilchot lssurei Mizbeiach 6:5; see also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 13:2).

I.e. the consecrated dimension of the meal is transferred to the money. The meal then is considered as ordinary flour and may be eaten.

The literal meaning of the term used by the Rambam is “until its form decomposes.” Our translation is based on Rashi (Menachot 46b). See also Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:26.

Who is obligated to bring an adjustable guilt offering.

The adjustable guilt-offering which he is required to bring. The Rambam’s interpretation of Keritot 27b-28a, the source for this law, differs from that of Rashi.

And, according to his present level of wealth, he would be obligated to bring a pair of doves.

Since only their worth was consecrated (for originally, this person could not sacrifice them), there is more reason to think that they would not become acceptable afterwards.

I.e., the doves were not disqualified as a sacrifice because of a factor intrinsic to their being, but because of a peripheral issue, the person's financial status. Hence if that changes, they can become acceptable. Note a similar ruling in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:4.

For he has exceeded the Torah’s requirements for him. Note, however, the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 123) which states that a person does not fulfill his obligation by bringing an inappropriate sacrifice even if it exceeds his obligations.

I.e., before he transgressed.

I.e., after he transgressed, he became aware and desired to atone for his transgression.

a) He knew that this was consecrated food, but he was unaware that he was impure. b) He knew that he was impure, but he was unaware that this was consecrated food. c) He was unaware of both the above factors. d) He knew that he was entering the Temple, but he was unaware that he was impure. e) He knew that he was impure, but he was unaware that he was entering the Temple. f) He was unaware of both the above factors.

For his becoming aware of the transgression a second time implies that there was a lapse in the interim.

As will be explained in Sefer Taharah, there are various types of ritual impurity, each type with different laws and restrictions. These categories are referred to as an av hatum’ah, literally, “a father of ritual impurity.”

Implied is that to be liable, he must ultimately know the type of impurity he had contracted. It is not sufficient merely to know that he became impure (Rav Yosef Corcus; Lechem Mishneh).

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 4:2.

Keritot 14b discusses this question without resolving it.

This phrase introduces a deduction which the Rambam has made through his own processes of reasoning without an explicit prior Rabbinic source.

I.e., if the person was in fact not obligated to bring a sacrifice, its consecration will have been in error and therefore void. Thus the animal’s status will be that of an unconsecrated animal. Slaughtering such an animal in the Temple Courtyard violates a transgression, as stated in Hilchot Shechitah 2:1.

The question involves a sin-offering, because other types of sacrifices may be brought when one is in doubt whether he is liable by making a conditional stipulation.

I.e., when one is not certain whether or not the person is obligated to bring the offering or not.

I.e., the fowl is offered according to all the sacrificial rites, because of the possibility that the person was obligated to bring it. Yet the priests do not partake of its meat, lest the person had been exempt. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 7:10, Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:6-7, for details regarding such a situation.

Ibid. 1:1; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:14.

Because there is no pressing need that will be met through bringing this sacrifice.

See Hilchot Bi’at Hamikdash 3:21-22. Keritot 16b notes that Numbers 19:13 and 19:20 both speak about a person imparting ritual impurity to the Temple. Thus it explains that one verse applies to a person who contracted impurity outside the Temple Courtyard and entered while impure and the other, to one who contracted impurity in the Temple Courtyard. Both must atone by bringing an adjustable guilt-offering.

Hilchot Bi’at Hamikdash 3:23 explains that a person is liable if he remains in the Temple for the time it takes to read the verse: “And they bowed with their faces to the ground on the floor, prostrating themselves and giving thanks to God who is good and whose kindness is everlasting.”

For, after all, if he left the Temple Courtyard as soon as he became ritually impure, we can understand why he does not require atonement: What else could he have done? If, however, he consciously incurred ritually impurity, there is reason to say that he is liable, because his being impure in the Temple Courtyard came as a result of his own actions.

Tosafot, Keritot 17a, explains that this is speaking about a person who was unaware that he was in the Temple at the time that he made himself ritually impure. For if he was aware that he was in the Temple, he would not be liable for a sacrifice, since these offerings are required only when initially one is transgressing unknowingly, as stated in Halachah 1.
In his gloss to Keritot, op. cit., Mitzpeh L‘Eitan offers an alternative resolution of the difficulty, explaining that this halachah refers to a person who knows that being in the Temple Courtyard while impure constitutes a transgression, but does not know that he is liable for karet. Thus his transgression is considered as willful, and yet, with regard to an adjustable guilt-offering, he is considered as acting inadvertently, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 2.

And thus waited the amount of time for which he is liable for lashes while suspended above the Temple Courtyard.

See Chapter 8, Halachah I; Chapter 9, Halachah 11.

I.e., anyone who walked down the impure path could not avoid contracting ritual impurity, because there was a grave positioned across the width of the path (Rav Yosef Corcus, based on Sh’vuot 19a). It was not known, however, which path was pure and which was impure.

Thus he definitely contracted ritual impurity.

I.e., he has a partial knowledge of the true reality. He is definitely impure- because he walked down both paths but is not aware of the full nature of his situation. This situation differs from that described in the last clause of this halachah, in that here, he is definitely impure, while there he is not.

Because he forgot that he walked down the first path.

More particularly, for an adjustable guilt-offering.

As stated in the previous halachah.

Thus purifying himself from the impurity associated with a corpse.

I.e., he undertook this purification process after entering the Temple.

For he entered the Temple after walking down both paths.

In which instance, he would also be absolved of the obligation to bring a sacrifice. See a parallel in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.
The Rambam’s decision appears to be based on the rationale of miggo, i.e., that if the person desired to lie, he could have told a more effective lie. Rav Yosef Corcus and the Kessef Mishneh cite the glosses of Rashi and Tosafot (Keritot 11b) who explain that the intent is not that we negate the statements of the witnesses in favor of the person’s statements (for, were that to be the case, there would be a contradiction between the initial clause of the halachah and the concluding clause). Instead, we interpret the person’s statements as meaning: “I did not enter inadvertently, but rather intentionally.” In this way, his statement is not a direct contradiction to the statement of the witnesses.
The Ra’avad explains that the emphasis on miggo reflects only one of the opinions mentioned in Keritot 11 b. The conclusion of that passage appears to differ and accept the rationale that a person’s word is accepted regarding his own self more than the statements of 100 witnesses. Thus he questions the Rambam’s ruling in the second half of the halachah. The Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus offer explanations that substantiate the Rambam’s ruling.

And thus regained ritual purity.

If they testify that he violated a transgression punishable by capital punishment.

I.e., he knew that he was ritually impure and what the Temple was or that food was consecrated and then forgot.

I.e., he remained unaware that he entered the Temple or partook of consecrated food while ritually impure and did not become aware of the matter until after Yom Kippur.

The literal meaning of the Rambam’s words are “in the inner chamber.” See the description of this sacrifice in Hilchot Avodat Yam HaKippurim 1:1; 3:3-5.

The essence of Yom Kippur itself, independent of the sacrifices offered, brings about a certain measure of atonement.

Protecting him from Divine retribution, for even an inadvertent transgression brings bout a certain degree of Divine retribution.

Either of his impurity or of the Temple or of the consecrated nature of the food. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 1:3), the Rambam states that this could apply to a child raised by gentiles from birth. Thus he had no concept of the transgression at all.

In which instance, he does not bring a sacrifice, as stated in Halachah 1.

Literally, “outside.” This refers to the goat sacrificed as one of the additional offerings of that day, as prescribed by Numbers 29:11. See Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 1: l; 2:2.

And thus there is no way he can atone for this transgression on his own.

These are offered as sin-offerings; see Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:3; 8:1; 10:3-5.

These are also sin-offerings; Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 8:1.

See Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 1:1; 2:2.

For with regard to this sacrifice, Leviticus 16:6 states: “And he shall atone for himself and for his household.” Sh’vuot 13b states that, in an extended sense, this could refer to the entire priestly family.

The essence of Yom Kippur itself, independent of the sacrifices offered, brings about a certain measure of atonement.

Since the verse mentions “the children of Israel,” we understand that it refers to the people at large. That verse also mentions umipisheihem which Sh’vuot 12b interprets as referring to_ their intentional sins.