Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 184) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 546) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

There are commentaries who object to the Rambam’s ruling, noting that the Sifre comments explicitly that the above verse includes these structures as well.
The Kessef Mishneh tries to rationalize the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the Rambam draws a parallel to the laws of mezuzah, which these structures do not require because they are not dwellings (see Hilchot Mezuzah 6:7). Kin’at Eliyahu, however, questions the comparison, because the reason for the guardrail is that an open roof presents a danger, and that applies regardless of the nature of the structure. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 427:1, however, mentions that it is uncommon to use the roofs of these structures for any purpose. It must be noted that the roof of the Temple in Jerusalem had a guardrail.
Significantly, with regard to a mezuzah, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 286:2) cites opinions that differ with the Rambam, while with regard to a guardrail (Choshen Mishpat 427:1), the Shulchan Aruch mentions only the Rambam’s view.

Since it is so small, it also is not considered a dwelling.

Which implies that the roof is owned by one individual.

To prevent someone falling from the public domain onto his roof.

Ten handbreadths is approximately 3 feet in contemporary measure. In most instances, this is high enough to prevent a person from falling accidentally.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, and maintains that ten handbreadths are required only in the lower portion of the roof. In most portions, it is sufficient for the guardrail to be three handbreadths high. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 427:5) rules according to the Rambam.

This indicates that its purpose is not merely to create a distinction so that a person will know where the roof ends, but actually to prevent a person from falling.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 298) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 547) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

And lashes are administered as punishment only when a prohibition involves a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1).

Note the comments of the Meiri on Bava Kama 51, which state that the mitzvah of erecting a guardrail applies only when there is a life-threatening situation. A person must endeavor to prevent any harm or injury from occurring, but the scope of this mitzvah includes only situations that involve mortal danger.

I.e., this is a charge to every person not to expose himself to danger.

In this vein, Bava Kama 15b states that anyone who raises a dangerous dog or has a faulty ladder violates this negative commandment.

This is the punishment given for the transgression of a Rabbinic commandment. The basis for the Rambam’s statements - and the laws that follow in this and the subsequent chapter - is that a person’s body is not his own possession, but rather that of God. Therefore, he is not allowed to harm it, and surely not to risk his life.
On this basis, our Rabbis have always advised our people to adopt a lifestyle that conforms to the rules of health, and to avoid life threatening situations. Applying this principle to contemporary experience, one can cite several examples of activities we should adhere to because God commands us to protect our lives, e.g., the Surgeon General’s warning about smoking and the speed limits on our highways.

For a blood-sucking leech could cause mortal danger if ingested.
In places where leeches are uncommon, this prohibition does not apply. Nevertheless, leeches are common in many places, and people should be aware of this prohibition.

And deposited its venom within.
This prohibition does not apply in places where snakes and other poisonous animals are not common. For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 116:1) states that today, it is permissible to drink beverages that were left uncovered.
It might, however, be added that a similar prohibition applies today with regard to drinking water that might be polluted.

Once it has become vinegar, however, there is no prohibition.

A legume used as fodder for cattle that can be made fit for human consumption after repeated cooking.

Since the fruit was needed for a sick person, one may assume that it was not left to soak in the water for a sufficient time to change its taste.

For then poisonous snakes will not drink from it.

This ruling is problematic, for in Halachah 14 the Rambam states that sometimes venom will remain concentrated in a certain portion of a container and not mix with contents of the container. Similarly, in this instance one might say that although there is enough water in the container to nullify the effects of the poison, it is possible that the poison will not mix with the water (Kin’at Eliyahu).

For crawling animals will fear drinking such water.

I.e., a depth below that which one would ordinarily expect a crawling animal to reach.

I.e., a height above that which one would ordinarily expect a crawling animal to reach.

Generally, crawling animals are not found in such structures.

For venomous crawling animals, and as the Rambam continues, for holes.

Kin’at Eliyahu questions why this measure is acceptable, noting that there are poisonous snakes that can fit through much smaller holes.

For we fear that the venom will pass through the filter.

Lest the venom have been deposited - or have come to rest - in the portion of the watermelon that remains.

Lest a person walking barefoot step in it and be affected by the venom.

For the same reason.

Lest the person mixing the mortar be affected.

For venom will not kill a cat; venom may adversely affect a cat temporarily, but it will ultimately recover.

Because of the danger.

Generally, it is forbidden to burn terumah that is ritually pure. Nevertheless, because of the danger, an exception was made in this instance.

There are opinions in the Tosefta (Terumah, Chapter 7) that maintain that the heat of the oven will destroy the poison. The Rambam, however, follows the more stringent views, that fear danger even in such a situation.

I.e., a deer, a wild goat or other kosher animal that has not been domesticated.

I.e., if the animal’s internal chemistry could change the makeup of the poison and render it harmless, and the animal lived a sufficient time for this chemical reaction to take place, the animal’s meat is permitted. (See Chulin 59a.)

This is one of the examples that illustrates the principle “[A suspicion of] danger is more severe than [a suspicion of] a prohibition.” Although we do not suspect that the animal was taref, we forbid it because of the possible danger.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 60:3) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah writes that since poisonous snakes are uncommon in our lands, just as we do not suspect that uncovered water has been poisoned, we do not forbid such meat.

I.e., the entire fruit is forbidden. Despite the fruit’s being large, we do not require a certain portion near the hole to be cut off, allowing the remainder to be eaten. The rationale is that we suspect that the venom became mixed with the juice of the fruit and spread throughout the entire fruit.

If, by contrast, the produce is dry, one may cut off the portion that has been bitten and partake of the remainder.

I.e., we do not conclude that the holes were made by the bird or the rat and not by a poisonous animal.

The fact that there are no outward signs of the venom’s presence indicates that either there is none, or that it has aged so long that it is no longer dangerous.

The Ra’avad notes that the Jerusalem Talmud (Terumot 2:5), the source for this halachah, uses the term פס. In contrast to the Rambam, who interprets it as referring to the palm of one’s hand, the Ra’avad interprets it as referring to a slice of bread or meat.

I.e., one’s hands may touch a person or a substance without one’s being aware.

This refers to the practice, adopted from the Romans, in which the gentry would eat while reclining on couches.
The Ra’avad states that the Jerusalem Talmud (ibid.) is referring to a bed on which one is sleeping, and the difficulty refers to the spirit of impurity that is generated when a person sleeps. As an extension of this concept, one should not store food or clothing under a bed, lest it be affected by this spirit of impurity. Similarly, one should be careful not to touch food or clothing before washing with negel vasser after rising in the morning.

The Ra’avad offers a different rationale for this law, explaining that doing so would be an act of disrespect for these foods. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Jerusalem Talmud (ibid.), the source for this halachah, can be interpreted either way, and a God-fearing person should respect both approaches.

And may fall at any moment.

Lest it collapse entirely; alternatively, because snakes, scorpions, and other poisonous animals are often found there.

This also includes living in or passing through various neighborhoods or cities.

This advice is being given to a right-handed person. The intent is that since his right hand is stronger, it will be easier for the person to defend himself in this position if necessary.

Even when they are both on level ground.

The above laws and those that follow were enacted in the time of the Roman occupation of Israel, when the gentiles were wont to perpetuate violence against the Jews for no reason. From the fact that the Rambam included these laws in his code written almost 1000 years later [and they are also cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 153:2-3), written approximately 350 years after the Rambam lived] indicates that unfortunately, such violence had remained a common factor within Jewish life. Although in America such wanton acts seem difficult to conceive, we have only to go back in history 40 years or think of the murders being perpetuated today in Eretz Yisrael to understand why such laws are mentioned.

Literally, “extend the road for him”; see the following note.

I.e., despite the fact that Jacob never intended to come to Seir, he told Esau that he would, in the hope that Esau would wait for him there and perpetrate any violence he desired at that time, when he would be in his home surroundings. Similarly, the intent is that a Jew should give such a misleading answer to a gentile, giving him a further destination, so that if the gentile lies in wait for him, one hopes that the Jew will have turned from the road beforehand.

Based on Rashi, Avodah Zarah 27a, b, it appears that the rationale for this prohibition is that we fear that the gentile will poison the Jew. This suspicion is also mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 155:1).
The Shulchan Aruch [based on the statements of Tosafot (Avodah Zarah 27b)], however, adds a provision - that it is permitted to be treated by a gentile doctor if he is a recognized professional. Based on this position, in the present era, when physicians are licensed by the government and vicarious wrongdoing would not be allowed to go unpunished, it is obviously permissible to be treated by a gentile doctor. Indeed, we see that many leading Rabbis have done so, when necessary.
Moreover, Tosafot (ibid.) also explains that the prohibition applies only when the remedy given by the doctor is associated with the false deity worshiped by the gentile. If there is no such association, there is no prohibition.
(The fact that the Rambam mentions these laws here, in the laws that involve protecting our lives, and not in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, which explain in detail our relation with idolaters, appears to indicate that he shares Rashi’s perspective.)

I.e., since there is no hope that the patient will recover by natural means, it is preferable to take the risk of being treated by the gentile than to resign oneself to death.

For we fear that one will be impressed by him and adopt his lifestyle. Physical death is thus preferred to spiritual death.
In practice, we see that many leading Rabbis have themselves been treated - and have instructed others to be treated - by doctors whose level of Torah observance leaves much to be desired. Their position can be explained by the rationale from Tosafot mentioned above.

Since only money is at stake, one may take the risk of going to a gentile doctor or not, at one’s own discretion.

Avodah Zarah 27a considers this a financial matter alone, since there is no threat of death.

See Hilchot Shabbat 2:4-5, which defines these ailments.

Rashi, Avodah Zarah 27b explains this leniency as follows: Since the gentile doctor sees that the patient is merely asking his opinion and is not relying on him, he will not give him bad advice, lest the advice be proven wrong and the doctor damage his reputation thereby.

He is afraid that the person’s absence will be noted, and others will investigate his disappearance and discover the murder.

I.e., although the person himself is not important, he puts on airs of being so, to create an impression on the gentile barber.

Rashi, Avodah Zarah 15a, states that the reason for this prohibition is that we fear they will use the weapons to harm Jews.

Iron that was used for making weaponry.

These animals were used by the Romans to fight gladiators in their stadiums.

One may question if this law is applicable today, particularly in light of the fact that a large portion of the income of the State of Israel comes from the arms trade, and none of the Torah authorities in the Holy Land or in the diaspora have called for a cessation of these activities.
It is possible to explain that this law was instituted in the Talmudic period, when the Roman rulers of Eretz Yisrael saw the Jews as a separate political body and persecuted them vicariously. Hence, anyone selling weaponry to the Romans could easily have been considered as contributing to the harm of our people. This situation was perpetuated throughout most of the subsequent period until the modern age.
In a large portion of today’s democracies, the Jews are not singled out as separate entities, and there is no fear of the local armies turning against them. Hence, it might be said that although we are anxiously awaiting the time when nations will “beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks,” until that prophecy is fulfilled, Jews who engage in the arms trade with nations that are not enemies of our people are not worthy of censure.

For ultimately it will lead to the same negative purpose.

Kin’at Eliyahu interprets Avodah Zarah 16a, the source for this halachah, as giving license to sell to the ruling army when they defend the Jewish inhabitants.

For without weaponry, he would not dare to sin.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 299) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 232) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam emphasizes that the commandment extends the verse beyond its literal meaning and interprets it as referring to a person who deceives a colleague by giving him improper advice. As in this halachah, he also applies the prohibition to one who supports or aids a transgressor of Torah law.

Although a servant is also commanded to observe the mitzvot, since he is wicked he should be left to his perversity. The Rambam’s source is the behavior of Bava ben Buta, who gave Herod advice to rebuild the Temple. Bava Batra 4a states that it is only out of deference to the Temple that he was permitted to give such advice.

Of being thrown into the lions’ den (Bava Batra, ibid.).

Nebuchadnezzar had seen a disturbing vision in a dream. Daniel interpreted the dream to mean that Nebuchadnezzar would be driven from all human habitation and would dwell in the field like a beast. He advised the king to give charity to avert this evil. Nebuchadnezzar followed this advice, and the evil was not visited upon him until he boastfully raised his head in pride.

I.e., we do not say that since the owner overloaded his animal, he alone should bear the responsibility of raising it up. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:1) state that if an animal is wont to collapse under its load, it is the owner’s responsibility, and a passerby is not obligated to assist him.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 202) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 80) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The reason the Rambam includes these laws in Hilchot Rotzeach Ush’mirat HaNefesh, “the laws of murderers and the protection of life,” is apparent from the final halachah, which states that we should not leave the person “inclined toward death, lest he tarry because of his money and be brought to danger.”
(Significantly, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch mention these laws directly after the laws regarding the return of a lost article - the order in which these subjects are mentioned in Exodus - and not at the conclusion of the text of Choshen Mishpat, where the laws governing protecting one’s life are mentioned.)

For reloading an animal is a more difficult task than unloading it, and most likely the wayfarer will not be able to perform it alone.

See Halachah 8.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 203) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 541) consider reloading an animal to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Some amend the text to read “and has negated the observance of two positive commandments.” Alternatively, by each of his failures to act - both the failure to load and the failure to unload - he negates the observance of a positive commandment and transgresses a negative commandment.

Sefer HaMitzvot Negative Commandment 270) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 540) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam mentions that one transgresses this commandment both when one fails to load and when one fails to unload, for the proof-text from Exodus mentions “refraining from helping him.”

See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:18, which explains that because there is both a positive and a negative commandment preventing a priest from contracting ritual impurity, they are not overridden by the commandment to return a lost article (even though it also involves both a positive and negative commandment). Similarly, in the present instance, the mitzvah to unload an animal does not override the observance of these positive and negative commandments.

I.e., a wise man whose dignity does not allow him to load and unload animals.

See the parallel in Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:13.
As will be explained in the notes on Halachot 8 and 9, there is a question whether we are obligated by Scriptural Law to show regard for the pain endured by animals (צער בעלי חיים). Even according to the authorities who maintain that there is such an obligation, it can be said that it is overridden by our obligation to honor the Torah and its students. Moreover, even showing respect to an honorable person who is not a Torah scholar (see the notes on the following halachah) overrides the need to care for animals, for human dignity takes precedence over caring for animals (Radbaz, Volume V, Responsum 1542).

But if unloading and reloading the animal were below his dignity, and he would not perform this activity even if his own animal were involved, he is not obligated to do so for a colleague.
The wording of this halachah appears to imply that if a person is dignified, but not a scholar, and would not unload his own animal himself, he need not unload one belonging to a colleague. (See Prishah, Choshen Mishpat 272.) There are, however, opinions that maintain that this leniency is granted only to a Torah scholar, for there is a mitzvah from the Torah to respect his honor. This does not apply with regard to the honor of other individuals.

The leader of the Sanhedrin, Israel’s highest court.

Thus, working with such a load is not a dignified activity.

Significantly, in Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:17 the Rambam also writes that a person who goes beyond the measure of the law should return a lost article even if doing so is beneath his dignity.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:3) state that a Torah scholar should not compromise his dignity. If he wants to go beyond the measure of the law and help the person in distress, he should hire another person to do so.

The number 100 is just a figure of speech, not a limit. One must unload and reload the animal as often as necessary.

From the Rambam’s wording here, it appears that it is the repetition of the verbs that indicates the need for a repeated activity. Nevertheless, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:9; see also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 11:14), he states that the use of the verb itself is sufficient to imply repeated activity, and that the repetition serves another exegetical purpose. (See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:7.)

I.e., lest the animal again collapse under its load.

A parsah is 4 mil, and a mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.

The Nimukei Yosef explains that, as stated in Halachah 7, one may charge the owner for accompanying him. If the owner does not want to pay, then it is unnecessary to accompany him.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:6) states that a person may charge for this service as he does for returning a lost object. See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 12:3-4 for a discussion of this matter.

The commentaries raise the question: Often it is explained that the mitzvah of unloading and reloading an animal was instituted because of the regard we must show for the pain endured by animals (צער בעלי חיים). Unquestionably, the owner of the animal is acting improperly by refusing to help. Nevertheless, why should his misconduct cause us to reduce our regard for the animal’s suffering?
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 272) explains that indeed, the mitzvah of unloading the animal does not apply because of the owner’s conduct. Nevertheless, the passerby is still obligated to do so because of צער בעלי חיים. Rav Yosef Karo, in his commentary on the Tur entitled Beit Yosef, maintains that the Rambam also shares this perspective. Although the Rambam does not say so explicitly, that is because he is relying on his statements in Halachah 13. There are, however, opinions that maintain that the Rambam does not consider צער בעלי חיים a Scriptural obligation, and they maintain that even with regard to Rabbinic Law, there are instances when we ignore this concern.

And thus incapable of helping load or unload.

As if the owner were not there at all.

For the responsibility to unload and reload the animal is the gentile’s. In contrast to the last clause of this halachah, the Rambam does not mention the possibility of animosity arisi11g in the instance at hand, because since the burden being carried belongs to a Jew, the gentile owner will not suspect that it was a difference of religion that motivated the passerby’s indifference (Bayit Chadash, Choshen Mishpat 272).
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo maintains that צער בעלי חיים is a Scriptural obligation, and for this reason the Rambam would obligate the passer-by to unload the animal. This - he states - is obvious from Halachah 13. The expression “one is not obligated towards him” refers only to reloading. One may, however, take payment for this service.
In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 272:8), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s wording verbatim. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:12, however, quotes the interpretation given above. The Tur and the Ramah state explicitly that one is obligated to unload the animal because of צער בעלי חיים in all instances where the Rambam says that one is not liable.
The Merkevet HaMishneh, the Be’urei HaGra and others differ, explaining that the Rambam - like Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi under whose disciples he studied - maintains that צער בעלי חיים is a Rabbinic, and not a Scriptural, obligation, and that there are instances, like the ones mentioned in this halachah, when one is not obligated to go out of one’s way to unload a fallen animal.
It must be noted that in his Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapters 17 and 48, the Rambam states that the respect for an animal’s suffering is mandated by the Torah. He quotes this as the rationale for the laws of ritual slaughter, for the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its calf on the same day and for the mitzvah to send away the mother bird. Significantly, however, he does not mention this mitzvah in that context. See also Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 21 and 25, where the Rambam mentions how consideration for an animal’s suffering overrides certain Rabbinic prohibitions.

Whose property is being carried by the donkey and who therefore suffers great stress and anguish, as the Rambam states in Halachah 13.

Who is serving as the donkey-driver, and is concerned about the fate of his animal.

As mentioned above, there is a question if this statement is all inclusive or referring only to reloading.

I.e., the gentile may become upset when he sees the Jew ignore him, and express his anger on other Jews. To forestall such feelings from arising, one should help him raise his donkey.

And thus, it cannot proceed as fast as the other donkeys in the caravan.

Leaving him alone on the journey.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s interpretation of the Tosefta (Bava Kama 2:8), which serves as the source for this halachah, stating that the intent is that the other donkey-drivers cannot drive their donkeys over the weak donkey until it falls.
In his Kessef Mishneh and apparently in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 272:12), Rav Yosef Karo favors the Rambam’s interpretation. The Or Sameach notes that the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Kama 3:5) appears to support the Ra’avad’s interpretation.

And is no longer capable of proceeding at all.

The Ir Shushan 372 interprets this halachah as resembling the one that follows - i.e., two donkeys approach each other on a narrow road wide enough for only one to pass.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 372:22 differs and explains that the halachah refers to an instance where two donkeys are proceeding together and suddenly the road narrows, so they can pass only one at a time.

As the Rambam states in the following halachah, one should pay the other for the right of passage.
Kin’at Eliyahu maintains that in all instances, payment should be given for the right of passage. In this final instance, who receives that right should be determined by who desires to pay more, while in the previous instances, the criteria are laid down. Even so, in those instances, the one who is given the privilege should reimburse his colleague for his difficulty.

Our translation is based on Rashi (Sanhedrin 32b). Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:24 offers a different interpretation.

For waiting until the other proceeds presents a greater difficulty for the ship or the camel driver that is further removed from the port or city from which he set out.

Sanhedrin, ibid., interprets this verse as a charge to seek a compromise.

This law (quoted from Bava Metzia 32b) is the source for the concept that צער בעלי חיים is a factor with regard to this mitzvah. In Bava Metzia, ibid., there is a difference of opinion among the Sages whether the obligation is Scriptural or Rabbinic, as mentioned in the notes above.

A simple reading of the Mishneh Torah implies that this and the following halachah should be seen as the development of a single concept, and the “enemy” mentioned in this halachah is defined in that.
Based on Tosafot (Bava Metzia 32b), the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 272:10) states that the “enemy” mentioned in this halachah refers to a person whom one regards as an enemy for personal reasons. It is not referring to the definition of an enemy given by the Rambam in the following halachah. For with regard to such a person, even though it is a mitzvah to assist him, as stated in the following halachah, the concept of subjugating one’s natural inclination does not apply. For, since the person has transgressed and not repented, it is proper not to show him any extra regard. (Note, however, Tosafot, Pesachim 113b, which offers a different interpretation.)

I.e., a person’s evil inclination would urge him not to help his enemy, but instead, watch him suffer. Therefore, he is instructed to overcome that natural tendency and help him. This indicates that his observance of mitzvot is not a matter of personal preference, but rather a commitment to an ideal that transcends his individual identity.

I.e., this is considered a more significant factor than the discomfort suffered by the animal.

The mitzvah to unload an animal does not apply to an animal owned by a gentile, and thus, the enemy who owns the donkey that the verse mentions cannot be a non-Jew. (As mentioned above, according to the Merkevet HaMishneh, the mitzvah does not apply at all to an animal owned by a non-Jew. According to the Kessef Mishneh, one must unload the fallen animal, but since one may charge for one’s services under such circumstances, this is not the intent of the verse.)

The Rambam’s words (based on Bava Metzia 32b) do not reflect naivete. He (and our Sages) realized that there could be individuals who do not observe the Torah’s standard. His question is why does the Torah, which reflects an objective standard of truth, communicate this mitzvah using a situation that runs contrary to the Torah’s ideal. To refer to a principle frequently stated in the Talmud: “The verse does not concern itself with the wicked” (Rashbam, Pesachim 113b).

The Rambam mentions that the person saw the transgression alone. If he saw it together with another witness, and testimony regarding the matter could thus be brought to court, it would be a mitzvah for the entire Jewish people to show negative feelings to the person until he repents (Pesachim, ibid.).

I.e., the person will not desire to abandon his cargo because of its worth, and he will be at the mercy of thieves and the elements.

In this vein, see the Rambam’s concluding words in Iggeret HaSh’mad, where he urges tolerance and patience toward those Jews who under pressure converted to other faiths.

And similarly on the verse (Psalms 104:35): “May sinners perish from the earth,” our Sages commented (Berachot 10a): “Read ‘may sins perish’” - i.e., our hope should be that the sinners repent and abandon their wickedness.