Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Taking hold of the object thus serves as a kinyan, giving the person who does so the right of ownership.

It appears that the Rambam is speaking in this clause about objects that are declared ownerless by their owners, as mentioned in Hilchot Nedarim 2:14.

See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 6:13. In contrast, objects belonging to other men found in such places may have to be returned to their owners.

With regard to Eretz Yisrael, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the land was divided among the tribes, and each tribe became the owner of the natural resources in its ancestral portions. Thus, every member of that tribe is allowed to take from these resources, but not so a member of another tribe.
From Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:3, it would appear that the Rambam maintains that every person has a right to these resources, although they have been granted to a particular tribe, provided he does not use those resources for commercial enterprise (Maggid Mislmeh). The perspective of the Maggid Mishneh is not, however, accepted by all authorities.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Choshen Mishpat, Hilchot Hejker 2) emphasizes that these laws apply to a wilderness in which no government has asserted its authority. If, however, a government has asserted its authority over land, it becomes the legal owner of the land, and its rights must be respected.

For he is not allowed to enter property belonging to a colleague without that colleague’s permission (Maggid Mishneh).

Because the field is not a protected courtyard, nor is the owner standing next to it. See Halachah 4 and notes (Maggid Mishneh).

The rationale is that a vivarium is considered to be a protected courtyard, for the animals inside cannot break out. Therefore, even a wild animal that enters from the outside is acquired by its owner (Maggid Mishneh).

For he takes property belonging to a colleague by force. As emphasized by the contrast to the following halachah, here the Rambam’s statements apply according to Scriptural Law. Thus, the worth of the animal can be expropriated by the owner of the vivarium through legal process.

See Hilchot Shabbat 10:19-20. Since the animal cannot leave the confines of the vivarium, the fact that effort is required to snare him is not significant.

I.e., the person is not considered to have acquired the animal in his snare according to Scriptural Law. Therefore, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in origin, and the person who owns the snare cannot expropriate the value of the animal trapped through legal process (Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 6:12).
The Rabbis instituted this prohibition as a reflection of “the ways of peace” - i.e., to prevent strife from arising.

I.e., it has a receptacle.

For a container belonging to a person acquires property on his behalf according to Scriptural Law. Hence, “the value of the animal can be expropriated through legal process” (Ra’avad).

A field is considered to be an “unprotected courtyard.” If a courtyard is protected and another person snares an animal there, it becomes the property of the owner of the courtyard, even though he is not present and does not state his intent to acquire the animal [Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 273:14).

The owner acquires the animal by virtue of its presence in his field. This kinyan is applicable according to Scriptural Law, since the animal is trapped and cannot move. [See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:11. With this explanation, the objections of the Ra’avad are resolved.]
The owner of the trap, by contrast, has a right to the animal only by virtue of Rabbinic decree. In this instance, the Rabbis did not ordain that their decree supersedes Scriptural Law and applies to property belonging to another person.

In such an instance, the owner of the courtyard acquires an article placed within, even when he is not standing next to his courtyard, and does not declare his desire to acquire it.

When an object is moving, even if it can be considered to be a courtyard, its owner does not acquire an object placed within it. See Hilchot Mechirah 3:13; Hilchot Gerushin 5:17.

Even if the convert had fathered children before he converted and they converted together with him, they are not considered to be his heirs. This applies even when the convert’s wife converts while pregnant with the child, or the convert fathered a child with a Jewish woman while he was a gentile. (See Bava Batra 149a.)

Moreover, since his sons whom he fathered as a gentile are not his legal heirs, he may not allocate property to them using the mechanism of a matnat sh’chiv me’ra (Ibid.).

See Hilchot Sh’chenim 12:5, which explains that when a person sells property, a neighbor is given the right to buy the property at the purchase price from the purchaser.

As stated in Hilchot Sh’chenim 13:1, when a person receives property as a gift, the neighbor is not given the right to buy it from him. The rationale is that property that is purchased can be purchased in another location as well. Therefore, we require the purchaser to seek out another location in consideration of the neighbor. There is, however, no way a person can guarantee that property will be given to him as a gift in another place. Therefore, the neighbor is not granted this privilege. Similarly, in the present instance, there is no way that we can guarantee that the person will be able to acquire ownerless property again, and so the neighbor is not granted the privilege of purchasing it from him (Lechem Mishneh).

When a person acquires several fields from a colleague because of a sale or a gift, through the acquisition of one he acquires the other (Hilchot Mechirah 1:19-20). This does not apply in the present instance. The difference between the two instances is that with regard to a sale, the transaction is dependent on the seller’s intent to transfer his property - to which there is no parallel in the present instance (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., our Sages (Bava Batra 53b) did not resolve the question whether this action is sufficient to acquire both fields.

The second person is considered to have a stronger claim, because there is no question that his action is sufficient to acquire ownership of the field (Maggid Mishneh) .

With regard to this point, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 275:10) differ and maintain that if he manifests ownership over the inner house with the intent of acquiring both it and the outer house, he acquires them both. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 275:15 explains that since one must walk through the outer house to reach the inner house, the outer house can be considered to be subordinate to it.

See the gloss of the Siftei Cohen 275:4.

Since there is no one transferring the deed to him, the deed is no more than a record of the convert’s acquisition of the property.

I.e., it is no more valuable than any other used piece of paper.

With regard to a sale, by contrast, he may acquire many fields by manifesting ownership over one. And he may acquire an entire field even if it is not distinctly marked.

For by plunging in the spade, he manifests ownership over the field. It is not necessary to manifest ownership over every portion of the field individually - once he acquires one portion, he acquires the entire field.

Since the boundaries of the field are not defined, when the person manifests his ownership of the field, it is not clear - to himself or to others - what he is acquiring. Therefore, we assume that he acquires only that portion of the field that he would plow at one time (Kin’at Eliyahu).

I.e., when threshing with a team of oxen, it is common to proceed for a certain length and then to return. The person who plunged in the spade acquires that measure of land. See also the notes on Halachah 13, where important insights applicable to this halachah are stated.

This term refers to a plant or tree with very long and powerful roots. Joshua planted it in Eretz Yisrael to distinguish the boundaries of the ancestral portion of one tribe from another [Bava Batra 56a; Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Kilayim 1:8)]. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 275:5 explains that it was also used to distinguish between properties owned by individuals.

Since these are clearly evident boundaries, even if the borders of the convert’s field extend beyond them, the person does not acquire any land beyond them.

See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 3:1, which explains that when a field is divided by certain entities - e.g., a river or an irrigation ditch - pe’ah, a portion of the crop left at the edge of the field for the poor - must be left at the sides of both divisions. It is not sufficient to leave a single amount.

The Rambam’s thesis is that whenever in some manner the two portions of the field are considered to be distinct, they are considered to be distinct with regard to [the acquisition of] the property of a [deceased] convert.
There is no explicit Rabbinic source for the Rambam’s opinion. His decision is an inference from Bava Batra 55a, which states:
A boundary marker and a chatzav constitute a distinction with regard to [the acquisition of] the property of a [deceased] convert, but do not constitute a distinction with regard to pe’ah and ritual impurity.
When Ravin came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: “They constitute a distinction with regard to pe’ah and ritual impurity, but do not constitute a distinction with regard to the Sabbath.”
Ravva declares: “[They constitute a distinction] even with regard to the Sabbath.”
The Rambam maintains that since there is a discussion of whether or not these articles that are sufficient to create a distinction with regard to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert are sufficient to create a distinction in the other contexts, the distinctions that are effective with regard to the other contexts are of greater halachic significance. Therefore, they are also effective with regard to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s rulings in this and the following halachah. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 275:5-6) quotes the Rambam’s rulings. Note also the gloss of the Lechem Mishneh, which raises questions based upon the Rambam’s rulings in other sources.

On the Sabbath, if one brought an article from one public domain to another through a carmelit, one would not be liable (Hilchot Shabbat 14:14). Thus, the carmelit creates a distinction.
The commentaries, however, note that there is an apparent contradiction between this halachah and Hilchot Shabbat 18:24.

See Hilchot Gerushin 5:9, which speaks of a husband’s granting a portion of his property to his wife so that she can acquire the bill of divorce.

Thus, it would not be included in the person’s acquisition of the field.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling on the basis of Bava Batra 56a. Indeed, even the Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh, who support the Rambam’s ruling, note that it appears to contradict Halachah 10, which states that if one digs in one field with the intent of acquiring it and another field, one does not acquire the other field.
The Maggid Mishneh distinguishes between the two rulings by explaining that digging is not a totally effective means of manifesting one’s ownership. In this halachah, we are speaking of a different and more involving means of manifesting ownership, as explained in Chapter 2.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the difference depends on the person’s intention. In Halachah 10, the person had a general intent to acquire the convert’s property, but did not have a specific intent to acquire both fields. In this instance, he had the intent of acquiring all the fields owned by the convert in this valley.
The Ra’avad and the Tur differ with the Rambam’s conception and maintain that the above applies only in a field that requires irrigation. In a field that is watered by the rain, different rules apply. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 275:7) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah cites that of the Tur.

The Rambam mentions the preliminary concepts in this halachah in this chapter, only because of the final clause, which relates to the acquisition of property from a deceased convert.

Our translation, though not reflecting the literal meaning of the words used by the Rambam, is based on the interpretation of both the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh. The laws regarding the acquisition of movable property through meshichah and the payment of money are discussed in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 3.
There the Rambam explains that, although according to Scriptural Law, movable property is acquired through the transfer of money, the Rabbis instituted the kinyan of meshichah (drawing the article from place to place). According to the Rambam, this applies only with regard to a Jew, and a gentile can acquire movable property through the transfer of money. This conception is also reflected in the Rambam’s decision in Hilchot Bechorot 4:5.
The Ramban and other authorities differ and maintain that even for a gentile, the transfer of money is not an effective kinyan. See the glosses of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 194:1, Siftei Cohen 194:1. The Lechem Mishneh indeed notes that from the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:5, it would appear that the Rambam also accepts this thesis.

The commentaries explain that the Rambam is referring to his ruling (Hilchot Mechirah 1:17) that states that a gentile may not acquire land by manifesting his ownership over it. The rationale is, as explained by the Maggid Mishneh in that source, that if this were allowed, it might lead to gentiles’ taking property by force.

I.e., until he has a legal document that will be honored by a court of law, the purchaser will not consider the transfer of property to be complete, for he will suspect that the seller might withhold the property from him.

From the Rambam’s wording, it is apparent that he maintains that if the purchaser manifests ownership over the property before the other person, the purchaser acquires it. This ruling is not accepted by the Ra’avad, the Rashba and the Tur, who maintain that since the purchaser desired to acquire the property via the transfer of a deed of sale, it is only through such a transfer that he can acquire it. Therefore, even if the purchaser manifests his possession over the property first, if the second person manifests possession before the deed of sale is transferred, the second person acquires it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 194:2) follows the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah cites that of the other authorities.

The Ramah (op. cit.) states that the person who acquires the land is considered wicked. Nevertheless, the purchaser is forbidden to try to retake the land from him with the help of the gentile.

I.e., only when there is no binding secular law, is the ruling of Torah law applied. Otherwise, Torah law itself accepts its limits and allows for its ruling to be preempted by secular law.

See Hilchot Gezelah, Chapter 5, where this concept is explained at length.

For in none of these cases is there another person who willingly transfers his ownership of the property (Maggid Mishneh).

See Hilchot Mechirah 1:8-16.

lbid.:16. Note the comments of the Ra’avad (both in that source and here), which state that eating produce is not considered to be an effective means of manifesting ownership.

It can be explained that this refers to the chazakah, proof of a claim of continued ownership for three years during which one benefitted from the property, as explained in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 11:2. This is effective with regard to a claim that one purchased the property from another person, for had he seen the person benefitting from his land, he would have protested. With regard to the property of a deceased convert, however, this is not relevant, for since the convert has died, there is no one to protest, and the acquisition of such land is brought about not by benefitting from it, but by making an improvement in the land itself.

In each context, the concept of chazakah, manifesting ownership, has a different meaning, and different laws therefore result. It would appear that the chazakah referred to within the context of proving a claim of ownership refers to activities that would be performed only in a person’s own home. The chazakah referred to with regard to acquisition of the property of a deceased convert, by contrast, refers to any change within the property that provides a person with benefit (Kin’at Eliyahu).

The intent is that he made an ornamental pattern in the plaster.

The Maggid Mishneh states that it is significant that the painting or the plaster work is done opposite the entrance. Therefore, it is noticeable despite the fact that it is small. If it is done in another portion of the house, a larger area must be painted or plastered.

See the for and the Ramah (Choshen. Mishpat 275:15), who state that the person must also lie down on the mattresses to benefit from the land itself (in contrast to eating produce). Alternatively, according to the Shulchan. Aruch (ibid.), this refers to an instance where in order to lay down the mattresses, the person had to level the land and thus improve it

This ruling aroused the attention of the commentaries. For the Rambam rules in Hilchot Mechirah 1:16 that a person who plows a field that he purchased with the intent of leaving it fallow acquires it. If so, why does the Rambam give leaving a field fallow as an example of the principle: “There are many acts that if [performed] by a purchaser to prove ownership [of property are] not [effective], but when performed to manifest ownership over ownerless property, property belonging to a [deceased] convert or the like, are effective in acquiring it”?
The difficulty was brought to the attention of Rabbenu Yehoshua, the Rambam’s grandson. He explains that leaving a field fallow for three years is not an effective kinyan, as reflected by the fact that it is not sufficient to substantiate a claim of continued ownership as stated in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 12:9. Hence, were the laws pertaining to the acquisition of the property of a deceased convert not more lenient, it would not be effective with regard to the acquisition of such property.
Why is it effective in the presence of the owners, as stated in Hilchot Mee hi rah 1:16? Because a person would never plow a field belonging to someone else in that person’s presence. Hence, it is evidence that a change of ownership took place.

For this is comparable to eating produce, which, as explained in Halachah 2, is not sufficient to acquire the property of a deceased convert.

I.e., how can we determine his intent?

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 275:18) state that even if the person claims to be performing the activity to improve the land, his claim is not accepted, because his actions indicate the opposite.
See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 8:12, which mentions the circumstances described in this and the following halachot.

For the small branches are not valuable for firewood, while the large branches are.

For he is seeking to bring the entire land to a uniform level.

For the water will remain within the field and irrigate it.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 275:21) states that even if the first person set up the doors, if he did not close them and the second person does close them, the second person acquires the property.

The Maggid Mishneh cites the commentary of the Rambam’s teacher, the Ri Migash, on Bava Batra 53b, which states that not only does the second person acquire the property of the deceased convert, he also acquires the building constructed by the first person. For placing his building materials on land that is ownerless is equivalent to declaring the materials ownerless.
The Ramah (op. cit.) quotes this opinion, but also quotes an opinion that states that if a person constructed the building with his own building materials, neither he nor the second person acquires the property.

In this instance as well, the Maggid Mishneh quotes the commentary of the Ri Migash, which states that if the person dug into the earth to build foundations for the building, he acquires the property. There appears to be an allusion to this concept in the Rambam’s wording, “the first person did not do anything with the land itself.” This opinion is also cited by the Ramah (op. cit.). The Ramah, however, also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, that digging the foundations of the building is not sufficient to acquire it.

From this phrase, the Maggid Mishneh derives that if the construction performed by the first person was at all useful - e.g., his deeds made it possible to keep chickens or livestock within the building - he acquires it. This ruling is quoted by the Ramah (op. cit.).

If, however, he covered the seeds, he does acquire the property (Maggid Mishneh).

Significantly, when, by contrast, a person purchases a field from a colleague, he acquires it by sowing it (Hilchot Mechirah 1:16).

For the produce had not grown at that time.

And not as a result of his efforts.

Because the partition that he set up is of no benefit.

This law is derived from the laws mentioned in the following halachah (Maggid Mishneh).

E. g., the fields bordered on each other. He started plowing in his field, and without realizing it he continued plowing in the convert’s field.

For one must have both deed and intent to acquire the property.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this ruling applies regardless of whether the security was given at the time the loan was made or afterwards.

Although Bava Metzia 82a states: “A creditor acquires security [given him],” this means that he must take responsibility for the security if it is destroyed. (See Hilchot Sechirut 10:1.) The security is, however, considered to belong to the debtor, for he has the right to redeem it at any time. Note, however, the comments of the Siftei Cohen 72:149.

I.e., before the creditor does. Note also the following halachah.

For the creditor’s lien on the security is not nullified by the convert’s death. The Maggid Mishneh extends this principle further and states that if a creditor has a promissory note or witnesses who will testify that the convert owes him money, a lien is established on the convert’s property, and it is is not nullified by his death. This applies even if the convert does not own any landed property.

For he took possession of it.

See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:8, which states that when a courtyard is protected, any ownerless article that falls into the courtyard is acquired by the owner. If the courtyard is not protected, the owner must stand next to his courtyard and express his desire that his courtyard acquire on his behalf. Similarly, in the present instance, the security belonging to the convert becomes ownerless upon his death. Since it is located in the creditor’s property, he acquires it immediately.

For it has already become the property of the creditor.

For immediately upon the convert’s death, they manifest ownership over themselves. This occurs automatically even without their conscious decision. They do not even require a bill of release (Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 267). Thus, they become free before they can be acquired by anyone else.

For they do not possess an independent financial capacity with which they can acquire their freedom. (See Tosafot, Gittin 39a.)

See Hilchot Mechirah 2:1-4.

In these instances, the property remains in the convert’s possession or in his estate, to be inherited by his child (or child to be born).

Without leaving any heirs, in which instance the convert does not have any heirs.

For they gave up their possession when they heard the second rumor (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 275:41).

See Hilchot Mechirah 3:1-2.

See Hilchot Mechirah 1:3-7, 2:1.

See the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:1), from which it is evident that this applies even when the commitment to give the gift was made in the presence of witnesses and/or acknowledged by the giver.

Just as a purchase cannot be made final through merely a verbal commitment (Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 7), so too, the mere promise to give a gift is not enough to make the transfer final. Nevertheless, as stated in Halachah 9 of that chapter, when a person promises to give a small gift and fails to do so, it is considered as if he did not act in good faith.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 241:2 states that this ruling applies even when the debt is supported by a promissory note or when security was given for it.

The Lechem Mishneh and the Ramah (loc. cit.) refer to the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 74) and state that the Rambam’s wording is precise. One must forgo the debt and give the entrusted article as a gift. If one uses wording that is reversed - i.e., forgoing an entrusted article or giving a loan - the transaction is not effective.

Since the loan is already in the possession of the recipient, the giver must merely forgo the obligation. Similarly, with regard to the entrusted article, since it is already in the physical possession of the recipient, the giver need not do more than make a serious commitment to give it to him.

See Hilchot Mechirah 5:11, which states that a kinyan is not required, nor need the transaction be observed by witnesses.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, which describes the kinyan referred to as ma’amad sh’loshtan.

See Hilchot Mechirah 5:9. Unlike the laws of marriage and divorce, where witnesses are necessary for the kinyan to be established, with regard to financial matters the kinyan is completed whether or not witnesses are present.

I.e., to prevent a person from making a gift and then denying the fact.

See Hilchot Mechirah 21:1-3.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:4) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, but also quotes that of other authorities, who differ and maintain that with regard to both a sale and a gift, the person transferring the property need not define the property that he is selling.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, based on Menachot 108b, which states that when a person states: “I am giving you one of the homes in my building,” the recipient acquires the least valuable home in the building. All the traditional commentaries on the Mishneh Torah attempt to resolve this difficulty. The Migdal Oz explains the difference as follows. The term “property” used in this halachah is not specific at all. For it can refer to a home, a field, an orchard or any other type of landed property. Once the giver says “a home,” by contrast, he has already been specific enough for the recipient to make an acquisition.

I.e., the transfer of ownership takes place at the time of the fulfillment of the condition. See Hilchot Ishut 6:15.

Since the condition was not fulfilled, it is as if the property has remained in the possession of the original owner. Therefore, the recipient was not entitled to benefit from it and must return the benefit to the original owner. (See Hilchot Mechirah 11:11.)

See Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 6, and Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, for a description of the laws governing conditional agreements.

Al menat in Hebrew.

Thus, when the condition is fulfilled, the recipient becomes the owner of the gift, not from the time of the fulfillment of the condition, but from the time the agreement was made.

There are, however, both previous and later authorities who do not accept this principle. See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:63).

This refers to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni. See Hilchot Ishut 6:14, where the Rambam discusses this issue and mentions this opinion in the name of “some of the later geonim.” In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, the Ra’avad attempts to substantiate this view.

In Hilchot Ishut 6:14, the Rambam attempts to negate this thesis, explaining that the source for the laws of conditional agreements is the agreement reached between Mo es and the tribes of Gad and Reuven. That was an agreement concerning financial matters.

I.e., provided the recipient ultimately returns the article, for during the time the gift remains in the recipient’s possession, he is the owner of the object with all the associated rights and responsibilities. If, however, the recipient does not return the article when he is required to, he breaks the conditions under which the article was given, and it is as if it had never been his.
The most classic example of this halachic institution is the gift of a lulav on the holiday of Sukkot. On the first day of the holiday, the person must be the owner of the lulav and the other three species to fulfill the mitzvah. In many instances, it occurs that a person does not own the species himself. How then does he fulfill the mitzvah? By receiving the species from a colleague as a gift with the intent that it be returned. At the time he fulfills the mitzvah, the species belong to him. Afterwards, he returns them to their original owner. See Hilchot Lulav 8:10.

I.e., that after the giver passes away, it should be returned to his heirs.

I.e., that after the recipient passes away, his heirs should return it to the giver or to his heirs.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 241:6) states that if the giver does not specify a time when the article must be returned, the recipient may keep it in his possession for as long as he desires.

He is never required to return the benefit to the giver.

Since the recipient was the legal owner of the ox at the time, he had the right to consecrate it.

For he brought the ox back to the giver. The condition mentioned only that the actual body of the ox be returned. The fact that its status changed is of no consequence.

For since the condition was not fulfilled, it is as if the ox never belonged to the recipient. Therefore, he had no right to consecrate it, for a person cannot consecrate property belonging to someone else.

For since the ox was consecrated, it is of no value to its owner.

Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:4 includes this as part of the prohibition (Deuteronomy 7:2): “Do not be gracious unto them.” See also Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 50).
When quoting this halachah, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 249:2) mentions two situations where a gift may be given to a gentile:
a) one knows him well;
b) doing so will contribute to “the ways of peace.”

This term has a specific meaning. As stated in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:7-8 and Hilchot Melachim 10:10-11, it refers to a non-Jew who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. Such a person is not a member of the Jewish people. He is, however, granted permission to dwell in Eretz Yisrael.
To attain this status, he must make a formal statement in the presence of a Rabbinic court. This status is granted only during the era when the laws of the Jubilee year are practiced.

“It” refers to the carcass of an animal that has died without ritual slaughter, and hence is unfit to be eaten by a Jew.

Implied is that we must make it possible for the non-Jew to live among us. See also Hilchot Shabbat 2:12 and Hilchot Melachim 10:12.

Even if the servant is freed later, the gift that was given to him remains the property of his master. The rationale is that a Canaanite servant has no independent financial capacity. Instead, everything that a servant acquires is acquired by his master.

If the couple divorces, or the husband dies during his wife’s lifetime, the article is given to her [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 249:3)]. The rationale is that a woman possesses an independent financial capacity. Nevertheless, throughout the time they are married, all of her property is placed in the hands of her husband. He manages it, and he is entitled to the benefits. See Hilchot Ishut 12:3, 22:7.
The same applies with regard to an article given to her as a gift. It is considered to be part of the woman’s nichsei m’log. See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 85:11).

For the giver has no authority over the article once it enters the woman’s or the servant’s possession. He cannot abrogate the rights given the husband or the master by our Sages or the Torah.

For in this instance, the giver is making a specification about the article itself, as illustrated in the following. In such a situation, he is - like a person who takes a vow - able to restrict how his property is used even when it leaves his actual possession.

The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that the condition must have two elements: a) a negative one, that the husband has no authority over the money; and b) a positive one, that it be designated for a specific purpose.

This is the only way a person can give a Canaanite servant money to obtain his freedom. Otherwise, it would automatically become the property of the master.

These laws apply whether the person gives the gift in a state of good health (a matnat bari) or in an oral deposition of his property (a matnat sh’chiv me’ra).

He acquires his own freedom and his capacity to acquire other property at the same time.

Or to his heirs.

For it mentions the master’s ownership of the property he retains.

Because he does not have an independent financial capacity.