Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Before he transgressed. Thus it is possible that his transgression could have been inadvertent.

For a sin-offering is brought only when one transgresses inadvertently and not when one violates a transgression intentionally.

If, however, he contradicts the testimony of the witnesses and states that he did not perform the act neither intentionally or inadvertently, he is liable for a sin-offering, because the testimony of the witnesses is binding [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:1)]. See also Chapter II, Halachah 8.

And women’s testimony is not accepted in a court of law. Moreover, the Rambam uses the singular and for testimony to be accepted, there must be two witnesses.

If, however, he protested and denied the witness’ statement, he is not liable for a sin-offering (Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:6).

Were there to have been a prevailing assumption already established that a food was permitted, it would take the testimony of two witnesses to cause it to be considered as forbidden. In this instance, however, the status of the fat is unknown. Hence, the statement of one witness is sufficient to cause it to be forbidden (Kiryat Sefer).

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:6.

Keritot 6:7.

This is the version found both in the standard published text and in many authentic manuscripts. Some commentaries suggest that the text should read: “He does not find atonement.”

For animals designated as sacrifices may not be redeemed until they become blemished.

The prooftext cited above also implies that each sin-offering should be brought for “the transgression that he committed” and not “the transgressions that he committed.”

The prooftext cited also implies that the sin-offering may be brought only for one transgression of one person as indicated by the phrase “he committed.”

See a comparable ruling in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 4:5.

A burnt-offering brought when the altar is idle.

Rav Yosef Corcus questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that in matters of Scriptural Law, we follow the principal that the laws of bereirah do not apply, i.e., we do not say that retroactively, it can be considered that a person had a particular intent at the outset. In this instance, we do not say that the person’s intent at the outset is determined by his choice when he desired to slaughter the animal. Kin’at Eliyahu justifies the Rambam’s ruling explaining that as long as the person’s initial intent is not a contradiction to his ultimate intent, we are not concerned with his initial intent at all.

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:4.

The above source states: Even a burnt-offering that is accepted from a gentile is not accepted from this apostate. [This is derived from Leviticus 1:2 which] states: “A man from you who will sacrifice.” According to the Oral Tradition, we learned: “From you,” i.e., not all of you, excluding an apostate.

For both of these actions are considered as a denial of the entire Jewish tradition.

I.e., it is public knowledge that he violates a given transgression, e.g., partaking of blood or forbidden fat, repeatedly.

This latter phrase can be understood as giving an explanation for the ruling. Since the person frequently violates this transgression, we assume that he is not sincere in his desire for atonement for it and a sin-offering must be accompanied by sincere regret.

Gittin 47a differentiates between an apostate who acts out of desire and one who acts to anger God, explaining that the latter term refers to one who had two cuts of meat before him of equal quality, one kosher and one non-kosher, and he ate the non-kosher one solely for the intent of angering God. If, by contrast, a person partook of non-kosher meat because he was hungry and there was no other meat available, he is not considered as acting to anger God. He is, nevertheless, considered as an apostate and a sacrifice to atone for that transgression is not accepted from him.

Even though it is a similar transgression to partaking of forbidden fat (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, loc. cit. Since he observes this commandment continually, why should his other transgressions prevent him from gaining atonement for this violation. Moreover, it is hoped that offering this sacrifice will spur him to complete repentance.

With regard to that transgression, alternatively, with regard to the Sabbath or idolatry. In such a state, the sacrifice of the sin-offering on his behalf is not acceptable.

In which instance, sacrifices can be brought on his behalf.

In which instance, sacrifices cannot be brought on his behalf.

I.e., we do not say that since an animal was disqualified as a sacrifice once, it remains disqualified forever. Instead, whenever it becomes possible to offer the animal again, the sacrifice is acceptable. See Yoma 64a.

This is a concept that applies in many different contexts of the laws concerning the consecration of animals. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:34, 4:24, 6:1; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:4; et al.
As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 4:15, this represents a reversal of the Rambam’s initial position on the matter.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:6-7.

I.e., guilt-offerings brought because of specific sins, as explained in ch. 9

I.e., the atonement generated by Yom Kippur is not sufficient to atone for these transgressions, since a definite obligation was already established (Keritot 25b).

And the transgression concerning which he is in doubt would require him to bring a guilt-offering.

If, however, he discovers that in fact he committed a transgression that warrants a sin-offering, he is obligated to bring that sin-offering even after Y om Kippur (ibid. 26a).

In the following halachah.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 1:1. This issue is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and the Sages in Keritot 7a. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi maintains that Yom Kippur is powerful enough to generate atonement even if the person does not repent. The Sages, by contrast, maintain that Y om Kippur is effective, only when accompanied by repentance. [It must be emphasized that even the Sages acknowledge the unique purifying influence of Yom Kippur. They, however, maintain that a person cannot receive that influence unless he first opens himself up through sincere repentance (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. IV).]

For it is as if the sacrifice that he brought initially had not been offered.

I.e., complete atonement is not granted from Above until this sacrifice is offered.

For it is not brought to atone for a transgression.

As explained in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1, that term refers to zavim, zavot, women after childbirth, and one who was afflicted by tzara’at. In all these instances, there are situations where questions could arise whether the person actually deserved to be placed in this category and was in fact obligated to bring this sacrifice.

A woman suspected of adultery who is compelled to undergo a test of her fidelity is required to bring a meal-offering, as stated in Hilchot Sotah 3:12. The bracketed phrase is necessary because in contrast to the prior examples where the doubt is whether the persons are required to bring the offerings or not, with regard to a sotah, the doubt is whether she committed the transgression or not.

Since these sacrifices are not brought to bring the people atonement for sin, the fact that Yom Kippur passes has no bearing on the person's obligation.

For another transgression that he committed.

The rationale is that it is forbidden to delay an execution. Nevertheless, when the sacrificial animal has already been slaughtered and the delay is minimal, we make that delay so that he will receive atonement for that sin. Once the person has been executed, a sacrifice may not be offered on his behalf, because sacrifices are offered only for the sake of the living. These laws are restated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:5.

See the examples given in Chapter 6, Halachah 4, and Chapter 7, Halachah 1.

In Chapter 1, Halachah 4.

One for each transgression, for they are all counted individually. Keritot 2b offers several means of exegesis through which this concept is derived.

I.e., there is a general principle (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:8, Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 9:6)“One prohibition does not take effect while another is in effect.” For example, if one partakes of a mixture of milk and meat from an animal that was not slaughtered properly, one is liable only for partaking of the non-kosher meat. He is not liable for eating milk and meat together. Nevertheless, the three situations which the Rambam proceeds to mention are exceptions.

As exemplified in several of the instances the Rambam cites below.

The Rambam does not give an example of this principle here. In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 8:6, he does, explaining that a person who partakes of a gid hanesheh, a sciatic nerve, of an animal which is treifah is liable for two transgressions. Since when the animal became treifah, its entire body became encompassed in the prohibition, that prohibition also encompasses the gid even though it was prohibited beforehand.
The difference between an issur mosif, the instance mentioned previously, and an issur kollel, this instance, is that an issur mosif has a greater scope of relevance, i.e., it affects a wider range of people. An issur kollel does not affect more people, but it is more encompassing with regard to the forbidden entity, as evident from the example given above (see Rashi, Yevamot 34b). See also Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

He is liable for these three transgressions, because all three transgressions are brought about by the same deed, the slaughter of the animal.

I.e., the windpipe and the gullet.

For an animal slaughtered for the sake of a false divinity may not be offered as a sacrifice to God. Chullin 40a describes the situation more picturesquely, stating: “It is as if he is cutting dust.”

As Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:6 states, one is liable for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple Courtyard only when it is fit to be offered as a sacrifice in the Temple.

The slaughter of a fowl is acceptable if only one of the signs, the gullet or the windpipe is slit. Now, if half or less than the windpipe is slit, the animal is considered as living. Thus if half of its windpipe is slit, adding the slightest amount to the slit is considered as ritual slaughter (see Hilchot Shechitah 1:11).

While outside the Temple Courtyard.

I.e., the performance of forbidden labor is prohibited on both these holy days. Thus with one act, he violates two prohibitions, see Chapter 6, Halachah 6.

If, however, his brother passes away childless, it is a mitzvah for him to marry his widow.

For which there is a separate prohibition.

I.e., when the woman married the transgressor’s brother. Significantly, Yevamot 34a, the Rambam’s source, extends the scope of the example, stating that the women married to the two brothers could have been sisters, in which case there would be another prohibition involved, because the prohibition of two sisters is an issur kollel. Rav Yosef Corcus states that the Rambam does not mention that particular, because he does not refer to an issur kollel in this chapter.

I.e., the prohibitions against relations with a woman in the niddah state.

More precisely, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 3, this is speaking about a situation where he sodomized a man and that man sodomized him. Nevertheless, since they both acted in different positions, each act of sodomy is considered a separate prohibition.

The Rambam mentions the names of individuals mentioned in the Book of Genesis. In the Biblical narrative, however, not all of them share the family ties he mentions in this hypothetical situation.

The father of Rachel, Jacob’s wife, but who was not related to Zilpa.

These relations are permitted, because, in this hypothetical situation, Lavan does not share a blood relationship with Zilpa.

I.e., the sister of Rachel who is also Jacob’s wife.

I.e., Jacob is prohibited against having relations with Serach on two counts. She is his granddaughter and she is the sister of his wife.

For both of these prohibitions took effect with Serach’s birth.

Jacob's son.

Since Reuven’s marriage caused Serach to be forbidden to his brothers, it also causes her to be forbidden to his father. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that even though the prohibitions need not be alike, i.e., Serach is not forbidden to Reuven’s brothers because of the same prohibition that she is forbidden to Jacob. There must, however, be some similarity with the prohibitions. It is not sufficient that she merely be married.

The Rambam speaks of Jacob’s maternal brother, because afterwards, he speaks of Serach being married by Isaac through the rite of yibbum. If one of Jacob’s paternal brothers had married her, she would be forbidden to Isaac and the marriage between them would not be effective (Kessef Mishneh, based on Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 6:8).

I.e., the prohibition is an issur mossif.

Who is Jacob’s uncle.

Yishmael’s brother and Yaakov’s father.

The Rabbis extended the prohibitions against marriage with relatives and included others who were not forbidden by Scriptural Law, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 1:5. Since the prohibition is only Rabbinic in origin, after the fact the marriage is binding.

Because she was his father's wife. If, however, Jacob did not have any other brothers, Isaac's marriage to Serach would not have increased the number of individuals to whom she was forbidden. Hence, the prohibition would not be considered as an issur mosif.

If Isaac was not alive, she would not be a married woman. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:5), the Rambam states that it is not necessary that Isaac be alive. That, however, applies only with regard to the prohibition against relations with one's father's wife.

Who is her sister. One is liable for relations with two sisters only while both are alive.

The wording of this halachah parallels the amended text of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.), as communicated by Rav Kappach in his translation. The standard published text follows a slightly different version.

I.e., in the last instance, Jacob must have paternal brothers for his father's marriage to Serach to bring about an additional prohibition for him. If he does not have paternal brothers, the fact that hypothetically, a prohibition could have been added is not of consequence.

To speak in terms of Biblical relationships: Jacob married Leah, the daughter of Lavan; he also married the daughter of Rachel (Rachel also being Lavan’s daughter and Leah’s sister); and he married the daughter of Lavan’s son. Thus Lavan’s wife is Jacob’s mother-in-law, the mother of his wife’s mother, and the mother of his wife’s father. These marriages are permissible, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 2:14.

I.e., he consecrated the women through the activity of agents, who consecrated all of them at the same time.

I.e., the verse mentions all three prohibitions and uses the same phrase, “They are close.....” to describe all three.

Since the verse uses the phrase “It is a depraved design” to refer to all the prohibitions, one can infer that at times, all three prohibitions are considered as one “depraved design” and one is liable for only one sin-offering (Keritot 14b).

After mentioning the prohibition once, the Torah reiterates the ban, to indicate that one is always liable for this transgression independently (Keritot 15a).

The offspring of the man and his illegitimate daughter.

For both the illegitimate sister and the illegitimate son were fathered by the same man.

Because the same woman gave birth to both that man and his daughter.

These women are mentioned in Chapter l, Halachah 4.

In Halachah 5, with regard to relations with a woman in the niddah state, and in Chapter 7, Halachah 2, with regard to the Sabbath prohibitions, the Rambam writes that the days themselves constitute an interruption. In those instances, however, during the interim days, the prohibition did not apply (the woman returned to a state of purity and the Sabbath ended). Hence a distinction is made and every transgression is considered individually. In this instance, by contrast, the prohibition continues throughout all the days in the interim. Therefore, all of the transgressions are covered by the same sin-offering.
See also Chapter 6, Halachah 9, where the Rambam writes that if a person becomes aware of his different transgressions at varying times, he is liable for more than one sin-offering.

As stated in Halachah 3, were there to be different women involved, each transgression would require a different sin-offering. Nevertheless, in this instance, since only one woman was involved, he is liable for only one sin-offering.

I.e., between relations, she forgot about the prohibition.

The Rambam is emphasizing that although they engaged in the forbidden relationships together, since there is a difference in the extent of their awareness, there is a difference in the number of sin-offerings they are required to bring.

I.e., one for every act of intimacy.

Keritot 3a, cited in Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

Or was sodomized by both.

See Hilchot Gerushin, chs. 12-13, with regard to when such a woman is given license to remarry and when it is suspected that her husband is still alive.

Even if the court granted her permission to remarry, she is not considered to have sinned due to forces beyond her control. See Yevamot 87b, 92a, where this issue is discussed.

In which instance, unknowingly, every act of intimacy with her second husband was an adulterous act.

I.e., one after the other during the time she was under the impression that her first husband had died.

In this instance as well, unknowingly, every act of intimacy was an adulterous act.

I.e., throughout the entire time, he did not become aware of the prohibition involved in intimacy with her while she was in the niddah state.

He is not, however, liable for every time they were intimate. All relations during one span of time when the woman is in the niddah state are atoned for by one sin-offering (Keritot 17a).

As stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:9: “Whenever a woman has a fixed time when she is accustomed to menstruate, her husband can assume that she is [ritually pure and] permitted until she tells him “I am impure.”

In which instance, relations represent a transgression. See Halachah 7.

And hence must bring a sin-offering.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:14, where the Rambam writes: It is the practice of Jewish men and women to carry out a personal inspection after relations. What is implied? The man should clean himself with a cloth prepared for [this purpose] and the woman should clean herself with a cloth prepared for [this purpose]. [The purpose of these inspections is] to see whether the woman menstruated during relations.
As mentioned in the notes to that halachah, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 186:1) does not require a husband and a wife to carry out such inspections in an ongoing manner.

As stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:12: It is forbidden for a man to engage in relations with his wife near the time she can expect menstruation to begin, lest she menstruate during relations.... For how long [is it necessary to refrain from relations]? If [the woman] would ordinarily begin menstruating during the day, she is forbidden to enter into relations from the beginning of the day. If she would ordinarily begin menstruating during the night, she is forbidden to enter into relations from the beginning of the night.

It is not considered as a willful transgression, since the couple did not expect that she would become impure. Nevertheless, since the possibility existed that she would become impure, atonement is required.

For a man who engages in relations with a woman in the niddah state is also impure (Leviticus 15:24).

For it can be assumed that the blood came from the woman’s menstruation during intimacy. Even if he waited before cleaning himself, we have no reason to attribute the bleeding to any other source.

Since she waited, it is possible that she began menstruating afterwards and was not impure during the time of intimacy. Hence there is an irresolvable doubt whether they transgressed or not, for there is no way that this matter can be determined (Niddah 14b).

Since it is possible they are not obligated to bring a sacrifice, it is forbidden for them to do so, lest they be slaughtering an ordinary animal (i.e., an animal consecrated in error) in the Temple Courtyard, which is a transgression.

I.e., a longer interval.

Although there is a possibility that he contracted impurity, it is also possible that she began menstruating afterwards. Hence we assume that she was pure until bleeding was discovered and her husband is not deemed impure.

But instead, should remain within his wife until his erection becomes limp.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:11.

I.e., with regard to his entry and his withdrawal. They are two different lapses of awareness: a) the thought that he could complete relations before she menstruated, and b) forgetting that it is forbidden to withdraw while erect.

Rav Yosef Corcus, Rabbi Akiva Eiger, and others note that here there is reason to say that the act should be considered as two transgressions, because he became aware of the prohibition between his entry and his withdrawal. Now, when one inadvertently engaged in two forbidden experiences of intimacy and became aware of the transgression in the interim, he is liable for two sin-offerings. Hence, there is room to say that he should be liable for two sin-offerings in this instance as well. Among the resolutions offered is that, here, the second forbidden act is so closely tied to the first that they are considered as being carried out in the same lapse of awareness (Or Sameiach).