Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

See Halachah 13. The consecrated animal should be redeemed, the money given to the Temple treasury, and the animal itself should be offered as a sacrifice. See Hilchot Arachin 5:5.

In this instance, the article should be redeemed and sold. An appropriate animal should then be purchased with the proceeds.

Here, also, the article should be redeemed and an article fit for the appropriate purpose should be acquired.

See Halachah 13.

See Halachah 5.

The latter term excludes animals that are fit to be offered that were consecrated as sacrifices. They may not be redeemed.

The minimum worth of benefit for which one is liable.

This represents a stringency relevant to me’ilah over other prohibitions. With regard to other prohibitions, if there is an interval longer than the time it talces to eat a large portion of bread (loch k’dei achilat p’ras) between them, eating on two separate occasions cannot be combined. With regard to me’ilah, one is liable despite the interval as stated above. See Hilchot Shegagot 9:9.

He remains unaware that he derived benefit from a consecrated article from the first time until the second. If he becomes aware, different laws apply.

Me’ilah 18b derives this concept through techniques of Biblical exegesis.

This term implies that even though he is not held liable, he is forbidden to do so.

Thus separated the earth from the field.

E. g., he took a clod of earth and broke it into small pieces and thus reduced its value. If, however, he does not cause damage, he is not liable. See Chapter 6 for an explanation of this idea.

The Kessel Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s words as meaning “the dust of the field benefits the crops threshed there.” Some indeed maintain there is a printing error in the standard text of the Mishneh Torah. They maintain that instead of sadeh, “field,” the text should read dishah, “threshing.” Rav Yosef Corcus, however, justifies the present version.

He is not liable for deriving benefit, because these objects are attached to the ground. Deriving such benefit is, however, forbidden (Tosefta, Me’ilah 1:12).

The Kessel Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:4, the Rambam rules that one who bows down to a building that is already constructed causes it to be forbidden. Nevertheless, that does not necessarily represent a contradiction to these rulings, because the laws applying to the worship of false deities are more stringent.

Chapter 6, Halachah 8; see also Chapter 8, Halachah 4.

Which would rot and be used as fertilizer.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Meilah 3:6), the Rambam explains that these three examples represent an entity fit for sacrifice on the altar (doves), an entity fit to be used for the improvement of the Temple (water, which when mixed with clay produces mortar), and an entity (wastes) that is not fit for either of these purposes.

But instead, had their origin in outside sources (ibid.). See Rav Kappach’s notes to the Commentary of the Mishnah, which explain that the Rambam reversed his thinking regarding this issue. Originally, he followed the view that the prohibition against me’ilah applies in such instances. Afterwards, he changed his position and accepted the opinion that it does not apply.

See Hilchot Shekalim 2:4; 4:8.

Even though underground, the stream flows through the field.

The prohibition does not apply, because such wood is not usually sold and benefit is not usually derived from it.
The Ra’avad follows a different interpretation of that mishnah and hence, does not accept the Rambam’s ruling.

Bava Batra 26b explains that when roots are less than sixteen cubits from the base of a tree, they derive their nurture from the tree. If they are more than sixteen cubits away, the nurture from the tree is minimal and the majority of the nurture is derived from the land. Hence, if the land is consecrated, the roots are considered as the products of consecrated property.

According to the principle explained in the previous note, in such an instance, the roots would not be considered the direct products of the consecrated tree. Nevertheless, since they come from that tree, certain stringencies are in place.

We assume that the fowl took the wood from another tree and not from the consecrated tree [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 3:9)].

Since the eggs and the chicks require the consecrated tree, they are deriving a certain benefit from the tree and therefore it is forbidden to benefit from them. Alternatively, were one permitted to derive benefit from the eggs or chicks, there would be reason to suspect one would climb the consecrated tree and thus benefit from it. Hence, we forbid benefiting from the chicks and eggs (Rav Yosef Corcus).

When the donor consecrated the forest, he consecrated everything that it contains including the nests (ibid.).

The Ra’avad offers a different interpretation, stating that the term refers to leaves that fall that are useful as fertilizer. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 3:9) where he elaborates, explaining that the term refers to a patch in a piece of wood at a point where a branch or stem formerly grew out of the tree.

I.e., since these entities are of little actual value, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to them.

The reason that the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to servants is that, as in many other halachic contexts, servants are equated with landed property. As stated in Halachah 5, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to land.

The rationale is that the growth of the new produce is not dependent on the seed alone, but also on the land. Since there are two factors involved and one is permitted, the prohibition does not apply. See a parallel in Hilchot Terumot 11:21; see also Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 6:15.

Needless to say, he must make restitution for the consecrated produce he used and add an additional fifth.

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that the rationale is that since this produce came from consecrated property that was not redeemed, it cannot be used to pay for the misappropriation of other consecrated property.

Challah is required to be separated only from ordinary dough, not from dough that is consecrated, as stated in Hilchot Bikkurim 6:1-4.
Similarly, he is obligated to separate terumah and the tithes. The Rambam mentions challah, because he is using the wording of his source, the Tosefta, Terumot 8:2.

After wine has been made from crushed grapes, there is still a certain residue of flavor in the dregs. Therefore it was common to pour water over the dregs and let the mixture stand. The water would then receive some of the flavor of the grapes. After the water was drained off and used as a beverage, the process would be repeated. The Rambam is stating that for the first three times that this process is performed, there is a sufficient amount of the grape residue left to prohibit making use of it. In his gloss to Bava Basra 97a, the Rashbam emphasizes that this law applies only when the final product is not one third larger than the amount of water added. If, however, it increased to that extent, it is considered as wine and forbidden (see Hilchot Berachot 8:9).
See also similar, but not identical concepts in Hilchot Terumot 11:13; Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 3:12; and Hilchot Tuma’at Ochalin 13:17.

For the entire prohibition is a Rabbinic safeguard (Bava Batra, loc. cit.).

More stringent laws are always applied to articles consecrated to the altar.

The hen is not fit to be sacrificed. It must be sold and the proceeds used to purchase an animal from a species that can be offered as a sacrifice.

For they are produced by an entity that is consecrated. Hence, they are also considered as consecrated property.

If the doves are unblemished, this is forbidden. For an animal that is fit to be sacrificed should be consecrated for that purpose alone. Were the doves to be consecrated for the altar, the prohibition against me'ilah would not apply to the eggs.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 13.

And thus will no longer be used for Temple service. See Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 8:6 which states that the worn out garments were used to make wicks for the Menorah.

As explained in the notes to Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 8:11, the priestly garments were consecrated with the stipulation that the priests would derive personal benefit from them. Hence the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that there is a difference of opinion concerning this issue between Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi Shimon in Zevachim 45a. Although Eruvin 45b states that in such a situation the halachah should follow Rabbi Yossi’s view, in this situation, the Rambam accepts Rabbi Shimon’s view because it is mentioned in Arachin Sb without qualification.

Thus excluding gentiles. The commentaries note that the Talmud (Zevachim 45a) and the Sifra derives this concept from other sources and question the source for the Rambam’s method of exegesis.

One derived satisfaction from the sound of the Levites’ melodies and chanting (Rav Yosef Corcus).

One took pleasure in the beauty of the Temple (ibid.). The prohibition against me'ilah does not apply to sound and appearance, because they are without substance.

Because then its mitzvah is completed and once a mitzvah is completed, the prohibition against me'ilah never applies.

Note the parallels in Hilchot Gezeilah Va’Aveidah 13:12.

If it is attached to the ground, this prohibition does not apply, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 5.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 5:1), the Rambam writes that “pure gold will not be diminished to a significant extent even over the course of several hundred years.”

To exemplify this concept, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.:2), the Rambam speaks of a person who partakes of consecrated food. He derived benefit from that food and consumed it.
Implied by the same principle is that a person who damages a consecrated article, but does not derive benefit from it, does not violate the prohibition against me’ilah (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Chapter 5, Halachot 3-4; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:9.

This ruling does not apply to sacrificial animals of a lesser degree of sanctity, for the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to such animals before they are slaughtered, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

I.e., even if the animal has been weakened and its value diminished, it is still fit for a sacrifice and will bring atonement for the owner (Rashi, Me’ilah 19a). Although the Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, Rav Yosef Corcus maintains that the Ra’avad did not possess the complete text of that Talmudic passage.

Not necessarily as a result of that person’s activities.

For the more wool there is on an animal, the more it is worth.

Taking the wool will damage the animal’s worth, because now it would be worth less.

Seemingly, this would apply whether the animal was blemished or not.

Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

I.e., the holiness is transferred to the money brought as atonement.

Since its holiness has departed, it is not considered as if he benefited from a consecrated article.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:2), the Rambam writes that a person who intentionally misappropriates a consecrated object is not required to bring a sacrifice because “his sin is too severe to be atoned for by merely bringing a sacrifice and making restitution.”

I.e., that when one violates the prohibition against me'ilah inadvertently, a second person who benefits from the article does not violate the prohibition.

Selling it or giving it as a present (ibid. 5:3).

And indeed, even a thousand such people (ibid.).

Here the Rambam is speaking about a non-kosher animal as apparent from the example he gives and from the following halachot.

For its ownership was not transferred; Since none of the individuals sought to give it away to another person, it never departed from its status as consecrated property.

Transferring its ownership.

Since the goblet was made of gold, the prohibition is violated even though it was not damaged, as stated in Halachah 1.
As the Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus explain, the Rambam’s rulings come from his juxtaposition of the teachings of the Mishnah (Me’ilah 5:3) with those of the Tosefta (Me’ilah 2:1). In doing so, he resolves those sources in a different manner than other commentaries.

For renting it for a limited period of time is equivalent to selling it, since during the time it is rented, it is no longer in the legal domain of the renter.

Even though the axe is consecrated, there are no restrictions on his colleague.

Consecrated for the Temple treasury.

I.e., one consecrated as a sacrifice of the highest order of sanctity, as explained in Halachah 1.

This reflects the difference between an entity that is consecrated to be offered as a sacrifice and one consecrated for its value.

I.e., a conclusion made by the Rambam by deduction without an explicit prior Rabbinic source.

So that it could be used for mundane purposes.

And not its physical person.

I.e., it follows the rulings mentioned in Halachah 4 and not the rulings found in Halachah 5.

Me’ilah 19b.

For, as stated in Halachah 3, when a person intentionally misappropriates a consecrated object, its sacred quality does not depart. Hence, anyone who uses it after him also violates the prohibition against me’ilah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 5:4), the Rambam explains that since the article was in the treasurer’s possession before the person took it and it remained in his possession after it was given to him, and he did not benefit from it, he does not violate the prohibition against me’ilah.
This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Me’ilah 19b-20a. The Ra’avad, Rashi, and others understand the passage differently. The Kessef Mishneh also understands the Rambam differently

In contrast to one who misappropriates it inadvertently, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.
The statements beginning “It appears to me” did not appear in the original version of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), but were added in the later version.

See Halachah 4 and the halachot that follow.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (toe. cit.), the Rambam explains that this applies even if he damages the article. As long as he does not derive benefit, he does not violate the prohibition.

Even if he does not dwell under its shade at all, he violates the prohibition against me’ilah, because incorporating the consecrated article into a building is considered as benefit.

It is not obvious that he is placing it there for a purpose.

Rav Yosef Corcus emphasizes that we are speaking about a situation in which the craftsman performs a service, but there is no article associated with that service. Otherwise, he would need to draw the article after him as mentioned in the following halachah.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Mechirah 3:1, according to Scriptural Law, the payment of money completes a transaction. Nevertheless, the Sages ordained that the transaction not be completed until he pulls it after him (meshichah).

According to the Rambam (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:14), a gentile can complete his acquisition of an article through either the payment of money or through drawing it after him. (Many other authorities differ and maintain that also for a gentile, the payment of money is not sufficient to finalize a transaction.) Thus according to the Rambam, since the article has been transferred to the gentile’s ownership, the prohibition against me’ilah applies.

Because the object has not been transferred to the Jew’s ownership.

A zav, zavah, or the like who may not partake of sacrificial offerings until they bring the offerings required of them. See Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1.

For even though he is bringing a sacrifice, he is deriving personal benefit, his atonement, from doing so.

For it is the casting of blood that brings him atonement.

I.e., the half-shekel that each person is obligated to give each year to contribute towards the purchase of communal sacrifices. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 1.

Although he transgresses, he is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of giving a half-shekel (Hilchot Shekalim 3:11).

Three times a year money was taken from the funds collected and placed in one of the Temple chambers and placed in baskets. The money in the baskets is referred to as teru.mat halishkah (ibid., ch. 3).

For every Jew has a portion in the communal sacrifices.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 2:2), the Rambam writes that initially, when the person pays the money to the Temple treasurers, its status does not change. The half-shekel remains consecrated and the person is not considered to have violated the prohibition against me’ilah. When the animal is sacrificed, the priest has the intent that everyone who gave his half-shekel has a share in the animal. It is then that the person acquires his share and violates the prohibition against me’ilah.
In that commentary, the Rambam cites our Sages’ statement (Eruvin 31a) that rnitzvot were not given for our satisfaction and asks: Since the money was used to fulfill a mitzvah, what benefit did the person receive? He explains that people who did not pay their half-shekalim were physically compelled to do so (the Jerusalem Talmud, Shekalim 1:3). The benefit the person receives is that he is not subjected to this compulsion.

From his own funds.

The Rambam’s wording is somewhat difficult and has attracted the attention of the commentaries. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that we are not speaking about a situation in which a person gave the half-shekel to a colleague and the colleague used it for his own purposes, because it is already stated in Halachah 3 that in such a situation the person who originally owned the money violates the prohibition against me’ilah, but the recipient does not. Instead, this is speaking about a situation where the half-shekel never left the original owner’s domain and either he or a colleague used it there.
From a comparison to the latter clauses of the halachah, it appears that this is speaking about a situation where the money for the sacrifices had already been set aside, as stated in note 49.

I.e., money was taken from the collected funds and set aside for use for the purchase of sacrifices.

For he is taking a consecrated article, the half-shekel, and using it on his own behalf. The benefit he derives is that, as explained above, coercion will not be used to compel him to pay the half-shekel.

I.e., when the priest sets aside the money for the communal sacrifices, he has in mind that if someone had not given his half-shekel as of yet, when he does give it, it will be retroactively considered as if he had a share in the sacrifices purchased with this money set aside.

Hilchot Shekalim 2:9.

Although in actuality it had not reached the treasury, it was considered as consecrated funds.

Because at the time he took it for himself, it had not been consecrated. He is obligated to reimburse his colleague for the half-shekel (Hilchat Shekalim 3:10).

As stated in Hilchot Shekalim 2:4, after the money that was used to purchase communal sacrifices and take care of other necessities in the Temple were set aside from the collection of half-shekalim, any money that remained was considered as “money remaining in the chamber.” As stated in Hilchot Shekalim 4:8-9, this money was used for improvements to the Temple and the city of Jerusalem and for burnt-offerings sacrificed when the altar was free.
Once the third batch of money set aside for the purchase of the communal sacrifices was separated, the remainder of the money was considered as ordinary funds. Hence the prohibition against me'ilah no longer applies to it.

Throughout Torah law, we follow the principle (Kiddushin 42b): “There is no agent for a transgression” and anyone who transgresses must bear the responsibility for his deeds himself. Me’ilah, however, is an exception to this rule and if a person misappropriates an object while acting as an agent for another person, the principal is the one who is liable.

Since he deviated from the principal’s instructions, he is not considered as an agent and is solely responsible for his deeds.

When both the meat and the bread were consecrated for the improvement of the Temple, as stated in Halachah 2.

This is a principle applicable in several contexts of Torah law (Kiddushin 49b; Hilchot Ishut 8:2; Hilchot Sh’vuot 3:3; Hilchot Mechirah 11:9). Even though a person has an intent in his heart, as long as he does not state it explicitly, it is of no consequence.

For they are not considered as responsible for their conduct (see Hilchot Shluchin 2:2).

Since ultimately, the principal’s intent was carried out, we are not concerned who carried it out [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:2)].

The agent added to the principal’s instructions and thus there is reason to think that he should no longer be considered as his agent (ibid.:1). Nevertheless, since he also carried them out, that presumption is not made.

The principal violates this prohibition, because his instructions are being carried out. The agent violates the prohibition, because he has taken the initiative and invited the guests to take more.

The agent who was the agent of the principal, and the guests who were the agents of the agent.

The principal and the first agent.

I.e., entities that will be offered on the altar’s pyre.

I.e., in addition to the prohibition against me‘ilah (misappropriating consecrated articles), the person violates the prohibition against partaking of the meat of the burnt-offering. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:1.

The commentaries note that, as the Rambam himself rules (Hilchot Geneivah 2:10, 3:6), a persorr is liable for a four- or five-time payment if he has a stolen animal sold or slaughtered. Thus, me’ilah is not the sole instance when an agent makes a principal liable.

Hence since here another prohibition is also involved, we follow the general principle that a person never becomes liable because of the activity of an agent and obligate the agent not the principal.

I.e., an earthenware vessel in which oil and a wick are placed (Rav Yosef Corcus).

And one must derive a p’rutah’s worth of benefit to be liable for this prohibition.

For half a p’rutah’s worth of his activity was performed in accord with the principal’s instructions.

For he has deviated from the principal’s instructions with regard to an entire p‘rutah. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that we do not say that he is merely suggesting a place to the agent. Instead, we assume that his intent is that he should bring the articles from that specific place.

Since the agent deviated from the principal’s instructions, the principal is not liable. The agent is liable, because, on his own initiative, he used a consecrated p’rutah for ordinary purposes.

The agent is liable because he used a consecrated p’rutah to purchase the pomegranate on his own initiative. The principal is liable, because his desire was fulfilled. The fact that he received the esrog for less than its value is of no consequence. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:4).

On the surface - as noted by certain commentaries - the Rambam’s ruling here appears to run contrary to statements of the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:2). Nevertheless, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains his position, showing how there is no contradiction.
The Rambam’s ruling is based on Chagigah 10b which states that it is hard to understand why the agent is liable just because the principal remembered. He did not know at all that the money was consecrated. Seemingly, it is like a transgression due to factors beyond one’s control. Nevertheless, our Sages conclude that the agent is liable.

Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

And since he is not liable, the holiness does not depart from the consecrated article.

For as explained above, a sacrifice is not brought to atone for the willful violation of the prohibition of me’ilah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (toe. cit.), the Rambam states that this applies when the storekeeper knows that he received a consecrated p’rutah. In that case, the storekeeper would be transferring the holiness of the consecrated p’rutah to a non-consecrated one. Seemingly, the same ruling would also apply if the principal or the agent made the transfer of holiness (see the gloss of Rav Yosef Corcus).

As described in the previous clause.

We do not say that the consecrated coin is betal, insignificant, and therefore considered as if it no longer exists, because a coin is important and is never considered as insignificant (Tosafot, Me’ilah 21b). Alternatively, it is an entity that can become permitted (by having its holiness transferred) and an entity that can become permitted is never beta! because of a mixture (Kessef Mishneh).

And no one is ever liable merely for a possible violation of the prohibition against me’ilah (Rav Yosef Corcus, based on Chapter 1, Halachah 5).

I.e., the person is forbidden to use some of the purses or oxen and needless to say, all of them, because he does not know which one was consecrated. Thus no matter which purse or ox he takes, it is possible that he is taking the consecrated one.

So he will be permitted to use them.

The Sages required that the largest of the oxen or purses be used even though according to the letter of the law, the same proviso would apply were a smaller one used.

Generally, anything less than a p’rutah’s worth is not considered financially significant and one is not liable at all. In this instance, however, Bava Metzia 55a-b uses Biblical exegesis to show that one is liable for restitution.

Although there is no explicit source that teaches this, it is a logical conclusion, since the Scriptural decree did not explicitly include it.

Without telling him that they are consecrated.

See Hilchot Sha’aleh UFikadon 7:8. Since the owner of the money had every reason to assume that the money would not be touched, he is not liable at all for me’ilah.

If, however, they were sealed or closed in this manner, the principles mentioned in the previous halachah would apply, because the storekeeper or money-changer has no right to use the money under such circumstances.

From the obligation to bring a sacrifice and, needless to say, from lashes.

Thus from his point of view, he is acting as the agent of the one who entrusted the money to him. Hence, he is not liable [the Rambam’s Commentary· to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:5)].

See Hilchot Sha’aleh UFikadon 7:7.

When a woman is married, all of her property enters her husband’s domain and he is entitled to use all of it at will. Here we are speaking of a situation in which the woman had consecrated articles among her property and her husband used them without being aware that they were consecrated.

The Rambam is emphasizing that the husband is considered to have violated the prohibition and not the wife. There is reason to say that the woman should be held liable and the husband considered as her agent (thus connecting this halachah to the previous ones). Nevertheless, since the woman did not instruct the husband to spend the money, she is not held liable (Rav Yosef Corcus).