Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The jugs must be pure because, as explained previously (Chapter 13, Halachah 4), an impure k’li does not intervene in the face of ritual impurity.

This addition is made on the basis of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 6:2). All of the principles mentioned apply only with regard to earthenware containers.

Because an earthenware container does not contract impurity from its outer surface, only from its inner space (Chapter 1, Halachah 5).

Because they contract impurity, and an impure k'li does not intervene in the face of impurity.

The portion of the house which is pure.

The portion which is impure.

Because it is considered as an independent entity.

I.e., the dividers extend vertically from the ceiling to the ground.

I.e., the dividers extend horizontally from one wall to the other wall.

For the partition creates an ohel and thus prevents the spread of impurity throughout the house [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 15:4)].

Since the impurity has no way to depart from the house except through the partition, it will pass through the partition as it departs.

See Chapter 20, Halachah 1.

I.e., impurity will only enter an area that is a cubic handbreadth in size. Hence if the place where the keilim are kept is of this size, it is considered as a separate entity (Kessef Mishneh). There is a difference between the laws applying in this instance and those which apply in Halachah 4, because here we are speaking about a partition in one house and there we are speaking about a partition between two houses.

For then the place where the keilim are kept will be considered as part of the wall and not as a separate entity (Kessef Mishneh).

Chapter 20, Halachah 6. In contrast to this halachah, there the Rambam speaks of an instance where the entrance to the house is above the partition.

Since the entire house is filled and there is not even a cubic handbreadth of open space, it is no longer considered as an ohel.

For the impurity will seek to depart through the entranceway and will make any keilim found in the open space through which it departs impure.

For they are considered to be in a separate ohel. Even though the straw will be removed as the Rambam proceeds to state, a temporary ohel is sufficient to protect entities from contracting impurity.

This follows the logic the Rambam states in the following clause: Since the straw will ultimately be removed, it does not intervene and prevent the impurity from spreading and making the keilim impure.

In which instance, the house is considered as an ohel.

Even though it could be considered as an ohel, in which instance, its contents would be protected from the impurity.

Hence it is considered as if it was already removed and it does not prevent the impurity from spreading. Note parallels in Hilchot Eruvin 3:12, Hilchot Sukkah 4:13.

This is speaking about an instance where there is not a cubic handbreadth of empty space around the impurity. Were that to be the case, it would be considered as a closed grave and would impart impurity on all sides (Chapter 7, Halachah 4).

I.e., distant from the impurity.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 6:4), the Rambam emphasizes that although the keilim are not exposed to the impurity, they are not protected because they are not closed with a sealed covering or in a distinct ohel. See also Chapter 20, Halachah 5.

As evident from the contrast to Halachah 8, here we are speaking about a structure of cement and the like built as a roof. Different laws apply to a roof of beams as stated there.

In his gloss to the final halachah in this chapter, the Ra’avad questions why the impurity does not pierce through the ceiling and cause the person standing under it to become impure. The Kessef Mishneh explains that a ceiling is governed by different rules than beams. Since it is part of the structure of the house, it is not considered as an independent entity and the impurity is contained within it.

And the roof intervenes and prevents the impurity from spreading upward.

If, however, he is not directly above the impurity, he is not impure.

This rationale applies in other halachic contexts as well, e.g., Hilchot Rotzeach 9:8 (Kessef Mishneh). That fact that this is seen as a general issue, not necessarily specific to the laws of impurity, resolves the issues raised by the Ra’avad in his gloss to this halachah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 6:6), the Rambam defines this term, contrasting it with the term used in the following halachah, “a structure that serves a wall.” The term used in this halachah, he explains, refers to a wall that was built above ground to support a roof built upon it.

I.e., the status of the house depends on the half of the wall in which the impurity is located.

I.e., it protrudes into the wall rather than rests on top of it.

I.e., it does not have a cubic handbreadth of open space around the impurity. Refer to the statements above, note 23. Diagram

Since the impurity is flush, there is reason to think that a person standing on the wall is impure, because the impurity would pierce through upward to the heavens. Nevertheless, since it spreads out in the house, it is considered as if it is located in the house and it does not spread upward [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.:4)].
If there are additional stories built over this structure, those stories are pure (in contrast to the situation described in Chapter 25, Halachah 3).

As stated in the notes to the previous halachah, since the impurity spreads throughout the house, it is contained within it and does not spread to the roof.

The commentaries have questioned the difference between this ruling and the ruling in the previous halachah concerning impurity located in the halfway point of a roof.

I.e., the person’s deeds affect the status of the house.

Since, as stated originally, the top of the wall is above the house, the impurity has no connection to the house at all.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.:6), the Rambam explains that this refers to an instance where the basis for the structure existed naturally and the wall is created by hewing out stone or earth.

In the above source, the Rambam refers to Bava Batra 6:8 which states that in the Talmudic era, it was common to dig burial caves which contained several graves, each the size of a human body. This halachah is speaking about the walls between the graves or the walls between the burial caves.

I.e., in contrast to the situation described in the previous halachah, as long as there is any portion of the wall covering either the impurity or the keilim, they are considered as enclosed in the wall and set off from the structure. The rationale appears to be that, since the wall was not built for the sake of the house, but existed beforehand, it is considered as an independent entity. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.).

Since the wall was built for the purpose of creating the house and is dependent on it, its contents can be considered as being within the structure (ibid.).

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that the portion of the wall that was rock was very thin and hence, it was reinforced by the construction. Since the functional aspect of the wall depends on the construction, its contents can be considered as being within the structure.

Since the beams are distinct entities, they are not considered as dependent on the house (in contrast to the ceiling mentioned in Halachot 4 and 6). Hence, impurity found within them is governed by different rules.

Because it would be considered as a closed grave. See note 23.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 6:5), the Ram bam states that this is speaking about a situation where there is a barrier of glass or the like under the impurity. Since the impurity can be seen, it is considered as if it was within the inner space of the house.

Here also the Ra’avad differs, for seemingly the impurity should be considered as flush. In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh explains that since the wall serves the house, it is possible that the impurity could be considered as contained within the house.

Others interpret the Rambam’s source (Ohalot 6:7) as referring to a pillar standing in free space.

I.e., an ornate architectural design on the top of the pillar for decoration that projects beyond its boundaries. This was common in the Greek and Roman period and indeed, in prior eras as well. See I Kings 7:26 [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 6:7)].

The flower is not considered as an ohel, because it does not project a handbreadth beyond the pillar.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 4.

The Ra’avad maintains that if there is a cubit of free space, the impurity is enclosed within and does not spread outward, as stated in the notes to Chapter 12, Halachah 6. As mentioned there, the Rambam does not accept this position.

If there is not a space that large, the wall is governed by the laws mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 5. The storey adjacent to the impurity is impure, but the upper stories are pure.

I.e., the same wall runs several storeys high.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 7:1), the Rambam states “even if the building was constructed to the maximum height possible.” Diagram

And the impurity remains contained in the second storey without spreading to the third.

But is a part of a different structure.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling based on his understanding of the fmal clause of the above mishnah. As the Kessef MisJmeh explains, it is evident from the Rambam’s commentary there that he interprets that mishnah differently than the Ra’avad.

The walls of the structures in the Talmudic period were quite thick (often a cubit or more) and it was common for the inhabitants to hollow out a portion to use for storage and the like.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 6:7), the Rambam explains that this term refers to storage compartments hewed out from the walls of a house. They have doors and thus resemble a chest of drawers. The Ra’avad offers a different definition of this term.

The Ra’avad states that the Rambam’s ruling contradicts his source (Tosefta, Ohalot, the conclusion of ch. 7). The Kessef Mishneh opines that there could be a scribal error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is “the house is impure,” for it is the nature of impurity to seek to depart even if the doors are closed. Alternatively, he explains that we are speaking about a hole that opens to the outside.

I.e., there is not a cubic cubit of free space around it.

As mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 4, with regard to impurity found in the walls of a structure.

Its door intervenes and prevents the ritual impurity from entering.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.), the Rambam spells out exactly the point of this ruling. Say a wall was four cubits thick and two cubits were hewed out as a pardesik. If impurity were found in the wall a handbreadth behind the pardesik, it is only a handbreadth from the inner space of the house when counting the pardesik as part of the house. Hence the house would be impure. If, however, the pardesik is considered as a solid mass, the impurity is considered in the outer portion of the wall and the house is considered as pure.

A place that is not under the lintel of the doorstep.

This applies even if the door to the house is open.

In the same way as the laws applying to impurity in the walls of a house (ibid.).

Since the impurity is under the lintel, it is considered as part of the inner space of the house.

For as long as the dog is alive, the flesh from the corpse that it ingested does not impart impurity to a house (Chapter 20, Halachah 2).

After three days, the flesh is considered to have been digested and no longer imparts impurity (Chapter 20, Halachah 4).

I.e., we consider the place where the dog’s stomach is located [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 11:7).

The commentaries recall Chapter 18, Halachah 2, which states that when a person was lying on a doorstep, part of his body being inside the house and part being outside the house and impurity was positioned in the portion outside the house, the house is impure, because a person is hollow and his upper portion is a handbreadth high. Seemingly, this same concept should apply with regard to a dog. It is possible to say that, in contrast to a human, it is unlikely that a dog will have open space of a cubit within his body.

The corpse of the fetus can impart impurity, but since it is within her body and she is alive, it does not. As soon as her womb opens, as the Rambam proceeds to explain, the fetus imparts impurity.

More particularly, the needle used for the strands of the warp [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 7:5)].

To discharge the fetus.

Once the fetus emerges, it imparts impurity even if the head is smaller, as indicated by the following halachah.

Thus even if the fetus is not visible, we assume that the fetus was crushed and dissolved [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nidah 3:4)].

The fact that he did touch him in the mother’s womb is insignificant, as stated in the following halachah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalat 7:6), the Rambam writes:
A viable fetus [seeks to] emerge itself and assists its discharge, if its formation has been completed. It does not allow itself to be discharged until [its formation] is completed. A stillborn fetus, by contrast, has no nature... holding it back. Instead, the body will discharge it like it discharges a dangerous substance.... When the first fetus emerges stillborn, we say that [the body’s] nature discharged it, but did not discharge the living fetus. On the contrary, it withheld it. After the stillborn was discharged, [we say that] the living fetus was aroused to emerge. [Thus there was an interval between their emergences and] it did not touch the stillborn when it emerged.
If, however, the living fetus emerged first, the stillborn one will certainly be drawn after it, for there is nothing to hold it back. It will thus emerge when the womb opens.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s interpretation, explaining that the mother will contract impurity from the dead fetus and then impart impurity to the living fetus. Alternatively, the mother will impart the impurity associated with birth and impart that impurity to the living fetus. These issues are discussed by the Tasafat Yam Tav and other commentaries to the above mishnah.

Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

I.e., the impurity that comes from direct contact with a corpse. She also contracts the impurity that results from birth (see Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 5:13-15).

At which point, it is considered to have entered the world and act as a source for impurity.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 113) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 397) include this commandment in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot, defining it as “to offer a red heifer so that its ashes will be accessible.”

As will be explained, a person who contracted the impurity associated with a human corpse can regain purity only when the ashes of the red heifer are sprinkled upon him.

Until that age, an animal is considered as a calf or “a calf growing into a cow” [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Parah 1:1)].

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning the rationale for this requirement, stating that a calf should not be purchased because an animal should not be designated as a sacrifice until it reaches an age when it is fit to be offered. The Kessef Mishnek defends the Rambam’s position, stating that, according to the Ra’avad, the calf could be purchased and not designated as a sacrifice until later. Moreover, he states, the Rambam’s ruling is taken from the Sifri Zuta.

Money which is collected for the purchase of communal offerings, but which is also used for other communal purposes, as explained in Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 4.

In the prooftext cited above.

Although a dwarf is disqualified as a priest, being dwarflike is not unacceptable for a sacrificial animal (Bechorot 45b). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Parah 2:2), the Rambam explains that since Numbers, loc. cit., states that the heifer must be “perfect,” one might think that it must be perfect in all its qualities. Hence, it is necessary to explain that the intent is that it must be perfectly red.

A round portion in the body from which several hairs grow [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Parah 2:5)].
The Kessef Mishneh states that there are commentaries to the mishnah who understand the terms kos and gumah as synonymous. That does not appear to be the Rambam’s understanding. As such, there is a difficulty with his interpretation because he appears to follow two Mishnaic opinions that appear to be contradictory in their source.

Or any color other than red.

If the roots are red, the animal is acceptable. If they are black, it is not.

So that it will be perfectly red. Indeed, if it is not cut off, the animal is unacceptable [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].

See Hilchot Me’ilah 1:7,12.

After the black portion of the hair has been cut. The Ra’avad questions why it is necessary for a portion of the hair to remain. Seemingly, even if it is removed entirely, the cow would be acceptable.
From the Rambam LeAm, it appears that the explanation is that since the person does not pull the unacceptable hairs out, but cuts them off, the hair that remains must be red and must be of a significant size.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that Nidah 52b mentions several opinions regarding the minimum length of a hair and concludes that one must follow the more stringent opinion in each instance. The shortest length mentioned there is the measure cited here “large enough to be pulled out by tweezers” and the longest is “in order to bend it over so that its top can touch its base.” Hence, with regard to the disqualification of an animal due to a colored hair and, similarly, when a hair is a sign of ritual impurity with regard to a tzara’at affiiction (Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at 2:1, 8:5), even when a hair is merely “large enough to be pulled out by tweezers” we rule stringently. When, however, the existence of a hair leads to a leniency (e.g., ibid. 8:7), the hair must be large enough to be bent over so that its top touches its base. Since here the existence of the red hairs are making the cow acceptable as a red heifer, seemingly, the larger measure should be required as well.
The Kessef Mishneh offers two resolutions: a) the conclusion in Nidah 52b that the more stringent opinion must always be followed applies only with regard to questions involving humans; b) that here, since the hairs are large enough to be considered hairs in a certain context, they are large enough to be considered as an interruption between the black portion of the hair and the cow’s body.

Our translation is based on Rav Kapach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Negayim 4:4). Others (including the standard published text of that source) translate zug as “scissors.”

This refers to cutting off the horny outer shell of the hoof. If, however, one cuts off the hoof entirely, the animal is considered as blemished and is unacceptable as a red heifer. See Bechorot 44a.

More particularly, an abnormal growth with a bone (Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:10).

The Ra’avad explains that the rationale is that the hair that grows in its place will never be fully red.

See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash ch. 7; Hilchot Issurei Mizbei’ach, ch. 2.

The reasons for the disqualification of such animals — and the others mentioned in this halachah — as sacrifices are discussed in Hilchot Issurei Mizbei’ach, ch. 3. Although a red heifer is not considered as a sacrifice per se, it is bound by many of the same laws.

I.e., it possessed an infirmity which would cause it to die within twelve months, even if it did not have a visible physical blemish.

And thus does not actually have the status of a sacrificial animal. As stated in Hilchot Me’ilah 1:12, generally, a person who performs work with an animal consecrated for the improvement of the Temple does not violate a Scriptural command (although there is a Rabbinic prohibition). See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah where he states that there is an opinion which considers the red heifer as included in the category of animals consecrated to the altar.
After an animal has been designited as a red heifer, if a person performs work with it, not only does he disqualify it, he violates the prohibition against misappropriating consecrated property (Hilchot Me’ilah 2:5).

Numbers 19:9, 17.

Although the term chata’at is generally translated as “sin-offering,” the root chait, also has the implication “purifying.” That is why it is used in this context.

Indeed, as related in Kiddushin 31a, a red heifer was indeed purchased from a gentile, Doma ben Netinah, in Ashkelon.

Thus disqualifying it, as stated above.

This is a general principle applicable in other contexts; see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:15. In particular, it applies in this context, because the gentiles knew the value of a red heifer and would not risk losing that sum.

As Hilchot Me’ilah 1:7 states the prohibition (Deuteronomy 15:19): “Do not perform work with the firstborn of your oxen” applies to all sacrificial animals. Nevertheless, the sacrificial animals are not disqualified.

To atone for an unsolved murder; see Deuteronomy, ch. 21; Hilchot Rotzei’ach, ch. 10. See Halachot 3-4 which restate the same principles mentioned here.

Or any other portion of its body.

Our additions are made based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Parah 2:3).

One must, however, have had the intent that the animal carry the article as a burden.

It is thus considered as a yoke and disqualifies the animal.

Even if it is significantly heavy.

In Deuteronomy 21:3 which states “With which no work was performed,” the term ubad is used. The term is pronounced in that manner, using a passive form, implying that the animal can be disqualified even if the owner does not cause the animal to perform the tasks. Nevertheless, the term is written as ovad, the active form, meaning to cause it to perform work. Resolving the contradiction, Bava Metzia 30b states: Ubad must be like ovad, i.e., animal can be disqualified even though it performs labor when the owner does not cause it to do so when the labor resembles that caused by the owner, i.e., the owner derives satisfaction from it being performed.

Even without the owner’s knowledge.

Even though the bird could be considered comparable to a yoke. Since there is no benefit to the owner in this, it does not disqualify it.

For the purpose of mating.

For the owner would desire to have his cow impregnated and produce offspring. Now it’s true, in this case, the profit he receives from the offspring will be far less than the amount he would receive for the red heifer and thus in actual fact, he did not desire the cow to be impregnated. Nevertheless, the activity in and of itself is one that he would desire. Hence the animal is disqualified.

Note the gloss of the Ra’avad which provides a rationale why a pregnant cow is acceptable. The Rambam does not accept this concept.

Without the owner intending that he do so.

In contrast to an animal consecrated as a sacrifice (see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:10). Once the animal is redeemed, it is permitted to perform labor with it.

Since it was consecrated (even if it is not considered as a sacrificial animal), it is considered as degrading to feed its meat to dogs.

I.e., its ashes do not bring about purification as the ashes of the red heifer. Moed Kattan 28a uses the expression “atonement” with regard to the Red Heifer.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 2.

For once it was slaughtered in the place where it should be burned, it is unfitting to use it for another purpose. Rambam LeAm states that this restriction applies provided the slaughter is acceptable and performed with the proper intent. If, however, the animal or the slaughter was disqualified for any given reason or one slaughtered it with the intent of using it for ordinary purposes, it may be redeemed even if it was slaughtered on the arrangement of wood.

Although there is an opinion in Parah 4:2 that requires the red heifer to be offered by the High Priest, the Rambam follows the dissenting view based on the gloss of the Sifri to the verse cited above. Although theoretically, it was possible for an ordinary priest to offer the red heifer, in practice, it was always the High Priests who performed this service, as alluded to in Parah 3:7 and other sources (Chasdei David).

Thus Elazar was not a High Priest at that time. Although his status was that of the segan, the High Priest’s deputy (see Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 4:16), there is no fundamental difference between such a priest and an ordinary priest.

Four garments: a tunic, leggings, a hat, and a sash (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 8:1). If the red heifer is offered when one is not wearing these garments, it is unacceptable (Chapter 4, Halachah 3). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Parah 4:1), the Rambam explains that this requirement is derived from an equation established between the offering of the red heifer and the service within the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur.
Although the sash of a High Priest is different from the sash of an ordinary priest, when offering the red heifer, the High Priest wears the sash of an ordinary priest (Mishneh LeMelech).

When a person incurs most types of impurity, he can regain purity by immersing himself in a mikveh and waiting until nightfall on the day of his immersion. For others, he must wait a given time before immersing himself. In both instances, after immersing himself, his status changes to a certain degree, as the Rambam proceeds to explain. Such a person is referred to as a t’vul yom, “one who has immersed that day.”

Burning it and gathering its ashes.

Placing the ashes in the water.

Numbers 19:9, 18-19

Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 7:11.

Hilchot Terumah 7:2.

The term Sadducee refers to the followers of Tzadok, one of the leading students of Antigonus of Socho. As the Rambam states in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 1:3), after he heard Antigonus teach: “Do not be as servants who serve their master for the sake of receiving a reward,” Tzadok and his colleagues forsook Jewish practice, saying: “Is it just that we labor without receiving a reward?”
They began splinter sects with the intent of swaying the people after them. At first, they sought to influence them to abandon Jewish practice entirely. They saw, however, the people would not accept this and so they focused their complasints on the Oral Law, arguing that although the Written Law was of Divine origin, the Oral Law was not. Their intent, however, was to deny the entire Torah. See Hilchot Mamrim 3:3.

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah, ch. 4, for a description of this impurity.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 2, which describes how they would make the priest impure and how he would immerse. See also the beginning of the next chapter which explains the extra stringencies enacted because of this leniency.

I.e., impure and then immersed on that day to purify them.

See Hilchot Keilim 2:4 with regard to how the reed must be cut for this law to apply.

As the Rambam explains in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Parah 5:4), Our Sages (Chagigah 3:2) ruled that, with regard to sacrificial offerings and certainly, with regard to anything involving the red heifer and its ashes, even an implement that was completed in a state of ritual purity is considered as impure and requires ritual immersions before use. It need not, however, be left until after nightfall on that day. In that aspect, it is like an implement that was purified from the ritual impurity connected with a corpse.

Following the rationale explained in the previous halachah.

On that same day.