Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

And the debt was equivalent to - or exceeds - the value of the field.

Although the gentile erred in ignoring the proper legal channels and taking the field by force, the sale is still binding.

Since the gentile had a right to the land because of the debt, his acquisition - and sale - are effective.

The Rambam’s ruling is dependent on his interpretation of Gittin 58b. Rashi, the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher interpret that passage differently. On the basis of their interpretation, the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 236) explains that the purchaser does not have a right to the field if the original owner is willing to pay his debt, for the field was never taken away from him by any judicial process.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 236:7) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 236:14 and the Siftei Cohen 236:3 question why the Ramah does not quote the opinion of the Tur.

The following are the laws of Sikarikon described by the Mishnah (Gittin 55b). This was, unfortunately, a fairly common occurrence in the era of the Roman occupation of Eretz Yisrael, when Roman officers and those under their protection would oppress the Jewish people, with no respect for law. From the fact that these laws were quoted by later authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 236), we can conclude that such events took place in other periods of Jewish history as well.

The Ramah states that if the property was sold, and the owner claims afterwards that he had the funds necessary to repurchase the property but was not given the opportunity, and the purchaser denies that claim, the onus of proof is on the owner. Since the property is presently in the possession of the purchaser, the owner must prove his claim. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 336:5 states that according to the views mentioned in the following note, the Ramah’s ruling is not applicable.

There are some who interpret the Rambam’s wording to imply that if the owner does not have funds available even if it is sold within the first twelve months, the purchaser has a right to acquire the land. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) do not share this conception and maintain that the owner always has the right to redeem his land within the first twelve months. Nevertheless, from the phrase “if the property has remained in the possession of the oppressor for more than twelve months,” Sefer Me’irat Einayim 236:1 infers that the original owner has twelve months to raise the money to repurchase his property.

As the Rambam continues to illustrate, the value of the land that the owner receives is equivalent to one third of the price the purchaser paid. Gittin, loc. cit. states that the owner is given the option to decide whether he desires the land or the money.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 336:3 states that even if the purchaser claims to have paid the market value of the property, he must give the original owner the portion stated by the Rambam.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:2) states that if the price paid for the property is not a matter of public record, the purchaser’s word is accepted.

It is more fit for use as an orchard than as a field for grain or vegetables.

This term has a specific meaning. As stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 5, the intent is that if the increase in the property’s value is greater than the expenses the squatter undertook, the owner is required to reimburse him only for the expenses. If the expenses he undertook are greater than the increase in the property’s value, he receives reimbursement for the expenses only to the extent of the increase in value.
This ruling is given because the owner of the field may claim that he had no intention of using the field to plant trees.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this halachah is a continuation of the previous one, applying only in a field that is not appropriate for growing trees. The Kessef Mishneh differs and maintains that it applies in all instances. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 375:4 appears to favor the interpretation of the Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., and receive nothing for your labor.

The Ra’avad states that this law does not apply in Eretz Yisrael. Orchards are more valuable than fields for the land as a whole. Hence, because of the importance of settling Eretz Yisrael, each individual is asked to sacrifice his personal desires. The Maggid Mishneh differs and interprets the halachah as applying only in the instance in which it is more appropriate to use the field to grow other crops. He maintains that since the field is more appropriate for other crops, there is no obligation to use it as an orchard.

Because of this rationale, this halachah applies not only in Eretz Yisrael, but also in the diaspora. Compare to Hilchot Sh’chenim 4:10.

I.e., its quality and appearance conform to the local norms.

Since the owner consented to this person’s working the field, it is as if he undertook these expenses himself.

Since the person who planted the field received the owner’s permission, the owner must accept the consequences. Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam regarding this point and maintains that since the field is not fit to be used for planting trees, the one who tilled the field must bear the burden if the expenses were greater than the increase in value.

I.e., the difference between his expenses and the increase in value is evaluated, and he receives a share equivalent to that given to other sharecroppers in that city.

As the Maggid Mishneh explains in his gloss on Halachah 12, a husband ordinarily has the rights to all the benefits from his wife’s property until he divorces her. Afterwards, he is judged at a disadvantage. If he spends more than the value of the improvement of the field, he is granted only the value of the improvement of the field.
This halachah applies only in the case of a wife below the age of majority, whose marriage to her husband can be dissolved through the rite of mi’un. Her husband is given full permission to use her property, lest he hesitate to do so out of fear that at any moment his wife will terminate their marriage.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 178:3) states that a partner who invests in a field and does not improve the field does not receive reimbursement for his investment.

Rabbenu Asher and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 375) differ and maintain that if the field is not fit for planting trees, and a squatter plants trees without the owner’s permission, he receives only his share of the value of the improvement of the field, even when his expenses were greater.

As stated above, this term has a specific meaning. If the increase in the property’s value is greater than the expenses the squatter undertook, the owner is required to reimburse him only for the expenses. If the expenses he undertook are greater than the increase in the property’s value, he receives reimbursement for the expenses only to the extent of the increase in value.
This ruling is given because the owner of the ruin may claim that he had no desire to rebuild the ruin at this time.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 375:6) differs and states that this ruling applies only when the ruin is located in a place where rebuilding it would be undesirable. Generally, as the Rambam states in Halachah 6, it is considered desirable to build a home in a courtyard or to rebuild a home that had been built there, and a squatter who rebuilds it is given the advantage when the improvement he brought about is evaluated.

I.e., the squatter who rebuilt the building, not the legal owner of the property.

I.e., “since I am not getting full reimbursement for the improvements I made, I am removing them.”

For destroying the house he built does not cause damage with regard to any future building.

I.e., “do not want to reimburse you at all for what you built.”

Because the ruin as rebuilt without permission.

Even if the improvements are worth more than the expenses, as explained in the notes on Halachah 7, the amount of the expenses is also significant in determining the person’s share, and an oath is therefore required. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 375:17.

This oath was instituted by our Sages out of fear that a person would demand more than what he is entitled to.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 375) apparently quotes the Rambam, but uses the expression “Let the builders come,” implying that the evaluation should be made by tradesmen.

I.e., he would rather avoid taking an oath, because of its severity. He is therefore willing to accept payment according to the minimum prices.

For the purpose of the oath - to ensure that the squatter would not be asking for more than what is due him - has been accomplished by the evaluation.

The word “only” implies that the person is making a sacrifice. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 375:19 interprets this as referring to a person who is judged at an advantage and is entitled to receive his expenses because they exceeded the improvement of the property. He, however, does not desire to take an oath regarding his expenses, nor does he have the means to prove how much he spent. He therefore states: “Reimburse me only for the improvement of the property. That is obvious and can be evaluated easily.”

For the value of the improvement is something that can be evaluated by experts.

Unless the owner can bring witnesses who testify that he paid the person who tilled the field.

This oath is necessary to negate the owner’s claim.

Therefore, the burden of proof lies on the person who tills the field.

Workers who till the land for a percentage (usually a third or a fourth) of the crop.

According to Torah law, all property owned by a woman is given to her husband to manage. He must take responsibility for it, and he is entitled to the benefits from it for the entire duration of the marriage (Hilchot Ishut 12:5).

I.e., he is familiar with agriculture and could have worked the land himself.

I.e., it is assumed that he would have worked the fields himself. If he chose not to do so, the people he hired are his responsibility.

This term has a specific meaning. As stated above, the intent is that if the increase in the property’s value is greater than the expenses the squatter undertook, the owner is required to reimburse him only for the expenses. If the expenses he undertook are greater than the increase in the property’s value, he receives reimbursement for the expenses only to the extent of the increase in value.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 88:12). The Beit Shmuel 88:22 explains that this applies only when the husband has not benefited at all from his wife’s field.

And thus it is as if the woman invited them to work her fields herself. For she had no other alternative; she could not rely on her husband and would have to have hired an outside person.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 204) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 538) consider this one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 269) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 539) consider this one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam is referring to the same negative commandment mentioned in the previous halachah. In this halachah, he is quoting Bava Metzia 26b directly and therefore uses a different proof-text.

For taking the property belonging to another person transgresses the prohibition against robbery. Indeed, on this basis we can understand why the Rambam coupled the two subjects (robbery and the return of lost objects) under the same general heading, instead of giving each a separate section in the Mishneh Torah. For misappropriating a lost object is an act of robbery. (See also Chapter 14, Halachot 6-7, for a further description of these commandments.)

I.e., because he is unable to withstand the temptation of his natural inclination (Avodah Zarah 26b).

See the following halachah.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7-8, which elaborates on the definition of these two terms. The Kessef Mishneh asks why, in Hilchot Teshuvah, the Rambam does not classify as a min a person who violates a commandment as an act of rebellion. Kin’at Eliyahu notes that in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:9, the Rambam speaks of “an apostate with regard to a single mitzvah” in terms very similar to those he uses here.

At the conclusion of Hilchot Shabbat, the Rambam states that a person who publicly violates the Sabbath laws is equivalent to a gentile. In the present age, however, certain leniencies have been advised in this regard for Jews brought up in assimilated backgrounds. For their public violation of the Sabbath is not a direct denial of their Jewish heritage.

This is the term used by the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. It appears, however, to be a censor’s emendation. Most authoritative manuscripts and early printings read “an article lost by a non-Jew.” The proof-text also leads to such a conception.

I.e., a fellow Jew.

Rashi, Sanhedrin 76b, gives a different rationale: By returning a lost article to a gentile, one shows that one does not view the mitzvah to return a lost article as a Godly commandment, but rather as a social nicety.

In this context, the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia 2:5) tells the story of Rabbi Shimon ben Shatach, whose students bought him a donkey from an Arab trader. Hanging from the donkey’s neck was a jewel that the Arab had not noticed. Rather than keep the jewel for himself, Rabbi Shimon returned it. When he did so, the Arab blessed the God of the Jews.
This halachah also teaches that kiddush HaShem is not merely martyrdom for the sake of God’s name, but also includes living a life that brings honor to God and the creed that He gave mankind. (See also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, the conclusion of Chapter 5.)

I.e., that the gentiles would think the Jews dishonest, because they did not return the article.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 266:4 explains that since the object has not become lost yet and is still in the legal possession of its owner, it is governed by different rules from those for a lost article.

The Ma’aseh Rokeach states that the wording of the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 266), when stating this law “together with Jewishly owned articles,” leads to the understanding that if a gentile’s articles are left outside alone, one need not bring them in. Only when they are “together with Jewishly owned articles,” and leaving the gentiles’ out would obviously spawn feelings of hatred, one must bring them in.

See Hilchot Geneivah 7:8, which states: “It is forbidden to deceive a gentile with regard to an account; instead, one must reckon carefully with him, as [Leviticus 25:3] states: “You should reckon with his purchaser.” See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 12:7), where he elaborates at length with regard to the prohibition against stealing from a gentile, explaining that doing so: a) transgresses God’s will, b) reinforces undesirable character traits, and c) can lead to the desecration of God’s name.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 348) follows the opinion of Tosafot (Bava Kama 113b) and states that it is permitted to cause a gentile to err while making an account. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 348:2) quotes both opinions without deciding between them.

For even if the gentile later realizes that he erred, he will not blame the Jew. Thus, the honor of God’s name will be preserved.

The Rambam’s statements are based on the conduct of Rav Kahana, as cited in Bava Kama, loc. cit. There are others who regard Rav Kahana as showing a measure of piety that is not required by the strict measure of the law. According to these authorities, it is not necessary to check with the gentile in this manner (Maggid Mishneh).

Needless to say, these laws apply if the majority are Jewish.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 3-7.

We assume that since the article has a mark by which it can be identified, its owner will not despair of its return. Even though there are gentiles in the town, the owner hopes that it will be found by a Jew.

Since the article was lost in a place that is frequented primarily by Jews, the owner will assume that a Jew will find it and announce its discovery. Therefore, he does not despair of its recovery.

The Rambam’s words (taken from Bava Metzia 24a) raise an obvious question: How is it possible for the majority of the people in a Jewish synagogue or a house of study to be gentiles? The Nimukei Yosef explains that this refers to the gentile workers and guards, who live on the premises. The Jews, by contrast, are merely visitors.

Since there are a majority of gentiles located in these places, the owner cannot rightfully assume that his article will be discovered by a Jew. Therefore, he will despair of the article’s return, and at the time the finder discovers it, he will already have relinquished his ownership.
For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 259:3) rules that if an article is lost in a city inhabited primarily by Jews, but in an area in which the majority of passersby are gentiles, there is no need to announce the discovery of a lost article.

This is one of the instances in which Torah law itself states that it is appropriate to go beyond the measure of the law. Indeed, the Siftei Cohen 259:3 states that if the finder is rich, he should be compelled to return the article.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 259:5) states that if the finder is poor, and the one who lost the article rich, the poor man is not obligated to go beyond the measure of the law and return the article to him.

According to Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to drink wine from which a gentile has poured a libation to a false divinity. Our Sages extended the scope of this prohibition and also forbade wine that a gentile has merely touched (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 11:4). Since the majority of the city’s inhabitants are gentiles, it is probable that the wine belonged to one of them and is therefore forbidden.

For as explained in the previous halachah, an article found in a place where most of the inhabitants are gentile belongs to its finder.

Because of the marks, we conclude that the wine belonged to the Jew. Hence, we permit it to be drunk, provided it was closed securely. According to the measure of the law, however, it need not be returned, because most of the inhabitants of the town are gentiles.

It is forbidden to be eaten, however, even if most of the inhabitants are Jewish. Our Sages forbade eating any meat that has been taken away from the eyes of an observant Jew (see Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 8:12).

When an object is ordinarily lost in such a town, one has legitimate reason to expect that it will be returned. However, in such an instance the tendency is to despair.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 2 and notes.

Even if an individual person claims that he did not despair of the recovery of his articles, his claim is not accepted, and the finder is allowed to maintain possession. Once an article is lost in such a situation, the owner has certainly abandoned hope of its recovery. Even if he persists in seeking it, this is merely wishful thinking.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 261:4) mention opinions that maintain that since the owner placed his cow in a shed, he is not considered to have abandoned it.

Any other person who finds an article in the public domain with a mark is obligated to try to return it. He cannot excuse himself saying, “Maybe the owner intentionally cast it away” (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 261:10).

Because the owner has not formally renounced his ownership of the article (Kessef Mishneh).
The Tur (loc. cit.) differs and maintains that abandoning one’s property in such a manner is tantamount to renouncing ownership of it. Hence, it may be taken by the finder. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 261:4) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, while the Ramah mentions that of the Tur.

A copper coin of minimal value.

Bava Metzia 27a derives this concept from the verse stated in the previous halachah. “That he loses” implies that the article has significant intrinsic worth.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Metziah UPikadon, law 37) states that (in contrast to the law stated in the previous halachah, in this instance,) the finder is entitled to keep the article for himself, because an object worth less than a p’rutah is insignificant.

See Halachah 17 and notes.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kilayim 10:29), the Rambam explains that because the mitzvah of returning a lost article involves financial matters, it may be superseded by the consideration of a person’s honor. One is obligated to observe other prohibitions of the Torah, by contrast, even if one’s honor is compromised.
The term “respected elder” refers not only to a Torah sage, but to a person who is regarded with dignity for other reasons [Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchot Metziah UPikadon, law 36)].

I.e., in a field there are fewer people, and it is less likely that he will be seen performing these demeaning activities by others.

Based on Bava Metzia 30b, the Rambam maintains that once a person has begun the performance of a mitzvah, he is obligated to complete it. Therefore, since he is obligated to return the article at the time he sees it, he must see that obligation through to its completion.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger cites the rationale of Tosafot, Bava Metzia 25a, who state that once a person who is obligated to return an article takes it, he is considered a watchman. Therefore, he cannot abandon the article unless it is returned to a proper place.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 263:2) quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that all that is necessary for the distinguished person to do is to bring the article from the field to the outskirts of the city. He is not obligated to shame himself by carrying it through the city.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:9), the Rambam writes that the form of השב is a מקור, “source.” This form implies that the activity it requires must be repeated many times if necessary.
Others explain that the obligation to perform the mitzvah repeatedly comes from the repetition השב תשיבם.

The Kessef Mishneh, the Radbaz (Volume V, Responsum 1544) and others question whether the Rambam’s ruling applies only to an animal or to other lost objects as well. From Bava Batra 88a, which states that the rationale for this halachah is that an animal has the tendency to bolt, one might conclude that it applies only to an animal. Nevertheless, the rationale given by the Rambam in this halachah - that once a person has begun the performance of a mitzvah, he is obligated to complete it - would imply that this obligation applies to other articles as well. From the wording of the following halachah, however, the Kessef Mishneh deduces that this halachah refers only to lost animals. See Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 267:1.

As mentioned in the following halachah, there is no need for the owner of the lost article to be notified.

Because it was due to his negligence that the animal ran away again.

This law applies also if the finder knows that the owner will go out in the evening and places the lost article in a place where he will certainly notice it at that time. The Rambam speaks about the morning because it is more likely that one will be able to place an article in its owner’s path at that time - e.g., one may place it outside the door of their home. In the evening, a person is less likely to leave home.

For we assume the owner will take it.

For it is possible that the live animal will run away.

See Hilchot Geneivah 4:10, which states that a person who seeks to return a stolen article must notify its owner, or at least bring about a situation where the owner will definitely take note of it. These laws also apply to a robber and a watchman. Nevertheless, as stated above, more lenient rules apply with regard to the return of a lost object (Bava Kama 57a).

Since the owner himself placed the animal in this corral, we may assume that he considers it a safe place for his animal.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 7, this is one of the instances where Torah law itself says that one should go beyond the measure of the law.

The Rambam’s opinion is not accepted by all authorities. The Kessef Mishneh (in his gloss on Halachah 13) cites the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who differs. He maintains that since the honor paid to a Torah sage is not a personal matter, but rather a reflection of the honor due the Torah, a sage does not have the right to forgo this honor for another person’s monetary welfare. If he desires to assist the other person, he may reimburse him for his loss. He should not, however, demean the Torah’s honor.
The Rambam, by contrast, maintains that since the person is demeaning himself for the sake of a mitzvah, he is showing greater honor to the Torah. The fact that he would not perform such an action for his own personal benefit, and yet he is willing to do so for someone else, shows how dear the Torah’s mitzvot are.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 263:3) quotes the opinion of the Rambam, while the Tur and the Ramah mention the ruling of Rabbenu Asher.

A positive commandment supersedes the observance of a negative commandment. For example, the mitzvah of wearing tzitzit supersedes the prohibition against wearing sha’atnez. Nevertheless, when the negative commandment is also reinforced by a positive commandment, it is never superseded by another positive commandment.
One might say that the commandment to return a lost object is also reinforced by a negative commandment, and thus the two are equally balanced. This is not a sufficient argument, however, for the power to supersede a negative commandment is dependent on the strength of the positive commandment itself (Rashi, Bava Metzia 30b).
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements (and the passage in Bava Metzia 32a, which serves as his source), stating that there is actually no rationale to think that the priest should be obligated to return the article. For he does not begin fulfillment of the mitzvah until he picks up the lost article, but he transgresses the prohibition as soon as he enters the cemetery.

Thus, the same rationale stated in the previous halachah applies.
Significantly, Bava Metzia 32b mentions the same ruling, but supports it with a different rationale. Leviticus 19:3 states: “A person must revere his mother and his father... I am God,” implying that the reverence shown to one’s parents must be subordinate to the reverence of God.

I.e., the verse mentions only types of livestock and movable property. The word “all” implies that the scope of the commandment should be expanded to include landed property as well (Bava Metzia 31a). See Chapter 15, Halachah 4.
This law also teaches that the obligation to care for a lost article begins even before the article becomes lost. Although the land is intact before being flooded, a person must do what he can to ward off the impending danger.

This teaches that a person should not excuse himself from caring for the other person’s article because of his concern for his own (Maggid Mishneh).

Bava Metzia 33a derives this law from Deuteronomy 15:4, “That there should be no poor among you,” which our Sages understand as a command to prevent oneself from sinking into poverty.
The rulings that apply when the other person’s lost objects are worth more than the person’s own are discussed in Halachah 3.

In Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:1, the Rambam mentions a similar situation and states that “If his father is a scholar, even if he is not equal in stature to his teacher, his father’s lost object [takes precedence].” The Kessef Mishneh (in his gloss on Hilchot Talmud Torah) resolves the discrepancy by explaining that Hilchot Talmud Torah is speaking about a person other than the finder’s primary teacher. [This interpretation is borne out by the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:11).] Others maintain that the text in Hilchot Talmud Torah is a printer’s error.
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 242:34) states that this law applies only when the teacher taught the student without charge. If, however, the student’s father paid for his studies, the father’s lost object takes precedence.

Bava Metzia 31 a explains the rationale for this halachah: His father brought him into this world, while his teacher brings him into the world to come.

I.e., he is not entitled to compensation for his lost article.
The commentaries question why (either in this halachah or in Halachah 1) the Rambam does not quote Bava Metzia 33a. That source states that a person who is concerned for his own welfare and therefore does not return a colleague’s article because of the loss he himself will suffer has cast off the yoke of brotherly kindness and will ultimately become impoverished himself. This concept is quoted by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 264:1).

I.e., he is paid as a worker who was hired to perform whatever labor is necessary to save the other donkey. He is not reimbursed for his own donkey or for any other loss that he suffered while returning the lost donkey.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this halachah applies only if the donkey’s owner has the capacity to save the donkey himself. If he does not have this capacity, the donkey is considered ownerless, and the person who saves it may keep it as his own.

The type of court referred to here consists of any three men who are acceptable as witnesses. The appeal to a court is acceptable only in the absence of the owner (Turei Zahav 264:8, Netivot HaMishpat 264:4). The Sefer Meirat Einayim 264:8, however, appears to differ and maintain that even if the owner is present and objects, the court may agree to this stipulation against his will, because it is in his best interests.
The Ramah 264:3 states that if neither the owner nor a court is present, it is considered as if the stipulation were accepted. Since the stipulation is to the owner’s benefit, we assume that he would agree. (See the notes on the following halachah.)

For the person is not willing to sacrifice his property without compensation.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 10:4), the Rambam explains that the owner of the donkey may not say, “I was only joking when I made the commitment,” for the person who saved the donkey forfeited his own property on the basis of this commitment.

And thus he does not actually lose his donkey.

But rather abandoned it to its fate, so that he could save his colleague’s donkey.

The recovery of his donkey is considered a present granted him from above.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 264:3) emphasizes that the person’s donkey is considered ownerless - for he abandoned hope of its recovery - and may be acquired by anyone else.

There is a disagreement among the commentaries if he should be paid the wage due him for saving the article (although he did not accomplish that purpose) or he should be paid as an unemployed worker. All agree that he need not be reimbursed for his loss, for he did not accomplish the purpose of his mission.

I.e., he receives less than the dinar.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bechorot 4:6), the Rambam explains the meaning of this term:
I have heard many interpretations, but none of them is satisfactory... This refers to a person who is capable and expert in his profession and thus worthy of earning a significant amount. [He] is not paid the sum given to such a worker, but rather that paid to an ordinary worker from this profession... This is the intent of the phrase “as a worker of the trade in which he is employed.”
“As an unemployed worker of the trade in which he is employed” implies [a further reduction], dependent on the amount of toil or rest involved in performing that profession. For example, there are certain tasks that require strenuous labor - e.g., iron workers or hewers of marble. If a worker in such a profession were given the chance of performing this labor or resting, he would prefer to rest, even though he would receive much less.
Thus, according to the Rambam’s conception, the person who saves the lost article must make two waivers. He must forfeit the additional money that he would earn if he is more skillful than the ordinary person in his profession. He must also consider it as if he is resting and give up the amount of his wage that he would sacrifice in order to rest.
Rabbenu Chanan’el offers a different interpretation, explaining that this refers to a worker who is unemployed and would thus hire himself out for a lower wage than usual. This interpretation is also accepted by many of the other Sephardic authorities. Rashi (Bava Metzia 31b) interprets the term as referring to the amount a person would like to receive for performing an easier task (returning the lost object) than his ordinary work.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 265:1) quotes the Rambam’s words and appears to follow his interpretation. The Tur and the Ramah accept Rashi’s interpretation in an instance where the owner of the article was not present, and the person returning the article voluntarily returned it. If the owner was present and the person who returned the article did not make a stipulation, these authorities also accept the Rambam’s view.

For he has a responsibility to earn money to support his family, and therefore will not be content with receiving the wages of an unemployed worker (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 265:5).

Our Sages maintained (Bava Metzia 31b) that by and large, a person would rather take a rest from his ordinary work and perform a lighter task, even if it involves a loss of money. They did not, however, obligate the person to accept such a loss. Thus, if he insists on making this condition, he is entitled to receive the sum he stipulates.
The basic principle reflected in this and the previous halachot is that the return of a lost article is a mitzvah, and a person should not seek to profit from fulfilling it. Nevertheless, he is not obligated to suffer a loss either and may thus receive a minimal wage (or a greater wage) if he insists, and recompense for any property of his own that he forfeits.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the Ramah maintains that this law applies only to this halachah, and not to the previous halachah. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 265:8 explains the distinction between the two. With regard to the previous halachah, it is obvious that the person would not sacrifice his donkey without receiving recompense. Therefore, the stipulation is accepted as if it were stated.
In the instance described in this halachah, by contrast, most people would prefer resting and working at an easier task, even if it involves a loss of income. Therefore, if a person does not have such an approach, he must state his claim to the owner or to a court. Otherwise, there is no way that we know that it will be accepted by the owner.

For honey spills slowly.

For in the Talmudic era, honey was more valuable than wine.

He need not be paid for the loss he suffers.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 264:16 states that this applies only when the owner of the honey is present. If the owner of the wine does not make a stipulation, he must suffer the loss. If, however, the owner of the honey is not present, we assume that the owner would agree to the stipulation, and the owner of the wine should be reimbursed for his loss.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 264:5) state that if the owner of the honey agrees to the stipulation, the owner of the wine is obligated to pour out his wine to save the honey. For he has a mitzvah to perform and will not suffer any loss. The Ramah, however, quotes other opinions that differ.

This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). The Tur and the Ramah quote the opinion of Rashi (Bava Kama 115b), who states that as long as the jug is broken in a manner that the honey will surely spill to the earth, the honey is considered ownerless.
On that basis, the Ramah states that if a fire breaks out in a city, and all the Jews flee because of the fire, anyone who stays and rescues property acquires it as his own.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 264:19 adds that if the person carrying the jugs suffers a loss because he cannot perform the job for which he was hired, he should also be recompensed.

And he is obligated to fulfill a mitzvah.

A fee far greater than what one would ordinarily pay.

I.e., we assume that the fugitive spoke facetiously and feigned to agree, without ever intending to meet his promise. He is not bound by his commitment, since the raft owner is obligated to try to save him. Kin’at Eliyahu notes that the raft owner is not given any increase for performing this task in the face of danger.
See the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 264:8), which states that if the fugitive actually paid the sum he promised, he cannot sue for its return. Ketzot HaChoshen 264:4 goes even further and explains that even if the fugitive took an oath to pay the sum, he is responsible for it. For the reason why he is ordinarily absolved is that we assume he was speaking facetiously and did not intend to meet his commitment. Therefore, if he takes an oath, we assume that he will not take an oath facetiously.
See also the Maggid Mishneh and Ketzot HaChoshen 264:1, who append to this law the teaching that a doctor is allowed to charge a high fee for the treatment he administers, for the patient is paying for his wisdom.

The Lechem Mishneh states that this applies even if the amount is far more than he would ordinarily earn. The commentaries question why a distinction is made between this instance and the case described in the previous halachah.

I.e., he is allowed to keep it all as his own, for the other people despaired of regaining their property when it was taken by the members of the armed force. This instance can be compared to property swept away by a river, as described in Chapter 11, Halachah 10.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 181) and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 181:1 state that this law applies even if the person who rescued the property did not state his intent to keep it as his own.

Since the property could be rescued, the owner did not abandon hope of recovering it. Therefore, the one who rescued it has no right to take it as his own.

The Ra’avad states that this applies even if the other partner is unable to rescue the goods. He assumes that his partner still desires to continue their business relationship and is saving the goods on behalf of the partnership.

Bava Kama 116a explains that since he is in danger of losing all of his money, he is given the right to terminate the partnership agreement.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 181:2) explain that this law applies with regard to the rescuer’s saving his share of the partnership (i.e., if all he could save was half the goods) or in a situation where the second partner did not have the potential to save his goods. If, however, the rescuer saved more than his share and the other partner could have recovered his share on his own, we assume that the other partner did not despair of the recovery of his property, and the rescuer is obligated to return it to him even if he states: “I am rescuing it for myself.”

I.e., an armed attack, a flood, a fire or the like.

For he is acting as an agent of his employer and acquiring the goods on his behalf.

As Bava Kama, loc. cit., explains every worker has the right to terminate his employment at will, as long as he does not cause damage to his employer’s property. Our Sages derive this from the verse: “The children of Israel are My servants” - i.e., only God has an absolute right to their obedience. [See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333) for the practical applications of this ruling.]
In this instance, the worker is making a simple reckoning: The property is ownerless. Why should I take it for the employer when I can take as my own?

The latter law applies when the owner has despaired of the article’s recovery. If, however, he has not despaired of the lost article’s recovery, it must be returned to him.

For the armed force was not interested in killing them, but rather in plundering their goods. Therefore, the ransom should be calculated according to the value of each person’s goods.

For without a guide, both the lives and the property of the travelers are in danger.

I.e., even if it conflicts with the above guidelines (Rashi, Bava Kama 116b; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:28).
This follows a general principle frequently stated by the Rambam: that the standard local business practice is always followed. The rationale is that we assume that all parties entered into the agreement knowing and accepting these practices.

E. g., it will be preyed upon by wild beasts or the like.

If such an agreement is made, it is not necessary for it to be formalized with a kinyan (Siftei Cohen 272:6).

E. g., he did not tie it securely at night and it ran away.

For they did not not agree to take responsibility for his negligence.

Instead of purchasing a donkey for me, as obligated by the agreement mentioned in the previous halachah.

Together with his own donkey, he will also guard the other beasts of the caravan. Needless to say, his commitment to guarding the caravan’s beasts will be far greater if he owns a donkey himself.

It makes no difference whether 100 pounds of gold or 100 pounds of iron are jettisoned. What is most important is to reduce the ship’s weight (Rashi, Bava Kama 116a).

See Halachah 11.

E. g., in Nisan the rivers swell from the winter rains and snow and are deeper. If, in Nisan a boatman sailed his ship in a place where it is uncommon to sail in Nisan, but common to sail in Tishrei, the other boatmen are not liable, for he should have realized the difference between the two seasons (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 272:29).