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But not a gentile, as reflected in Halachah 7. When speaking of this obligation, Leviticus 5:21 uses the term “a colleague,” thus excluding one who is not of the Jewish faith.

In most instances, the robber will not be required to take an oath to clear himself from the claim of the plaintiff (for according to Scriptural law, an oath is required only when the defendant admits part of the claim, the plaintiff’s claim is supported by the testimony of one witness, or the defendant was a watchman). Instead, he is voluntarily taking this oath or voluntarily responding Amen to an oath suggested by the plaintiff. See Hilchot Sh’vuot 7:1.

See Halachah 8.

In the original Hebrew a plural form is used, for there are times when this additional amount will be increased, as explained in Halachah 13.

E. g., if the original obligation was four, he must now pay five. (See Halachah 7.)

See Leviticus 5:20-25, where these obligations are described.

This excludes a fine (קנס), i.e., a payment of more or less than the principal, for which a person is not liable on the basis of his own admission. He must be convicted on the basis of testimony of witnesses.

For if the son did not know of the matter, one would never suppose that he would be liable, for he is not considered to have taken a false oath.

The liability of a son for robbery committed by his father is discussed in Chapter 5, Halachot 5-6.

And the son is liable to return the value of the article obtained by robbery, but not the article itself.

For in this instance, the heir himself is obligated to return the object obtained by robbery. Failing to do so and attempting to avoid his obligation by taking a false oath is equivalent to taking the article from its rightful owner. Therefore, he is liable for the additional amount.
The Sefer Mitzvor Gadol states that the son need not bring a guilt offering, but this view is not accepted by all authorities.

Since the robber admitted his guilt, he became liable for the addition of the fifth before his death. His estate remains responsible for that obligation after his death.

For the robber died without admitting his guilt. As stated in Halachah 8, the additional fifth is a penalty that brings atonement for the transgressor. Since the heir did not sin, he is not required to pay this penalty to achieve atonement.

I.e., in the situations described in this and the previous halachah.

For the guilt offering is intended to bring atonement for the robber, and there is no concept of a person’s gaining atonement through sacrifices once he has died.

I.e., excluding a plaintiff who is not a fellow Jew.

See also Halachah 12.

This concept applies whenever the Torah mentions the concept of adding “one fifth.” See Hilchot Arachin 4:5.

See the Tosefta, Bava Kama 8:3, which indicates that if the defendant admits his guilt after the witnesses testify, he is obligated to bring a guilt offering and pay an additional fifth.

In the Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 41, the Rambam states that the sacrifice and the additional fifth atone for the sin of taking a false oath.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 9:8), the Rambam cites Leviticus 5:23 as a proof-text, which speaks of the return of an article obtained by robbery. From the context of the passage, it is obvious that the Torah is speaking of a person who returns the article in an attempt to seek atonement.

And bring the money to him, regardless of where he is located.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 367:4 maintains that this is one of our Rabbis’ ordinances employed to encourage robbers to repent. The Siftei Cohen 367:2 differs and maintains that even according to Scriptural law, there is no need to seek out the owner.

We assume that since the robber did not take a false oath, the matter remains open, and the owner is planning to return and sue for the return of his money.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 367) states that while the owner is away, the robber must, however, try to notify him that he has his property and is prepared to return it. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 367:1) quotes the Tur’s comments. Nevertheless, from the context it appears that the Ramah’s intent is that the owner should be notified when he returns.

Bringing a sacrifice will not convey atonement upon him until the article obtained by robbery is returned. This is the reason given by Bava Kama 103a. The Siftei Cohen 367:6 questions why the Rambam ignores the rationale given by the Talmud and instead mentions a reason that he arrived at himself.

Bava Kama 103a derives this from Leviticus 5:24, which states: “He must give it to its owner.” Sefer Me’irat Einayim 367:5 states that even when the robber did not take a false oath, he is not able to return the object obtained by robbery to anyone but the owner himself.

This fulfills his obligation to return the object obtained by robbery, and he may attain atonement by means of the sacrifice.
Bava Kama 103b explains that this is one of the leniencies adopted by our Sages in order to encourage people to repent. In this manner, the expense of the journey to find and return the object obtained by robbery will be undertaken by the court and will not have to be borne by the robber.

Once the principal has been returned, the robber has met the fundamental financial obligation incumbent upon him (and he can thus attain atonement via a sacrifice). Hence, he is not required to seek out the owner to return the additional fifth.

The owner’s waiver of payment is equivalent to his receiving the money due him.

For, as mentioned above (Halachah 7), less than a p’rutah’s worth is not significant, and it is considered as if the object obtained by robbery has been returned in its entirety.

The article obtained by robbery itself must be returned to its original owner. Although the portion of the article concerning which the owner did not waive payment was originally worth less than a p’rutah, that portion is still considered to be in the possession of its owner. Thus, when the value of the article as a whole increases, the value of this portion also increases, and it is possible that it will be worth more than a p’rutah. (In which case the robber would have to seek out the owner, as stated in the following clause.) We are, however, not concerned about this possibility and consider it as if the article has been returned.
Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 367:8, which quotes opinions that state that even if the article does increase in value to the extent that the remaining portion is worth a p’rutah, the robber is not obligated to return it. Since he was absolved of his obligation originally, he does not become liable again.

I.e., as long as the robber owes at least a p’rutah’s worth of the principal, he must seek out the owner and return it to him.

E. g., the obligation to seek out the owner and return the money due him.

I.e., a fifth of the original fifth. For example, if the object obtained by robbery was worth 16 [zuz], the original fifth was four, and the fifth of the fifth is one.

For he is required to seek additional atonement for this second misappropriation of money and false oath.

At which point an oath is not required, as stated in Halachah 7.

In this instance, the intent is that every additional fifth is one fourth of the value of the original article.

In which case the robber is allowed to keep the article itself, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 5.

This applies whether he admitted taking the false oath to the original owner or to the heirs.

He must return the object obtained by robbery and the additional fifth to the estate. Nevertheless, since he has a share in this estate, he need not pay his share.
For example, he took an article worth sixteen zuz. With the additional fifth, he is obligated to pay twenty zuz. If he has three brothers and none of them has the rights of a firstborn, each is entitled to a fourth of the estate. Thus, instead of paying twenty zuz, he must pay only fifteen.

To return his share to him.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 367:5) follow Rashi’s interpretation of Bava Kama 108b. Thus, they differ with the Rambam and maintain that the robber cannot demand his share of the object obtained by robbery back from his brothers.

According to the Rambam, this refers to an instance where the object obtained by robbery exists intact, and the robber is therefore obligated to remove it from his property. If it has already been destroyed, or it has undergone a change, these laws do not apply.

His repentance involves removing the object obtained by robbery from his possession. It is, however, a moral and not a financial obligation, for he himself is the beneficiary of his father’s estate.
Rashi, the Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) differ and maintain that if the robber has no brothers, he must return the object obtained by robbery to his uncles, for they are next in line with regard to his father’s inheritance.

Here the intent is a convert who did not father children after his conversion. Thus, he has no legal heirs, and after he dies his property belongs to whoever takes possession of it first. See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1.

I.e., the principal and the additional fifth.

See the notes on the following halachah.

For it is in his possession at the time of the convert’s death, and he thus assumes legal ownership of it.

By giving it to his sons, a creditor or a charity, as explained above. The Tur and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 367:18 state that it must be given to charity.

When the robber admits the debt to the convert, he becomes obligated to pay the convert for the principal and the additional fifth. Thus, when the convert dies he is freed from that obligation. When he has not made the admission to the convert, however, the obligation did not take full effect at the time of the convert’s death, and the debt is therefore not discharged to the convert. To fulfill his obligation to return the object obtained by robbery, the robber must therefore return the objects to the priests.
From the Rambam’s wording in this and the previous halachah, it is unclear what his ruling would be if the robber admitted having taken the false oath to the convert, but the convert did not consider it a loan. From the previous halachah, it would appear that he is liable. From this halachah, however, it would appear that he is not.
The commentaries have also debated this issue. The Ra’avad states that as long as the convert has not considered the obligation as a loan, the robber must pay the priests. The Maggid Mishneh differs and maintains that even if it was not considered a loan, he is not required to pay the priests.

In the present age, he should pay the sum to charity.

There were 24 priestly watches. Each would serve in the Temple for a week at a time in an ordered pattern. The money returned is divided among all the priests in the weekly watch and not among only those priests (the Beit Av) who served in the Temple that day.

I.e., a relative.

The previous verses repeat the obligation to pay the principal plus an additional fifth when misappropriating money and taking a false oath. Afterwards, the Torah states: “If a man does not have a redeemer to whom the guilt offering can be returned, it should be returned to God, to the priest.” This is one of the 24 presents granted the priests; see Hilchot Bikkurim 1:7 and 10:15.

For every native born Jew will surely have heirs, for the line of inheritance will extend upward until Jacob our patriarch.

I.e., every animal sacrificed as a guilt offering must be divided individually among all the priests. If there are two animals, each priest must be given a smaller piece to each animal, rather than one larger piece of one. Similarly, with regard to property obtained by robbery, each property obtained by robbery must be divided individually.

Rashi, Bava Kama 110a, states that to fulfill his obligation, the robber must add a further sum of his own.

As stated previously, less than a p’rutah is not considered a significant sum of money.

For the same laws also apply to a female convert and to a minor.

This refers to children born after his conversion. Those born to him as a non-Jew are of no significance in this context.

I.e., they are not considered to be the heirs of the convert (and thus an extension of his estate). Instead, the obligation to pay them is a present granted them by God.
This is implied by the verse cited above: “It should be returned to God, to the priest.” The property must be returned to God. After it is returned to Him, He grants it as a present to the priests.

Leaven, which is forbidden on Pesach, remains forbidden after the holiday if it had been owned by a Jew during the festival.

It is thus valueless, and the obligation stated above to give each priest something of value could not be met.

Although the chametz is totally worthless at that time, the robber is still considered to have returned the article, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

This applies even when he admits the robbery during the week his own priestly watch is serving in the Temple.

He, like any other robber, is obligated to return the property “to God.” God in turn grants it to the priests serving in the Temple that week.

Because the object obtained by robbery became the property of the robber at the time of the convert’s death. The robber, however, had a personal obligation to return it. The money he set aside, however, does not become the property of the priests until it is actually given to them.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:14, which states that when the owner of a guilt offering dies, that offering should not be brought, because there is no concept of atonement through sacrifice after death. The animal should pasture until it receives a blemish that disqualifies it from being offered as a sacrifice. It should then be sold, and another animal should be purchased with the money from the sale and sacrificed as a burnt offering.

One might think that since the robber did not receive atonement, the priests would be enjoined to return the money. This, however, is not the case.

Bava Kama 110b states that giving the money to the priests did convey a partial measure of atonement.

See Hilchot Lulav 8:10 and Hilchot Mechirah 29:1.

For the payment for the object must precede the offering of the sacrifice.

If, however, the robber gave the money to the members of the watch serving in the Temple and gave the guilt offering to another watch, the priests of the latter watch should offer the sacrifice when their time to serve in the Temple arrives, and then the robber attains atonement (Bava Kama 110a).

For the fundamental preparatory step allowing atonement to be granted is the return of the object obtained by robbery.

A defendant is never required to take an oath with regard to these objects. See Hilchot Sh’vuot 7:4. Accordingly, since the fundamental reason for the additional fifth is to atone for a false oath, such a penalty is not imposed in such instances (Maggid Mishneh).

With regard to servants, Leviticus 25:46 states: “And you shall transmit them as a heritage to your children,” indicating they have the same status as landed property that becomes one’s ancestral heritage (Kiddushin 22b).

For a promissory note itself has no intrinsic worth aside from the paper on which it is written. See Bava Kama 105a.

The Ra’avad maintains that they are considered ownerless and can be acquired by any other person after the convert dies. The Maggid Mishneh differs and maintains that according to the Rambam, if the robber takes possession of them with the intent to acquire them after the convert’s death, they become his property. If, however, he does not do so, and another person takes possession first, that person acquires them, as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:2.

In contrast to movable property, which can be acquired by a robber if it undergoes a fundamental change or by a purchaser after the owner despairs of its return. See Chapter 2.

With regard to movable property, by contrast, if the purchaser is obligated to return it, our Sages obligated the owner to reimburse him (Chapter 5, Halachah 7).

For he caused the damage himself.

These are losses beyond mortal control (onasim). Even if the owner had been in actual possession of the property, it would have depreciated in value in the same manner. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 10:5), the Rambam writes that the owner cannot accuse the robber by claiming that the losses came as Divine retribution for the robber’s sins.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachah 11, when a person obtains movable property by robbery, he is responsible for its damage by forces beyond his control.
Some early manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah equate servants with movable property, but this is a printing error and does not reflect the Rambam’s perspective.

I.e., the robber is not responsible, for the property would also have been confiscated had it remained in the possession of its rightful owner.

E. g., the robber’s property was confiscated because of a debt he owed the king.

For the field was confiscated because of the robber. The king forced the robber to show him only fields that the robber himself owned, and not this field that belonged to another person.
The Or Sameach and the Turei Zahav (Choshen Mishpat 371) explain that this law is not a restatement of the previous law. This law refers to an instance in which the king seized properties belonging to many people. Nevertheless, since the robber was not forced to show the king the property he obtained by robbery, he is obligated to reimburse its owner.

As mentioned in Halachah 1.

When a loan is supported only by a verbal commitment [and not by a sh’tar (a contract of loan)], the lender can collect his due only from the property that is in the possession of the debtor at the time the matter is brought to court. For the debt was not public knowledge (as is a debt supported by a sh’tar), and the purchasers of the debtor’s property had no way of knowing that the property was encumbered.
Similarly, in the instance at hand, the purchasers of the robber’s property had no way of knowing that the robber had damaged the property. Therefore, the properties they purchased are not on lien to the robber’s debt.

Once the robber was obligated by the court, his debt became common knowledge, and the purchasers of his property should have taken into consideration the fact that the properties they purchased could be expropriated from them. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 11:4.
Siftei Cohen 372:1 maintains that if the robber’s word would be accepted by the court if he claimed to have paid the debt, the property that he sold is not considered to be encumbered.

For, as mentioned above, the property remains in the possession of its rightful owner, and all the produce grown on it therefore belongs to him. Similarly, if the robber lived in a home or rented it out, he must pay the rent to the rightful owner (Siftei Cohen 371:5).

But not from property that he sold, because the extent of the benefit he derived is not public knowledge.

Although, as above, he is responsible for the depreciation of the land that he obtained by robbery, he is not given a chance to profit from its improvement.

E. g., if he spent 100 zuz and the land’s value increased by 150, he is given only 100.

E. g., if he spent 150 zuz and the land’s value increased by only 100, he is given only 100. These are the same laws that apply when a person plants within a field belonging to a colleague without his permission (Chapter 10, Halachah 8).

Since the purchaser was not aware that the field was obtained by robbery, he is not required to forfeit the increase in value that he brought about. The original owner is, however, not required to pay the purchaser more than he spent. Therefore, he is repaid in the manner described above.

The robber must pay the purchaser, for when he sold the land to him, he accepted responsibility for any loss that he would cause him. The Ra’avad states that the robber must explicitly accept responsibility in the deed of sale. The Maggid Mishneh states that since it is standard business practice to accept such responsibility, we take it for granted that he does so unless the deed of sale explicitly states otherwise. (See Hilchot Mechirah 19:3.) This is the position accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 373:1).

Once a person becomes liable for a debt that is public knowledge, all the landed property in his possession is considered to be on lien to that debt. Even if he sells the property afterwards, his creditor may expropriate the property from the purchaser.
In the case at hand, the sale of the property obtained by robbery was public knowledge. Therefore, we follow the principle of caveat emptor; anyone who purchases property from the robber must take into consideration the possibility that the property that he purchases will be expropriated from him because it is encumbered to the other property.

Bava Metzia 14b explains that this is a Rabbinic decree, instituted to create stability in the real estate market. The purchaser of the robber’s property is not held liable, because it is impossible to know whether or not the value of a property will increase. Therefore, a person buying property from the robber cannot be told that he should have taken this factor into consideration.

The Maggid Mishneh states that for this law to apply, the robber must prove that the purchaser knew that the field had been obtained by robbery.

Since he knew that the person who sold him the field was not its rightful owner, he should have understood that he has no right to work it. Hence, he is not entitled to any increase in value.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 373) explains that since the purchaser knew that the field did not belong to the robber, the money he gave him is considered to be a loan. Were he to receive any more money in return, it would resemble interest. Therefore, the Tur forbids payment for any increase in value, even if it came as a result of an investment.

Since the field is always in the possession of its rightful owner, any produce reaped from it belongs to him. He must be compensated for it by the person who benefited. The Maggid Mishneh states that the owner must nevertheless reimburse the purchaser for his expenses.

The purchaser need not suffer this loss himself. Instead, the produce is considered equivalent to the increase in the property’s value mentioned in the previous halachah.

For he is not entitled to benefit from someone else’s property.

Chapter 8, Halachah 14.

We do not say that the robber becomes the rightful owner of the property and he has the right to demand that the purchaser return the field and receive his money back. The Maggid Mishneh states that this law applies only when the purchaser was not aware that the field had been obtained by robbery, but Sefer HaTerumot does not accept this ruling.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 2:9, which explains the manner in which property is expropriated and sold to pay a person’s debts.

Instead, the robber may maintain possession of the field and reimburse the purchaser from other funds.

For transferring the property to someone else is the clearest indication that he was not concerned with upholding his original sale.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 374:2) maintain that if the robber purchases the field from its rightful owner, it automatically becomes the property of the first purchaser. Afterwards, the robber cannot nullify that person’s claim to it by selling it to someone else. It is only when the robber sells it to another person before acquiring it, that the first purchaser’s claim is nullified.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo justifies the Rambam’s decision, explaining that in general, the transfer of the property to the original purchaser is based on our assessment that the robber’s intent is to act in good faith. When, as in the instance described in this halachah, we see that his intent is not to act in good faith, we view the instance as an exception, and the above general principle is not applied. Based on this reasoning, Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s view in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 374:2).

When the robber endeavored to purchase the property he sold, we assume that he undertook these efforts in order to uphold his word. When, however, he inherits the property, he has done nothing personally to acquire it. Therefore, we cannot say that he acquired it with the intent of upholding his word. Accordingly, should he desire to retain possession of the property in question and pay the purchaser with other funds, he is entitled to do so.

For otherwise he could have collected different property.

Therefore, if he desires to retain possession of this property and pay the purchaser with other funds, he may.

I.e., a present is compared to a sale and not to an inheritance.

I.e., the Rambam (and Bava Metzia 16a, on which his ruling is based) maintain that a person will not give away his property without a reason. Unless the recipient did something that was worthy of his being granted a gift, the giver would not make that gesture.

The Rashba, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 374:4) differ with the Rambam’s ruling and maintain that unless the purchaser can prove that the robber caused the present to be given because he wanted to maintain good faith, the present is likened to an inheritance. As such, the property is allowed to remain in the robber’s possession, and he can repay his debt to the purchaser with other funds.
In the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 374:4), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s ruling. In the Kessef Mishneh, he explains that since the purchaser is in actual possession of the land, he is allowed to maintain his possession as long as there is some legal basis for him to do so.

The person feared that the robber would harm him physically or inform on him to the gentile authorities, if he did not agree to the sale. Hence, his consent is considered to be having been given against his will, and the sale is nullified.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 151:3) differs and maintains that if the owner included a clause in the deed of sale taking responsibility if the field is taken from the robber, the sale is binding.

He is not penalized by having his money withheld for taking the field by robbery.

Then we can be certain that the robber did in fact give money to the owner.

The Ra’avad, Rabbenu Asher, the Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that if the witnesses saw the robber give the owner money and the owner does not protest, the sale is binding.
In his Kessef Mishneh (in his gloss on Hilchot Mechirah 10:5), Rav Yosef Karo explains the Rambam’s decision, stating that it depends on the distinction between a person who has already been established as having taken a field by robbery, and other instances.

The literal meaning of the Rambam’s words (taken from Bava Batra 47a) is “he hung him until he sold it.”

See Hilchot Mechirah 10:1-5, which explain that unless a protest is issued before the sale, such a sale is binding.

Before the sale.