Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Were he to have definitely eaten these foods or drank these liquids, he would have contracted impurity of Rabbinic origin, as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 10.

Were he to have definitely entered the drawn water or had the water fall upon him, he would have contracted impurity of Rabbinic origin, as stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

Since only a question of Rabbinic Law is involved, we rule leniently when a doubt arises.

I.e., a question arose whether or not it contracted impurity and, hence, its status is held in abeyance. It is neither burnt as is impure terumah, nor eaten as is pure terumah.

E. g., gentiles, false deities, wine used for libations to false deities and the like.

I.e., a beit hapras and the earth of the Diaspora are not inherently impure. They were deemed impure only because the possibility existed that a piece of the bone of a corpse could be present.

Chapter 13, Halachah 13.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 1.

E. g., perhaps they came in contact with the clothes of an ordinary person [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 4:12)].

I.e., a zav or the like who may not partake of sacrificial foods until he offers the sacrifices associated with his emergence from impurity.

She discharged fluid and it could not be determined whether it was blood or not.

I.e., she miscarried and it could not be determined whether the fetus was of sufficient maturity to require that she bring a sacrifice for her purification.

Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:10. The same concepts apply to all others who must bring sacrifices before regaining purity.

I.e., Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at 6:5.

If it were certain that the pure person passed under the tree, he would be impure (Hilchot Tzara’at 10:12).

If a person afflicted with tzara’at merely passes under a tree and does not stop there, he does not impart impurity to the persons or objects under the tree (ibid.).

I.e., if a pure object is found touching a source of impurity, it is impure; if not, its status does not change. Conversely, if a source of impurity is found touching a pure object, it imparts impurity; otherwise, it does not.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 3:3).

This applies even if such a situation occurs in a private domain.

As long as a crawling animal is alive, it does not impart impurity.

Since the impurity is being carried, it is considered analogous to impurity that is thrown and the principles mentioned in the previous halachah apply.

I.e., the final clause when the question was whether the crawling animal was alive.

For the status of the crawling animal is determined based on its state at the time it was discovered.

The rationale is that until the time that it is discovered to have died, it is considered as alive and therefore not a source of impurity.

Since it is known that the carcass will not remain in the mouth of the animal carrying it for an extended time, it is not considered as a fixed position.

Since they could be placed on the ground for an extended time, even though, in fact, they were placed there for a brief moment, that is sufficient, for it to be considered as a fixed position.

In the following halachah. See also Chapter 14, Halachah 3, and notes.

I.e., the ten principles mentioned in this and the previous chapter.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 2.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the Sages ruled that these ten situations are pure, even if people who have the knowledge to inquire about their status are involved. The Kessef Mishneh states that from a superficial perspective, the Ra’avad’s perspective appears justified. For, if only objects are involved, what is the difference between these ten situations and others? Since we are speaking about objects, they should be considered as pure, even when the doubt arises in a private domain. There is no need to single them out as unique. He explains that, according to the Rambam, the intent in mentioning these ten questionable situations was not to distinguish between them and others, but to illustrate the types of doubts that could arise.

For, as stated in Hilchot Tum'at Meit 1:7, moving an object is equivalent to carrying it.

I.e., imparting impurity through the convention of ohel.

I.e., if a mikveh to immerse is easily accessible, why shouldn’t the person immerse himself [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ediot 8:4)]?

Since it was burnt, it no longer imparts impurity.

I.e., this is speaking about an instance where it is known that the garment or the needle had contracted impurity. Nevertheless, when a garment becomes worn out or a needle becomes broken or rusty, the impurity departs, because the article is not useful in its present state (see Hilchot Keilim, ch. 6). Since the garments and the needle were discovered when they were no longer useful, we assume that they were in this condition when they came into contact with the other keilim.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 3:5, 9:9, according to Rav Kapach’s translation), the Rambam offers a different interpretation, stating that this is speaking about an instance where it was not known whether the garment or the needle came into contact with impurity before becoming worn, broken, or rusty or not. Were it to have come into contact with the impurity before reaching that state, it would have contracted impurity and, in the case of the needle, remained impure even after it became unfit for use. However, if it came into contact with the impurity after it became unfit for use, it would not contract impurity.

For a person’s word is accepted regarding his own status more than that of 100 witnesses (Keritot 12b).

I.e., because of the doubt involved, he should immerse in a mikveh before touching foods or keilim that are ritually pure.

For this is considered like a doubt that arises in a private domain. And we follow the principle (Halachah 8), when a doubt arises in a private domain, the object is considered as pure.

For this is considered like a doubt that arises in a public domain.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:17. According to Scriptural Law, if there is a doubt regarding the existence of a prohibition, there is no obligation to observe it. The Rabbis, however, established safeguards and rule that such prohibitions should be observed. See parallels in Hilchot Kilayim 10:27; Hilchot Tum’at Meit 9:12.

A woman suspected of adultery who was warned not to enter into privacy with another man. See Numbers, ch. 5; Hilchot Sotah.

For there are no witnesses to that effect.

A lack of fidelity is referred to as impurity. An adulterous woman is forbidden to her husband. Since there is a doubt whether or not the sotah committed adultery, she is considered “impure” until her status is clarified.

That will cause her fidelity or lack of such to be established. Thus we see that when there is a doubt in a private domain, we consider the person impure.
The Ra’avad refers to the Tosefta (Taharot, ch. 6) that offers another rationale, stating that a question regarding an individual can be clarified, while a question regarding masses of people cannot be clarified. [Significantly, the Rambam quotes the Tosefta in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 3:6)]. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam does not favor this approach, because, as stated in the following halachah, even when only three people are present in a domain, it is considered as a public domain. And a question involving three people can be clarified.

For she is an adult and intellectually and emotionally competent.

Since the person can neither hear, nor speak, he or she is considered as intellectually compromised.

As apparent from Halachah 10, if a minor is sufficiently mature that he is able to respond to questions relevant to the contraction of impurity, he is considered as an adult. Unless he can clarify the matter otherwise, whenever there is a doubt whether he contracted impurity in a private domain, he is considered as impure.

In the Talmudic era, private homes would open up to courtyards, which would open up to alleys and the alleys would open up to the public domain. Thus the courtyards and the alleys are normally considered as private domains.

Although the awareness of these individuals is limited, at least in these situations, since they are mature adults who are able to respond to questions, they are not considered as children or mentally compromised individuals.

The principle and the example that follows apply to a question that arises in a private domain.

This is speaking about a situation were it was previously established that the child was impure. If that is not known, he is not assumed to be impure. See Halachah 10.

Even though someone else could have given the dough to the child without the child touching the dough [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 3:8)].

As is required when terumah becomes impure.

Instead, the determination of its status is held in abeyance. It is not eaten, nor is it burnt until it definitely contracts impurity.

There is no one to ask and thus, based on the principle stated in Halachah 2, one might presume that the dough would be considered pure. Nevertheless, the presumption discussed here is deemed powerful enough to override that principle.

For it is common for a cow to wipe its tongue against its lips after drinking. Hence, we assume it did so and thus removed the impure liquids before partaking of the dough.

Thus it can be assumed that it ate the food without touching the liquids.

Which are not included among the eight crawling animals whose carcasses impart impurity. See Chapter 4, Halachah 14.

Since the two are in such close proximity, we assume that if the garment touched one, it also touched the other (Kessef Mishneh).

Although generally, when questions arise concerning keilim, we rule leniently, because the keilim cannot clarify the situation. In this instance, since there is a person involved, if he cannot clarify the matter, based on the principles mentioned in Halachah 2, the article is deemed impure.

The Rambam is borrowing the wording of Nidah Sb. As Tosafot (cited by the Kessef Mishneh) states, the intent is not that it was actually impossible that it did not touch them both, because such a ruling would be obvious. Instead, the intent is that it was highly unlikely.

Because no one actually saw the garment touch both the impurity and the pure substance.

And thus is considered as a primary source of impurity (Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 6:2).

Thus it is highly likely that the loaf fell from the board to the support, thus contracting impurity, and then fell to ground.

In his gloss to Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 12:16, the Kessel Mishneh cites a responsa of the Rambam which explains that we do not suspect that an impure person came and moved the loaf (and thus imparted impurity to it).

I.e., the cemetery. And thus it is logical to conclude that the child picked the roses and contracted impurity from the graves.

As mentioned in Halachah 2, a child is not considered capable of responding to questions concerning halachic matters.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 3:7).

And at the time both the child and the donkey were discovered, they were not in contact with impurity.

Even though the child himself is incapable of responding, bis father can.

And thus imparted impurity to him.

An impure entity.

The latter are impure due to Rabbinic decree, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 1.

After the fact, the status of the pure entities does not change.

As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 8, and Chapter 13, Halachah 3, our Sages instituted additional safeguards regarding the impurity of hands that apply even when a person’s entire body has not contracted impurity.

This precaution is taken lest he caused the terumah to contract impurity.

When an olive-sized portion of a human corpse is held over a person or a k'li, that person or k'li contracts impurity due to the principle of ohel.

I.e., he is not a deafmute, mentally or emotionally compromised, or an immature child.

Rav Yosef Corcus emphasizes that this is speaking about an instance where the person drew water separately for each particularly container. For if he drew all the water at the same time, there would be no reason to differentiate between this clause and the following one.

Hence, it had imparted impurity to all the water and the water imparted impurity to all the other containers.

The Ra’avad offers a different rationale for this ruling: that the status of keilim with regard to impurity depends on the situation in which they are found. He does not accept the Rambam’s rationale, because he maintains that since the question was brought about by human activity, it is not considered as if there is no one to ask. The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam’s position, explaining that since no persons know how to clarify the issues regarding the keilim, it is not considered as if there is anyone to ask.

Which would have prevented the carcass of the animal from flowing out.

Until the water was poured into the last container.

We assume that the carcass was in the container used to draw water and remained there until the water was poured into all the containers. Thus the water in all the containers (and therefore the containers themselves) was impure. The Kessef Mishneh asks: Since a doubt involving containers is involved, why are we stringent here?

The other nine containers are certainly pure, because there was no carcass in them, nor was there any reason to suspect that there was a carcass in the bucket from which the water was poured. Similarly, only one of the buckets — the bucket from which the water was poured into the container where the carcass was found — should be impure. Since the identity of that bucket cannot be determined, we rule leniently regarding all the buckets.

Either terumah or sacrificial foods.

After the pure substances were removed.

For we assume that the carcass was in the container at the time the pure articles were held within and imparted impurity to them. When the container has a base, the substances are removed from its opening and it is possible that the carcass was not noticed at the time they were removed. When it does not have a base—and thus had the carcass been located there previously, it would have been poured out together with the pure substances—if it has a rim, the rim would have kept the carcass inside. Hence, it is deemed pure.

Thus it was present when the pure substances were placed inside.

Oil or wine [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 10:7)].

For either the carcass was in the container before he immersed it in the cistern, in which instance, it imparted impurity to all the liquid in the cistern or the carcass was in the cistern beforehand and had imparted impurity to it.

The water remaining in the cistern is also impure.

After the oil or wine was poured into it.

Because the crawling animal must have come from the original cistern or the container used to draw from it. There is no other alternative. Hence the wine is all impure.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 9:1), the Rambam explains that a pit is dug in the ground and the olives are stored there before they are pressed so that they will soften.

For we assume that the crawling animal was not in the pit and removed together with the olives.

The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 9:9).

Those on the roof, however, are pure, for we assume that they were removed before the crawling animal fell into the pit. The Kessef Mishneh observes that this ruling [although based on the Tosefta (Taharot 11:1)] runs contrary to the mishnah cited in the previous note and questions why the Rambam did not, as is the common practice, give precedence to the mishnaic ruling.

Without touching the olives.

We do not suspect that the carcass touched the olives and then fell off.

We are speaking about an instance where the carcass is found within the mound itself.
Now, olives will not solidify into a mound within three days. Hence, it can be assumed that the while the mound had been in the vat, the carcass had been there and had imparted impurity.

I.e., the carcass fell among them after they were taken to the roof. There they solidified and formed a mound.

I.e., touching it externally, but not mixed in it.

The larger portion is pure, for we assume that the carcass fell there afterwards.

For we assume that it fell there after the smaller portion was removed.

Because it was obvious that it had been mixed together with the dough and taken from the larger dough together with the smaller portion.

If there was liquid present, there is greater reason to suspect that the loaf or food became impure. For the impure food would have imparted impurity to the liquid and the liquid would have imparted impurity to the loaf or the food. Nevertheless, even if there is no liquid present, the loaf or the food are considered impure for the reason the Rambam proceeds to explain.

And thus the impure food never touched the pure loaf or food.

As mentioned in the first clause of the previous halachah.

If the majority of the food that had been located in the house previously was pure, the loaf or cooked food is pure. If the converse is true, it is considered as impure.

The carcass of a crawling animal is impure, as is the blood which emerges from it (Chapter 4, Halachah 7). This does not apply with regard to a living crawling animal.

And are thus impure in addition to the meat that comes from them being forbidden to be eaten.

If, however, it is found inside a home, it is considered as kevua, having a fixed place and we follow the general principle (Ketubot 15a): “Whenever an entity has a fixed place, all doubts about its status are considered as equally balanced.” See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 8:11 with regard to the parallel with regard to the laws of kashrut. Moreover, a home is generally considered as a private domain and, hence, that itself is sufficient reason to rule stringently.

Although one might argue that there is a greater likelihood of non-kosher meat being discarded than kosher meat, the ruling still depends on the majority.

See parallel rulings in Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 2:11; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:25; 15:26, Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 12:28.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 3:1).

See Chapter 4, Halachah 2.

Because it is unlikely she touched it.

Chapter 16, Halachah 1.