Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day
Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 17, Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 18, Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 19
Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 17
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Pesulei Hamukdashim - Chapter 19
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Hence the person(s) bringing the sacrifice are not required to bring another one.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.
Chapter 16, Halachah 1, states that when a disqualifying intent concerning place is combined with a disqualifying intent concerning time, the sacrifice is disqualified, but is not piggul. In the present instance, it is placed in the more severe category, because once the fundamental presentation was made in a manner that rendered the sacrifice piggul, the the priest’s subsequent intentions are of no consequence.
Chapter 2, Halachah 3.
However, it is not piggul. The Kessef Mishneh explains that it is not considered piggul because one must have the disqualifying intent concerning time when performing all of the presentations.
See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:7.
Literally, the Rambam’s words mean: “Remained silent with regard to the others.”
See ibid.:8.
The commentaries note that this ruling appears to run contrary to the statements of Zevachim 44a: “If one had a disqualifying intent that would render an offering piggul inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not piggul.” Rambam LeAm suggests that Rabbi Elazar, the author of the statement cited, does not accept the concept that one’s intent when immersing one’s finger in the blood can cause an offering to be considered as piggul. If, however, he would have accepted that concept, he would also have accepted the Rambam’s ruling here.
When they should be presented on the day the sacrificial animal is slaughtered.
On the outer altar (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:10).
For the bread is secondary to and dependent on the sacrifice, but the sacrifice is not dependent on the bread [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 2:3)]. See also Chapter 15, Halachah 13.
Rashi’s commentary to Menachot 15a implies that it is forbidden to eat the meat. From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, it would appear that the meat is permitted entirely.
Here, also, the bread is considered as secondary to the sacrifice, but the sacrifice is not secondary to the meat [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].
I.e., half an olive-sized portion of meat and half an olive-sized portion of bread (Rashi, Menachot, loc. cit.).
Menachot, loc. cit., mentions both of the situations spoken about in this halachah. One opinion maintains that the ruling was given both with regard to the bread on Shavuot and the bread of the thanksgiving-offering. A second view maintains that it was given with regard to the breads and the offering of Shavuot, for they are interrelated, as evidenced by the fact that they are waved together (Leviticus 23:20). It is possible, however, that it does not apply to the thanksgiving-offering. The Rambam accepts the more stringent view, because of the doubt involved (Kessef Mishneh).
For it is the offering of the bowls of frankincense that enable the breads to be eaten.
For the two loaves are considered as a single offering.
Here too both arrangments are considered as a single offering.
The commentaries have noted the apparent contradiction to Chapter 12, Halachah 14. See the notes to that halachah.
Of the blood of the sacrifices or the frankincense for the showbreads [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 2:2)].
For he had a disqualifying intent concerning time with regard to the entire offering that would enable the bread to be eaten.
In this context, each of the sheep is considered as an independent entity.
It appears that the Rambam follows the view of Rava (Menachot 13b) that bread is considered as consecrated, but it is forbidden to be eaten.
The place where the bread is located is not of consequence.
For as stated in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 8:15, the offering of the bread is a fundamental requirement for the offering of the sheep and if the bread is lost, the sheep should be destroyed by fire.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains that this is a printing error and the text should read “with an intent for another sacrifice.” This view, however, is not borne out by the manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah.
According to the Kessef Mishneh, the Rambam's ruling can be explained as follows: One might think that the meat would be permitted to be eaten, because they are peace-offerings and when a peace-offering is offered for the sake of another offering, it is permitted to be eaten, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 1. On the other hand, since the sheep are associated with the bread and the bread is lost, there is room to say that they have been disqualified.
The Kessef Mishneh notes, however, that Rabbenu Yehoshua, one of the Rambam’s descendants, was asked about the matter and explained the question according to the existing text. According to his view, the issue is that since the blood was cast on the altar after the bread was lost, the Sages had a question whether to consider the meat as ordinary meat or whether the meat should still be considered as sacrificial meat, because the sheep were slaughtered before the bread was lost.
The wording used by the Rambam is often employed when referring to one of the 613 mitzvot. Nevertheless, neither in the listing at the beginning of these halachot, nor in Sefer HaMitzvot, does he count this charge in that reckoning. The Ramban (in his Hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 4) does give this charge that distinction. Megilat Esther explains that this charge is part of the directive to offer sacrifices in the proper manner and hence need not be considered as a separate mitzvah. See also Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 144) where the issue is discussed.
As is one who causes a blemish to sacrificial animals (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:7).
And lashes are given only when one violates a transgression while performing a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2).
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 140) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 469) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
See the Sifri to the verse cited.
The Rambam is emphasizing this point lest one think that the charge also refers to other prohibited substances. This stress is necessary, for otherwise the prohibition could be considered a prohibition of a general nature (lav shebiklalot). Lashes are not given for violating a prohibition of this nature (Hilchot Sanhedrin, loc. cit.).
After they have been redeemed. As the Rambam LeAm elaborates, in addition to contracting a blemish, an animal dedicated as a sacrifice must be redeemed before the prohibition against partaking of its meat is lifted. (This constitutes a difference between the laws pertaining to such an animal and a firstborn animal.) Even after the Scriptural prohibition is lifted, there is a Rabbinic prohibition to partake of its meat until it contracts another blemish on its own accord. (This prohibition was instituted as a penalty lest one intentionally inflict such a blemish. See Bechorot 34b.)
The Rambam’s wording has aroused the attention of the commentaries, for this law is stated in Hilchot Bechorot 2:7, where the entire law stated here is mentioned. As such, it would have been more correct for the Rambam to have stated “as will be explained.” Some have suggested that the intent here is to refer to the concept that a sacrificial animal that has contracted a blemish may be eaten after being redeemed, as stated in Hilchot lssurei Mizbeiach 1:10.
In various halachot from Chapter 13, Halachah 1, onward.
Literally, that the soul is cut off. This involves premature death in this world (before the age of 50, Mo’ed Kattan 28a) and the soul not meriting a portion in the world to come (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1).
Since this phrase is also used with regard to notar (sacrificial meat left beyond its time limit) in Leviticus 19:8 and the punishment of karet is explicitly stated with regard to that prohibition in that verse, the Sifra makes an equation with regard to the punishment for the two transgressions.
This term is used to differentiate between this offering and an adjustable guilt-offering in which instance, the sacrifice the person required to bring is dependent on the person’s means. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:3-4.
Entities eaten by a person or consumed by the altar’s pyre.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 4:3), the Rambam explains this concept as follows: The prohibition of piggul is qerived from Leviticus 7:18 which pertains to the peace-offerings. Our Sages explain that the peace-offerings are unique in that they involve both consumption by the altar and consumption by man and that there is an act that permits such consumption (the offering of the blood permits the fats and organs to be offered and offering them permits the meat to be eaten). Hence this is established as a general rule with regard to all sacrifices.
I.e., the portion to be eaten by man.
The sheep themselves, however, can also become piggul, as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 16.
For there is no other act performed that enables these to be offered.
See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 2.
Ibid. 17:12.
See Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2. It must be noted that the latter point is the subject of a difference of opinion in the Mishnah. Rabbi Shimon maintains that the log cannot become piggul, while Rabbi Meir maintains that it can for the reasons stated here. Although the standard published text of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah states that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon’s view (as the Rambam rules here), Rav Kappach notes that all the manuscript copies of the Commentary to the Mishnah state that the halachah does not follow Rabbi Shimon.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 120) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 142) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Nevertheless, Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 117-119) does count the prohibitions against leaving over the meat Qf the Paschal sacrifice, the chagigah offering, and the second Paschal sacrifice as separate commandments.
The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam mentions this point. True, it is mentioned by Pesachim 84a, but that passage follows the opinion that lashes can be given for the violation of a prohibition even if a deed is not involved. The Rambam (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2) maintains that lashes are not given unless the transgression involves a deed. Hence, seemingly, he does not have to add the explanation given here.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 91) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 143) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 131) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 215) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The first shining of the light on the eastern horizon, between 72 and 120 minutes before sunrise according to the various authorities.
With the exception of the thanksgiving-offering and the nazirite's ram for which one is liable from dawn of the day following their sacrifice.
The commentaries note that the Rambam’s citation of the verse is not entirely exact. See also Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.
From the wording of the Mishnah (Meilah 4:3), one might think that these two prohibitions are not combined. Nevertheless, the Talmud (Meilah 17b) states that the Mishnah is speaking about the impurity of one’s hands, but that with regard to the prohibition against partaking of the food, they may be combined.
Although the Rambam’s wording implies that a Scriptural prohibition is involved, he does not include it as one of the 613 mitzvot. See a parallel in Hilchot Terumah 12:1.
The Or Sameach comments that the Rambam’s wording implies that if the sacrificial foods were disqualified for other reasons, it is permitted to cause them to contract impurity. See Chapter 19, Halachot 5-6.
Partaking of sacrificial foods that have become impure is considered by Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 130) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 145) as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The attainment of atonement refers to the casting of the blood on the altar.
Although the sacrifice became impure before the blood was cast on the altar, after the fact, it is acceptable, because the forehead plate of the High Priest causes such sacrifices to be considered acceptable (Menachot 25b). And since, after the fact, it is acceptable, one is liable for partaking of it if it became piggul.
In the original, an av tumah, literally, “a father of impurity,” an object deemed inherently impure by Scripture decree which has the potential to make other objects impure.
In the original, a v’lad tumah, literally, “the offspring of impurity,” an object that contracts ritual impurity through contract with a primary source of impurity, which in certain instances can impart impurity to other substances.
The punishment given anyone who violates a Rabbinic ordinance.
Because such a sacrifice is disqualified and, as an initial preference, its blood should not be offered on the altar. The Mishneh LiMelech states that he is, however, liable for lashes for partaking of sacrificial food before its blood was cast on the altar, as stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:1,4.
See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:13-14. As mentioned in the Kessef Mishneh, there are certain states of ritual impurity for which one is not liable for karet for entering the Temple. This prohibition, however, focuses only on those concerning which this penalty can be incurred, because of an association between the words mikdash, “sanctuary,” and kodesh, “sacrificial food.”
There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in the Mishnah (Zevachim 13:2) because there are two prohibitions involved: the prohibition against partaking of impure sacrificial meat and the prohibition against a person who is impure partaking of sacrificial meat. Rabbi Yossi maintains that since the meat is impure and unfit to be eaten, we are not concerned whether the person is impure or not. The Sages, by contrast, maintain that since the impure person is forbidden to partake of pure sacrificial food, the prohibition also applies when he partakes of impure sacrificial food. The Rambam accepts the Sages’ opinion. See also Halachah 16.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 129) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 167) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
An obligation for which the offering changes dependent on the person’s financial capacity (see Leviticus, ch. 5; Hilchot Shegagot 10:1).
For one could interpret the above verse as referring to sacrificial food that contracted ritual impurity.
This verse clearly indicates that the passage is speaking about a person who has contracted ritual impurity.
The interpretation of the verse is explained in the following halachah.
As stated in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1, to be permitted to partake of sacrificial food or to enter the Temple, a zav (a male who has secretions similar to those produced by gonorrhea), a zavah (a woman who experiences vaginal bleeding outside her menstrual cycle), a woman who gives birth or miscarries, and a person afflicted by the skin condition of tzara’at must do the following after they are fit to emerge from their ritual impurity: a) immerse in a mikveh or a stream b) wait until nightfall after immersion, and c) bring the appropriate sacrifice.
Since the person has already immersed in the mikveh, a certain dimension of his or her ritual impurity has been removed. Hence, although he or she is liable for lashes for this transgression, there is no liability for karet.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that even in such a situation, one is liable for karet. As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:9, the Kessef Mishneh cites Talmudic passages which could be used as support for both positions.
For according to Scriptural Law, he is not liable. Compare to Halachah 12.
In this instance as well, according to the Mishneh LiMelech, the person would be liable for lashes for partaking of sacrificial food before its blood was cast on the altar, as stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:1,4.
See Halachah 13 and notes.
For afterwards, they are ready to be burnt.
Le., this conclusion can be reached by comparing Halachah 7 with the previous halachah. An equation is made between sacrificial meat that is notar and that which contracted ritual impurity.
In Halachah 7.
I.e., the prohibition against partaking of blood, which appears unifonnly, both to the blood of sacrificial animals and to that of ordinary animals. Since it is already prohibited, none of the other prohibitions apply to it. See Zevachim 4:5.
This is the version accepted by the R. Shabsi Frankel edition of the Mishneh Torah. The Kessef Mishneh offers a different version of the text.
I.e., although these activities are necessary for these sacrifices to be acceptable, a person can still be held liable for partaking of the sacrifice in a state of ritual impurity.
This is a general rule. There are several particular aspects to it, as explained in Keritot 14a.
This is speaking about a situation where there is an olive-sized portion of all the prohibited substances. Nevertheless, one might think that the presence of one might nullify the other. The person receives a set of lashes for each prohibition he violates.
Instead, as stated in Halachah 11, they are combined together.
The commentaries have noted that this ruling appears to contradict the Rambam’s own ruling in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 16:18, that orlah nullifies the presence of terumah. See also the Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 98.
It can be explained that in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot, the Rambam is speaking about an instance where there is sufficient amount of kosher food to nullify the prohibited substance according to Scriptural Law (for only a majority is required). Hence, for the additional amount required by Rabbinic Law, a forbidden substance is also sufficient. In this instance, however, the substances are not nullified according to Scriptural Law. Hence, one forbidden substance cannot nullify another.
In Chapter 14, Halachah 7, the Rambam defines this as: “the meat that slipped by the knife at the time the animal was skinned and remains cleaving to the hide.”
The thin membrane that clings to the hide and separates between it and the meat; it is not fit to be eaten (ibid.).
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:4), the Rambam explains that this is a general term referring to blood vessels, nerves, and sinews.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 1:2), the Rambam explains that this term refers to the growth that remains after the large feathers are removed.
For these entities are not considered as fit to be eaten.
Based on a comparison to Chapter 14, Halachah 7, the Ra’avad explains this should be understood as meaning that if one intended to eat the meat of a sacrifice after the time when it was supposed to be eaten, the entire sacrifice, even the fetus and the placenta, become piggul. If, however, one’s intent is to partake of the fetus or the placenta, the sacrifice does not become piggul.
As stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:2, burnt-offerings brought by a gentile may be offered on the altar. According to the Rambam, even though such sacrifices are acceptable, these prohibitions do not apply.
The commentaries note that the Rambam’s ruling appears to reflect the understanding of Rabbi Shimon in Zevachim 4:3. Nevertheless, most authorities including the Rambam in his Commentary to the Mishnah - follow the view of Rabbi Yossi, who differs. It can, however, be explained that Rabbi Shimon’s opinion concerns only “one who offers them outside the Temple.” The preceding clause of the mishnah concerning piggul and the like is accepted by all opinions (Kessef Mishneh).
In truth, the Rambam’s opinion concerning this issue is somewhat problematic. He accepts Rabbi Yossi’s view in his ruling in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 19:16. Nevertheless, his ruling in Hilchot Me’ilah 5:15, like the one here, appears to follow Rabbi Shimon’s view.
Halachah 17 above.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that it reflects the understanding of Rabbi Shimon in the above mishnah. Rav Kapach notes that in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, his original writing was rubbed out and his final statement is: “The halachah does not follow Rabbi Shimon.” The Kessef Mishneh offers a resolution to the difficulty explaining that the Rambam is postulating that the transgressor is liable for lashes and not for karet. The exemption for karet is accepted by all opinions. Rabbi Shimon exempts the transgressor from lashes as well, but the initial opinion of the mishnah - which is accepted by the Rambam - holds him liable on that account.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam equates a person partaking of them while he is impure with one partaking of them while they are impure. The Kessef Mishneh debates the Rambam’s intent here.
Although wood does not usually contract impurity, sacrificial wood may [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 90) and Sefer HaChinueh (mitzvah 146) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 91) and Sefer HaChinueh (mitzvah 143) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. There the Rambam states that the commandment was instituted to correct the transgression of leaving the meat past its required time. See Chapter 18, Halachah 9.
This is speaking about a peace-offering which may be eaten on the day it was offered and on the following day. If it was left for a third day, it must be burnt.
In the Temple Courtyard, but not on the altar. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:3-4 which states that there are three places where sacrifices are burnt.
We have translated the term used by the Rambam according to its halachic intent. The literal meaning is that it should be left long enough to decompose until it loses the appearance of meat. Our Sages understood that as being a twenty-four hour period. Leaving the sacrifice until the next day disqualifies it and requires it to be burnt. Since initially there was a doubt involved, this is the desired course of action.
I.e., they are burnt in the ash heap outside of Jerusalem after their fats and organs were offered on the altar’s pyre.
I.e., before their blood is cast upon the altar.
The fats and the organs would definitely be disqualified in such circumstances. Zevachim 104b questions whether this would also apply with regard to the meat of a sacrifice and leaves that question unresolved.
Rav Yosef Corcus and the Kessef Mishneh question the Rambam’s decision, because the Talmud’s query seems to follow the opinion of Reish Lakish (Zevachim 89b) who maintains that when the meat of sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness was removed from the Temple Courtyard before their blood was cast on the altar, the sacrifice is disqualified. According to Rabbi Y ochanan who maintains that the sacrifice is not disqualified in such an instance, seemingly, these sacrifices are also not disqualified.
Rav Yosef Corcus resolves the issue, explaining that even Rabbi Yochanan maintains that the meat of those sacrifices is disqualified. Hence, there is reason to question what his opinion would be in this instance.
If the majority of an animal is not taken out of the Temple Courtyard, it is not disqualified. Zevachim l05a speaks about a situation where only half an animal was taken outside the Temple Courtyard, but included in that half was the majority of one limb. If the remainder of that limb was considered to be outside the Temple Courtyard, the majority of the animal would be considered to be outside.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on both of these instances, maintaining that the Talmudic passage which is the Rambarn’s source (Zevachim 104b-105a) can be interpreted differently. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s interpretation can be substantiated.
All three instances mentioned above.
I.e., they will definitely be burnt. The question is only where they will be burnt, whether in the Temple Courtyard, like sacrifices that are disqualified or outside Jerusalem, as is required for these bulls and goats. When, by contrast, a doubt arises with regard to other sacrificial animals, there is no obligation to burn them unless they are disqualified. On the contrary, burning them would be considered as degrading for sacred articles (Rav Yosef Corcus). Hence they are required to be left until the next day, so that they will definitely be disqualified.
Even though it is permitted to cut the meat of burnt-offerings into portions (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 6:19), the priests were not accustomed to doing so. Rather a burnt-offering was cut up into several large portions and then brought to the altar. Hence if the meat of an animal was cut up into smaller pieces, one could assume that it was a sin-offering (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 7:3)). The meat of such offerings must be eaten in the Temple Courtyard.
It is also possible that the meat was from a guilt-offering, but sin-offerings are more common and hence, they were mentioned. The meat could also have come from a peace-offering—for such offerings are also cut up into smaller pieces—but out of respect to the stringencies associated with sin-offerings, it is considered in that category.
Since peace-offerings may be eaten throughout Jerusalem, we can assume that meat found there was left over from such an offering.
Which is forbidden to be eaten or offered on the altar. Since it is possible that the meat was left beyond its appointed time, it must be burnt as is required for such meat. Nevertheless, since it is also possible that it had been sacrificed on this day, it cannot be burnt immediately. Instead, we wait until the following day when it is certainly required to be burnt and burn it at that time. For peace-offerings, it is necessary to wait two days.
I.e., since it is possible that the sacrificial meat had not been left for an extra day, if a person who is permitted to eat such a sacrifice partakes of it, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering to atone for misusing sacrificial meat.
Since the verse mentions the day, it must be burnt during those hours.
See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 10:6.
I.e., even if it is discovered at night, several days after the meat should have been consumed, it should be burnt on the following day and not immediately at night.
The verse regarding notar serves as the basis for the ruling regarding all sacrifices that must be burnt.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 7:10), the Rambam states the rationale: The prohibition of work on festivals is mandated by both a positive and negative commandment, while the charge to bum notar is merely a positive commandment. Now, a positive commandment never overrides the observance of both a positive and negative commandment. See also Hilchot Sh’vitat Yorn Tov 3:8.
Although it is forbidden to cause sacrificial meat to contract ritual impurity and by mixing notar or piggul with impure meat, one would be doing so since notar or piggul are already considered impure, this provision is granted (Pesachim 15b).
See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:3-4.
In the original, an av tumah, literally, “a father of impurity,” and a v’lad tumah, literally, “the offspring of impurity.” See Chapter 18, Halachah 12, for more details regarding these terms.
The Rambam is borrowing the wording of the Mishnah (Pesachim 1:6), even though—as he states in his Commentary to the Mishnah—the intent is “a derivative of a derivative,” i.e., an entity of third degree impurity as mentioned here. Thus we are speaking about meat that touched an entity that had touched an entity that had touched a primary source of impurity. Indeed, the Kessef Mishneh and others suggest that text of the Mishneh Torah should be emended to reflect that understanding.
The meat becomes impure only according to Rabbinical decree. According to Scriptural Law, food does not cause other food to contract ritual impurity [Hilchot Sha’ar Avot Ha Tuma’ah 7:1; the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].
See Hilchot Tuma’at Ochalin 4:15.
To emerge from most types of ritual impurity, a person must immerse in a mikveh and then wait until nightfall. Even if a person has already immersed in a mikveh, he does not regain impurity until night. Until that time, he can impart ritual impurity to certain entities (Tvul Yom 2:1).
But not an earthenware lamp touched by a person who became impure because of contact with a corpse, for an earthenware utensil never becomes a primary source of impurity [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].
For the impurity resulting from contact with a corpse is so severe that even an entity that touches it becomes a primary source of impurity.
Which may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem.
There is no necessity to bring it to the Temple and have it burnt there.
Meat from sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity must be eaten in Jerusalem.
The last place from the surroundings of Jerusalem from which the Temple can be seen. See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 7:8.
And thus the difficulty in returning is not so great.
If, however, it is smaller, it is not significant and can be burnt wherever he is.
The Hebrew term birah is used to refer to the entire Temple complex.
This provision was made lest guests refrain from burning the sacrificial meat because of a lack of wood. See also Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:3 which touches on related matters.
It is sufficient to merely discard them.
See Hilchot Pesachim 10:1-2 which explain that the bones of the Paschal sacrifice are burnt together with its meat, because according to the Rambam, the prohibition against breaking a bone from the Paschal sacrifice applies even after the mitzvah to partake of the sacrifice is concluded. It is therefore desirable to bum the bones, so that they do not become a cause of transgression.
The Ra’avad mentions, based on Pesachim 83a, it can be concluded that only bones that had marrow and which were cracked open and the marrow removed must be burnt. If they have no marrow at all, there is no need to bum even the bones of the Paschal sacrifice.
According to this view, the difference between the law governing the bones of the Paschal sacrifice and those of other sacrifices can be explained as follows. It is forbidden to break open the bones of the Paschal sacrifice. Therefore, if the bones of a Paschal sacrifice were broken open, we can assume that this was done after the Paschal sacrifice became notar, for, according to many authorities, there is no prohibition against breaking the bones of a Paschal sacrifice once it has been disqualified. In such a situation, the bones are forbidden, because they served notar (i.e., the marrow). (See the gloss of the Mishneh LiMelech who notes that in Hilchot Karban Pesach 10:6, the Rambam writes that even in such a situation, it is forbidden to break the bones of a Paschal sacrifice, and offers a possible resolution.)
With regard fo other sacrifices, by contrast, there is no prohibition against breaking their bones even during the time the sacrifice is acceptable. Hence, we can assume that they were broken during that time and the marrow removed. Thus, there is little likelihood that they served notar and thus became forbidden. According to this understanding, if a sacrifice was notar, any bone that contains marrow should be burnt. See the gloss of the Meiri to Pesachim, loc. cit., who implies that the Rambam should have been more explicit in his statements.
Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:20.
In the instance of sacrifices of the highest degree of sanctity.
As the Mishnah (Zevachim 12:2) states: “Whenever the altar did not acquire the flesh [of a sacrifice], the owners do not acquire the hide.”
See Chapter 15, Halachah 1.
This is a violation of the norms of sacrificial practice (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:18). Nevertheless, it does not disqualify a sacrifice.
It is forbidden to benefit from these entities. They should be burnt so that they are destroyed entirely.
A conditional guilt-offering is brought when a person suspects he has violated a negative commandment, but has no definite knowledge that he did so. If he receives knowledge that he is guiltless after the animal has been slaughtered, but before its blood is cast on the altar, the sacrifice is disqualified. Once its blood has been cast on the altar, the sacrifice is acceptable even if the person receives definite knowledge that he is guiltless. See Chapter 4, Halachah 19.
See Chapter 7, Halachah 10.
A nazirite’s hair is considered “holy” and it is forbidden to be benefit from it. Therefore at the conclusion of his nazirite vow, he shaves his head and burns his hair in the Chamber of the Nazirites that was in the southeastern corner of the Women’s Courtyard (Hilchot Nizirut 8:1-3).
Produce that grows in the first three years after the planting of a tree. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot, ch. 10, and Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, ch. 10.
Species of grain or vegetables sown in a vineyard. See Hilchot Kilayim, ch. 5.
An ox—or any other animal—that killed a person. The ox is stoned to death and it is forbidden to benefit from its flesh at all (Exodus 21:29-32; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, ch. 10).
When a wayfarer is found murdered and it is not known who killed him, a calf is brought as atonement. See Deuteronomy, ch. 21; Hilchot Rotzei’ach, ch. 9.
As stated in Leviticus, ch. 14, Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at, ch. 11, when a person whose body had been afflicted with tzara’at becomes pure, he must bring two birds as part of the purification ritual.
As stated in Hilchot Nizirut 6:11, when a nazirite becomes impure because of contact with a human corpse, he must have [the ashes of the Red Heifer] sprinkled upon him on the third and seventh days. He then has his hair shaved on the stventh day. This shaving need not be performed in the Temple Courtyard.
The firstborn male offspring of a donkey must be redeemed for a sheep. If it is not redeemed, it is executed and it is forbidden to benefit from its flesh (Exodus 13:13, Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 12).
Which is forbidden not only to be eaten, but also to benefit from (Exodus 23:19; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 9:1).
It is forbidden to benefit from the meat of such animals, as stated in Hilchot Shechitah2:2.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:2), the Rambam translates the term sit into Arabic. Most commentaries interpret his statements as meaning “the distance between the top of the thumb and the next finger [when the fingers are spread out]. This is one-sixth of the distance between the thumb and the middle finger.” Rav Kappach notes that in fact such a calculation will not be accurate. He interprets the Rambam’s words as defining a sit as half the distance between the index finger and the middle finger when spread out. This he maintains is two thumb breadths.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 13:4), the Rambam differentiates between “the width of a sit” and “the full length of a sit.” As indicated by Hilchot Shabbat 9:20, “the full length of a sit” is two thumb breadths. In contrast, as stated (ibid.:7), “the width of a sit” is two thirds of a zeret, i.e., three thumb breadths.
Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.:3).
Generally, the hair of an unredeemed firstborn donkey need only be buried, as stated in the previous halachah. Nevertheless, in this instance, the cloth must be burnt lest the forbidden substance not be recognized and the cloth considered as permitted (Temurah 34a).
Temurah, op. cit., derives this concept from the exegesis of the statements of Leviticus 25:3 with regard to the ash of the inner altar. From those statements, a parallel is established with regard to the other ashes mentioned here. The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam and maintains that it is only forbidden to benefit from the ashes which the priest removes when taking out the ash in the morning. He maintains that the ash on the altar is permitted. The Rambam, by contrast, maintains that all of the ash of the altar is forbidden.
Because in all these instances, the mitzvah is that the article be burnt.
While the ash of entities that are to be burnt is permitted.
The Ra’avad states that, on the basis of Gittin 54b, both of these statements should be understood as applying while the article in question is in that person’s hands. The rationale is that since he could now make the article piggul or impure, his word is accepted when he says that it was previously brought to that state.
The Kessef Mishneh states that although that is the opinion of Abbaye in Gitlin, loc. cit., Rava differs, maintaining that the law applies even when the articles in question are not in his hand. Generally, the halachah follows Rava’s opinion, but in this instance, Abbaye’s view is favored.
For this would cause acceptable sacrifices to be burnt unnecessarily and pure entities to be destroyed.
And accept the other person’s statements.
The wording of the Talmud that the Rambam quotes, “according to the letter of the law, his word [need] not be relied upon,” implies that it is desirable to go beyond the letter of the law. See the parallels in Hilchot Karban Pesach 4:1; Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 13:8.
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