Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Note the parallel in Hilchot Shechitah 2:22.

Vayikra Rabbah 22:7 states that even if the owner “sits and thinks [unacceptable intents] the entire day,” the sacrifice is not disqualified.

The Rambam proceeds to define each of these concepts.

For these undesirable intents disqualify a sacrifice only when they alone are the factors that disqualify it and not when it is disqualified for other reasons [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:1)].

For it is disqualified and must be disposed.

He should then bring it to the altar and cast it upon it. The sacrifice is then acceptable. As stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 27-28, the rationale is that “individuals who are unacceptable for Temple service do not cause the remainder of the blood to be considered as remnants.” Hence it is as if the blood of the sacrifice had never been taken.

Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

E. g., a burnt-offering is offered with the intent that it is a peace-offering.

Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam is implying that since the sacrifice is acceptable in these instances, even though in other instances, such a change in intent would disqualify it, a person who is not fit for Temple service is considered just like one who is. His intent is significant and could disqualify the sacrifice. The Kessef Mishneh, however, questions on what the Rambam bases this principle.

I.e., with the intent that it be offered as another type of meal-offering.

I.e., all of the other meal-offerings were brought from wheat and thus the barley used for the omer offering is unfit to be used for other meal-offerings. Hence even if one had the intent to offer it as another type of offering, that intent is of no consequence. (The meal-offering of a sotah is also brought from barley, but there are fundamental differences between it and the omer offering.)
The Rambam’s understanding is based on his understanding of Menachot 5b which states that the omer offering is a chidush, something new and different than other meal-offerings, for it is from barley, as explained. The Ra’avad follows a different version of the text which states that the omer offering is different, because it is brought from chadash, wheat from the new harvest.
There is an advantage to the Ra’avad’s understanding, because - as he explains according to the Rambam, the same rationale could seemingly be used with regard to the sotah offering mentioned in the second clause of the halachah. There would be no necessity to mention frankincense. The Kessef Mishneh favors the Rambam’s version and explains that by mentioning frankincense, our Sages (and the Rambam) chose one of two possible answers. They could also have stated that it is unfit to be used for other offerings.

The term used by Numbers 5:15, 18 to describe the meal-offering brought by a woman suspected of adultery.

It is forbidden to place frankincense on this offering (Numbers 5:15). Thus before the offering is brought, the frankincense must be removed and until it is removed, the offering is not fit. Hence, whatever intent the person has concerning the offering at that time is of no consequence.

And it may be offered when the altar is repaired.

This applies even if he had this intent while performing service in the Temple Courtyard. Since the altar is not fit for sacrifices to be offered upon it, the place is not considered as fit for service.

Because the act was performed outside the Temple Courtyard, a place where sacrificial service may not be perfonned.

The definitions given in this and the following two halachot are necessary to understand the laws stated in Halachot 8-10 (Kessef Mishneh).

The commentaries have noted that the Rambam’s wording is not exact, for although the blood is presented on the altar, it is not “offered on the altar’s pyre.”

The fats and organs offered on the altar (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:18).

I.e., what remains after the handful is removed.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:2-5 which describes the burning of these sacrifices.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:4), the Rambam explains that this is a general term referring to blood vessels, nerves, and sinews.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 1:2), the Rambam explains that this term refers to the growth that remains after the large feathers are removed. [The Mishnah there uses the tenn mourah. The spelling of that term is important, for some spell it in the same way as a tenn the Rambam translates as referring to one of a fowl’s stomachs.]

In the above source, the Rambam explains that when the feathers are removed from these places, they remain dry projections tha! are unfit for consumption unless the fowl is very fat.

Similarly, they are not considered as meat with regard to the prohibitions against partaking of forbidden foods and the laws of ritual purity. See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:18, 9:7; Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTumah 1:7.

See Halachah 2 above.

I.e., a disqualifying intent because of the place.

I.e., a disqualifying intent because of the time.

Because the substances mentioned are not usually eaten.

For these entities are neither fit to be eaten, nor fit to be offered on the altar’s pyre.

Because these sacrifices are not fit to be eaten. With regard to a disqualifying intent while burning these sacrifices, see Chapter 13, Halachah 8.

While performing one of the four services mentioned previously.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that, as stated in the following halachah, our Sages considered an animal’s consumption as “eating.” Hence consumption by such individuals will certainly fall into that category.

In Chapter 13, Halachah 1. The fact that the person who was intended to partake of the sacrifice or offer it was impure or disqualified is not significant.

See Chapter 13 which explains that the concept of piggul applies only when the disqualifying intent applies to time alone.

An olive-sized portion is 27 cc according to Shiurei Torah. Both the mitzvot and the prohibitions involving eating center on partaking of an olive-sized portion of food. See Hilchot Sh’vuot 4:1; Hilchot Terumot 10:2, et al. This measure is also of consequence with regard to offering substances on the altar as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 15.

Because his forbidden intent is of no consequence.

Zevachim 31b refers to II Kings 9:10 as support for the concept that consumption by animals can be termed achilah.

I.e., an equivalent of three egg-sized portions. Generally, if a person stretches out his consumption of an olive-sized portion beyond this time span, it is not considered as “eating,” for he will not have ingested a significant amount at once. The Rabbis mention different opinions with regard to this time span, referred to as k’dai achilat pras, some as brief as 2 minutes and some as long as 9 minutes. Based on Shiurei Torah, the suggested practice is to consider k’dai achilat pras as 4 minutes with regard to eating matzah on Pesach, but 9 minutes with regard to eating on Yom Kippur.

For here the emphasis is not on the person’s activity of eating, but on the sacrifice being eaten (Kin’at Eliyahu).

The Kessef Mishneh suggests amending the text to read “half an olive-sized portion” and in that way fit the context of the entire halachah. The notes to the Frankel edition of the Mishneh Torah, however, indicate that all of the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah speak of an olive-sized portion.

The Mishneh LiMelech notes that in Chapter 11, Halachah 8, the Rambam writes that two grains of frankincense are sufficient for a meal-offering to be considered acceptable. Seemingly, then, that amount should also be enough to disqualify such an offering.

In Chapter 13. Our text represents a slight emendation from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. Others maintain that version and explain that the reference is to Chapter 16, Halachah 8.

I.e., a very small amount.

The mention of communal sacrifices represents a change of mind for the Rambam. In the original version of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 1:1, which is preserved in the standard printing of that text), he writes that a communal sacrifice slaughtered for a different intent fulfills the community’s obligation. Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura also follows this view. In his later years, however, the Rambarn emended his text to agree with the ruling here (see Rav Kapach’s text). Note also Rabbi Akiva Eiger whose gloss questions the initial version of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah.

Hence, even if one slaughtered an animal designated as a burnt-offering for the sake of a sin-offering, one should continue performing all the subsequent tasks for the sake of a burnt-offering [Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah]. See Halachah 3.

See Halachah 3 which explains why these offerings are singled out in contrast to all others.

Chapter 13, Halachah 4.

See Halachah 3 which explains the derivation of this concept. The Mishneh LiMelech questions the Rambam’s equation of sacrifices offered for a different purpose than they were originally designated and those offered for the sake of a different person. There is, he explains, a fundamental difference between them. If one slaughters an animal for the sake of another person, the owner is still considered to have fulfilled his obligation. It is only when the blood is cast on the altar for the sake of another person that he is not considered to have fulfilled his obligation. Nevertheless, the Rambam’s statements can be interpreted as referring to an instance when one slaughtered the animal with the intent to cast its blood on the altar for the sake of another person.

This also represents a change of mind for the Rambam. In his original version of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 1:1), which is preserved in the standard printing of that text), he writes that if an intent is supplanted in error, it is considered to be supplanted. In his later years, however, the Rambam emended his text to agree with this ruling (see Rav Kapach’s text).

This applies even if its blood was presented on the lower portion of the altar as is the blood of a sin-offering.

I.e., the meal-offering brought by a transgressor obligated to bring an adjustable guilt-offering, who is very poor. See Hilchot Shegagot, ch. 10.

A woman suspected of adultery. This meal-offering is comparable to that of a sinner.

Mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 6.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 13, for a description of the differences between these offerings.

Chapter 18, Halachah 1.

The rationale is that since the sacrifice is acceptable, its functions must be performed for the proper intent.

Zevachim 7a interprets the phrase cited as implying: for him and not for his colleague. See Halachah 8.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 1:1), the Rambam states that the first verse teaches that the offering must be brought as a Paschal sacrifice and the second, that it must be brought for the sake of its owner. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 5:2), the Rambam quotes the Jerusalem Talmud which mentions only the second verse and states that a Paschal sacrifice that is not offered for the proper purpose is unacceptable. See also Halachah 11.

Our text reflects an amended version. The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah contains a different prooftext.

Zevachim 46b derives this principle through Biblical exegesis.

I.e., even though it was slaughtered as a sin-offering, since it was not slaughtered for the sake of the sin for which the animal was originally designated, it is unacceptable.

Since this is a different type of sacrifice, one might think that the situation is comparable to that stated in the following halachah, slaughtering a sin-offering for the sake of a person obligated to bring a burnt-offering. Nevertheless, since both offerings atone for sins punishable by karet, they are considered as comparable. Hence the sacrifice is disqualified (Rashi, Zevachim 9b).

To atone for the failure to observe a positive commandment.

I.e., the law stated in Halachah 7. From this concept, it is also possible to derive the law stated in this halachah, for the implication is that when one offers a sin-offering for the sake of another person who is obligated to bring a sin-offering, it is disqualified, but not when one offers it for the sake of another person who is not so obligated (Zevachim 7a).

Hence the deceased person is not considered as obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore, this is not considered as an instance where one offered a sacrifice for the sake of another person obligated to bring a sacrifice.

A burnt-offering to atone for the failure to observe a positive commandment.

Hence he is considered to be obligated to bring a sacrifice.
Zevachim 71-7b explains that there is a difference between such a situation and a person who knows he is obligated to bring a burnt-offering (in which instance, the sin-offering is not disqualified, as stated in the previous halachah). When the person knows he must bring a burnt-offering, his atonement is associated with that offering only. When, however, he does not know that he must bring a burnt-offering, he will not seek atonement. Hence, the sin-offering he brings will bring him a certain measure of atonement for the positive commandments he did not perform. For as stated in Halachah 14, everyone has certain positive commandments that he has failed to fulfill.

The Mishneh LiMelech restricts the scope of the Rambam’s statements, maintaining that, if at the time of slaughter or the performance of one of the other three services mentioned in Halachah 2, one has a disqualifying intent concerning receiving the blood or bringing it to the altar, the sacrifice is still acceptable.

The commentaries question the Rambam’s ruling, because even a sin-offering is acceptable when slaughtered as an ordinary animal. The Kessef Mishneh states that the phrase “unto God” in the prooftext excludes slaughtering the animal for ordinary purposes. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 5:2), the Rambam cites the Jerusalem Talmud which states that the phrase “And you shall say, ‘It is a Paschal sacrifice’” excludes all other intents.

See Halachot 1 and 3.

The Paschal sacrifice may not be sacrificed until the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan. Nevertheless, since it is offered on that day, the morning is considered “the time of its sacrifice” with regard to the disqualification of an offering.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Zevachim 1:3. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that the more lenient opinion should be accepted. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam accepted the more stringent view because it is debated in the Talmud.

For if it was slaughtered at such a time, it is considered as a peace-offering and a peace-offering that was slaughtered with a different intent is acceptable.
In the clause which follows, the sacrifice is unacceptable, because there is no one to partake of it and a Paschal sacrifice is brought only to be eaten (Hilchot Korban Pesach, ch. 2).

At this age, it is no longer fit to be offered as a Paschal sacrifice.

See Leviticus 7:15 which speaks of “the thanksgiving-peace sacrifice.”

For it is considered to have atoned for the person for whose sake it was sacrificed, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

And atonement for these unknown faults will be secured by this sacrifice.

The heir.

As stated in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 8:1, together with the two loaves brought on Shavuot are offered several burnt offerings, among them two rams, and two sheep as communal peace-offerings.

And two other sheep must be brought.

As stated in Halachah 1.

A skin malady similar to, but not identical with leprosy that renders one ritually impure.

See Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 2.

Even though the person has not fulfilled his obligation and must bring another sacrifice, he is required to bring the accompanying offerings, for the reason mentioned by the Rambam.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:3.

As would be required were it offered for the specified intent (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 2:5).

In contrast to the guilt-offering mentioned in the previous halachah, it is customary to bring burnt-offerings as freewill offerings. Hence, the accompanying offerings should be brought accordingly.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 2:2-3.

The commentaries note that it is forbidden to offer the eimorim on the festival and question whether the intent is that the meat may be eaten on the festival or whether it is necessary to wait until the evening.

For only obligatory sacrifices are offered on the Sabbath.

Like the peace-offerings of a nazirite, rather than for a two days and a night like other peace offerings.

Bread must be brought with the peace-offerings of a nazirite (Hilchot Nizirut 8:1).

Chapter 13, Halachah 1.

Slaughter, receiving the blood, bringing it to the altar, and casting it on the altar, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 4, and in the following halachah.

Implied is that with regard to other sacrifices which are not disqualified when slaughtered for another purpose, if there was a disqualifying intent concerning time, the fact that they were slaughtered for a different purpose does not prevent them from being considered as piggul.

As stated in Chapter 18, Halachot 3 and 6, when a sacrifice is merely disqualified, a person who partakes of its meat is liable for lashes. If, however, it is deemed piggul, he is liable for karet, a much more serious punishment.

I.e., there is no difference which disqualifying intent a person has first; as long as another intent is mixed together with the intent involving time, the sacrifice is disqualified, but not piggul. In Zevachim 29b, there is a differing opinion which maintains that if the intent involving time is first, the sacrifice is deemed piggul even if there is another disqualifying intent afterwards.

More precisely, that the meat be eaten, whether by himself or by someone else.

See Chapter 14, Halachah 8.

Both of these situations are examples where a disqualifying intent involving place is combined with a disqualifying intent concerning time.

As mentioned in Chapter 14, Halachah 10, to disqualify a sacrifice one must have an intent concerning an olive-sized portion. Here the Rambam is emphasizing that even though two different intents are involved, they may be combined.

In the previous halachah, the half portion was considered significant, because there was no olive-sized portion present and it can be combined with another half portion. In this halachah, there is an olive-sized portion present. Hence, nothing concerning the smaller portion is significant.
The commentaries note that the Rambam apparently had a slightly different version of the Talmudic passage that serves as the source for this law than the standard printed text.

I.e., the same law mentioned in the previous halacbah applies in this instance as well. The fact that the first half portion would have been combined with the second half portion had the person not had the second disqualifying intent concerning time, is not of consequence. Rava (Zevachim 31a) states lyrically: “The piggul arises, like one rising from sleep.”

Although the second disqualifying intent combines an intent concerning place and one concerning time and thus there is room to think that they cannot be separated from each other, the two intents concerning time are considered as one unit and the intent concerning place is disregarded.

Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

Since these intents are not significant, they do not prevent the sacrifice from being considered as piggul.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that this word is problematic, because even if a disqualifying intent concerning time is also combined, the sacrifice is not piggul.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Ra’avad’s objection follows the interpretation of Zevachim 27a advanced by Rashi. The Rambam, he maintains, has a different understanding of that Talmudic passage.
It is possible to distinguish between the situations mentioned in this halachah and those mentioned in the previous halachah as follows: In the situations mentioned here, the very same thought which concerned the place where the blood of the sacrifice would be offered concerned also its time.

Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

Although the priest had a disqualifying intent while performing one of these acts, we do not say that he had the same intent concerning the other unless he explicitly had such a thought.

For, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 6, a disqualifying intent concerning time causes a meal-offering to be considered piggul only when one has this intent while performing one of the four services mentioned in the previous halachah.

Even though neither of the intents in their own right would cause the sacrifice to be considered as piggul, when combined, they have this effect.
To explain: Until the frankincense is offered, it is forbidden to partake of the remaining portions of the meal-offering. Thus having the intent to offer the frankincense on the following day is equivalent to having the intent to partake of the remainder of the offering on the following day.

As indicated by Chapter 14, Halachah 10, which states that if one had the intent to eat an olive-sized portion in an extended interval, he can be held liable.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this instance in Menachot 16b. One sage maintains that the offering is acceptable. Another maintains that it is piggul, and a third rules as the Rambam rules here. The Rambam accepts that view, because there are a majority of opinions negating either of the extremes (see Kessef Mishneh).

Even though there are explicit negative commandments not to place frankincense on these offerings. See Chapter 14, Halachah 3; Chapter 11, Halachah 10.

Because the offering is not fit to be brought on the altar until the frankincense is removed.

Because the offering is fit to be brought on the altar.

For the handful is fit to be offered on the altar. Hence if one has a disqualifying intent while placing the handful in a sacred vessel, bringing it to the altar, or offering it on the altar's pyre, there is room to say that it is piggul. (See Rashi, Menachot 12a.)

For it is unfit to partake of such a meal-offering.