Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

See the description of the taking of the handful of meal in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 13:13.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 1:1), the Rambam explains that taking a handful of meal is equivalent to slaughtering an animal sacrifice. Hence if the act is performed by an unacceptable person, it is disqualified. Rav Yosef Corcus states more precisely that it is equivalent to receiving the blood of a sacrifice, thus also disqualifying a non-priest.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 13:12 which mentions the separation of the frankincense.

The Kessef Mishneh understands the Rambam as ruling that these acts disqualify the offering permanently, even if the priest corrects the act afterwards. From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), it appears that the deed may be corrected.

The frankincense should be shifted to the side before the handful is taken. If afterwards any of these substances is found in the handful, it is unacceptable, because the handful is lacking the required amount [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 1:1)].

Any place within the Temple Courtyard is acceptable (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:12).

And the meal-offering is acceptable. The Kessef Mishneh states that this is referring to an instance where he placed the handful of meal into a utensil and from the utensil, it spilled to the floor. If, however, it falls to the floor from his hand, it is disqualified. As support, he cites a similar ruling with regard to the blood of a sacrifice (Chapter 1, Halachah 26).

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:12 with regard to bringing the meal-offering to the altar.

Menachot 26a elaborates on the necessity of using a sacred utensil for each of these stages of service.

Although it need not be mixed with oil by a priest, it must be mixed in the Temple Courtyard (Menachot 9b).

As required for certain meal-offerings; see Leviticus 2:6.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:12 which describes the waving process which is necessary for certain meal-offerings.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:23.

One log for every isaron (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:7).

A handful per offering (ibid.).

There is no Biblical phrase using the exact wording employed by the Rambam. Menachot 11b derives the concept stated by the Rambam from Leviticus 6:8. Leviticus 2:2 uses a phrase very close to that cited by the Rambam.

The use of a plural tenn indicates that one particle is not sufficient.

Double the usual measure.

Concerning which Leviticus 5:11 states: “You shall not place upon it oil, nor shall you place upon it frankincense.” See also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:7.

Because of the transgression involved.

Since the frankincense can be removed, the offering is not disqualified.

For the violation of the above prohibition.

The Rambam’s wording appears to imply that as an initial preference, one should not place oil on these remnants. Nevertheless, from other sources, it would seem that there is no difficulty in doing so.

Either ordinary oil or oil from another meal-offering.

For anything less than an olive-sized portion is not halachically significant.

Before the handful of meal is removed.

I.e., when ground, as stated in Halachah 10. Our translation is based on authentic manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text has a slight error.

For here also anything less is not considered significant.

Leviticus 7:10 speaks ofa meal-offering “mixed with oil or that is dry.”

The remainder of the offering, however, need not be salted.

Although Menachot 18a states: “If salt was not placed on it, it is acceptable,” it is explained (ibid. 20a): “If a priest did not salt it, but a non-priest did.”

Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:12. As stated there, this is a severity that applies to the meal-offerings and not to other sacrifices.

I.e., it must contain at least an isaron, as stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:5.

Hence it must be complete at that time.

This is the minimum size of the offering, as stated in ibid. 16:13.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 5:2.

Doubling the minimum requirement.

And thus the offering is acceptable.

On the afternoon of the Sabbath, before the showbreads are replaced by new breads, the bowls of frankincense are removed and the frankincense offered on the altar.

The Rambam is speaking after the fact. As an initial preference, once the handful of meal becomes impure, it should not be offered.

See Chapter 1, Halachot 34-35; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 4:7; Hilchot Me’ilah 3:9, et al.

Menachot 26a derives this from a comparison to the laws regarding offering the blood on the altar when the meat of a sacrifice became impure or otherwise disqualified.

Which causes the meal-offering to be disqualified.

And the person who brought it is considered to have fulfilled his obligation.

Menachot 9b derives this concept from Leviticus 2:3: “The remainder of the meal-offering shall be for Aaron and his sons.” Implied is that the priests should receive the remainder of the offering and not the remainder of the remnants.

For the handful must be taken from an isaron of flour and since there is a division in the container, it is considered as if the isaron was brought in two containers, which is unacceptable (Menachot 24a).

Since the flour is mixed together below, it is considered to be a single entity.

Since the question was not resolved, one should not attempt to bring the sacrifice in this manner.

The commentaries have not found an explicit source for this ruling. The Kessef Mishneh states that it is derived from the Halachah 20 above.

15 handbreadths, for there are six showbreads in each arrangement and each one is two and one half handbreadths high.

I.e., if it remains overnight, is taken out of the Temple Courtyard, or the like. Beforehand, it could not be disqualified for those reasons. From the Rambam’s wording, one can infer that placing the handful of meal on the table does not disqualify the handful entirely and if it is gathered and placed in a sacred vessel, it may be placed on the altar’s pyre (Kessef Mishneh).

Menachot 11a questions whether these situations are acceptable and leaves the matter unresolved.

The rationale for the ruling is that their presence in a common container causes the different elements of an offering to be considered as one, even if they are not touching (Chagigah 20b; Hilchot Sha’arAvot HaTuma’ah 12:7). Hence, since these two portions were originally part of the same offering and they are now in the same container, the first part is also disqualified.

Since these two portions were never planned to be offered together, they do not share a halachic connection.

For the portion set aside as a replacement and the original portion were intended to serve as a single offering.

For, as mentioned, it and the replacement have no intrinsic connection.

For they both share a connection with it.

In its entirety.

Instead, another portion should be combined with it and a second meal-offering brought (Zevach Todah).

The remainder of the first portion may, however, be eaten, because the handful is acceptable.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, taking the handful from a meal-offering enables the remainder of the isaron from which it is taken to be eaten. It, however, only allows an isaron to be eaten, not more. Thus the two portions could not be eaten because, when brought together, the three would comprise more than an isaron.

Since each portion is distinct from the other, it is possible for the priest to be focused on two, but not three.

Since each portion is distinct from the other, it is possible for the priest to be focused on two, but not three.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:9.

See ibid. 2:1.

Our translation reflects the version in the standanl published texts of the Mishneh Torah even though many commentaries have questioned it and have suggested that the text should read: “or [the handful] became mixed with the remaining portion of another meal-offering.” This version appears preferable, for seemingly, even if two offerings become mixed together, if their handfuls have already been separated, why shouldn’t the handfuls be offered? Halachah 29 apparently leads to such a conclusion. Nevertheless, we did not correct the text in this fashion, for the authoritative manuscripts and early printings employ the same version as the standard printed text. Moreover, the Rambam’s text of the Mishnah (Menachot 3:3) also contains such statements.

In the first instance, this refers to the mixture of the handful and the remainder. In the second instance, according to the standard version of the Mishneh Torah, it refers to the handful for the remainder that became intermingled with another remainder.

Generally, when a forbidden substance becomes mixed together with a permitted substance of the same type, the forbidden entity becomes batel—it is considered nullified because it is a tiny proportion of the mixture. Nevertheless, in this instance, Menachot 23b quotes a textual association to prove that the handful does not become batel to the remainder of the offering.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 8:1.

Ibid. 5:1.

And offered on the day following Pesach; ibid. 7:12; Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:5.

See ibid. 9:17-22.

lbid.:23.

The animal offered with the loaves.

The communal peace-offerings brought on Shavuot.

Offering the frankincense is thus equivalent to offering the blood on the altar. See also Chapter 11, Halachah 17.

In all instances, however, they are considered sanctified to the extent that they must be kept overnight and then destroyed by fire.

According to the Kessef Mishneh, the intent is that even the reception of the blood was not performed in an acceptable manner. See the following note.

Hence since the sacrifices were slaughtered in an acceptable manner, the accompanying offerings should be offered on the altar. The Ra’avad notes that this ruling is the subject of a difference opinion between our Sages in Menachot 79a. Rabbi Elazar ben Shimon maintains that for an accompanying offering to be offered, the blood of the sacrifice must be received in an acceptable manner. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that as long as the slaughter is acceptable, even if the blood was not received in an acceptable manner, the accompanying offering should be offered.
The Ra’avad maintains that the Rambam follows Rabbi Elazar ben Shimon’s ruling. The Kessef Mishneh and R. Yosef Corcus, by contrast, elaborate to show that he accepts the position of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi. Moreover, they cite the Rambam’s ruling in Chapter 17, Halachah 18, as proof that this is the Rambam’s understanding here. The Kessef Mishneh does, however, explain a way to interpret the passage according to the Ra’avad’s view.

I.e., by definition an accompanying offering may not be sacrificed alone, only with a sacrifice, and in this instance, the sacrifice has been disqualified.

And does not have an accompanying offering to be brought with it.

The priests must wait until the next morning to burn them. For until a sacrifice is actually disqualified, it is forbidden to destroy it. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 7:4).

I.e., the court takes into consideration all the possible eventualities that might crop up and has the accompanying offering brought with those possibilities in mind. Hence if the sacrifice is disqualified, the basis on which the accompanying offering was brought is not nullified.

For the court does not make such stipulations about them.

I.e., when one sacrificed it with the intent that it was another type of offering, e.g., one slaughtered an animal consecrated as a burnt-offering with the intent that it was a peace-offering.

For with the exception of a sin-offering, sacrifices are acceptable if slaughtered with such a mistaken intent. And there are no accompanying offerings for a sin-offering.

See the parallels to similar questions involving a sin-offering in Chapter 4, Halachah 4.

I.e., the 40 breads offered together with a thanksgiving-offering.

The apparent meaning of the Rambam’s words here and in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot, loc. cit.) is that bread should be brought when offering both of these sacrifices. Shoham VeYashpah, however, cites Menachot 79b which states that when both a thanksgiving-offering and an animal separated as a replacement for it are both present before us, the breads should be offered with either one and the other should be offered without bread. Even such an interpretation, however, is not appropriate with regard to an animal onto which the holiness of a thanksgiving-offering was transferred. The Rambam’s ruling here is also slightly problematic when compared to the following halachah.

That bread is or is not required for both of the offerings in the above situations.

I.e., he did not designate a specific animal as a thanksgiving-offering, but instead, undertook the responsibility to bring such a sacrifice.

Rambam LeAm explains that when an animal is designated as a thanksgiving sacrifice and is lost, there is no need to bring another instead of it. Hence the second thanksgiving-offering is considered as an independent sacrifice and bread is required for it independently.
With regard to an animal upon which the holiness of the thanksgiving offering was transformed, Rambam LeAm questions the Rambam’s ruling, because, seemingly, bread should not be required for such a sacrifice after the first animal was offered. Based on Halachah 13, Rav Yosef Corcus maintains that there is a printing error here and that in no instance is bread required when offering an animal on which the holiness of a thanksgiving-offering was transferred.

I.e., in any situation; see Hilchot Temurah 4:1.

Rambam LeAm maintains that this line refers only to the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering.

This law applies when the person made a vow to bring a thanksgiving-offering, accepting responsibility for the sacrifice.

The second animal was set aside in place of the first. Since the owner fulfilled his obligation with the first, there is no obligation to bring bread with the second.

For it does not have a connection to the first. Therefore it is considered as a new thanksgiving-offering which requires bread.

For the third animal takes the place of the second.

For it is not associated with the third animal.

Because the middle one is associated with both of the others. It was set aside instead of the first and the third was set aside instead of it.

For if there are funds left over from the purchase of a sacrifice, the money should be used to purchase an offering of the same type, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 9. Nevertheless, the additional thanksgiving offering does not require bread as reflected by Halachah 8.

For it must be offered according to the requirements appropriate for thanksgiving-offerings.

I.e., the animal originally set aside as a thanksgiving-offering should be offered for that purpose together with the bread and the money should be used to purchase an additional thanksgiving-offering.

Since the money was originally set aside for this purpose, it should be used for the primary offering.

Setting aside a specific animal and bread.

Since he did not accept an obligation to bring a sacrifice upon himself, but rather designated an animal as a sacrifice, if that animal is lost, he is under no obligation. The fact that there is bread remaining does not obligate him as the Rambam explains.

Because the bread is referred to as a thanksgiving-offering, but the offering is not referred to as bread (Menachot 80a).

Designating an animal to be offered for that purpose.

And bread should not be brought with such an offering.
As mentioned above, there appears to be a contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 8, for Halachah 8 appears to imply that bread is required for an animal to which the holiness of a thanksgiving offering was transferred if the original animal had been designated for the sacrifice. For this reason, Rav Yosef Corcus maintains that there is a printing error in Halachah 8.

Which requires bread.

At which time, it should be sold and the proceeds used to purchase another thanksgiving-offering and its bread. The Ra’avad maintains that the person should bring another thanksgiving-offering and bread from his own resources. The proceeds from the sale of the blemished animal should be used to purchase a thanksgiving-offering without bread. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, while the Chacham Tzvi (Responsum 24) reinforces the Ra’avad’s objection.

The breads accompanying the thanksgiving offering must be whole. The Rambam is speaking about an instance when one of these breads became broken between the slaughter of the animal and the presentation of its blood on the altar.

Menachot 12b states that the High Priest’s forehead plate causes those impure to be considered acceptable and the acceptability of those taken out of the Temple Courtyard is derived through Talmudic logic.

This is speaking about an instance when all of the loaves were disqualified in this manner. If only some of the loaves were disqualified, they should be replaced.

Rav Yosef Corcus and others question the Rambam’s ruling, noting that he is equating the loaves becoming impure or taken outside the Temple Courtyard with their being broken although at the beginning of the halachah, he himself mentioned the difference between these categories. Also, this ruling would apparently contradict the ruling in Chapter 17, Halachah 13. Rav Yosef Corcus therefore suggests that the Rambam’s statements are referring to a situation where all the loaves became impure or were taken out of the Courtyard.

And instead must bring another thanksgiving-offering. The commentaries note that the Rambam’s ruling is in direct contradiction to the standard printed text of Menachot 46b. They suggest that perhaps the Rambam had a different version of that Talmudic passage.

A total of 40 loaves (10 of four different types) are offered with the thanksgiving offering. One loaf of each type is given to a priest (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 9:12, 17-18).

Since only 40 are required, the additional 40 are not consecrated.

The commentaries question why the loaves must be redeemed. Since the person stated that only 40 are being consecrated, why is it necessary to redeem the other 40? Among the answers given is that originally, when setting aside the loaves, he mentioned that all the loaves would be consecrated.

This term refers to the wall that surrounds the Temple Mount. The term relates to the phrase (Daniel 1:5): patbag hamelech, “the food of the king” [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 7:3)].

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that although the Torah states that the thanksgiving offering should be brought “on the bread,” the intent is not they must be physically adjacent to each other. It is sufficient that they be close.

For in order to be associated with the sacrifice, the bread must be baked at the time that the animal is slaughtered.

See the following chapters which discuss these issues at length.

Because the disqualification came at the time of the slaughter of the animal and not beforehand. Since the bread becomes sanctified, it is considered as piggul

An animal that will die within a year. In these instances, since the animal was never acceptable for sacrifice—even if that was not discovered before its slaughter—the breads are not consecrated.

I.e., it was slaughtered with the intent of it being offered as another type of sacrifice. In this instance, even though the disqualifying factor took place at the time the animal is slaughtered, the bread is disqualified. For based on Leviticus 7:12, the Sifra states that for the bread to be consecrated, the animal must be slaughtered for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering.

I.e., for this offering is also accompanied by bread. The same concepts also apply with regard to the two loaves brought on Shavuot and the two lambs brought at that time. See Chapter 17, Halachah 18.

The particular activities which disqualifiy a sacrifice are mentioned in Halachot 4-6.

I.e., for the sacrifice of another type or not for the sake of its owner, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

Zevachim 1:1 states: “All of the sacrifices that were sacrificed without the proper intent are acceptable, but their offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation with the exception of a sin-offering and the Paschal sacrifice.” Thus although most sacrifices that are not offered with the proper intent are acceptable, since the owner does not fulfill his obligation while offering them, the Rambam mentions them in this halachah (Kessef Mishneh). See also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 4:10.

I.e., for the type of sacrifice for which it was designated and for the correct owner.

Sacrifices of the most sacred order· must be eaten in the Temple Courtyard and sacrifices of lesser sanctity must be eaten in Jerusalem.

Most sacrifices must be eaten on the day they were offered and on the following night. Certain others may also be eaten on the following day.

Leviticus 7:18. The term has the implication of “rejected” (Targum Onkelos) and “abhorrent” (Rav Saadia Gaon).

Sifra to the verse quoted; Zevachim 29a; see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:3).

I.e., the verse states: “ifit was eaten on the third day, it is unacceptable.” Peace-offerings may be eaten only for two days. The Oral Tradition explains that the intent is not that eating the sacrifice on the third day disqualifies it, but that having the intent that it be eaten on the third day while offering it, disqualifies it from the outset.
Although this interpretation is communicated by the Oral Tradition, there are allusions to it in the Torah’s words. The above verse uses the term: “the one who offers it,” implying that the disqualification involves the offering. And it uses the phrase venechshav (“and it will be considered”), implying that the disqualification has to do with thought.

Zevachim 28b explains that since the above verse uses a twofold construction for the term “eat,” haechol yaechol, our Sages interpreted it as referring to two types of consumption: consumption by the altar and consumption by man.

See Chapter 18, Halachah 10, for more details regarding this prohibition.

The rationale is that these four services are necessities for the offering of a sacrifice (Zevachim 1:4.)

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 6:7), the Rambam writes that perfonning melikah is equivalent to slaughter and squeezing a fowl’s blood on the altar is equivalent to casting an animal’s blood. In this instance, there are no parallels to receiving the blood or carrying it to the altar.

For these four services are comparable to the four services mentioned in Halachah 4 (Zevachim 13b). As the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 1:3) separating the handful is equivalent to ritual slaughter and the handful of meal is equivalent to the blood of a sacrificial animal.

All of these services are not essential to the offering of a sacrifice. Even if they are not performed, the sacrifice is acceptable.

These services are perfonned before taking the handful. Thus it is comparable to the services perfonned before slaughter which do not disqualify an animal.

All of the acts mentioned by the Rambam would disqualify a sacrifice or its meat if performed. In this instance, however, we are not speaking about a situation where these acts were performed. Instead, it is merely that the priest performing the service intended that they be performed.

While according to law, the blood must be cast on the altar on the day the sacrifice was offered and the limbs and organs must be burnt on either that day or the following night.

Which would disqualify them.

And the blood of certain sacrifices must be poured on the base of the altar.

Burnt-offerings.

Sin-offerings.

I.e., the overwhelming majority of both the communal and individual offerings.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:11.

Both of these are forbidden (Exodus 12:46, 9).

See ibid. 7:2-5 with regard to the burning of these sin-offerings. As related there, they would be burnt in a special place outside of Jerusalem on the day they were offered or on the following night.

Chapter 1, Halachah 23.

Even one of the three undesirable intents mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

He did not actually take the blood outside - that would disqualify it but he walked in that direction, away from the altar (see Rashi, Zevachim 16b).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion in Zevachim, loc. cit., and the halachah appears to follow the view of Rabbi Elazar who maintains that a priest’s intent can disqualify the sacrifice only when he is carrying the blood to the altar. The Kessef Mishneh offers a resolution of the passage according to the Rambam’s understanding.