Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

For that is the end of the day in halachic terms.

Nedarim 60a discusses this issue without reaching a conclusion.

I.e., for lashes are not given when there is a doubt.

The Rambam uses the Hebrew term Shabbat, which literally means “Sabbath.” Nevertheless, his intent (and that of his source, Nedarim 60a) is obviously a week and not the holy day itself.
When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 220:3) uses the term shavua for “week/’ rather than Shabbat. The Turei Zahav 220:2 states that the Shulchan Aruch ‘s ruling applies when the person taking the vow speaks in lashon hakodesh, “’the holy tongue.” If, however, he would speak in Yiddish and say di voch, “this week,” the Sabbath is not included, because the term voch implies ordinary weekdays that are different in nature than the holy Sabbath.

Even if a week has not passed since the vow was taken. The Radbaz states that the vow takes effect only when it is made during the week. If, however, it is made on the Sabbath, it takes effect only on the Sabbath itself, for the week has already concluded.

We are forced to say that he is referring only to one type of food. For if a person takes a vow that he will not eat at all for an entire week, the vow does not take effect, for it is impossible that he will fulfill it. See Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 1 :7.

In the first clause of this halachah.

A month which is lacking is a month of 29 days [as opposed to a month of 30 days; see Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, chs. 1-3, which discusses the principles determining when a month is given only 29 days and when it is given 30].
The commentaries question why the Rambam (based on Nedarim 60b) speaks of the month being lacking. Seemingly, it is quite obvious that if there are only 29 days in a month, one would be permitted on Rosh Chodesh in the next month. The new month has already begun. A point that has to be made is that even if there are 30 days in a month, one is pennitted to partake of wine on the thirtieth day. Since it is Rosh Chodesh of the coming month, the vow has concluded even though the date is the thirtieth of the previous month.
The Radbaz explains that this in fact is the Rambam’s intent, even though his wording is somewhat difficult to explain in that manner. This interpretation is reflected in the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 220:4). The Or Sameach offers a different interpretation, stating that when a month has only 29 days, sometimes the conjunction of the sun and the moon does not take place until the first day of the new month. Even so, since it is already Rosh Chodesh, the vow is concluded.

As explained in the previous halachah.

I.e., he made the vow on the twenty-ninth of Elul.

Although Rosh Chodesh Nisan is considered the beginning of the year in certain contexts, this does not apply with regard to vows:

I.e., a full year on the Jewish calendar.

And a month is added. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, ch. 4.

In Halachah 2.

Like the Sabbath is the conclusion of the week, the Sabbatical year is the conclusion of the seven year cycle {Radbaz).

For the Jubilee year is considered as the conclusion of the 50 year cycle.

For his intent was Adar that follows Shvat.

For his intent was to remain forbidden for the entire time referred to as Adar. This applies whether he knew that it was a leap year or not (Radbaz).

There is a difference of opinion among the Sages (Nedarim 63a) which of the two months of Adar is considered as Adar and which is the additional month of the leap year. There are other authorities who follow a different version of the passage in Nedarim and maintain that he is always forbidden only until the beginning of Adar I.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 220:8) mentions the Rambam’s view as a minority opinion. The commentaries note that in other places in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 43:28, Rama, Even HaEzer 126:7), the Rambam’s view is not cited at all.

We have translated the expression to fit the meaning given it by the Rambam.

The rationale for this ruling is explained in the following halachah.

Like Pesach which lasts for seven days (eight in the Diaspora) as prescribed by the Torah.

There is no fixed time for the harvest’s conclusion, for that depends on how plentiful it will be.

For we do not assume that he took a vow of undetermined length.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 8:3), the Rambam defines this as referring to the period from the end of Tammuz until the end of Elul when figs ripen and are ready for harvesting.

The wheat harvest is several weeks after the barley harvest. Since wheat is the more important crop, it is given prominence (Kessef Mishneh).

The figs and grapes would be laid out upon the mats to dry in the sun.

As the Rambam explains in the following halachah.

A mountainous region is cooler in the summer than a valley and the figs there will ripen later.

For that was his intent when he took the vow. It does not matter if this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent one [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ ah 220:13)].

E. g., if he took a vow until the katzir in a place where the primary crop is barley, he is forbidden until the beginning of the barley harvest (ibid.: 14).

The seventeenth of MarCheshvan begins the first phase of the rainy season. Although it is really an extension of the summer and not the beginning of the winter (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Pe’ah 7:5), rain at that time is not considered a chance occurrence and the vow is released. See Hilchot Ta’aniot 3:1-2 and Hilchot Matanot Aniyim I: 11 which also discuss these times for rain.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam interprets the term reviah as referring to the time when rain descends, explaining that it is similar to the term used for impregnating a woman, because in both cases, the potential for life is granted.

For that is when the rains cease there. In the Diaspora, different laws apply with sregard to all these expressions according to the local conditions.

And thus retroactively, she will be forbidden to derive benefit from the time the vow was taken. Had she been allowed to derive benefit, after she broke the vow, it would be a transgression.

For he allowed her to benefit from his property, thus committing a transgression. The woman is not liable for lashes (Radbaz). Others (Rashba, Rosh, Nedarim 57b) differ with the Rambam and maintain that the woman is liable for lashes.

For she did not benefit from him until Pesach.

The Merkevat HaMishneh explains that he should continue to withhold benefit from her, for that is the only way that he can insure that she will keep the vow. The Ra’avad and others differ with the Rambam concerning the need for this safeguard and their view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 220:22).

For the time for the stipulation has passed.

As above.

I.e., even if he was subjected to lashes for one transgression.

As explained by the commentaries, in this context, we follow the principle: “A portion of a day is considered as an entire day.” Thus, directly after his twelfth birthday, as soon as a male child enters into his thirteenth year of life, these laws apply to him. Similar concepts apply with regard to a female minor.

For a vow must be taken for God's sake, as Numbers 30:3 states: "When a man will take a vow to God."

This is a unique concept that Niddah 45b derives from the exegesis of Leviticus 27 :2. Although throughout Jewish law, until a male attains the age of thirteen and a female, the age of twelve, their actions are of no consequence according to Scriptural Law, an exception is made in this instance because of the above verse, as stated in Halachah 4.

As explained in the following halachah.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Niddah, loc. cit., the source for this halachah, does not lead to such a conclusion. He suggests that perhaps the Rambam had a different version of that text. Yayin Malchut states that this resolution is reflected in the revised version of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6). In his initial explanation of the mishnah, he appeared to follow the same text as the popular version of the Talmud, but later in life, he revised that interpretation, accepting a different version of the text. The Rambam’s rationale is that since we are speaking about aminor, it is possible that his level of understanding will fluctuate.

I.e., their thirteenth and twelfth birthdays arrive as stated in note 1.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6), the Rambam writes that the Torah made the age for which women become responsible for their vows lower than that of men, because a woman’s lifetime is generally less than that of a man.

If they manifested signs that they are mentally or emotionally incapable, this law does not apply. If, however, they are merely somewhat slow and do not understand the concept of vows, their vows are of consequence, because they have already reached the age when one becomes responsible for his or her actions.

I.e., two pubic hairs as stated in Hilchot!shut 2:1.

There are others who maintain that the expression “the time when vows [take effect]” refers to a minor who understands the meaning of his vows as stated in Halachah 1. The Rambam prefers his interpretation, because it is dependent on time, the child’s age, while the first interpretation is dependent on the child’s knowledge (Yayim Malchut).

This is the subject of debate among the Rishonim, for some do not accept the Rambam’s view.

For until the latter age, they are still minors, and minors are not liable for punishment for transgressions that they perform.

For violating the prohibition against benefiting from consecrated property (Hilchot Mei/ah 1 :3).

In the previous halachah. Since the child’s consecration is valid, the article has the status of a consecrated article according to Scriptural Law and a person who misappropriates it is liable.

I.e., her father died. Alternatively, she was married as a minor and then she was divorced or widowed (see Halachah 25). Otherwise, she remains in his domain until the age of twelve and a half, as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., from the age of twelve until the age of twelve and a half.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 2, which describes how the father nullifies his daughter’s vow.

As the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:1) states, this applies even to vows taken dependent on the consent of others which cannot be repealed by a sage.

The HaEmek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.

I.e., reaches the age of twelve and a half after manifesting physical signs of maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:2).

Numbers 30:17 gives him this privilege “during her maidenhood,” i.e., and not beyond that time period (Kessef Mishneh).

l. e, from the beginning of the second stage of the marriage relationship known as nissuin. At that time, he takes her into a private room and from that time onward, the couple live as man and wife (Hilchot ls hut 10: I). During the first stage of the marriage relationship (erusin), when the erus has merely consecrated his wife, he does not have the right to nullify her vows alone (see Halachah 9). (In the present era, it is customary to perfonn both these stages of marriage together in one ceremony.)

Implied is that if he sends the bill of divorce to her via an agent, he may nullify her vows until the bill of divorce enters her possession (Siftei Cohen 234:6, Turei Zahav 234:1).

I.e., he had a bill of divorce given to her and our Rabbis could not resolve if the manner in which the bill of divorce was given or written is effective. See Hilchot Gerushin 5:13 for an example.
The rationale for this law is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife’s vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him (Yevamot 90b). In this instance, he is not concerned if she becomes unattractive (Radbaz).

See Hilchot Gerushin 8:1.

He tells her: “Here is your bill of divorce, but it does not take effect for 30 days” (ibid. 9:1).

I.e., in the days before the vow takes effect. The Siftei Cohen 234:8 states that even after the fact, the nullification does not take effect.

See Hilchot Gerushin I 0:5 which describes this situation at length.

E. g., a woman who went through a divorce and then remarried, but then it was discovered that her divorce was invalid (ibid.:7). In both this and the previous instance, both husbands are required to divorce the woman.

The rationale for this and the previous laws is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife’s vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him. In this instance, since he is obligated to divorce her, it is desirable that she become unattractive to him (Yevamot, loc. cit.).

I.e., a negative commandment that is not punishable by execution, death at the hand of heaven, or karet. See Hilchot!shut I :7.

E. g., marriages like that of a non-virgin to a High Priest, which are -not prohibited by a negative commandment. Instead, the prohibition is self-understood, because there is a positive commandment instructing the opposite. See ibid. :8.

Although these marriages are forbidden, since they are still binding, the husband has this privilege.

I.e., a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half.

The term arus means “the man who consecrated her.” The Rambam does not use this term, but instead, the term baal meaning “husband.” We, however, have used the term arus, because the term baal usually implies that nisuin, the second stage of marriage, has already taken place.

Numb’ers 30:17 states: “These are the statutes... between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter in her youth.” Nedarim 68a interprets the verse as referring to one woman, implying that the nullification of her vows is performed by her father and her erus together. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 9:9), the Rambam writes that from the Biblical text, it might appear that both the father and the. erus have the right to nullify her vows independently. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that this is not so.

Nedarim 68a states that since one of the two has already nullified the vow, it is weak and its violation is not punishable by lashes.

Even the vows she took previously while consecrated [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:11)]. This applies even if she has a yevam (Halachah 24).

As stated in Halachah 6.

Before nissuin, an erus can nullify his wife’s vows only together with her father and that is impossible in this instance. See also Halachah 16.

For if her first arus heard her vow and did not nullify it, her father can no longer nullify it together with her second arus. See Halachah 17.

Or consecrated again by her first erus [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:13)].

It is necessary that the divorce(s) and the consecration(s) take place on the same day the father heard of and nullified the vow. For if not, the woman’s last erus will not have the right to nullify the vow, as indicated by Chapter 12, Halachah 17.

In contrast to the laws applying to a married woman, as stated in the following halachah.

Nor may her father nullify her vows, for once she marries, her father no longer has the right to nullify her vows.

Once a woman becomes independent for even one moment, her future husband cannot nullify the vows she took previo:usly..

If, however, either her erus or her father heard her vow when it was taken, it cannot be nullified at a later date.

Since she remains partially in her father’s domain, the divorce does not affect the right of her father and her present erus to nullify her vows.

The consecration and the nullification of the vow must take place on the day that the father heard of the vow and nullified it (Turei Zahav 234:22).

Since her first erus did not hear of her vow, the fact that he died before nullifying it does not deprive her last erus of that right. The father cannot nullify her vow alone, because it was taken when she was consecrated. Since her father nullified the vow, the right of her erus to nullify the vow is weak and of little substance. Accordingly, the right to nullify it cannot be transferred to the father alone, as in Halachah 16.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:16) quotes the Rambam’s view, but also that of the Tur which maintains that the second erus can never nullify a vow together with the father.

I.e., after the death of her erus.

But not on the following day. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation when the father heard of the vow on the same day as her first erus, for the nullification must be completed on the same day that he heard of the vow. If, however, her father does not hear about it until the following day and she was consecrated then, he
and her new erus may nullify her vow then.

The Turei Zahav 234:13 maintains that the Rambam would also give her father the right to nullify the vow alone, because her first erus also heard the vow and did not maintain it (see the following halachah). The Rambam mentions her being consecrated by another person only to teach that if this is indeed the situation, the second erus must also nullify the vow.

Since he did not maintain the vow and died before the day was completed, we say that there was a possibility that he would nullify it. Hence, her father is given the right to nullify it.

Since her erus no longer exists and he did not maintain the vow, the right to nullify is given to her father. In his gloss to Halachah 19, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between these two halachot by stating that this halachah refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. Halachah 19 refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it, as explained above.

Since he did not nullify it on the day that he heard it, he cannot nullify it later. It is considered as if he maintained it. Once he maintained it, her father cannot nullify it.

I.e., combining Halachah 15 which states that the father and the second erus can nullify the vow and Halachah 16 which states that silence is equivalent to nullification. If she does not become consecrated again, the father can nullify the vow alone (Turei Zahav, toe. cit.)..

And cannot be nullified afterwards.

But did not nullify it then.

If, however, he nullifies on a later date it is unacceptable, for the father must nullify the vow on the day he became aware of it.

Halachah 15. In his gloss to this halachah, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 16 by stating that Halachah 16 refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the arus died. Accordingly, the right of the arus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. This halachah refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it. Hence it cannot be transferred as explained in the notes to Halachah 15. This understanding is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16).

I.e., completed the second stage of the marriage, nissuin.

See Halachah 8.

I.e., to enable all the vows concerning which he did not hear to be nullified.

I.e., before their marriage.

An erus may also nullify the vows that a woman took before he consecrated her (together with her father). We assume, however, that her father already nullified those vows (Siftei Cohen 234:21; Turei Zahav 234:11).

This also applies to her father. The husband and the father must, however, be capable of hearing. If they are deaf, they cannot nullify a vow (Chapter 12, Halachah 13).

Thus if both the father and the husband made these statements, the vows are nullified. In some manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah, these two halachot are combined as one..

Who were sent to bring her to her husband's home.

As long as her father is accompanying her, he is not considered to have transferred her to her husband’s domain and hence, still has the right to nullify her vows.

I.e., even if the husband dies [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:12)].

See Halachah 20.

I.e., we are speaking about a widow whose husband dies childless who must be married by her deceased husband's brother. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25.

Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1).

And thus there is no question that she is designated for him.

At which point their marriage is consummated and she becomes his wife. Until then, even if he has stated his intent, according to Scriptural Law, she is not his wife and he cannot nullify her vows.

As stated in Halachah 10.

I.e., she has already completed nissuin, the second stage of the marriage bond.

I.e., although from the standpoint of age, her father would still have the right to nullify her vows, since she married, she is given full independence. Hence, he no longer has this right.

As stated in Halachah 7, once she comes of age, her father no longer has any authority over her.

I.e., she was divorced or widowed after marriage, as stated in the previous halachah.

I.e., in the first situation, the man who consecrated her before she came of age. In the second situation, it refers to a second husband who consecrated her after she was divorced or widowed.

This occurs only after nissuin. Moreover, even after she enters her husband’s domain, he cannot!}Ullify her vows that were taken beforehand, as stated in Halachah 20.

I.e., he may nullify all vows, not merely those that a husband may nullify.
Rabbenu Asher and other Rishonim differ and maintain that the Sifri states that the father’s rights are the same as the husband’s. In a response attributed to the Rambam, he explains that although this view is stated in the Sifri, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Talmud and the simple meaning of the Biblical passage does not lead to such an inference. This leads to the conclusion that the statement of the Sifri is a minority opinion. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:58) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.

I.e., not necessarily on the day the vow was taken, but on the day he first heard of it.

The Emek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.

I.e., after nissuin, the second stage of the marriage relationship.

For Numbers 30:14 specifically mentions a husband’s authority involving vows of this type. Vows that involve personal aggravation refer to vows that involve accepting a prohibition of a particular type of satisfaction.

Literally, those “between him and her.”

Such conduct could arouse a husband’s displeasure, for he will not be happy that his wife does not appear attractive.
The Shulchan Aruch (234:59) mentions other views which consider these vows as ones that involve personal aggravation as well as the Rambam’s view that these are matters that affect the husband-wife relationship.

I.e., even if he divorces her, the vow is nullified.

The nullification applies only when they are married.

See Halachah 9 with regard to clarification when this vow must be nullified and when it need not be nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:83 quotes views that maintain that since the vow takes effect with regard to other men, it would also take effect with regard to him if he did not nullify it.

These are considered vows that involve personal aggravation.

These are considered vows affecting the marriage relationship.

Our translation follows the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. The Chatam Sofer explains that since it is forbidden to eat unpleasant foods on Y om Kippur - when fasting is described as aggravating one’s soul - even unpleasant foods are included in this category.
The Turei Zahav 234:51, however, translates the term as “harmful foods,” arguing that if the woman considered the food unpleasant and had no desir€ for it, it would not be considered as “aggravation” for her to be prevented from partaking of it.

Since she never partook of this food, there is room to say that no aggravation would be caused by prohibiting it. Hence it is necessary to emphasize that it is forbidden.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Asher’s coJ.1llllentary to Nedarim 82b which explains that this refers to a situation where one loaf is made of fine flour and is attractive and one is made of coarse flour and is not. She will suffer aggravation from not eating-the first, but not from not eating the second.
There is a slight difficulty with this explanation, because the previous halachah stated that a husband may nullify even a vow involving unpleasant food. It can be explained, however, that since her husband makes it possible for her to partake of the loaf of fine bread, she will have no aggravation over not partaking over the coarse bread. When, however, she is not able to partake of the unpleasant food, she has no similar alternative. Alternatively, Rabbenu Asher explains that she is hungry and will be satisfied by eating one loaf. Hence, not eating that loaf will give her aggravation. Not eating the second one will not.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that when a sage absolves a vow, if he nullifies a portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Chapter 4, Halachah 11). This principle does not, however, hold true with regard to a vow nullified by a husband.

I.e., it is not a matter of aggravation, because she may eat figs. Nevertheless, o~taining the figs places a difficulty upon her husband. Although it also mentions the Rambam’s view, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:60) appears to follow the view of other Rishonim who maintain that this is also considered a vow involving aggravation.

As stated in Halachah 2.

I.e., this point is obvious. Even if she does not say so explicitly, she may benefit from him without him having to nullify the vow.

The Mishnah (Nedarim 11 :3) quotes Rabbi Y ossi who rules that one may not nullify such a vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this is a minority view. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:64) quotes the Rambam’s view, but also that of other Rishonim who maintain that such a vow is considered one which involves personal aggravation.

Our translation is based on the Kessef Mishneh who states that the wording of the original is inexact.

I.e., even if he does not nullify the vow, it does not take effect.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 3. By agreeing to marriage, a woman gives her husband rights to marital intimacy that cannot be withheld.

Hilchot /shut 12:2, based on Exodus 21:10.

Since the vow does not forbid anything to the man, it will take effect unless he nullifies it.

I.e., in both cases, she is consecrating the future products of her labor to the Temple treasury. She must, however, be careful to phrase the vow in a manner that she is not consecrating an entity that does not exist. For then the vow would not be effective [Nedarim 85a; Rama (Yoreh De’ah 234:71)]. See also Hilchot Arachin 6:28.

I.e., one of the rights given to a husband is the right to benefit from his wife's labor (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).

Ketubot 59b; Nedarim 86b.

Of a servant. If a servant was designated as security for a debt and was then freed by his master, he is a free man and is not in any way subjugated to the person who had the lien (Hilchot Malveh VLoveh 18:6).

If a Jew designated leavened products (chametz) as security for a loan to a gentile, when the prohibition against benefiting from chametz takes effect, the lien is no longer effective and the chametz reverts to the ownership of the Jew and he is obligated to destroy it.

If an ox was designated as security for a loan and then its owner, the borrower, consecrated it, the lien is severed and the lender must collect the debt from another source. See also Hilchot Arachin 7:5.

As in several other instances, our Sages reinforced their decrees, giving them more power than Scriptural Law (see Chapter 3, Halachah 9 for another example). The rationale is that if Rabbinic Law was not given this additional measure of strength, people might treat it lightly.

For her vow would take effect after the divorce and then, he would not be able to remarry her because he would then be forbidden to benefit from her work, including her perfonnance of household tasks, thus creating an impossible situation.
See Turei Zahav 234:63 who explains why we mention this concern in this instance and not in others where it would seemingly apply.

For, as reflected by Hilchot!shut 21 :3, she is not under any obligation to perform work on behalf of these people.

I.e., the animal he rides upon.

As Hilchot Ishut 21:5 states, she is not obligated to provide water for his animal, for it is necessary to draw water from a spring or river and that is compromising to a woman’s modesty (Kessef Mishneh).

She is obligated to provide straw for the animal he rides upon, for that is an expression of consideration for her husband's person. She has no such obligation with regard to his cattle, for those animals are necessary only for work and that is solely her husband's concern.

I.e., were she obligated to perform these tasks, her vow not to perform them would not take effect.

A sage, by contrast, may only absolve an oath or a vow after it takes effect (Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:14).

The Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 234:28). The Kessef Mishneh and the Rama quote the ruling of Rabbenu Y erucham who maintains that this principle applies only with regard to vows that have not taken effect because the time when they are due to take effect has not come. If, however, they are dependent on a deed, they cannot be nullified until they take effect. See the comments of the Siftei Cohen 234:45 which discusses this issue.

This applies even if he is not both deaf and dumb [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:25)].

For Numbers 30:5 speak of her father hearing. Implied is that if he cannot hear, he cannot nullify the vow (Sifri to the verse).

Chapter 11, Halachah 21. This also applies with regard to her father, as indicated by Halachah 20 of that chapter.

Rabbenu Asher [quoted by Rama (Yoreh De’ah 234:25)] differs and maintains that it is necessary for him to hear the vow.

See Hi/chat /shut 4:7; 11 :6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:29) quotes the Rambarn’s ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

I.e., until nightfall, as the Rambam continues to explain.

I.e., neither a husband, nor a father.

I.e., neither a husband, nor a father.

For the day on which he heard the vow has passed.

Which seemingly implies a 24 hour period.

In the previous halachah.

I.e., according to the Rambam, regardless of who hears about the vow and nullifies it first, the father and the husband must both nullify it on the same day. The Shu/chan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:5) quotes the Rambam’s view~ but also that of the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher who maintain that the father and the husband do not have to nullify the vow on the same day. As long as each one nullifies it on the day he hears of it, it is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:13 quotes the opinion of the Bayit Chadash who rules that we should be stringent and follow the Rambam’s decision.

I.e., this obviously applies after nissuin, when the woman is living in her husband’s home.

I.e., he intended to nullify her vow afterwards, but desired that she think that the vow is binding so that she will take the matter more seriously.

Le., since the vow was nullified, there is no prohibition involved in the action.

A punishment instituted by the Rabbis.

If she transgressed willfully.

If she transgressed inadvertently.

In contrast to the repeal of a vow by a sage, when a father or a husband nullify a vow, they do not nullify it retroactively, only from the time of their actions onward. See the notes to Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

Significantly, the Sifri derives the same concept from a different verse.

For the day he discovers new information concerning the vow is equivalent to the day he hears of it.