Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Rambam proceeds to explain these four types of oath in this chapter.

Bitui literally means “expression.” I.e., this oath is taken expressing statements concerning the past or the future. See Chapters 4 and 5 where this subject is discussed in detail.

As evident from Chapter 5, Halachot 16-17, this applies when he takes an oath to harm himself, but not to harm others.

I.e., one positive and one negative. The concept that a sh ‘vuat bitui has both these forms is derived from the prooftext cited which states: “Whether he will do harm or do good.” See Chapter 9, Halachah 18. ·

But not with regard to something which he cannot perform. As stated in Halachah 7, that is included in the category of an oath taken in vain.

An oath he takes concerning the future that involves another person is not included in this category, because he has no way of controlling that person’s conduct. See Chapter 5, Halachot 1-2.

One positive and one negative.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 61) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 227) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This is somewhat of a new concept, because one does not receive lashes for violating a transgression that does not involve a deed and ordinarily, speech is not considered a deed. Nevertheless, taking a false oath is an exception to this principle, for Exodus 20:7 states: “God will not absolve anyone who takes His name in vain.” Sh’vuot 21a interprets that to mean that a person who takes an oath in vain is liable for lashes. See also Chapter 4, Halachot 20-21 for more factors concerning this concept.

In contrast to an ordinary sin-offering, the sacrifice a person liable for such an offering must bring is adjusted according to his financial status as stated in Leviticus, ch. 5.

See Chapter 6 where this subject is discussed in detail.

The Ra’avad explains that the term “a known matter” refers to something known to three people. The Radbaz notes that the Rambam himself mentions this point in Chapter 5, Halachah 22. See Chapter 3, Halachah 5, and notes, from which it is evident that here, the person taking the oath is not speaking facetiously. Although it is known that what he is saying is false, he intends that his words be taken at face value. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21, and notes.

Thus since no one else but a fool will have any doubt concerning the matter, there is no need to take an oath. Hence, the oath is considered to have been taken in vain (Radbaz).

Since he is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah and the matter is not dependent on his choice or consent, his oath is considered to be in vain. See also Chapter 5, Halachot 14-15.

The Radbaz clarifies that we are not speaking about taking an oath not to wear a tallit, for a person is not obligated to wear a tallit by Scriptural Law (see Hilchot Tzitzit 3:11). Instead, the intent is to take an oath that he will wear a four-cornered garment and not put tzitzit on it.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 18.

For one must take pleasure in food and drink on these days. It is forbidden to fast (Hilchot Shabbat 30:12; Hilchat Sh ‘vitat Yorn Tov 6:17).

Since he is unable to perform the matter, the oath he took is obviously in vain.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 20.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 62) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 30) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See the notes to Halachah 3.

The latter is the literal translation of the term pikadon. Nevertheless, as the Rambam continues to explain, the term has a broader halachic meaning in this context. The Radbaz explains that the mishnah uses the term sh ‘vuat hapikadon, because it is most common that such a claim will be made with regard to an entrusted object. Alternatively, because the prooftext (Leviticus 5 :21) mentions an entrusted object first. See Chapters 7 and 8 where this subject is discussed in detail.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 248) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 225) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Either because the transgression does not involve a deed, or because financial compensation must be given and a person is not held liable both for financial restitution and lashes (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2).

He also violates the commandment against taking a false oath [Sh‘vuot 20b; Sefer HaMitzvot (negative comni. andment 249)].

Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 226) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As the Rambam explains in several instances, the intent is one fifth of the new total. For example, if he denied a debt of 20 zuz, he must pay 25 in restitution.

This term is used to distinguish this offering from the conditional guilt offering brought by a person who is unsure whether or not he committed a sin.

contrast, an ordinary sin offering is brought only when one transgresses inadvertently.

As Leviticus 5:4 states with regard to a sh ‘vuat bitui.

Neither for a sacrifice, nor for the payment of an additional fifth of the object’s value.

The Radbaz states that although such an individual is not liable for a sacrifice or the additional fifth, he is liable for transgressing the prohibition against denying property.

Since he is unaware of the fact that he must bring a sacrifice and thus does not know the full severity of his act, he is considered to have transgressed inadvertently. Nevertheless, because he is conscious of the transgression and the fact that he has the other person's money in his possession, he is not considered to have transgressed due to forces beyond his control.

The term literally means “an oath [associated with] testimony.” See Chapters 9 and 10 where this subject is discussed in detail.

See Chapter 9, Halachot 3-5..

This oath is not required by the court, but rather is· demanded by the person affected by their testimony. See Chapter 9, Halachah 6.

See the notes to Halachah 3.

In translation, we have used the singular for continuity. The Rambam, however, uses plural forms, because testimony brings about a monetary obligation only when given by two witnesses.

Le., they are not considered to have transgressed at all.

The concept that a person is considered to have taken an oath when he responds Amen to the statements is derived from the Torah’s statements with regard to a sotah, a woman suspected of adultery (Numbers 5:22). For she is required to answer Amen to the oath administered to her by the priest and yet, it is considered as if she took the oath herself.

Although in most instances, statements made by such gentiles are of no significance according to Jewish Law, this is an acceptance. Here also there is an allusion to this concept in the Bible itself. Ezekiel 17:13 and II Chronicles 36:13 speak of Nebuchadnetzar having King Tzidkayahu take an oath. Nedarim 65a states that this oath was binding. Similarly, Sh‘vuot 36a speaks of an oath Moses took to Jethro, his gentile father-in-law (Kessef Mishneh).

This is derived through a comparison to gentiles.

I.e., not only in lashon hakodesh, the Hebrew used in the Bible and by the Sages.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 1, Chapter 8, Halachah 7, and Chapter 9, Halachah 1, which mention instances where a person is considered to have taken an oath even if he does not respond Amen.

If he takes a false sh ‘vuat bitui or takes an oath in vain.

If he takes a false sh‘vuat hapikadon or sh‘vuat ha‘edut.

I.e., the name Yud-Hei-Vav-Hei.

Note, however, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:5, which states that even when these descriptions are used to refer to Him, they are not considered to have the same holiness as one of His names.

The Rambam uses the expression “in the full sense of the term” to differentiate between this instance and the law mentioned in Halachah 4. Note the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz who explains that there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim if a sh ‘vuat bitui must contain God’s name for one to be liable as appears to be the Rambam’s opinion or whether His name need not be mentioned as is the view of the Ramban, Rabbenu Asher, and others. The Ra’avad takes an intermediate view, stating that one transgresses by talcing a false oath and is liable to bring a sacrifice, but he is not liable for lashes unless he mentions one of God’s names.
All authorities agree that God’s name must be mentioned for one to be liable with regard to a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut or a sh ‘vuat hapikadon. On that basis, the Radbaz supports the Rambam’s position, asking why a differentiation should be made between one type of oath and another. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 237:1) and commentaries.

Both these terms mean “curse.”

Sh ‘vuot 36a derives this concept from the verses cited above with regard to Tzidkayahu’s oath, for there he used the term “curse.” See also I Samuel 14, 24, 27 which indicates that saying that one will be cursed is equivalent to an oath.

And is liable for taking a false sh ‘vuat bitui, as indicated by Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

I.e., the Rambam is giving an example of all four types of oaths.

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2 for a list of the seven names of God.

For that reason, when called to take an oath in a secular court or the like, one should refuse. Instead of saying “I swear,” he should say, “I affirm.”

The repetition and the mention of God’s name indicate that he is not merely making a statement, but intending that it have the severity of an oath. The Kessef Mishneh states that since the person mentioned God’s name, seemingly, it is not necessary for him to repeat yes or no, the mention of His name alone should be sufficient for his statement to be considered an oath. He explains that we are speaking about an instance when God’s name was not mentioned in direct connection with the statement. Nevertheless, the fact that he repeated no, or yes, while mentioning God’s name, albeit indirectly, is sufficient for his statements to be considered an oath.

Nazir 3a states that “the arm of His strength” refers to His left arm. Otherwise, the verse would be redundant.

Sh ‘vuot 20a notes that Numbers 30:7 understands this term as referring to an oath.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that the Rambam’s choice of wording - “He is not liable” rather than “It is permitted” - implies that although he is not liable, he is forbidden to break the commitment he made. Although other Rishonim differ, he follows this interpretation in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:9-10). See the following halachah.

This is one of the distinctions between oaths and vows. One who “appends” - i.e., says “And I will be like him” - to a colleague’s vow is liable. See Hilchot Nedarim 3:3M4.

The Radbaz explains that the Rambam elaborates here in contrast to the previous halachah - for here there is greater reason to think that he will not be obligated. The explanation is based on a fundamental understanding of the difference between a sh‘vuah - oath - and a neder - vow. When a person takes an oath, he places a prohibition upon his person - he is forbidden to perform the activity concerning which he took the oath. When he takes a vow, the article becomes forbidden for him. Hence, since he spoke about the article and not himself, one might think that his statement has no effect at all.

For as Sh ‘vuot 26b implies, one’s heart and one’s lips must be in concord.

In some authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this sentence is the conclusion of the previous halachah. The present. halachah begins: “Therefore.” Compare to Halachot 15-16.

I.e., if he makes this statement when given the warning, we accept his word and do not hold him liable (Tosefta, Taharot 6:9).

To be liable for lashes, a transgressor must acknowledge the warning. Since, at that time, he did not mention the lack of concurrence between his intent and his statements, we assume that he is fabricating the matter (Sanhedrin 12:2).

And since the stipulation was not met, the vow is not binding.

For he has already lied concerning this oath.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries with regard to the interpretation of the Rambam’s statements. Some explain that the intent is that the husband used the halachic convention of hafarah and made the statement nullifying his wife’s vow in a hushed tone. If, however, he did not make a statement of hafarah at all, the vow is not nullified, as stated in Hilchot Nedarim 13:7. The Tzaphnat Paneach states that the intent is that he used the halachic convention of bittul. In such an instance, a statement need not be made (Hilchot Nedarim 13:4).

Thus the person cannot claim that his statement did not reflect his intent.

I.e., this law applies even if the person takes the oath on his own volition, not only if it is administered by others.

I.e., require an oath of a person who denies a plaintiffs claim. See Chapter 11, Halachah 18.

Thus afterwards the person cannot claim that he had these-and-these thoughts in mind when taking the oath (Radbaz). See also Nedarim 25a.

“Greetings to you, my teacher.” We have cited the term in transliteration for we are speaking about the amount of time it takes to say these three Hebrew words.

Nedarim 87a states that this principle applies with the exception of four situations: a blasphemer, one who accepts a false deity, one who consecrates. a woman as a wife, and one who divorces her. Rabbenu Nissim explains that when taking an oath,. a person has in mind that he might change his mind in this brief amount of time. Hence, his oath is not binding until this time passes.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, saying that the objections of others cannot by connected to his oath. In his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 210:3), Rav Yosef Caro and also the Radbaz explain that since the others protested immediately after his oath and his acceptance also came immediately afterwards, it is as if he never completed taking the oath.

This applies even if the oath has not taken effect as of yet (Radbaz).

I.e., without verbalizing his retraction.

The Radbaz emphasizes that he must also make his statements with intent. Just as his mouth and heart must concur when making an oath, so, too, they must concur when retracting it.

He is not liable even for reciting God’s name in vain (Radbaz). Sh ‘vuot 26a derives this concept from the prooftext: “When a soul will take an oath, expressing with his lips.... “The implication is that the oath must come from an expression made by the. person’s free will.
The Siftei Cohen 239:9 interprets the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:1) as implying that such an oath must be released before it can be violated. The Siftei Cohen himself differs and maintains that the oath is of no consequence at all.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 10, which speaks of a person who took a false oath because of a memory lapse.

For in all instances, a person is not liable when he is compelled to perform a transgression against his will. See Nedarim 27a.

I.e., at the outset such license is granted.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 3:3).

I.e., the type of tax or customs duty collectors described in the following halachah.

During the time the Greeks and the Romans ruled Eretz Yisrael, they would very frequently sell the right to tax the inhabitants of the Holy Land or to collect customs duty to an individuals or a group for a fee and allow that individual or group to tax the people as he pleased, whether the tax was justified or not. Similar practices continued in many of the lands to which the Jews were exiled. If, however, a tax was established according to a just law, one is obligated to pay and may not take a false oath. For “the law of the ruling authority is law” (Nedarim 28a).

Chapter 5, Halachah 11.

As illustrated· in the following halachah.
One might ask, for an oath to be effective, the person’s statements must reflect the intent in his heart, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 10. Why then must the person taking the oath have in mind a permitted situation? Seemingly, the very fact that he does not desire to take the oath should be sufficient to render it invalid. It can be explained that this situation is different, because this oath is being taken based on the·other person’s - the tax collector’s - request. Thus it is bound by the restrictions mentioned above in Chapter 2, Halachah 15.

This is a general principle in Torah Law. See Hilchot Ishut 8:2; Hilchat Me’ilah 7:1; and Hilchot Mechirah 11:9.

I.e., the man of force compelled him to take an oath that if he was evading customs duty, he would be forbidden to eat meat. He should have the intent that he is promising not to eat pig meat.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 232:14) emphasizes that the license to take a false oath under compulsion is granted only when the gentile will not know that the oath has been violated. If, however, the gentle will know, license is not granted because this will lead to chillul hashem, the desecration of God’s name. For this reason, King Tzidkiayahu was punished for violating the oath he took to Nebuchadnetzar.

I.e., he is not given lashes, nor is he required to bring a sacrifice for taking such an oath. Needless to say, however, it is forbidden to take such oaths. For by doing so, one takes God’s name in vain. If, however, one does not mention God’s name, it is permitted to make such a statement [Radbaz; see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:1)].

See Deuteronomy 1:28 which uses such exaggeration.

One might think that he would be · 1iable for taking an oath in vain, because he is saying something that is obviously not true (as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 4). To refute this supposition, the Rambam explains that in this instance - as opposed to that stated above - the person is speaking facetiously. He knows he is exaggerating and does not intend that his words be taken literally. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21, and notes.

Chapter 1, Halachot 10, 13. As stated there, it is considered as if he transgressed because of forces beyond his control and hence, he is absolved entirely.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6, one of the types of oaths taken in vain is an oath to neglect the observance of a mitzvah. In this instance, although the person took such an oath intentionally, his violation is considered inadvertent, because he did not know that tefillin are a mitzvah.

I.e., a sh ‘vuat bitui. See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

For in the situations described in the previous halachah, he is not liable at all.

For if he forgets his oath entirely, he is not liable at all as stated in Halachah 6.

Sh ‘vuot 26a cites Leviticus 5:4: “which a person will express in an oath and it
became concealed from him.” Implied is that the oath becomes concealed and he loses his
awareness of it.

The Rambam LeAm quotes opinions that maintain that if the person violated his oath, knowing it was forbidden to break the oath, but unaware that he is liable for a sacrifice, he is liable for the sacrifice as in the previous halachah. The Rambam, however, mentions another instance, because that situation is very rare.

And as indicated by the above prooftext, it is the oath that must be. concealed and not the article concerning which the oath was taken.

Sh ‘vuot 26a raises a question concerning this situation and leaves it unresolved. Since there is a doubt involved, one is not held liable for the sacrifice.

A person is liable to bring a sacrifice when he would refrain from eating were he to know that the object from which he is partaking is forbidden by oath. In this instance, he did not forget the oath and his knowledge of it did not cause him to refrain from eating.