Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Similar verses are also stated in that passage with regard to fish, fowl, and locusts. We find comparable verses also in Leviticus, except that in Leviticus, there is no such commandment with regard to a kosher fowl. To include that as well, the Rambam refers to the passage in Deuteronomy.

I.e., it does not have the severity of a negative commandment. Hence its violation is not punishable by lashes.

Here the Rambam cites the verses from Leviticus although like verses also appear in Deuteronomy - for Leviticus comes first in the Torah.

The commentaries have raised a question concerning the Rambam’s statements. There is a general principle (Pesachim 24a, et al): “We do not issue a warning on the basis of logical deduction.” Implied is that a person is not given lashes when a prohibition is not” explicitly mentioned in the Torah, but instead derived through logic. Why then, these commentaries ask, are lashes given for partaking of non-kosher species other than the four mentioned specifically by the Torah?
The Rambam offers a resolution to this question in his Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 172). There he explains that in this instance, we are not deriving the prohibition on the basis of logic, for it is already stated in the positive commandment. We are using logic only to derive that this prohibition is also included in the negative commandment.

Approximately, an ounce in contemporary measure.

Such a distinction is made with regard to the meat and fat of kosher animals. With regard to non-kosher animals, by contrast, the two are included in the same category and the same prohibition applies to both of them.

For the prohibition mentions the animal’s hoofs.

The Ra’avad and the Rashba differ with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that there is no prohibition at all against partaking of meat from a human. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 80:1) follows the Rambam’s ruling.
The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position, noting that - as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2, and in Chapter 6, Halachot 1-2 - there is no Scriptural prohibition against partaking of milk and blood from a human. Now these leniencies are derived from the exegesis of verses from the Torah. Were the meat of a human not to be forbidden, why would it be necessary to teach that his milk and blood are permitted? Who would have thought otherwise?

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 172, 173, 174) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 154, 156, 157) include these among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., there is no separate commandment not to partake of a non-kosher locust. Instead, this is included in the general prohibition against partaking of non-kosher teeming animals. The Lechem Mishneh and others note that, in contrast, to the previous halachot, the Rambam does not mention the fact that there is a prohibition against partaking of locusts that results from the positive commandment to partake of them.

Or an entire teeming animal even if it is smaller than an olive; see Halachah 21.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 175) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 471) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
As explained in the halachot that follow and summarized in Halachah 23, there are five prohibitions in the Torah that refer to teeming animals. The categories are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that one particular creature may be included in several - or all of these categories.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 176) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 162) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Torah singles these teeming animals out from others and states that they convey ritual purity. It does not mention anything about them with regard to the prohibition against partaking of their flesh. Nevertheless, since this quantity of their flesh is significant in another halachic context, it is also considered significant with regard to this prohibition (Meilah 16b). This explains why the minimum measure for which they are liable is less than that associated with other prohibitions.

For their flesh only imparts ritual impurity after they have died.

Hilchot Shaar Avot HaTumah 4:3 states that there is no minimum measure with regard to the limbs of a teeming animal within the context of ritual impurity. A person who touches an entire limb of a such an animal after its death becomes impure even if the limb is smaller than the size of a lentil. Nevertheless, we do not rule that one is liable if he eats such a limb.
Meilah, loc. cit., explains that although the limbs of other animals also impart ritual impurity no matter what their size, one is not liable unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion. Hence, there is no reason to extend the stringency that applies with regard to these teeming animals any further.

If not, one is not liable until he partakes of an olive-sized portion, as stated in the following halachah.

Which is not one of the teeming animals explicitly mentioned by the Torah.

In contrast to the blood of the eight teeming animals that were singled out by the Torah.

The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to Halachah 9) states that this applies even to the eight teeming animals mentioned explicitly in the Torah. Once their blood is separated from their bodies, the minimum measure is the same as that of other species.

As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 1.

That for some one is liable for an olive-sized portion and for others, for a lentil-sized portion.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 179) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 164) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As obvious from the Rambam’s words here and as explained in greater length in Sefer HaMitzvot, this is not a specific commandment relating to aquatic teeming creatures, but a general commandment relating to all teeming animals. Accordingly, when a person partakes of a teeming animal of the land or a flying teeming animal, he is liable for two transgressions.
The Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 9) and the Maggid Mishneh differ with the Rambam and maintain that this is not considered as a separate mitzvah.

See Halachot 18-19.

The Rambam is stating - based on Midrashic and Talmudic sources - that there are creatures which spontaneously regenerate. It is not our place to defend these concepts against the findings of science. It must, however, be said that many Rabbinical leaders who are aware of the work of Pasteur and others did not doubt the teachings of the Torah and accepted these laws.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 177) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 165) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam’s wording is borrowed from the prooftext cited. Even if these crawling animals do not reach the earth, but merely appear on the surface of the fruit, they become forbidden, as stated in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 178). Note, however, Halachah 16.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 178) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 163) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Or removed from its tree.

This is a halachic issue that is given much attention today. We find certain Jewish groups who have taken it upon themselves to grow vegetables without any exposure to insects. There is a heightened consciousness with regard to the need to check and many books and tools have been produced with this purpose in mind. It must be emphasized, however, that although there are no vegetables that are absolutely insect and larvae free, the common halachic approach is not to show concern for any insects and/or larvae that are not visible to the naked eye. Conversely, we assume that all insects we discover came from male-female relationships or came into being while the fruit was connected to its source and do not permit any because they might have come from the fruit itself after it was detached.

I.e., an external search is not sufficient and one must cut the fruit or vegetable open and search from the inside.

Since a crawling animal will not live for more than twelve months inside produce and the produce has been detached for more than twelve months, it follows that the animal came into being from the produce itself and thus the produce and the animal can be eaten together.
Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 84:8) states that the produce should be checked lest there be crawling animals that have left the produce. One of the ways to select grains, legumes, and the like is to soak them first. Any ones with holes will float to the top. They should be discarded, lest they be worm-ridden.

Provided they have not departed from the fish itself (Maggid Mishneh).
The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s approach as follows: All worms that are found in both meat and fish while the animals are alive are forbidden, for we assume that they entered from the outside. Even after a fish dies; we can assume that the worms in its stomach were swallowed when it was alive.·Similarly, those in an animal’s brain can be assumed to have entered its nose from the outside and are hence, forbidden. Those found in the body of a fish are considered to have been spontaneously generated are hence permitted. Those found in the meat of an animal are not permitted. The rationale is that anything that comes from an animal is permitted to be eaten only after it has been slaughtered according to law. Even though the animal itself was slaughtered, since that slaughter preceded the existence of the worms, they are not permitted.
The Ra’avad and many other Rishonim differ with the Rambam’s understanding and permit worms that came into being in meat from animals that were ritually slaughtered, e.g., in meat that was salted to be used at a later time. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 84:16) quotes both views, but appears to favor the more lenient one. The Rama states that it is customary to follow the more lenient view. In practice, in the present age, this problem is far less prevalent, for because of refrigeration and freezing, it is less likely for worms to exist in meat.

Or other beverages (Siftei Cohen 84:1). This is evident from Halachot 19-20.

I.e., water that is stored in storage compartments dug into - or naturally found within - the earth.

Commenting on the citation of this ruling by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 84:2), the Rama states that if one finds worms in a bucket of water drawn from such bodies, the worms are forbidden, because we fear that the worms came from the bucket and not from the water.

For the walls are still considered as ‘’the place where the teeming animals came into existence.”

If the insect has the characteristics of both the prohibited species, as stated in Halachah 23.

Halachah 18. I.e., he need not worry that perhaps they became separated (Maggid Mishneh).

For the portions of forbidden insects to be combined, they need not be of the same species. They must, however, be included in the same prohibition. See Chapter 4, Halachah 17.

This is a general principle applying in many contexts in the laws of kashrut. The creature must, however, be visible to the naked eye.

If, however, it has decayed to the extent that it is no longer fit for human consumption, one is not liable, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 11.

For it is no longer considered as a complete creation.

This phrase refers to the previous halachah.

The Rambam’s statements are based on Makkot 16b: “If one eats a potisa, one is liable for four [sets of] lashes, an ant, five [sets of] lashes.” As he explains in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 179), the intent is not that one is liable for additional sets of lashes because several prohibitions are stated with regard to a particular creature. Instead, the intent is that if one creature falls into several forbidden categories, one is liable for a set of lashes for every forbidden category. See Maggid Mishneh.
It must be emphasized that the Ra’avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen, the Ramban, and other Rishonim do not accept the Rambam’s interpretation and instead, maintain that the prohibitions mentioned in Makkot, loc. cit., refer to the repetition of prohibitions concerning a single creature.

I.e., although this particular creature was spontaneously generated, it was brought into being in a manner that it could reproduce and bear offspring.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loe. cit.), the Rambam is sensitive to the question that might arise and states: “Do not wonder how it is possible for a fowl to come into being from the decay of fruits, for we have seen this take place frequently.” In that source, he also explains that it is possible for a single creature to have the characteristics of a non-kosher fowl and a flying teeming animal.

As stated in the previous halachah.

The Rambam is not referring to the prohibition against partaking of an animal that is not ritually slaughtered. For that prohibition applies only with regard to kosher animals, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 2. For this reason, the Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to that halachah) raises questions with the Rambam’s statement here. The Kessef Mishneh and others attempt to offer resolutions.

I.e., foods that are forbidden by a negative commandment.

Chullin 64b. The term literally means “the daughter of the ostrich.” Our Sages, however, expanded the interpretation of the term as the Rambam explains.

I.e., even by an adult. Note, however, Halachah 4.

Chapter 2, Halachah 3.

Thus it does not contradict the general principle mentioned in the previous halachah.

As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, there is a difference of opinion among the Sages in Bechorot 7b whether the honey of hornets is forbidden. This difference of opinion is perpetuated among the later authorities. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 81 :9).

Or into a person’s hands. She may not, however, express it into the person’s JDOUth [the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 81:7)].

The Ra’avad and the Turei Zahav 81:9 explain that these words of censure were issued because an observer might think that the milk of a non-kosher animal is also permitted.

Needless to say, if there is a danger to the child’s life, he may be. allowed to nurse again regardless of the amount of time for which he had been weaned [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 81:7)].

When an infant has never been weaned, he may continue past the 24 month limit as the Rambam states at the beginning of the halachah. If, however, he has been weaned, he is bound by this restriction [Beit Yosef (Yoreh De ‘ah 81)].

See Chapter 4, Halachah 16, Hilchot Shivitat Esor 2:3, et al.

For they are part of the fish’s body and are not separated by a shell.

For this instance as well, the eggs are not a distinct entity, but instead are considered part of the fowl’s body. The Maggid Mishneh brings proof of this concept from Chapter 9, Halachot 4-5, which states that it is forbidden to eat such eggs together with milk and from Hilchot Sha ‘ar Avot HaTumah 3:10 which states that they convey ritual impurity like the meat of the fowl itself.

The embryo is not considered as a non-kosher fowl. Nevertheless, it is already a distinct entity. Hence it is considered as a non-kosher teeming animal. The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there are other Rishonim who do not accept the Rambam's position.

From Chullin 64a, it appears that there is only a Rabbinic prohibition against partaking of this embryo. Hence, this punishment is given.

This refers to an egg that could have been fertilized. If, however, we know that an egg was not fertilized, it is acceptable no matter where the blood spot is found. The blood itself, however, must be discarded [the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 66:7)]. Most of the eggs commercially sold are not fertilized.

For the embryo has not begun to form and has not affected the entire egg.

At this stage of development, the entire egg has been affected. See the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Yoreh De’ah 66:2-3) which also mention other halachic perspectives with regard to blood found in fertilized eggs.

Even though they could be considered spoiled [see Rashi, Chullin 77a; Rama (Yoreh De’ah 66:7)].

Until it is hatched, however, it is forbidden as indicated by Halachah 8. See also Siftei Cohen 15:2 who mentions authorities who suggest that one should wait until its wings start to develop before slaughtering it.

Forbidden because it contracted a wound that will cause it to die within a year.

Although the milk comes from a kosher species, since the animal itself is unacceptable, its milk is also deemed unacceptable.

According to Rabbinic decree, this law applies to eggs that are found within a fowl that died without being ritually slaughtered [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 86:3)].

Chullin 31 a states that the fact that the egg from which the embryo is formed is treifah does not present a halachic problem. The rationale is that, for the embryo to form, the egg must decompose. Hence its halachic status does not affect that of the embryo.

For 21 days [Bechorot 8a; the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 86:99]. This is the amount of time our Sages thought necessary for a fowl to begin laying a new batch of eggs.

I.e., the eggs it was carrying when it first became treifah. Although Chulin 58a states that a fowl which is treifah will not lay eggs, the intent is that it will not lay a new batch of eggs. It will, however, lay the batch it is presently carrying.

There are opinions in the Ashkenazic halachic tradition that forbid such a chick. The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 86:7) states that the initial and preferred option is to respect these views.

This term refers to an animal from a kosher species which died without being ritually slaughtered.

For milk to solidify as cheese, it needs a catalyst, rennin, to cause it to curdle. One of the most common sources of rennin was the digestive organs of an animal. For the enzymes that facilitate the digestion of food also produce such an effect. Using the skin of a non-kosher organ causes the cheese to be non-kosher for the reasons the Rambam proceeds to explain. See also Chapter 4, Halachah 19, and Chapter 9, Halachah 15.

As will be explained, according to Scriptural Law, when a forbidden substance is mixed together with a kosher substance, it is nullified - i. e, considered as if it has become part of the permitted substance - if the quantity of the permitted substance is greater than it. According to Rabbinic Law, this is true when the quantity of the permitted substance is so great that the taste of the forbidden substance would not be detected. That would certainly be true in the instance at hand. Nevertheless, the forbidden substance is not nullified for the reason explained by the Rambam.

Chapter 9, Halachah 16; Chapter 16, Halachah 26.

This is also the Rambam’s view. It is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 115:2). The Rama states that it is customary to follow this view. The Rama continues, stating that when a Jew observes a gentile milking the cows and making the cheese, it is permitted to partake of it even though the cheese belongs to the gentiles. Furthermore, even if the Jew does not observe the gentile milking the cow, as long as he observes him making the cheese, the cheese is acceptable after the fact. The Turei Zahav 115:11 and the Siftei Cohen 115:22 quote opinions that differ and maintain that the prohibition should be observed even if a Jew did not observe the milking.
This difference of opinion is relevant today, reflecting the difference between chalav Yisrael cheese and ordinary kosher cheese. In both instances, the cheesemaking process is supervised. Chalav Yisrael cheese uses milk that was supervised when milked, while ordinary kosher cheese does not.

For his behavior is in violation of an explicit Rabbinic prohibition. Even though the rationale for the original decree is no longer applicable, the prohibition established by our Rabbis is still in force. (See Hilchat Mamrim 2:2.)
In the present era, there are certain Rabbis (see Rav Moshe Feinstein, Igros Moshe) who give a rationale for leniency with regard to this prohibition, stating that government supervision makes it impossible for gentiles to mix non-kosher milk together with cow’s milk and thus there is no necessity to heed that prohibition. It must be emphasized, however, that this responsum was authored before the time when it became relatively easy to procure chalav Yisrael and that many other Rabbinical authorities never accepted this decision. On the contrary, basing themselves on the ruling of Hilchat Mamrim 2:2, they explain that the original decree must still be observed. As a result of their forceful stance, at present, it is possible to obtain chalav Yisrael products in almost every major Jewish community.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 115:3) states that one should not rebuke those who permit the use of such butter, but if the local custom is to forbid it, that custom should be respected. At present, since it is possible to obtain chalav Yisrael butter in almost every major Jewish community, many Rabbis urge that this prohibition be observed.

We are speaking about homemade butter which always has some small drops of whey within it. These drops, however, are not mixed with the butter itself, but instead remain as a separate entity. Hence, they cannot be nullified. See Kessef Mishneh.

This expression connotes a law derived by the Rambam through his deductive reasoning without an existing prior Rabbinic source.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that not only is this permitted after the fact, one may do so at the outset (lechatchilah). For it is possible that there is no forbidden substance present at all.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 115:3) quotes this ruling. Nevertheless, most of the authorities who forbid using non-Jewish butter maintain that, in practice, one should refrain from cooking it as well.

I.e., the amount of non-kosher milk is surely insignificant in relation to the quantity of the mixture as a whole. Hence it is nullified.

I.e., in their own utensils.

As explained in Chapter 17, Halachah 2, it is forbidden to cook food in utensils belonging to gentiles, for the utensil will have absorbed some of the non-kosher food cooked in it previously and will discharge it into the kosher food during the cooking process.

Similarly, if the Jew walks in and out of the place where the milking is taking place, it is acceptable. For the gentile will fear that any moment, the Jew will return (Turei Zahav 115:3).

The Rambam is explaining that although our Sages require that a Jew observe the milking of an animal, it is not necessary that he watch the actual milking. As long as he is present and could see what the gentile is doing, the gentile will refrain from mixing in a non-kosher substance.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 115:1) states that this ruling applies only after the fact. At the outset, the Jew must observe the milking and also check the container into which the gentile is milking.
The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that this ruling applies only when the gentile is milking the animal for the Jew and knows that the Jew will not drink the milk of the non-kosher animal. If he is not aware of the prohibition, we suspect that he will give the Jew milk from any animal in his herd.

I.e., all kosher eggs have these characteristics, but not all eggs with these characteristics are kosher.

But not a non-Jewish hunter, as evident from the following halachah.

We are certain that he will not lie, because it is possible to bring other eggs from that species and see that they are not alike (Turei Zahav 86:1; Siftei Cohen 86:3).

For the method of verification mentioned in the previous note does not apply. The Ra’avad rules that if the hunter has an established reputation for observance, we may rely on his word, even though he does not name the species of the fowl. The Maggid Mishneh states that, as indicated by the conclusion of Halachah 20, the Rambam would also accept that ruling. According to this understanding, the hunter we are speaking about is not known for his observance. Nevertheless, we rely on his statements.
In his notes to Halachah 20, the Rashba emphasizes that we are not speaking about a person who is known to sell non-kosher food as kosher. As evident from Hilchot Maaserot 12:16, such a person is considered as a gentile and his word is not accepted at all. Instead, the intent is someone whose reputation for observance has not been established, but is also not suspected of causing others to transgress.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ramban who differs with the Rambam and maintains that there is no difference between a Jew whose reputation for observance is not established and a gentile. Just like we accept the Jew’s word, we accept that of the gentile. For we assume that he will not risk his reputation by making false statements. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 86:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Tur and the Rama cite that of the Ramban.
The Maggid Mishneh also quotes Rashba who states that in the present age, we purchase eggs from gentiles without compunction, because non-kosher species are uncommon and the overwhelming proportion of eggs sold are from chickens or geese. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 86:2).

I.e., that died without being ritually slaughtered; see Chapter 4, Halachah 1. We rule leniently, because it is very uncommon to have eggs from fowl in such a condition (Maggid Mishneh).

For we fear that it came from an egg that was treifah (Maggid Mishneh).

For the distinguishing signs themselves are not sufficient for the eggs to be considered kosher. The Maggid Mishneh explains that although Avodah Zarah 40a would appear to indicate that the distinguishing signs are sufficient, since Chuilin 64a compares fish eggs to fowl eggs, we assume that all the laws that apply to one apply to the other.
In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 83:8), Rav Yosef Caro quotes the Rambam’s ruling, but states that at present, it has become customary to buy any red fish eggs, even from gentiles. Black fish eggs, however, may not be purchased. In his Beit Yosef 81:12, he explains that the Rabbinic authorities of the earlier ages researched the matter and discovered that there are no common non-kosher fish that lay red eggs. See Siftei Cohen 83:27 who quotes other sources from which it is not clear whether or not this ruling was accepted in all communities.

I.e., to preserve them, for it is common to bring fish eggs from distant places.

Naming the species as in Halachah 18.

As indicated by Chapter 11, Halachah 25, today, the same principles that apply in the Diaspora apply in Eretz Yisrael.

In the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 10:9), he states that they possess very little moisture. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and forbids brine from non-kosher locusts.

For then we assume that the brine came from this species of fish.

For we consider all the open barrels as a single entity and the one fish indicates that the entire quantity is acceptable. See Kessef Mishneh. This represents the Rambam’s understanding of Avodah Zarah 39b-40a. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 83:6) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, but also those of others who interpret that passage differently.

The intent is not that all the barrels are considered as a single entity, but that since two barrels are discovered to be kosher, we assume that the others are also kosher (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., by looking at the head and the backbone, the person is able to recognize that the fish comes from a kosher species. One alone, i.e., either the head or the backbone, is not sufficient (Avodah Zarah 40a).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 2:6), the Rambam explains that it was customary to crush and stir the fish until it produces a mixture like dough that was used as a dip.

I.e., if we discover the head and the backbone of one fish, we may purchase a larger quantity, because we do not expect that kosher fish and non-kosher fish were salted together (Maggid Mishneh).

The Siftei Cohen 83:4 notes that the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 83:4) does not quote the Rambam’s wording and explains that according to that source, it is not necessary for it to be obvious that they all come from one fish.
If it is not obvious that they come from one fish, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) rules that only the piece with scales is permitted.

For every fish that has scales will also have fins.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 180) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 472) include this among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 10.

From Chuilin 100b, it would appear that the rationale for this ruling is the general principle: “One prohibition does not fall upon another prohibition.” Since the meat is already prohibited because it is from a non-kosher species, the prohibition of nevelah does not apply to it. The Rambam’s wording, however, is slightly different and may be alluding to a slightly different rationale.

Which was not correctly slaughtered.

This reflects a general concept with regard to the laws of kashrut, that whenever "one eats an entire forbidden creature by itself, one is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law even if it is smaller than a mustard seed" (Chapter 2, Law 21).

For the concept of being liable for an entire creature even though it is not the size of an olive, applies only when that creature is inherently forbidden (Meiri). While alive, the bird is considered as an entire forbidden entity, like a non-kosher species. After its death, that distinction does not apply.

For we include the bones and the sinews as well (Chullin 102b).

The same laws apply if the fetus is born alive, but it is obvious that the birth is not viable. Even if the animal is slaughtered in the appropriate manner, we are forbidden to partake of it.

I.e., even if the animal is slaughtered properly, it is forbidden because it is possible that the birth is not viable. Although our Sages (Chuilin 136a) spoke of the eighth day of an animal’s life, their intent was the beginning of the eighth day (Maggid Mishneh).

Since it is not a definite matter, lashes are not administered (ibid.).

In contrast, an animal may not be offered as a sacrifice until the eighth day of its life (Exodus 22:29; Turei Zahav 15:3).

I.e., he is not considered to have partaken of a nevelah.

For as stated in Halachah 18, these are not considered meat, but rather comparable to an animal’s wastes. For that reason, the Ra’avad (in his gloss to Chapter 5, Halachah 13) states that there is no prohibition against partaking of a placenta.

I.e., like the prohibition of nevelah, the prohibition of treifah does not apply with regard to non-kosher species.

I.e., even if it was slaughtered properly before it died, the meat is, nevertheless, forbidden, as stated in the following halachah. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 181) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 73) include this among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain in Halachah 8, the term treifah also applies in other situations. Nevertheless, an added dimension of severity applies to the laws concerning animals that are mortally wounded by beasts. See Hilchot Shechitah 5:3 (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh).

The term treifah literally means “preyed upon.” Our translation “mortally wounded” is the halachic definition as the Rambarn proceeds to explain.

This and the following examples are specifically mentioned by the Rambam in Hilchot Shechitah 10:1, 9:8, 11:4, 6:1.

This is a general principle employed by our Sages with regard to the interpretation of the Torah's language. When it mentions a specific situation, it is not confining itself to the limited setting mentioned in the verse, but applies to other circumstances as well. Why is that situation mentioned? Because it is common.

For only that is in the direct scope of the verse.

Longer than twelve months (Hilchot Shechitah 11:1).

Chullin 42a.

From ch. 5 to ch. 11. A concise list is found in Chapter 10, Halachah 9.

For as mentioned above, the prohibition against partaking of a treifah applies only with regard to kosher animals.

See Chapter Five, Halachot 2-3, where the Rambam distinguishes between this prohibition and the prohibition against partaking of a limb from a living animal. Note, however, Hilchot Melachim 9:10-11, where the Rambam includes eating the meat from an animal and eating a limb from an animal as a single prohibition for a gentile.

I.e., just as we forbid the meat of an animal that was mortally wounded, we should forbid a portion of meat that was cut off with a knife.

I.e., the meat was cut off from its natural place. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 9.

With this explanation, the Rambam is clarifying the distinction Chullin 37a makes between an animal which is misukenet (dangerously ill) and treifah. The treifah condition is a result of a wound, while in the case of a misukenet, all of its limbs and organs are sound. Nevertheless, as stated in Hilchot Shechitah 5:2, there are other physical conditions which render an animal treifah even if it has not been attacked by an animal. These conditions were communicated as halachot to Moses at Sinai.

The Maggid Mishneh (based on Chullin 37b) interprets this as a gesture of pious conduct. Note, however, Siftei Cohen 17:8.

Such a convulsive movement is a sign that it was alive at the time that it was slaughtered, as the Rambam continues to explain in the following halachah.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes opinions that maintain that this leniency was granted only to alleviate the financial loss a Jewish owner of an animal would suffer. Therefore, meat from an animal belonging to a gentile which is in such a condition should not be eaten. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 116:7) quotes this ruling.

It must be able to stand up on its own when called or hit with a switch. If it is stood up by hand, it is still considered dangerously ill even if it is able to remain standing [Rama (Yoreh De’ah 17:1); Siftei Cohen 17:1].

I.e., we assume that it died before the slaughter was completed (see Chullin 38a).

The Maggid Mishneh and the Siftei Cohen 17:4 quote opinions that rule that if a small domesticated animal’s foreleg was extended and it bent it, that is sufficient to render it acceptable.

Note the Siftei Cohen 17:5 which quotes different versions of Chullin 38b that state that a fowl must move its wing. Winking its eyes is not sufficient.

The Maggid Mishneh (and the Turei Zahav 17:4 and the Siftei Cohen 17:6) quote opinions that maintain that swishing its tail is also sufficient for an animal to be considered as having made a convulsive movement.

I.e., because he cannot see. Needless to say, if the room is illuminated, this law does not apply.

I.e., we follow the principle that when a doubt concerning a Scriptural prohibition is involved, we rule stringently.

As stated in Hilchot Nazirut 5:3, although there are separate prohibitions against eating raisins, grape peels, grape seeds, and partaking of wine, if one combined all these substances, one is liable.

In which instance, the prohibition is Scriptural in origin, but lashes are not given (Chapter 3, Halachah 6).
The Rambam’s statements in this and the following halachah touch on an issue of general significance. Rabbi Meir (Avodah Zarah 66a) maintains that forbidden substances of different types can be combined to make a person liable for lashes. The Sages differ and maintain that they cannot be combined, but instead are judged individually. If there is enough of the one substance to make one liable, he is liable. If not, he is exempt.
The principle stated in Halachot 18-19 is a corollary to these concepts. Since the forbidden substances are not combined with each other, but are instead considered as discrete entities, they help nullify each other, as explained there.

For this is included in the prohibition against a treifah, as stated in Halachah 10.

Although each one of these species is mentioned separately in the Torah, they are all included in the same prohibition.

The Ra’avad mentions that this point is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Talmud, seemingly implying that the opinion which maintains that they should be combined should be followed. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s position.

See Chapter 2.

Note the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 9:1) which interprets the Hebrew term giddim as also referring to veins, arteries, and nerves.

This applies even if the portions eaten were soft and blood spurts from them.

As stated in Halachah 5.

The Rambam does not distinguish between milk that has coagulated and milk that is fluid. For even if it is fluid, it is already considered as a waste product. (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., since the digestive juices from the animal’s stomach have already mixed with this milk, it will be an effective catalyst to cause the large quantity of milk to curdle and harden into cheese. See also Chapter 3, Halachah 13, and Chapter 9, Halachah 15.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 81:6) differs and quotes Rabbenu Tam’s opinion that liquid milk found in the stomach of a forbidden species is forbidden. Moreover, at the outset, one should not use even dried milk found in the stomach of a non-kosher animal as a catalyst because of the impression it will create. After the fact, it is permitted.

Our translation is based on the glosses of Rashi and Tosafot, Bechoros 7b. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that this placenta is forbidden. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling.

And not processed so that it becomes hard like leather.

That of a wild boar, by contrast, is too tough to be eaten.

As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 2, Halachah 7, the names of these species are a matter of debate.

This addition is necessary, for there is a prohibition against partaking of any skin, as stated in Halachah 18.

For an olive-sized portion of the meat of a nevelah can convey ritual impurity, while a hide or a piece of leather that size does not.

For goring a human being. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, ch. 10, which explains the pertinent laws.

For it died without ritual slaughter.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 188) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 52) include this among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Instead, the corpse of the executed animal should be buried (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:11).

As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 15, unless there is a teaching that states otherwise, this phrase implies both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 5:2, the rationale is that the dung is considered of negligible importance with regard to the ox itself. As implied by Halachah 20, the dung of an animal is not considered as part of the animal itself, nor is it included in the prohibitions applying to it.