Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Compare to Halachah 6.

As evident from Halachah 3, although such acts are forbidden whenever sexual relations are prohibited, lashes are given only when the woman is one of the arayot (Maggid Mishneh).

The verse teaches that not only is undesirable sexual conduct itself forbidden, but also preliminary acts that lead to such conduct.
This teaching is significant from a theoretical perspective. Our Sages (Avot 1:1) teach: “Make a fence around the Torah,” i.e., enact prohibitions to safeguard Scriptural prohibitions and prevent them from being violated. Our Rabbis, however, question if there is a concept of “making a fence” in Scriptural Law itself, i.e., are there Scriptural prohibitions that exist solely to prevent one from violating more severe prohibitions?
It would appear that this prohibition would fall into that category (see Halachah 4). Why are these acts of closeness forbidden? Because most likely they will lead to intimacy. One may, however, explain that these acts of closeness are, in and of themselves, “abominable practices,” and hence, forbidden.
The above discussion is relevant according to the Rambam’s approach. The Ramban [Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot (negative mitzvah 353) differs and does not consider the prohibition mentioned here of Scriptural origin. Instead, he views it as a Rabbinic safeguard, “a fence” instituted by the Rabbis to protect Scriptural Law.

The Maggid Mishneh considers the following as Rabbinic safeguards. The Beit Shmuel 21 :2 mentions opinions which consider some as having a Scriptural source.

As Avot 1 :5 teaches: “Mirth and frivolity habituate a person to immorality.”

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 7:4), the Rambam quotes the Pesikta Rabati, ch. 25, which interprets the commandment lo tinaf, as “Do not take forbidden pleasure with your nose.”

For if a person does not look at a woman before he marries her, he may have an unpleasant surprise afterwards (Kiddushin 41a). The Ra’avad suggests that a pious person should rely on the opinion of others rather than looking at his intended himself, but the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:3) quotes the Rambam’s view.

Indeed, a woman may adorn herself during this time so that she will not appear unattractive to her husband (Chapter 11, Halachah 19).

This applies only to portions of her body: which are usually revealed. He should not look at those portions that are usually covered (Ra’avad).

This applies even if the woman does not actually touch him [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21 :5)].

Implied is that outside one’s presence, this is permitted.

For they all suggest a certain measure of intimacy. Compare to Chapter 11, Halachah 19.
When commenting on the quotation of these laws by the Shulchan Aruch, the Rama mentions certain leniencies, e.g., if the tasks are performed in a public place, if there is no indication of closeness involved.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh who explains that it is permitted to inquire concerning a woman’s welfare.

I.e., he has no fear that this closeness will lead to intimacy.

Nevertheless, if one has no pleasure or desire, the act is not punished by lashes [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 7:3)].

The Chelkat Mechokek 21:10 adds that one may show physical closeness to one’s granddaughter and to one’s infant sister.

I.e., even unclothed.

In Hilchot Keriat Shema 3:19, the Rambam mentions that the children must also have reached the age of majority, thirteen for boys and twelve for girls. In our translation, however, we have focused on the physical characteristics, because as emphasized by the Chelkat Mechokek 21:12 this is what is of primary importance.

The Rambam borrows the wording ofEzekiel 16:7 which l, terally means “her breasts are developed and her hair has grown.”

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if she is merely consecrated.

Even when children reach the stage when they and their parents are required to sleep together while clothed, their parents are still allowed to embrace them and kiss them (Beit Shmuel 7:15).

Sifra, commenting on the above verse.

By Scriptural Law. The verse is not merely cited as support for a Rabbinic injunction.

As stated in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 353), this is a general prohibition, including all types of forbidden sexual behavior. As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3, lashes are not given for the violation of prohibitions that are of a general nature.

As would apply were this to be considered as adultery.

This represents a change of opinion from his statements in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 7:3) where he writes that even according to Rabbinic Law, no punishment should be given.

The Beit Shmuel 25:1 quotes many authorities who forbid a man from kissing his wife’s genitalia.

See Halachah 18.

In Hilchot Deot, ch. 3, the Rambam elaborates on the concept that all of a person’s actions, even his sexual conduct, must be for the sake of heaven. In Chapter 5, Halachot 4-5, the Rambam elaborates on refined habits of sexual conduct.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 7:3), the Rambam writes:
The intent of sexual relations is the preservation of the species and not only
pleasure. The aspect of pleasure was introduced only to motivate the created beings
toward that ultimate goal....
The proof of this is that desire and pleasure cease after ejaculation; this was the
entire goal for which our instincts were aroused. If the goal were pleasure,
satisfaction would continue as long as man desired.

The point of the laws mentioned in this halachah is that one should not look at one’s wife while engaging in relations.

When it is a mitzvah to engage in relations.

If one can cover the light or create a partition in front of it in a manner permitted on the Sabbath, there is no prohibition [Chelkat Mechokek 25:4; Rama (Orach Chayim 240:11)].

I.e., one feels very aroused (Magen Avraham 240:25).

In Hilchot Deot 5:4, the Rambam gives a rationale that at this time a person’s food will have been digested and yet, he will not be overly hungry. The commentaries to Nedarim 20b explain that in this manner, the man and his wife will have forgotten all their daytime concerns and will be able to focus their attention on each other and the holiness of the experience.

See Hilchot Ishut, ch. 14, which explains the frequency of the conjugal duties a husband has to his wife. This factor is dependent on the nature of the husband’s work and the manner in which it taxes him.

See Hilchot Kriat Shema 4:8 which explains that originally, Ezra enacted such a decree for the reason mentioned by the Rambam. Afterwards, our Sages checked and saw that this decree had never fully spread throughout the Jewish community. Hence they nullified it

Nedarim 20b.

See Hilchot Deot 5:4-5 which states:
[Relations should be conducted] with their mutual consent and joy. He should
converse and dally with her somewhat, so that she will be relaxed. He should have
intercourse [with her] modestly and not boldly.... Whoever conducts himself in this
manner [may be assured that] not only does he sanctify his soul, purify himself, and
refine his character, but furthermore, if he has children, they will be handsome and
modest, worthy of wisdom and piety.

I.e., exhibits any of the undesirable behaviors described above. The rationale is, as explained in Iggeret HaKodesh and other sources, a person’s intent at the time of sexual relations has a major effect in determining the character of his children.

Nedarim, foe. cit..

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:16, whenever a woman is divorced or widowed, she should wait 90 days before remarrying, so that the identity of her child’s father will be clearly established.

For surrendering oneself to one’s desires without control within the context of marriage may lead one to surrender oneself to one’s desires outside the context of marriage.

According to Scriptural Law, a person may consecrate his wife by engaging in relations with her. Nevertheless, our Sages forbade such a practice because of its immodest nature (Hilchot Ishut 3:21).

As Hilchot Ishut 3:22 continues, the latter two practices were forbidden as a safeguard to lewd conduct. Our Sages feared that if women would be consecrated in this manner, the people would look at marriage and intimacy in a much baser manner.

Kiddushin 12b.

For an extended period of time. Needless, to say, there is no difficulty with making a short visit.

Lest this arouse undesirable thoughts [Rashi, Pesachim 51a; see Rama (Even HaEzerv 23:6)].

I.e., a widow or a divorcee. A woman who never married may wear her hair uncovered (Chelkat Mechokek 21 :2).

When stating this prohibition, Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 23:1) adds: “This transgression is more severe than any of the sins in the Torah.”

See the commentaries to Genesis, ch. 38, which relate that this was the sin of Judah’s two sons: Er and Onan. They married Tamar, but did not desire that she become pregnant. Hence they did not release their sperm within her. Their sin angered God and He caused them to die.

For in essence, whenever the couple engage in intercourse, he will be releasing sperm without purpose, because she is not old enough to become pregnant. Niddah 13b states that those who marry minors hold back Mashiach’s coming.
It must be emphasized that if a man does marry a minor, he is permitted to engage in relations with her [Rama (Even HaEzer 23:5)]. Similarly, relations are permitted in other instances where they will not lead to pregnancy: e.g., when the woman is already pregnant, directly after birth, or she is past menopause. Since a man has conjugal duties to his wife, he is not allowed to ignore them even though she will not become pregnant.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 21. See also Avot D’Rabbi Nattan 20:1 which implies that this is not merely a matter of will power and mind control. Instead, directing one’s attention to the Torah awakens spiritual influences which prevent a person’s attention from focusing on sexual thoughts.

This analogy for the Torah is taken from Proverbs 5:19.

Needless to say, it is forbidden for one to sleep on his belly.

Our translation follows the authoritative manuscripts and early prmtmgs of the Mishneh Torah. This also follows the text of Avodah Zarah 20b, the Rambam’s apparent source. The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah employs a slightly different version.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:1) clarifies that it applies even when the woman is not wearing the garments. The clothes themselves may prompt the man’s imagination.

For watching her body might arouse him.

Even if his wife is not together with him (Beit Shmuel 23:4).

See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 3:14) which grants a man permission to hold himself below the corona of his organ, for this does not stimulate him sexually.

See Shabbos 118b, 53b.

I.e., directly after a youth becomes thirteen (Chelkat Mechokek 1:3).

I.e., having foresight with regard to one’s children’s sexual behavior will prevent sin. See the conclusion of Hilchot Sotah where the Rambam cites the same verse in a different - although somewhat related - context.

According to Scriptural Law, a man cannot consecrate a woman until he reaches the age of thirteen and demonstrates signs of physical maturity. Hence, if a couple are married beforehand, all relations are comparable to promiscuity. See Chelkat Mechokek, loc. cit. and Beit Shmuel 1 :4 who discuss certain views that maintain that it is permitted to marry beforehand.

Lest he be prompted to sexual thoughts.

This certainly applies before the man has fulfilled the obligation to be fruitful and multiply (i.e., he fathered a boy and a girl). Even after he has fulfilled that mitzvah, he should marry a woman capable of bearing children [Hilchot Ishut 15:7, 16; Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1 :8)]. In the latter situation, however, there is room for certain leniencies.

For she is not bound by the commandment of procreation.

We assume that the difference in age will lead to a lack of sexual harmony and cause the man and/or woman to seek fulfillment outside of marriage.

If, however, the woman was merely consecrated, the couple will not have shared familiarity and there is less grounds for suspicion, as mentioned at the conclusion of the halachah.

In the Talmudic era, the custom was to build blocks of homes that opened up to a communal courtyard. Several of these courtyards would open up to a single lane. If a man and his divorcee would dwell in a single courtyard - and even in a single lane - they would meet each other on a frequent basis. In such a situation, we fear that the familiarity that they shared in the past might lead them to be intimate.
Rav Moshe HaCohen and others question the Rambam’s ruling, noting that as long as the woman has not remarried, there is no prohibition against relations between the couple. They cite the standard text of Ketubot 27b which reads “A woman should not marry in his neighborhood.” They maintain that the prohibition applies only when the woman remarries. She and her new husband should not dwell near her previous husband lest this lead to adultery.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 119:7) quotes the Rambam’s wording. The Rama, however, mentions that if a woman remarries, she should not dwell in the same lane as her ex-husband even if he is not a priest.

Since he is also bound by the prohibition against relations with a divorcee, there are more severe restrictions.

Rather than demand payment herself. In this way, they will share less contact.

For one of them should have appointed an agent so that they would avoid meeting each other.

Since they never lived together, we do not fear that meeting each other will lead to intimacy.

This applies if the home belongs to the husband and even if the woman also owns a home in that courtyard or the couple’s home was rented (Chelkat Mechokek 119:27). Ketubot 28a explains that it is more difficult for a man to leave his home than it is for a woman.

In this instance, she is not “dwelling securely,” because she was informed of the temporary nature of the relationship from the outset. See Yevamot 37b which gives the example of several Sages who would marry women for brief periods of times after informing them beforehand.
See also the Chelkat Mechokek 119:1 and the Beit Shmuel 119:1 which debate whether it is proper for a man to engage in relations with his wife in such a situation. For as stated in Halachah 12, a man should not engage in relations with his wife if he intends to divorce her.

Since they live apart from each other, it is possible that they will not know of the other’s existence. If they visit that other locale, they may marry a relative without knowing of the family connection.

For then, it will be unlikely that his descendants will intermarry unknowingly.

For we fear that he will die as they did. See the Rama (Even HaEzer 9:1) who mentions certain leniencies concerning this situation.

The commentaries cite the Biblical narrative concerning the marriage of Judah’s sons to Tamar (Genesis, ch. 38) as proof of these laws. At the outset, Judah did not want her to marry his third son. After he had relations with her, however, he married her and continued living with her as man and wife.

The term am haaretz which we translated as "unlearned" has broader implications. As indicated by the following halachah, it also has the connotation of one who is not careful in the observance of the mitzvot and whose character is unrefined and underdeveloped.

Pesachim 49b.

The commentaries note that Pesachim, op. cit., states “it will lead to poverty.” Some resolve the differences by explaining that poverty will lead a family to strife.

I.e., we can assume that his wife will return to her family and that the children will be raised according to the prevailing atmosphere in that home. From the statements of Rama (Even HaEzer 2:6), we can conclude that if an unlearned person is precise in his observance of the mitzvot, these words of caution do not apply.

This prohibition also includes women with whom relations are forbidden merely by a negative commandment (Beit Shmuel 22:1).

And thus there is no apparent motivation toward sexual relations.

See the Chelkat Mechokek 22:1 and the Beit Shmuel, loc. cit. which cite opinions that maintain that a man is permitted to enter into privacy with his sister in a temporary situation.

Since the couple have never engaged in relations, we fear that they will not be able to control their desire. Hence we require them to take this added safeguard.

See Rama (Yoreh De’ah 192:4) who discusses this issue in depth, mentioning several stringencies and leniencies. He states the prevailing custom is for a young boy to accompany the groom and a young girl to accompany the bride. Every person should check with a competent Rabbinic authority with regard to the custom followed in their community.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 24:1) writes that homosexuality had become prevalent in his community and hence, it was deemed appropriate not to enter into privacy with other men. The Bayit Chadash states that in places where this transgression is not widespread, there is no need for taking such precautions.

See Kiddushin 81b.

Kiddushin 80b states that “there is an allusion to the prohibition against entering into privacy in the Torah.” The Rambam understands that to mean that the prohibition was conveyed by the Oral Tradition and our Sages found an allusion for it in the Torah. The Tur (Even HaEzer 22), however, follows the opinion of Tosafot who maintains that the prohibition is of Scriptural origin.

As II Samuel, ch. 13, relates: Amonon, David’s oldest son, lusted for Tamar, his half-sister. He feigned illness and asked that Tamar serve him a meal. While she was serving him, he raped her.

In that era, there already were more substantial social conduct between Jews and gentiles and our Sages felt that there was a need for further safeguards.

Publicizing their misconduct so that the shame will further inhibit a future recurrence.

The simple meaning of the Rambam’s words is that lashes are not administered at all, neither to the man or the woman. The Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 22), however, states that punishment should be administered to the man, for it is not necessary to mention the woman with whom he transgressed.

And there is the possibility that he will engage in relations with her in the presence of his wife.

For we fear that the gentiles will engage in sexual misconduct. See Halachah 7.

Chapter 14, Halachah 10.

As interpreted by Avodah Zarah 6b, et al, this verse is a command not to place a person in a situation where he is likely to sin. By placing an animal belonging to him in the gentile’s possession, the Jew is making it possible for him to sin.

For we fear that she will enter into relations with one or more of the men in the presence of the others.
The Rama (Even HaEzer 22:5) states that a woman may enter into privacy with two upright men in a city, but not in a field, and only during the day, but not at night).

For in that instance, she will guard him, as stated in Halachah 4. Nor will the other woman engage in relations in her presence, for it is likely that she will publicize the matter (Kessef Mishneh).

For in this instance as well, there is the possibility that they will engage in relations. The Rama (loc. cit.) gives permission for many [three (Chelkat Mechokek 22:11) women to enter into privacy with one man, provided his profession does not involve contact with women.

In such a situation, it is highly unlikely that the people will engage in relations.

E. g., one who sells clothes or perfumes to women.

Hence the women will be frightened to engage in sexual relations, for they know the matter will become public knowledge.

And this does not apply below the ages mentioned in the halachah.

A person with both male and female sexual organs.

For he has a sexual drive for relations with women (Beit Shmuel 22:16).

A tumtum refers to a person whose genitalia are covered by a block of flesh and it cannot be determined whether he is a male or female. A male is permitted to enter into privacy with these individuals, because he does not have a sexual drive for anyone other than an actual woman (Beit Shmuel 22:16).

She will fear that at any particular time, her husband will come. Hence she will never commit adultery.

Because this familiarity may cause her to overstep the bounds of modesty even when her husband is in the city.

The later commentaries explain that open windows are also sufficient.

Since it is possible for the two to be seen by passersby, they will not transgress.

This applies even in a situation where there is no question of the teacher entering into privacy with the mothers (Beit Shmuel 22:21).

This refers to an unmarried woman or one whose husband is out of town. Otherwise, there is no prohibition against entering into privacy (Chelkat Mechokek 22:21).

To avoid the prohibition that stems from his being tempted by women.

According to the Maggid Mishneh, this leniency applies even if the teacher’s wife is in another city. As long as he is married, there is no prohibition. The Chelkat Mechokek 22:21 and the Beit Shmuel 22:22 differ and conclude that this leniency applies only when the man’s wife lives in the same city where he teaches. If she lives in another city, it is forbidden.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 22:13) states that this refers to outhouses in the fields (which was the custom in the Talmudic era), but not to outhouses in the city (which had become the custom in his time). Needless to say, it does not apply in the present age when the lavatories are in the privacy of buildings.

I.e., No matter how upright the person's character, there is the possibility that frequent exposure to women will lead him to undesirable relations.

We fear that if another man was placed in charge of a person’s home, he would have frequent contact with the owner’s wife and there is the possibility that ultimately the two will commit adultery. As Berachot 63a states: “Had Potiphar not appointed Joseph as the supervisor of his home, that incident (Potiphar’s wife's attempted seduction of Joseph) would never have occurred.”

I.e., people at large will suspect that they are sharing a relationship.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that what was forbidden was to dwell with her in the same home. There are no restrictions against dwelling in the same courtyard. According to the Rambam, dwelling in the same home temporarily is permitted as long as one does not enter into privacy with her. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Rambam’ s interpretation.

I.e., people will gossip that she is intimate with the dog or the servants. In Hilchot Avadim 9:6, the Rambam mentions this restriction only with regard to servants nine years old or above. See the notes to that halachah.

Rashi (Chagigah 11b) interprets this as referring to those matters which are not explicit in the Torah.

The Rambam, based on Chagigah, loc. cit., is explaining why there is a difference between the laws concerning forbidden sexual conduct and those involving other matters.

Sifri, Parshat Bahaaloscha; Shabbat 130b.

Makkot 23b.

Bava Batra 165a.

This term refers to remarks concerning a colleague that are not actually lashon hara, unfavorable gossip, but which border on that type of speech. See Hilchot De’ot, ch. 7, for a more precise discussion of this issue.

See Kiddushin 82b who quotes Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Meir as making such statements. It continues, relating that one of his students mocked Rabbi Meir for making such statements. Shortly afterwards, it was discovered that this student committed adultery with his mother-in-law.

Our translation is based on the words of Rama (Even HaEzer 25:1) and Chelkat Mechokek 25:1.

While married, he will have the opportunity for ordinary male-female relationships and will not develop pent up feelings that seek expression in forbidden relations.

Kiddushin 30b.

The Torah. See Eruvin 54b which explains the analogy in detail.

The Rambam includes these four among the Torah’s 613 mitzvot in his Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandments 149-152). The Ra’avad (in his hasagot to the listing of the mitzvot at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah) and the Ramban (in his hasagot to general principle 6 in Sefer HaMitzvot) differ and maintain that they should not be counted as mitzvot. According to their view, the mitzvot involve the observance of the prohibitions, but there is no positive act involved that could be considered as the observance of a commandment. [The Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 153, 470, 158, and 155) mentions these mitzvot, but explains that he personally subscribes to the opinion of the Ramban that they should be not included among the 613 mitzvot.]
In his Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam explains his position. Leviticus 11 :2 states: “This is the living creature that you may eat...” The Sifri, commenting on that verse, describes it as a positive commandment. Now there is no positive commandment to eat kosher meat. The commandment is to know which species are kosher and to make a distinction between them and those which are not kosher, as implied by the verse the Rambam cites here: “And you shall distinguish.... “For it is only in this way, that one will be able to eat kosher meat. See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh. And see Chapter 2, Halachah 1, where the Rambam explains how he derives the idea that both a positive mitzvah and anegative mitzvah are involved.

Leviticus 11 :3.

The Ra’avad questions why the Rambam does not mention a rabbit or a hare. The Torah specifically mentions that they chew their cud. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam does not mention them because they have teeth on their upper jaw.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 79:1) also mention that a camel has two tooth-like growths on its upper jaw, but they do not in any way resemble teeth.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s intent is that any kosher domesticated animal or wild beast that chews its cud will not have teeth on its upper jaw and every such animal will have a split hoof.

I.e., if one sees that the domesticated animal is not a camel, one can assume that it is kosher, for a camel is the only non-kosher animal without teeth on its upper jaw.

For a pig is the only non-kosher animal with split hooves.

For before slaughtering it, such an inspection would be painful for the animal.

Our translation is based on the commentary of the Meiri to Chullin 59a. Rashi interprets that passage slightly differently and his opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 79:1).

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 79:1) mention another sign for a kosher animal: horns.

As indicated by the Rambam’ s statements in the following halachah, the matter is dependent on the species and not on the presence of distinguishing signs in and of themselves.

The Ra’avad qualifies the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it applies only when the person possesses a non-kosher animal in his herd. If that is not the case, we do not suspect that a non-kosher newborn came from elsewhere. The Maggid Mishneh and the Siftei Cohen 79:6 do not accept this addition.

See also the beginning of ch. 3.

I.e., a calf born with a Siamese twin.

The hoof, however, need not be split as indicated by Halachah 4. See also Rama (Yoreh De’ah 13:5) and Siftei Cohen 13:20 who rule more leniently.

The translation of the names of these seven species is a matter of debate among both Torah commentaries and zoologists. Our translation is taken from Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan’s Living Torah. Consult the notes there for a detailed discussion of the matter. See also Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 80:3); Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 28:4) who discuss these issues. In practice, we partake of the meat of an animal only when there is an established tradition that it is permitted (Siftei Cohen 80:1).

The Maggid Mishneh and others interpret t’o as referring to a wild ox.

To see whether or not they have teeth on their upper jaw, as stated in Halachah 3.

As stated in Hilchat Shechitah, ch. 14.

See Chapter 7.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 3:6) for a definition of these terms. The Ra’avad, the Rashba, and Rashi offer slightly different definitions for these terms.

Although it is not domesticated and lives like a wild beast, it is still placed in this category.

This was not a mythical beast, but a species of antelope known to exist during the Talmudic period (Chullin 59b).

And all other kosher wild beasts have two.

I.e., we accept the stringencies resulting from both positions. The Turei Zahav 80:3 adds that since we are not certain that this is required, we do not cover its blood on a festival. Similarly, the Siftei Cohen 80:4 states that a blessing is not recited before covering its blood.

See also Hilchot Nazirut 2:10-11 which states that in certain ways it is like a domesticated animal (its fat is forbidden). In others, it is like a wild beast (its blood must be covered). In yet others, it is like neither a domesticated animal or a wild beast (for it is considered as a mixed species with either of them) and in others (that it must be slaughtered), it resembles both.

I.e., even if they are mated, they will not produce offspring.

Leviticus 11:13-19; Deuteronomy 14:12-18.

In this instance as well, the translation of the names of these species is a matter of debate among both Torah commentaries and zoologists. Our translation is taken from Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan’s Living Torah. Consult the notes there for a detailed discussion of the matter. In practice, we only partake of those species of fowl concerning which we have an established tradition that they are acceptable.

See the Kessef Mishneh and others who state that there is a difference of opinion whether this species is acceptable or not.

As mentioned, there is a difference of opinion regarding the species associated with these names and there are few, if any, individuals who can claim the desired level of familiarity (see Siftei Cohen 82:1).

As indicated by Chapter 3, Halachah 18, the knowledge of the names of the species is important. Otherwise, the hunter’s word is not accepted.

For these are the only ones forbidden by the Torah.

If there is such a tradition, there is no necessity to check the signs mentioned in the following halachah.

Chullin 63b states that this refers to a person who taught hunting and not a teacher of Torah, for it is possible that the Torah teacher will not be able to actually identify the species. Nevertheless, if a Rabbinical authority testifies that he has received the tradition that a species is acceptable, we follow his ruling (Siftei Cohen, loc. cit.).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah’ (Chullin 3 :6), the Rambam defines this as meaning “places its claws on the object that it desires to eat and eats it.” ·

I.e., a claw that is positioned higher and behind the fowl’s row of claws (Rashi, Chullin 62a). Although most species of fowl possess such a claw, it is called “extra,” because it is not positioned in the row of claws. Alternatively, the Hebrew term yeterah can be translated not as “extra,” but as “larger,” i.e., a claw that is larger than the others (Rabbenu Nissim).

An organ which parallels a human's stomach.

An extra muscular stomach that exists in fowl.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 82:2) quotes the Rambam’s words, it concludes: “Even though a fowl possesses these three signs, it should not be eaten, because we suspect that it might be a bird of prey unless they have a tradition given to them by their ancestors that this species is kosher.” Similarly, the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 82:3) states: “One should not partake of any fowl unless there is a received tradition that it is kosher. This is the accepted custom. One should not deviate from it.” Thus even if a species of fowl possesses these three signs, we do not partake of it.

And we do not permit it.

I.e., it stands on a rope or a pole extended for it by gripping the rope or pole with its claws (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Chulin 3:6).

For these actions indicate that it uses its claws to attack other animals.

Chullin 65a states that only species that are themselves impure will dwell together with other impure species.

In this instance as well, the translation of the names of these species is a matter of debate among both Torah commentaries and zoologists. Our translation is taken from Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan’s Living Torah. Consult the notes there for a detailed discussion of the matter. In practice, it is common in most communities not to partake of any species of locusts (Turei Zahav 85:1). In the Yemenite community, however, there are certain species of locusts which are eaten.

The Torah mentions four names of locust species and in connection with each states “according to its family,” indicating that a sub-species is also permitted.

Halachah 15.

Chullin 66a speaks of four identifying signs for a kosher locust: a) four wings, 2 long legs, four legs, and the fact that its wings cover the greater portion of its body.

Note the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin, the conclusion of ch. 3) which states that the factor of fundamental importance is that the species be referred to as a locust. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 85:1).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this term implies that the scales are not an integral part of the fish but can be separated from its body either by hand or with a utensil. If they cannot be separated from the fish, the fish is not kosher [Rama (Yoreh De’ah 83:1)].

Thus if one finds scales on a piece of fish, there is no need to check whether it possessed fins (the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 83:3)). Chulin 66b asks: If so, why did the Torah mention fins and answers that this magnifies and amplifies the Torah.

There are several species of kosher fish which shed their scales in this manner.

The Tur and Rama (loc. cit.) quote the view of certain Rishonim who maintain that in such an instance, the scale must be located under its gills, fins, or tail.