Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This is a principle applying to all of the Torah’s prohibitions concerning eating.

In such an instance, as stated in Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 4:7-8, the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, but the violator is not punished. Accordingly, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 238:1) rules that it is forbidden for the person who took such an oath to partake of even the slightest quantity of food.

Because he singled out a specific article and by partaking of it broke his oath.

For tasting does not imply eating a full measure of food. Since he used that expression, it is clear that his intent was to forbid partaking of even the slightest measure of food.

Sh ‘vuot 22b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 14:23: “And you shall eat before God, your Lord. the tithes of your grain, your wine, and your oil.” Implied is that partaking of wine and oil is also eating.

As in Halachah 5.

This expression indicates a conclusion derived by the Rambam from logic without any explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source.

I.e., a fourth of a log. In contemporary measure, a revi'it is equivalent to 86 cc. according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cc. according to Chazon Ish.

The Radbaz explains that since this is the measure which the Torah considered significant in other contexts, one can extrapolate that anything less is not considered significant enough to warrant liability. Alternatively, with regard to oaths and vows, we follow the commonly accepted implications of the terms used and people do not consider partaking of a smaller measure as “drinking.”

I.e., for one set of lashes or one sacrifice. As will be explained, this applies only when the transgressor did not become aware of his oath between eating.

The minimum measure for which one is liable as stated in Halachah 1. The Radbaz states that the superficial implication of the Rambam’s words is that it is not necessary for one to partake of such a portion of each of the foods separately to be liable. He differs and maintains that the person must partake of all of them to be liable.

Otherwise, it would be considered as eating as stated in Halachah 3.

If, however, he mentioned “bread” only once, he is liable only once. See Halachah 5.

I.e., the emphasis is one repeating his colleague’s words, while stating each one individually. That shows that his intent is focused on each one individually. If, however, he made such a statement on his own initiative, without repeating his colleague’s words, they are not considered to have been singled out [Rav Kapach’ s edition of the Rambam’ s Commentary to the Mishneh (Sh ‘vuot 3:4)].

I.e., if he drank half of a revi ‘it of wine and half of a revi ‘it of milk, he is not liable.

Chapter 4, Halachah 16.

We assume that his intention when taking the oath was to interpret the term eating according to its halachic definition (Radbaz).

Since he spoke in a colloquialism, we assume that he was not referring to the halachic meaning and instead, meant the entire loaf.

Whether an olive-sized portion or the entire loaf.

Because once eating an olive-sized portion of the loaf is forbidden by an oath, a second oath concerning that same loaf cannot take effect, as the Rambam states in the following halachah.

The implication is that he would not eat an olive-sized portion of food that day.

The Ra’avad accepts the principle stated by the Rambam, but explains that this is not a good example of it. For in this instance, the second oath does take effect, for it applies not only on the day that the first oath applies, but for all time. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would agree that the second oath will take effect at the end of the day on which the first oath is in effect. This, he maintains, is why the Rambam mentions eating it “that day.”

For example, that mentioned in Halachah 12.

he rationale for this principle is that a sh ‘vuat bitui applies only with regard to matters that are dependent upon one’s volition, not on those forbidden by the Torah (Chapter 5, Halachah 17). Accordingly, once something is forbidden by an oath, it is no longer a matter dependent on one’s volition. Hence, a sh ‘vuat bitui cannot take effect (Kiryat Sefer).
As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 17, if the person has the first oath nullified, the second oath takes effect.

Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 8:6 states that although one prohibition does not take effect when an object is already prohibited, there are exceptions. One of them is when the second prohibition includes other entities that were not included in the first prohibition (issur kollel). Similarly, in this instance, since the second oath includes something which is not prohibited by the first oath (grapes), it takes effect.

For he cannot eat nine or ten without first eating eight. Hence, the second and third oaths do not take effect, for one oath does not take effect when the objects it concerns are already forbidden.

For each oath was separate. After he took the oath forbidding ten, nine were still permitted. And after he took the oath forbidding nine, eight were still permitted. Hence, the later oaths take effect.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 238:13) states that if the person specifies 10 specific items in his oath, he is not liable if he later reduces their number to eight, for all ten have become forbidden to him.

I.e., he takes an oath against eating an olive-sized portion of each type of fruit. He does not violate his oath unless he eats both of these portions. Since the second oath also includes grapes, it takes effect with regard to the figs based on the principle of issur kollel.

For breaking his first oath.

For to be liable he must eat grapes and figs together. By realizing his transgression, he makes a distinction between the figs he ate and the grapes.

I.e., his first oath involved ten specific items. His second oath involved nine additional items from a larger group. The Ra’avad claims the Rambam’s ruling is a distortion of Sh ‘vuot 28b. See also Rashi and Tosafot who discuss the proper wording of that source.

This version, slightly different from that of the standard printed text, is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The intent is that the second oath included the original ten, plus a second nine. In this instance as well, had he not realized his first transgression, he would have been liable twice for eating the second nine.

This ruling follows the version of Sh ‘vuot 28a suggested by Rabbenu Chananel. The standard published text of the Talmud reverses the ruling. Thus in the instance stated by the Rambam, one would be exempt as the Ra’avad notes. The ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:16) follows that of the standard printed text of the Talmud.
The Rambam’s rationale can be explained as follows: Since the person willfully transgressed by eating the larger loaf, he is liable for lashes. The fact that he inadvertently caused the oath to take effect is not of consequence.
The person is liable for lashes only when he is given a warning before transgressing. From this we see that even if a warning is given conditionally, it is effective.

He is exempt from lashes, nor is he required to bring a sacrifice. As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 6, and notes, this is considered as if he violated an oath due to forces beyond one’s control.
The Rambam’ s rationale is that he did not perform the transgression knowingly. At the time, he partook of the larger loaf, he was not aware that it was forbidden. In this instance as well, the Rambam’s ruling does not follow the standard printed text of the Talmud. Hence there are authorities who differ.

I.e., without awareness of the oath.

For both lashes and a sacrifice as in the previous clause.

For lashes (Ra’avad).

And thus it becomes forbidden only retroactively. Although it was already eaten, when he eats the smaller loaf, his eating the larger loaf becomes a prohibited act.

I.e., not only the large loaf dependent on the. smaller loaf as in the previous instance, but each one was dependent on the other as the Rambam continues to explain.

For lashes as in Halachah 16. Again, this runs contrary to the standard published text of the Talmud and there are other authorities who differ.

As stated in Halachah 17.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2. Note the following halachah.

Hence he is liable for lashes, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 3, 7.

In the Hebrew, the Rambam restates this phrase using slightly different wording.

The double negative implies that an oath will take effect if he does eat. See Tosafot, Sh ‘vuot 36b.

I.e., it is not considered as if each one is an independent oath, because an oath cannot take effect when an object is already forbidden by another oath.

Although the concept of a sh ‘vuat bititi applies both with regard to the past and the future (Chapter 1, Halachah 2), it is not necessary that every sh ‘vuat bitui have both a past and a future component.

As the Rambam continues to explain, the oath is not necessarily false, because the other people may do what he postulated. Rashi (Sh ‘vuot 25a) considers this a false oath. The Siftei Cohen 236:4 quotes Rashi’s view.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh point out several difficulties with the Rambam’s words. Firstly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin, the Rambam does not make such statements explicitly. The only mention of a warning of a doubtful status is in Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:4. From those statements and those here, it appears that the Rambam considers such a warning as significant. There he does not explain the distinction of whether the prohibition is explicitly mentioned in the Torah or not. Also, the prohibition against taking a false oath is explicitly mentioned in the Torah. The Radbaz explains that the intent is that the concept that such an oath is considered as having been taken in vain is not explicit in the Torah and may not be known by an ordinary person.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 236:2) mentions two opinions. One emphasizes that the one who took the oath must certainly fulfill it. For example, if one takes an oath to marry a woman, the oath is considered as having been taken in vain, because the woman may not consent. Nevertheless, if she does consent, the man should keep his word and marry her. The other, however, does not consider this as an oath taken in vain, but rather as a false sh ‘vuat bitui.

The Ma ‘aseh Rokeach maintains that even if the involved parties fulfill the oath, the person taking it is given stripes for rebellious conduct, for he should never have taken such an oath.

For in these instances, he has no control over the other person’s actions.

For he did not know of Shimon’s actions.

The Tur questions the Rambam’s ruling, focusing on the difference between an oath (sh ‘vuah) and a vow (neder). When taking an oath, a person causes his own person to be prohibited against performing a particular action. To use yeshivah terminology, it is an issur gavra; the prohibition is on the person. When taking a vow, by contrast, he places the prohibition on the object. It is an issur cheftzah.
Now when a person takes a vow against a colleague benefiting from his property, there is no difficulty, because he is placing the prohibition on the property. How can he, however, place a prohibition on a colleague’s person? How can his oath take effect?
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 236:3; albeit using slightly different wording). The Turei Zahav 236:7 explains that the Rambam follows the principle stated by the Ramban that an oath expressed using the wording of a vow and a vow expressed using the wording of an oath is binding. The Radbaz, puzzled by the same difficulty, states that this refers to an instance where the colleague answered Amen to the oath.

E. g., earth or spoiled foods.

The Radbaz explains that he is eating them, not because he considers them as food, but in order to quench his pangs of hunger.

An animal that died without ritual slaughter.

An animal with a blemish that would cause it to die within twelve months.

Since he is already forbidden to partake of these entities by the oath taken by the Jewish people as a whole at Sinai, the oath he takes is of no significance (Sh’vuot 22b). See Halachah 11.

Rabbenu Nissim explains the difference between this and the first clause as follows: In the first clause, we assume that the “not eating” he referred to in his oath was not eating foods that people usually eat. These articles were not included in his oath, for there is no reason to forbid them. In the second instance, he included everything that he considers as food in his oath.

Even before he took his oath.

As the Torah states: “Cursed is the man who will not observe the words of this Torah” (Deuteronomy 27:26).

The Radbaz explains that although the Rambam maintains that there is a Scriptural prohibition against eating even less than the measure for which one is liable (Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Asurot 14:2), this is not considered a matter for which one is bound by an oath from Sinai. For that oath includes only those matters which are explicitly mentioned by the Torah and this prohibition is not. There are, however, other Rishonim who do not makes such a distinction. See Siftei Cohen 238:6.

The oath takes effect, because, as stated in the previous halachah, for this quantity, he is not bound by an oath from Sinai.

On the other hand, perhaps, he is not liable, for since he mentioned “eating” in his oath, we assumed that he meant an olive-sized portion.

Perhaps he is liable for, as mentioned above, since such articles are not usually eaten, he may be held liable even for eating less than the usual amount or perhaps we require an olive-sized portion.

As stated in Numbers 6:4.

As stated in Halachah 11.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

I.e., in addition to violating the prohibition against forbidden foods.

We do not say he is required to eat the two together.

Chapter 4, Halachah 11.

Substances explicitly forbidden by the Torah.

This oath does not take effect, because an oath cannot take effect with regard to an object bound by another oath. Since the entire Jewish people are bound by the oath taken at Sinai not to partake of these substances, no other oath involving these entities can take effect (Kessef Mishneh).

Were the person to have taken an oath to eat the forbidden substance, he would be taking an oath in vain, for his oath would be to nullify one of the Torah’s mitzvot. In this instance, however, he is taking an oath to fulfill the mitzvah. This is permitted. See Nedarim Sb; Chapter 11, Halachah 3.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

For the oath is considered as having been taken in vain at the moment it was uttered (see Rashi, Sh ‘vuot 29b).

Due to his first oath.

As stated in the previous halachah.

I.e., within the time period he specified in the oath; alternatively, after the loaf was destroyed or eaten by others. As long as the loaf continues to exist, however, he may fulfill his oath.

For his first oath is binding.

Due to his first oath, as above.

For the reasons stated in Halachah 11.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

For these are all mitzvot that he is required to fulfill.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 178) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 122) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Hilchot Edut 1:1.

Nor is he liable for taking an oath in vain, for at the time he took the oath, it was not in vain. And one may take an oath to observe the mitzvot, so his intent was desirable (Radbaz).

I.e., since performing any one of these acts violates one of the Torah's prohibitions, taking an oath to perform such an act is equivalent to taking an oath to nullify a mitzvah.

A person may not injure himself. Nevertheless, since this prohibition is not explicitly stated in the Torah, it is not considered as one is taking an oath to nullify a mitzvah and the oath takes effect (Radbaz).

If, however, it is not in his capacity to perform this favor, he is liable for taking an oath in vain, but not for failing to fulfill a sh ‘vuat bitui (Radbaz).
Perfonning deeds of kindness fulfills a mitzvah. Nevertheless, since the specific deeds. are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah as mitzvot, the violation of an oath concerning them is considered as a false sh ‘vuat bitui.

When we are commanded to eat matzah. The mitzvah applies only on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan and not throughout the holiday.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 236:5, quoting the Maharam of Padua, Responsa 74) emphasizes that this ruling only applies with regard to positive commandments, but not with regard to the Torah’s prohibitions. Thus if a person took an oath that he would eat all types of meat, we do not say that since the oath takes effect with regard to the kosher meat, it also takes effect with regard to the non-kosher meat.

And thus the oath also prevents one from fulfilling the mitzvah of dwelling in a sukkah on Sukkot.

The Radbaz interprets the oath· as preventing the person from fulfilling the mitzvah of tzitzit. Nevertheless, as the Radbaz himself notes, this interpretation is somewhat problematic, because there is no Scriptural mitzvah to wear tzitzit each day. Instead, the mitzvah is that if one is wearing a fourcornered garment, one must attach tzitzit to it. See Hilchot Tzitzi 3:11. Others interpret this as referring to priests who take such an oath and thus are prevented from wearing the priestly garments while serving in the Temple. As stated in Hilchot Klei HaMikdash I 0:4, wearing such garments is a mitzvah.

And he is liable if the oath is false.

For there is no way that he can keep his word. Thus from the moment he uttered the oath, it was uttered in vain (Radbaz). See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim who questions the similarity between the two instances. It is impossible that a person will not sleep for seven days. He will fall asleep whether he desires to or not. Hence, he should not even try to remain awake. With regard to eating, by contrast, seemingly, the person should wait until he reaches a dangerous state and then he should be allowed to eat.
Based on the commentary of the Tzaphnat Paneach, it is possible to explain the differences in approach as follows: According to Rabbenu Nissim, the prohibition is lifted because of the danger, but it is not nullified entirely. Hence, when a person takes an oath on a matter that involves danger, we lift the prohibition, but only after we have waited until the danger is acutely felt. Hence, the oath not to eat is not necessarily a false oath. The oath not to sleep, by contrast, is definitely false, because it is impossible that he will not sleep.
According to the Rambam, by contrast, since there is danger to life involved, the prohibition is nullified entirely. Hence, even the oath not to eat is considered to-have been taken in vain.

Our translation is based on the commentary of the Radbaz. Even if there is no court to administer this punishment to him, he may eat and sleep whenever he desires. When he is brought before the court, they will subject him to punishment.

For the oath is not considered to have taken effect at all.

Because the meaning of phrases used by people at large determines the ruling with regard to oaths and vows (Radbaz).

For taking an oath in vain.

Actually, according to the scientific data available at present, the sun is far larger than this. Some have tried to reconcile the Rambam’s statements with this data by explaining that the Rambam is speaking about the actual mass of the sun and not the burning energy on its surface. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 10, p. 180.

I.e., one might think that since this is the reality, taking such an oath is considered an oath in vain. The Rambam is clarifying that since people at large may not be aware of this fact, it is not placed in that category.

The Radbaz states that even if the person taking the oath knows that the sun is larger than the earth, he is not liable for taking an oath that is smaller, for people at large do not know this fact.

Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text differs slightly.

Kiryat Sefer emphasizes that the concept of repealing an oath applies only with regard to a sh'vuat bitui that involves the future. With regard to a sh'vuat bitui that involves the past, an oath taken in vain, a sh'vuat hapikadon, or an oath regarding testimony, it does not apply. These oaths cannot be repealed for the transgression was performed at the time they were uttered.
More particularly, as the Radbaz explains, there is a difference between a sh’vuat bitui that involves the future and one that involves the past. For when taking a sh’vuat bitui that involves the past as well, as soon as one utters the oath it is false. Nevertheless, he states that it is customary to repeal even this oath to minimize one’s punishment.

The Rambam uses the passive form, nishal, rather than the active form sho ‘el. Tosafot Yorn Tov, Shabbat 24:5 explains that we use that form because the person asked for the repeal of the oath is asked many questions by the sage.

The sage must be of unique distinction in Torah knowledge to be given the privilege of releasing oaths alone. Nevertheless, he need not have been granted the special semichah extending back to Moses our teacher. For the Torah does not describe the judges with the term elohim in the passage concerning oaths (Rabbenu Nissim).

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro maintains that the Rambam’s words can be interpreted simply: Even three ordinary people can perform this function. The Radbaz, by contrast, maintains that the intent is three Torah scholars who are knowledgeable, but are not worthy of being called sages. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 228:1), Rav Caro, however, rules that the three men repealing the oath must be knowledgeable. He also states that in the present age, there are no sages of the stature to repeal an oath alone.

See Chagigah 10a which states: “The release of vows is hanging in the air and they have nothing to depend on.”

That verse begins: “You shall not take a false oath in My name.”

See·also Chapter 12, Halachah 12.

This is an expression of respect for the greater scholar. The Radbaz states that he has. not seen this restriction observed and questions why this leniency is taken. If the greater scholar grants permission, the lesser scholar may release the oath [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 228:2)]. Nevertheless, after the fact, if a lesser scholar releases an oath even without permission, the release takes effect.

Nor may he send a written request to the court (Radbaz). He may, however, use a translator [Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 10:8); Rama (Yoreh De’ah 228:16)].

For a husband and his wife are considered as the same person.

Nedarim Sb explains that if a person takes the effort to gather a court together, we fear that he will also exaggerate his wife’s statements and the court’s cross-examination of him will not be effective.

I.e., he may not serve as one of the three judges who release the vow [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 234:57)].

See Halachah 1.

I.e., he need not make a formal statement in Hebrew. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 10:8, the Rambam elaborates on this rite:
He tells [the sage or the three ordinary people]: “I took a vow and I changed my mind.” They ask him the reason he changed his mind and he tells them.... The foremost among the three asks: “At the time, you took the vow, had you known that this and this would occur to you, would you have taken the vow?” And he says: “No.”
He asks him: “Do you regret this oath?” and he says: “Yes.” The foremost of the three addresses him with this wording: “It is permitted for you; it is permitted for you; it is permitted for you. It is absolved for you in the heavenly academy and the earthly academy as it is written (Numbers 15:26): ‘And it will be forgiven for the entire congregation of Israel and the stranger who dwells among them for the entire nation has acted inadvertently.’”

The Torah gave them this power. See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 13, for an explanation of this issue.

The Radbaz explains that the terms “nullify” or “uproot” imply being overpowered by a stronger authority without reason. For the woman is placed under the control of her husband or father and with or without reason, he may nullify her oath even against her will. His authority overpowers the oath, as it were. “Permit,” “release,” or the like, by contrast, imply that a decision is made on the basis of logic and the oath is revoked as if it never existed. See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit., where he discusses the differences between these two terms.

Thus two relatives may sit on the same “court” that releases vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah.

Although they are not acceptable to serve on the same court with regard to cases of law.

In contrast to judgments of law which may be rendered only during the day.

In contrast to judgments that are rendered while sitting.

When it is forbidden to render judgments (Hilchot Shabbat 23:14).

If, however, it is not for the sake of the Sabbath, it may not be released on the Sabbath, because it is forbidden to perform any activity for the weekdays on the Sabbath (Radbaz).

Which causes the oath to take effect, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 228:20) states that Reuven must “be notified.” The Rama maintains that he must also consent to the oath being released. The Shulchan Aruch also states that this law applies only when the oath was taken in response to a favor the. person performed for him.

Lest Shimon see Reuven not paying attention to the oath and think that he violated the Torah’s prohibition. Alternatively, so that Reuven will be embarrassed and not treat oaths and vows frivolously [Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 5:4)].
The Radbaz and the Hagahot Maimoniot state that, after the fact, if Reuven had the oath released outside Shimon’s presence, the release is binding. The Radbaz, however, states that if the oath involves financial claims, the person in whose presence the oath was taken must be present.

Who are not obligated in the observance of mitzvot. Nedarim 65a states that since Moses took an oath in the presence of Jethro, his father-in-law, to stay in Midian, he had to have the oath nullified in Jethro’s presence. At that time, Jethro was not Jewish.

The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah concludes “or provide benefit for him.” This appears to be· a printing error; it is not found in manuscripts or early printings.

I.e., we do not say that since the respect due God’s name will be compromised, the oath may not be released.

At least three (Radbaz, based on Gittin 46a).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 228:21) state that we may release the. oath or vow if those people consent. The Rama states that the oath can never be released. The difference between these rulings depends on the rationale for this decision. Rabbenu Nissim explains that taking an oath based on the understanding of others reinforces the severity of the oath and prevents it from being repealed. Others explain that the person is merely substituting the others· for himself. Just as ordinarily an oath is dependent on his own understanding, now it is dependent on that of others.

For we assume the others would agree not to enforce the oath when doing so would prevent the fulfillment of a mitzvah (Tosafot, Gittin 36a).

I.e., the person who took the oath.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that he misinterpreted the passage from Gittin, loc. cit. The Ra’avad continues, explaining that in the situation described by the Rambam, it is preferable for the person to teach without charging a wage. Moreover, he is not responsible for the Torah education of those children and hence, the motivation to have the oath rescinded is not this.
The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam’s ruling, noting (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 1 :2) that a sage is obligated to teach all the students, not only the members of his family. The Radbaz explains that it is preferable that he work for a wage than do so gratuitously, for a person who does not receive a wage for his work will not apply himself sufficiently.

I.e., they try to influence him to change his mind and express his regret.

The Ma ‘aseh Rokeach explains that we are talking about a situation in which the person feels uncomfortable with keeping the oath in the future, but does not regret having made it. In such a situation, the oath cannot be repealed [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 228:7)]. Therefore the court, as the Rambam illustrates, explains the negative consequences of the oath so that the person will feel genuine regret.

I.e., people will spread rumors that the children were conceived adulterously and are illegitimate.

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:12.

For example, Nedarim 66b states that we warn him that paying the woman’s ketubah is a significant expense.

See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 7:1 which mentions these obligations.

See Hilchot Shabbat 30:10; Hilchot Sh’vitat Yorn Tov 6:16,18 which detail how partaking of these foods leads to the fulfillment of these mitzvot.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that we do encourage the person to ask for the repeal of an oath if the factor that caused the oath was a reasonable probability. To support his argument, he refers to Nedarim 64b which states that God encouraged Moses to nullify his vow not to return to Egypt, telling him that the people who caused him to flee had died. The Talmud explains that the individuals concerned, Datan and A viram, had not actually died; they merely became impoverished and “a poor person is considered as if he died.” Since poverty is a frequent occurrence, it was appropriate for God to encourage Moses to ask to have his oath repealed. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam would also accept this principle, but the Kessef Mishneh differs.

I.e., he regretted taking the oath not to benefit from him, because he realized that he could become the city scribe.

Otherwise, asking for the repeal of the first oath would violate the second oath (Kessef Mishneh).

And the second oath will not take effect until the first oath is released. The Siftei Cohen 228:30 writes that even after the fact, an oath cannot be nullified until it takes effect. This refers to the repeal of a vow or an oath by a sage. A father or a husband, by contrast, may nullify a vow before it takes effect. See Hilchot Nedarim 12:12.

For as above, the second oath cannot be repealed until it takes effect. See the Radbaz who offers explanations why the Rambam includes this and the following halachah though seemingly they could easily be derived from the previous one.

Even though it is a mitzvah, a nazirite vow can be repealed. See Hilchot Nazirut 3:10.

For even though he is not liable for that second oath until the first oath is repealed, the second oath is not nullified. Instead, it is valid and thus can take effect after the first oath is nullified.

The Rambam maintains that since this oath is prevented from taking effect only because of another oath, one can ask for it to be repealed. Based on this view, the Radbaz maintains that one may have all the relevant oaths repealed with one request. There are, however, other views (the Ramban), who maintain that since the second and third oaths have not taken effect, they cannot be repealed. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 228:46) cites the Ramban’s view, while the Siftei Cohen 228:110 mentions that of the Rambam.

Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

Once the court begins administering the lashes, the oath cannot be repealed (Radbaz).