Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Rambam describes each of these terms in the subsequent halachot in this chapter.

I.e., a sheep or a goat.

I.e., a cow.

I.e., each animal is considered according to its category. It will take more time to deal with a large animal than a smaller one and the time factor is adjusted accordingly.

The Rambam’s ruling favors the opinion of Shmuel over Rav. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro explains that generally, we follow the principle that the halachah follows Rav’s approach with regard to the Torah prohibitions. Nevertheless; in this instance, since there are other Sages who support Shmuel’s view, the Rambam favors his opinion. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 23:2), in addition to the Rambam’s view, Rav Yosef Caro quotes Rashi’s position which rules much more stringently with regard to shehiyah for a fowl. The Rama states that the common custom is to disqualify any ritual slaughter involving shehiyah of the slightest time for both animals and fowl.

Although the Ra’avad and Rav Moshe HaCohen dispute the Rambam’s ruling, it is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 23 :3). The Rama reiterates the stringency stated above.

In addition to the Rambam’s view, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 23:5) quotes the view of Rashi cited by the Tur that as long as the cutting of the signs is not completed, shehiyah can disqualify an animal. Hence, as an initial and preferred option, one should show respect for this view. The Rama rules even more stringently, stating that even after the fact, the slaughter is disqualified. For that reason, he continues, if the greater part of the signs are cut, but the animal is lingering alive, rather than cut the signs further, one should hit it on its head to kill it.

For until half of the windpipe is cut, the animal is not considered as treifah.

He cannot return and correct the slaughter, for the animal is already considered as a nevelah.

Halachah 19.

As stated in Halachah 5.

As stated in Halachah 6.

If the gullet was perforated, the slaughter is unacceptable. If not, it is acceptable.

Theoretically, he could also cut the windpipe in the same place and complete the slaughter in that manner. Nevertheless, our Sages advised against doing so, for in this way, it is much easier to perforate the gullet when cutting the windpipe and thus he might disqualify the slaughter unnecessarily (Kessef Mishneh). See the Turei Zahav 23:6 who offers another rationale. As mentioned above, the Rama rules that whenever one waits during the slaughter of a fowl or an animal, the slaughter is disqualified.
A parallel law - slaughtering the animal in a different place - does not apply with regard to an animal. For to slaughter the animal, he must slit the gullet and we fear that he will cut at a place where it had been perforated previously (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., he should cut the gullet off at its top and/or bottom and turn it inside out. If he is able to find a drop of blood, he can assume that it is perforated and it is unacceptable. An external examination of the gullet is not sufficient for the surface of the gullet is red and a drop of blood will not be noticeable. Its inner surface, however, is skin-colored and the blood will be noticed (Kessef Mishneh).

Chullin 20b states that this term is derived from the word chuldah meaning “weasel,” i.e., an animal that hides in the foundation of homes. Similarly, chaladah involves “hiding” the knife when slaughtering; i.e., inserting it in a way that the blade is not open to the eye. Implied is that the proper way to slaughter is for the slaughterer to hold the animal or fowl with its neck upward and to draw the knife back and forth across the neck. Diagram

Certainly, this applies when he inserted the knife below both signs and slaughtered the animal by moving the knife back and forth while pointed upward (Siftei Cohen 24:6).

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Y osef Caro quotes other authorities who explain that this is referring to a situation where the person tied the cloth around the animal’s neck, attached it with wax, or the like. If, however, he merely loosely spread the cloth over the animal, the slaughter is acceptable. He concludes, however, that the Rambam’s opinion should be respected. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 24:8), he rules according to the other views, but states: “One should show concern for his (the Rambam’s) opinion at the outset.”

The term doreis means “prey” or “strike,” i.e., killing with a blow, rather than drawing back and forth as is required for ritual slaughter.

The Maggid Mishneh gives two interpretations of the term hagramah: a) “lift up,” as in II Kings 9:13; i.e., he lifted the knife above its proper place; and b) “tip,” as in Bava Batra 88b; i.e., he tipped the knife upward.

The Rambam speaks only with regard to the windpipe, because he defines hagramah as slaughtering the animal in an improper place. If one would slit the gullet above the proper place, the animal· would become disqualified as a treifah immediately (Kessef Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh states that the windpipe is made up of many rings. Over the top ring, there is a flap (cap) of flesh which is slanted. (This is the area of the larynx. See also Chapter 1, Halachah 7, and notes.) At the top of this flap, there are two kernel-like buttons of flesh. As long as the slaughterer leaves some portion of these kernels intact, the slaughter is acceptable. Diagram

The Rambam derived this concept from a comparison to the laws of shehiyah mentioned in Halachah 5. The same concept applies if one slaughters more than half the signs appropriately and then completes the slaughter through chaladah. Indeed, it can be explained that the Rambam does not mention this law with regard to chaladah, because it is obvious. For in chaladah, the slaughter is essentially correct; it is only the manner in which one inserts the knife that is unacceptable (Kessef Mishneh).
As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 5, there are authorities who differ and disqualify the slaughter. Similarly, with regard to the laws at hand, there are opinions that are more stringent, except with regard to hagramah. In that instance, they accept the leniency mentioned by the Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 24:12) quotes both of the views without stating which should be followed. The Rama goes further and states that it is customary to rule stringently even with regard to hagramah, and even with regard to fowl.

This addition is necessary, for as stated above, if the gullet is perforated, the slaughter is disqualified.

For the majority of the windpipe was cut in an acceptable manner and the preliminary cutting did not cause the animal to be considered as a treifah.

Here also, the majority of the windpipe is cut in an acceptable manner. The fact that the two thirds were not cut directly after each other is not significant. Diagram

For the majority of the windpipe has not been slit in an acceptable manner.

The rationale for the Rambam’s words has been discussed at length by the commentaries, because with regard to chaladah, in Halachah 10, he writes that there is an unresolved question whether the slaughter is disqualified, while here he appears to say that it is definitely unacceptable. The Rivosh (Responsum 187), the Kessef Mishneh, the Maggid Mishneh, and the Siftei Cohen 24:18 all offer lengthy - and somewhat forced - explanations to attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction. The core of the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh is that since the majority ·of the windpipe was slit in the proper place, it is not disqualified because a portion was not.

The term ikur means “uproot.” The Kessef Mishneh states that, according to the Rambam, the fact that the signs have slipped from their place does not cause the animal to be deemed a treifah (see, however, Chapter 9, Halachah 21, and notes). Nevertheless, such a condition disqualifies the animal, for it is impossible for the ritual slaughter to be carried out in the proper manner. Diagram

For the slaughter was already completed in an acceptable manner. Compare to the following halachah.

This applies even with regard to a fowl. Although it is only necessary for one of the signs of a fowl to be cut in the appropriate manner, the other one must be fit to be slit in an appropriate manner (Kessef Mishneh).

In which instance it would disqualify it.

In which instance, it would be acceptable.

With regard to a fowl, the sign in question is the only sign slit. With regard to an animal, the other sign must have been slaughtered effectively.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 24:18) rule more stringently and maintain that it is necessary to slaughter another animal, displace its signs afterwards, and compare the two. Only if they are similar is the slaughter accepted. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch continues, stating that, at present, we are not expert at making this comparison and hence, forbid an animal whenever such a condition arises.

Because the slaughterer will hold the signs in the proper position by hand.

And we do not know whether the slaughterer held it by hand or not.

Since an animal is forbidden during its lifetime, its meat is permitted only when we are certain that the slaughter was acceptable (Radbaz).

The addition is made on the basis of the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh.

I.e., even though the animal still has a certain vestige of vitality, it is considered as if it has died already and it imparts ritual impurity as a nevelah does (Hilchat Shaar Avot HaTumah 2:1).

In this and the following instance, the Siftei Cohen 33:4 rules that the animal is a treifah and not a nevelah.

If, however, the gullet was perforated at a higher point in the neck (see Halachah 12), it is considered as a treifah and not a nevelah.

I.e., skin-colored.

For the one that is not perforated is sufficient to protect the animal to the degree that it will survive. This leniency applies when the inner membrane is perforated due to sickness. If, however, it is perforated due to a thorn, we fear that the outer membrane may also be perforated, but that perforation cannot be detected [see Halachah 22; Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 33:4)].

As above, if the gullet was perforated at a higher point in the neck (see Halachah 12), it is considered as a treifah and not a nevelah (Kessef Mishneh).

With regard to other organs which have two membranes, e.g., the brain and the lungs, the animal is not considered as treifah unless the holes correspond to each other. In this instance, however, the ruling is much more severe because the gullet is stretched and becomes extended. Thus even if the place of the holes do not correspond, they can match each other at times [Kessef Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 33:4)].

For as the gullet expands, it is possible that the scab will open (Rashi, Chullin 42a).

The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 33:9) rules more leniently, stating that unless a trace of blood is detected on the outer side, we do not disqualify an animal because a thorn was implanted in the gullet.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 33:9) rules that this applies even if the thorn is lying widthwise, as long as it is not implanted in the membrane. [Indeed, some versions of the Mishneh Torah substitute widthwise for lengthwise.]

And yet do not suffer any internal damage.

Because, as stated above (see Halachot 8, 19), since its outer membrane is red, a trace of blood will not be obvious.

I.e., the slit goes from side to side in a manner in which the majority of the cavity is slit. The Rambam (based on Chullin 44a, b) is emphasizing that this measure disqualifies an animal even if when including the thickness of the flesh of the windpipe, the slit would not cover the greater part of the windpipe.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7, and notes.

An Italian coin, frequently used in the Talmudic era. In his commentary to the Mishnah (Mikveot 9:5), the Rambam states that an isar is the weight of four barley corns. Diagram

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 33:3) speaks of perforating the windpipe “like a sifter.”

In his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 34:3), Rav Yosef Caro writes that as long as the flesh between the holes is not larger than the holes themselves, it is included together with them in this measure.

For the entire windpipe of a fowl may not be the size of an isar (Rashi. Chullin 45a). Diagram

The addition is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. For each particular fowl, this measure is calculated individually (Maggid Mishneh).

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who quotes the Tur (Yoreh De ‘ah 34) who explains that in contrast to the previous halachah which speaks of a hole the area of an isar, this halachah is speaking about a hole through which an isar can be slipped through on its side. It must be emphasized that the Rambam’s ruling depends on the interpretation of Chullin 54a advanced by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Rashi advances a different interpretation of that passage on which basis, the Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 34:5-6) quotes both opinions without stating which is favored.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rashi who explains that we rule more stringently if the windpipe is slit across its width, for the stress of breathing will extend the windpipe and cause the slit to expand. This does not apply when it is split lengthwise.

In a manner that would disqualify the animal.

Were it to have been perforated afterwards, the perforation would not be significant.

For it is apparent that the first hole was also made after the animal's death. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 34:9) states that we are not proficient in inspecting the animal in this way and should disqualify it in all situations.

The five factors mentioned in the previous chapter and how to prepare a knife [Kessef Mishneh; Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 1 :2)].

If, however, a wise man supervises his actions, the slaughter is acceptable, as indicated by Halachah 5. The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as ruling that such a person may slaughter in the presence of a wise man even as an initial and preferred option. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 1:3) accepts this ruling, but the Rama does not.

There is no factor that we see that would cause us to disqualify the slaughter. Nevertheless, since it is highly probable that he slaughtered the animal in a way that disqualified it and rendered it a neveilah, the animal is prohibited and placed in this category.

Moreover, even if afterwards, he is taught the laws of ritual slaughter and states that he observed them when he slaughtered the animal, the ruling is not revised. Since he did not know the laws at that time, we fear that he did not observe them (Kessef Mishneh).

This training process is still observed in the present age. Even though a person is familiar with the laws of ritual slaughter, he must first undergo apprenticeship under the guidance of a master and receive authorization to slaughter [Rama (Yoreh De’ ah 1:1)].

I.e., after the fact, since he knows the laws, we do not disqualify the slaughter.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ ah 1:1) states that woman should not be allowed to slaughter as an initial and preferred option.

This refers to Canaanite servants whose Halachic status is the same as women. The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 1) rules that in general servants may not serve as ritual slaughterers. See Siftei Cohen 1 :2.

See Halachah 9 which grants a person with only one of these handicaps the right to slaughter.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 1 :5) states that this refers to a child who does not know how to maneuver his hands for ritual slaughter. If he knows how to maneuver his hands he may be given an animal to slaughter at the outset. The Rama emphasizes that even so, the child may only slaughter in the presence of others. He may not slaughter alone. Furthermore, the Rama states that it is not customary for a person to receive authorization to slaughter until he is eighteen. The Siftei Cohen l :25, however, rules more stringently.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah l :8) states that one who becomes as drunk as Lot (see Genesis, ch. 19) may not slaughter. One who has not reached this stage of inebriation may slaughter at the outset. The Rama rules more stringently, stating that a person should never slaughter when drunk, for it is likely that he will disqualify the slaughter.

With regard to his proficiency in the laws of ritual slaughter.

Those mentioned in the previous chapter and how to check a knife; there is no need for him to be knowledgeable with regard to all the particulars of the laws of ritual
slaughter.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that when there is no alternative (see the following halachah), we rely on the principle that most of those who slaughter are knowledgeable regarding its. Jaws. Nevertheless, in this instance, since we have the opportunity to clarify the matter, we do so.

With regard to questions of business law, we rely on the presumption that an agent will perform the mission with which he was charged. We do not, however, accept this principle with regard to questions involving the Torah’s prohibitions (Hilchat Terumot 4:6). Nevertheless, even if we know for certain that the agent did not slaughter the animal, we consider it as permitted because of the reason stated by the Rambam.

And when there is no alternative we can rely on this presumption.
From the statements of the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 1:1), it appears that there is a slight difference between the present age and the Talmudic period. In the Talmudic era, most people were proficient in both the laws and practice of ritual slaughter. In the present age, this applies only to those who are occupied professionally in this field. Nevertheless, the laws remain the same, for we assume that only a person who is knowledgeable will actually slaughter animals.

We are not speaking about a waste dump in the market place. In such an instance, all opinions would agree that the animal is forbidden. Instead, we are speaking about a situation where it was found in the marketplace at large. Chullin 12b records a dispute between two Sages concerning this matter and the Rambam chooses the more stringent ruling.

For the circumstances indicate that it was discarded.
As mentioned, there is a difference of opinion in the Talmud regarding this issue. Most Rishonim follow the more lenient view and rule that if the slaughtered animal is found in an ordinary place in the marketplace or in a waste dump at home, it is permitted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 1:4) also follows this view.

Another person should recite the blessing for him [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 1:7)].

As long as he has the ability to speak, he is not considered to be intellectually underdeveloped.
Rabbenu Asher explains that such a person should not slaughter as an initial and preferred option, because there is a difficulty with his recitation of the blessing. For a person must recite a blessing in a manner that enables him to hear it and that is impossible for such an individual. Indeed, the Jerusalem Talmud (Terumot I :6) rules that a person who is dumb should not separate terumah at the outset for that reason [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 1 :6)].

For we fear that he will err and not detect his error. The Siftei Cohen 1 :35 quotes opinions that rule that a blind person should not slaughter even when others are watching him.

In this instance as well, the Siftei Cohen I :36 mentions views that maintain that a person who was never able to see should not slaughter. Even after the fact, one should not partake of his slaughter.

And is well-versed in the laws of ritual slaughter [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin I : 1)].

One might think that the slaughter of a minor has an advantage, because a minor’s worship of idols is not significant.

Thus a gentile’s slaughter is not recognized by Scriptural Law. See, however, the following halachah. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that the reason the animal is forbidden is that, in general, when a gentile slaughters, his intent is that the animal is an offering to his false deity, it is, however, permissible to benefit from the animal. We do not consider it as a sacrifice to idols (Chullin 13b; see Chapter 2, Halachah 2), because we assume the gentile is not really sincere in his worship. Instead, he is merely mimicking his ancestors.
Rabbeinu Asher differs and explains that the Scriptural command for ritual slaughter states: “And you shall slaughter,” implying that the slaughterer must be a Jew. Hence, a gentile is inherently disqualified; his thoughts are of no consequence. See the Siftei Cohen 2:2 and the Turei Zahav 2:1 who discuss this issue.

E. g., a resident alien who accepts the Seven Universal Laws Commanded to Noah and his descendants (see Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 14:7).

According to the Rambam, if he does not serve false deities and knows the laws of ritual slaughter, his slaughter is acceptable according to Scriptural Law.
One might ask: If so, why is an animal slaughtered by a child a nevelah? A child is not liable for the service of false deities. The Lechem Mishneh answers that ultimately, the child will grow up and worship false deities.

See the Siftei Cohen 2:27 who maintains that if the Jew slit the greater part of the gullet and windpipe, the slaughter is acceptable even if the gentile completed it.

Thus if a gentile slit the greater part of the windpipe or any portion of the gullet, the slaughter is disqualified [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 2:10)].

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim l: 18 for another application of this principle.

For, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 11, even if the windpipe is half slit because of other factors, it can be slaughtered acceptably.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:9, there is a concept of an apostate with regard to one transgression, i.e., “a person who has made a fixed practice of willfully violating a certain transgression [to the extent that] he is accustomed to transgressing and his deeds are public knowledge... provided he does so with the intent of angering God.”

Although he repeatedly violates that particular transgression, we do not assume that he will not slaughter correctly.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro cites Chullin 4a which states that as long as if the person would choose the kosher meat if given a choice whether to partake of it or non-kosher meat - even if he would partake of the non-kosher meat if kosher meat were not available - it is permitted to partake of an animal he slaughtered. The Kessef Mishneh continues, explaining that as long as one does not transgress with the intent of angering God, one may partake of an animal he slaughtered. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 2:5), he rules that an apostate who transgresses with the intent of angering God resembles a gentile and his slaughter is inherently unacceptable.
Kin‘at Eliyahu notes that there is some difficulty with the Kessef Mishneh ‘s interpretation, because Hilchot Teshuvah specifically states that a person is deemed an apostate only. when his transgression is performed with the intent of angering God.

Although we do not assume that he will definitely transgress, it is logical to presume that he will not be careful in his observance.

See the conclusion of Hilchot Shabbat.

Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8.

See Hilchot Edut 10:1-3.

In this instance, the Rambam does not even require him to have another person observe him. Since his disregard for Jewish observance is not as severe as that of an apostate, he is allowed to slaughter on his own.

I.e., he would not slaughter the animal in an invalid way when it would be just as easy for him to slaughter it in an acceptable way.

Tzadok and Beotus were two of the greatest students of Antigonus of Socho. As the Rambam states in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 1:3), after they heard Antigonus teach: “Do not be as servants who serve their master for the sake of receiving a reward,” they forsook Jewish practice, saying: “Is it just that we labor without receiving a reward?” They began splinter sects with the intent of swaying the people after them. At first, they sought to abandon Jewish practice entirely. They saw, however, the people would not accept this and so they focused their complaints on the Oral Law, arguing that although the Written Law was of Divine origin, the Oral Law was not. Their intent, however, was to deny the entire Torah.

The Rambam appears to be saying that there is no inherent difficulty with these individuals slaughtering an animal. The only question is whether or not they slaughtered correctly. Hence, when it is possible to verify that the slaughter was performed correctly, the animal is permitted. They are not placed in the same category as apostates. Kin‘at Eliyahu adds that, based on the previous halachah, these Tzadukim must also be Sabbath observant.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this point among the Sages (Chullin 17a). The Rambam follows Rabbi Akiva’s perspective.

The obligation to offer as a sacrifice an animal which one desires to ritually slaughter.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1

Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 4:8-9.

All the 70 conditions the Rambam mentions in Chapter 10 are included in these eight general categories.

These tenns are defined in this and the following chapters.

And thus all are judged with the severity appropriate for questions of Scriptural Law.

Exodus 22:30 speaks of “meat torn apart in the field.”

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De ‘ah 29) questions the Rambam’s statements, for since these other conditions are considered questions of Scriptural Law, whenever a doubt arises, we rule stringently. The Turei Zahav 29:1 explains that the severity involving derisah concerns a sefek sefeikah, a condition of multiple doubt. Although generally, we tend to leniency in such situations, an exception is made in this instance. See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh which offers several resolutions to this question.

As will be explained in the following halachot, the laws of derisah do not concern only the wounds to the victim’s organs that the attacking animal causes. Instead, the concern is that even a superficial wound can cause the victim to die, because there is poison in the attacker’s claws that will affect the victim. (Exactly, what that means in contemporary terms is difficult to understand. Some have suggested that the attacker’s claws are infected with bacteria which could be considered comparable to poison. That explanation, however, cannot be easily resolved with some of the points in the subsequent halachot.)
The intent of this and the following halachah is that “the poison” of certain animals or fowl is effective in harming some and not in harming others.

An ox.

If, however, it is attacked by smaller animals of prey, even a tiger, we assume that its strength will enable it to defend itself (Kessef Mishneh). The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 57:1) follows a more stringent opinion which rules that the laws of derisah apply when any predator larger than a wolf attacks a large animal.

A sheep or a goat.

We have quoted the definition of this term given by Rashi. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bava Batra 2:5), the Rambam defines the term in Arabic as alnamas, a small predator.

See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 57:5) which discusses the question whether leniency can be granted when a cat enters a chicken coop.

For it can harm fowl larger than itself.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 57:3) qualifies this matter, saying that these laws do not apply when a hawk attacks a chicken. The Tur and the Rama, however, state that this applies only to large chickens, but not to smaller ones.

Here also, the Tur and the Rama loc. cit.) add a further point, stating that the laws of derisah apply with regard to a falcon regardless of the size of the bird it attacks.

Compare to the following halachah. The Kessef Mishneh explains that in this halachah, the Rambam is not concerned with the question of whether the attacker perforated one of the organs whose perforation disqualifies an animal. For if so, it would not have been necessary for the Rambam to mention derisah. If such an organ was perforated, even a large animal is disqualified. Instead, the intent is whether the “poison” of the attacker is sufficient to kill the victim.

This refers to a beast. The laws of derisah apply, by contrast, when a fowl attacks with its feet (Turei Zahav 57:10; Siftei Cohen 57:19).

Needless to say, if it delivers a mortal wound with its hindlegs, the victim is disqualified. Here, however, we are speaking about “poisoning” an animal through derisah and that applies only when it attacks with its foreleg and with its claws [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 57:6)].

With regard to this and wounding with its legs, the Shulehan Aruch (loc. cit.) states, “they are no different than a thorn,” i.e., there is no question of “poison.”

For then it will not release its poison.

For it releases its “poison” only when it withdraws its claws and only when it is alive.
For this same reason, if ritual slaughter is performed on the animal that is being attacked before the attacking animal removes its claws, the slaughtered animal is permitted [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 57:8)].

As explained in the following halachah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 57:18) mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if such an examination can be relied upon in the present age. The Rama rules that we should be stringent, not rely on the examination, and hence, declare any animal that was attacked - or there is a question whether it was attacked - forbidden.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro explains that the fact that the flesh turns red indicates that the poison from the predator has penetrated the animal’s flesh and will ultimately, cause the intestines to be perforated. The Kessef Mishneh questions, however, why the Rambam mentions only the intestines. Since - as mentioned in the previous halachah - it is necessary to inspect the entire body, seemingly (and indeed, the Tur rules accordingly), the same laws would apply if red marks were found on the flesh above any organ whose perforation can disqualify the animal. He explains that perhaps this is indeed the Rambam’ s intent and he mentions the intestines only because there are many disqualifying factors involved with them. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 57:16), he quotes the Rambam’s wording without emendation. The Siftei Cohen 57:38) quotes the Tur’s ruling.

Here also we assume that the poison will ultimately cause the organ below the flesh to become perforated (Kessef Mishneh).

Here too the rationale is that once the poison has begun to have an effect, it will ultimately penetrate through and perforate the entire organ. There is, however, a difference between the signs and the other organs. With regard to the other organs, as soon as the flesh above the organ is affected, the animal is considered treifah. With regard to the signs, they themselves must be affected. It is possible to explain that the signs are tougher and more resilient than the other organs. Hence, the fact that the flesh above them is affected is no proof that they will also be affected (Kessef Mishneh).

This applies even when a small portion of the windpipe becomes red. Although a perforation in the windpipe does not disqualify it unless it is the size of the majority of its cavity (Chapter 3, Halachah 23), we assume that the poison of the predator will ultimately cause such a perforation (Siftei Cohen 57:40).

As mentioned in Halachah 8. As stated in the notes to that halachah, there are authorities - and this is the custom cited by the Rama - it is customary in the present era not to rely on this examination and to regard any animal that was attacked - or even if there is a doubt whether it was attacked - as treifah.

An animal does not release its poison until the claw is removed (Halachah 7), and is this instance, it is implanted in the victim. We, nevertheless, disqualify the victim, for in this instance, we say that the attacker released its poison when it lost its claw (Turei Zahav 57:21). Alternatively, we fear that the victim was also attacked with another claw and that claw was removed (Rambam LeAm).

And the claw which had been implanted in the wall became stuck in it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 57:14) emphasizes that this ruling is followed even if the claw is dried out (and thus is unlikely to have come from an animal recently).

And that is why they are clamoring.

The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 57:9) states that this applies when we do not see that he attacked others. If, however, we see that he attacked others, we do not assume that his rage subsided.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 57:11) states that this applies only when we see that he did not attack any animals. If, however, we saw an attack, the fact that he and the victims were silent is not significant.

For there is a multiple doubt involved. Perhaps the predator entered and perhaps it did not. Even if it entered, perhaps it wounded the animal and perhaps it did not (see Chullin 53b).

I.e., it scratched itself and caused itself a wound. We must, however, check to see that the gullet was not perforated (Radbaz). The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 57:13) states in the present age we do not rely on our inspection and therefore forbid any fowl that comes to us with a neck that is bleeding.