Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

See Hilchot Arachin 8:1, Hilchot Kilayim 2:15, and Hilchot Rotzeach 8:6, where referenceis made to various services performed by the court at that time.

The commentaries note that the court cannot actually compel a woman to drink the bitterwater. All it can do is issue a warning so that she will become forbidden to her husband, asstated in Chapter 1, Halachot 10:11.

I.e., although the court pays attention to this matter in Adar, it is possible for a sotah tobe compelled to drink at any time of the year. See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 7:11, whichstates that it was customary to have a sotah drink the bitter water during Chol HaMo’edwhen there will be many people visiting the Temple.

See Halachah 7.

The commentaries note that there is no verse in the Torah that uses the wording cited bythe Rambam. There are, however, several from which it could be implied that only one sotah should be compelled to drink at one time.

Her original refusal to drink the waters is interpreted as an admission of guilt thatcannot be retracted.

For every scroll must be written for the sake of the woman who drinks its waters, asstated in Chapter 3, Halachah 8. See also Halachah 11 of this chapter.

The ‘‘ash heap’’ was a place in the Temple Courtyard, east of the altar, where sacrifices that became disqualified were burned. Rashi (Sotah 20a) states that this offering also had to be burned.

She is not compelled to drink them. At the outset, their purpose was to determine whetheror not she was innocent. Through her admission, that determination was made (Rashi,Sotah 20a).

. Although God’s name was blotted out in it, this does not endow it with holiness.

As must all sacrifices.

Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 2:4), the Rambam quotes adifferent proof-text as the source for this concept.

I.e., in that order.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rashi (Sotah 17b) as stating that this means without having the lines of the scroll ruled (sirtut) before it is written.

For a more detailed definition of the term the Rambam uses, see Hilchot Tefillin 1:6.

I.e., a person other than a priest.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:3, the Rambam mentions Arabic terms for these words. Rav Kapach explains the meaning as follows: Kumos and kankantum are two similar substances, yellow and green powders, which when mixed with gallnut juice produce a black substance. Others translate kumos as gum or resin and kankantum as vitriol or atramentum sutorum.

See Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, which describes how ink was made.

Sotah 18a states that the decision in this instance resolves around the question of bererah — i.e., the idea that retroactively it can be considered that an activity was performedoriginally with an intent that becomes clarified only afterwards.
There is an unresolved debate among the Sages if the principle of bererah is accepted withregard to questions of Scriptural Law, and therefore, the more stringent approach is taken. In this instance, this implies that God’s name should not be blotted out a second time.
Note the Minchat Chinuch, who asks how this questionable drinking of the water isconsidered sufficient to release a woman from the prohibition she incurred after violatingher husband’s warning and entering into privacy with the man in question. Note also that Halachah 2 states that two sotot should not be forced to drink at the same time.

This is not a continuation of the previous subject, but with an instance in which water was prepared for one sotah.

We do not say that God’s name should not be blotted out a second time because of onewoman.

For at the outset, the woman must drink all the water in which her scroll was blotted out.

Sotah (ibid.) also leaves this as an unresolved question. Since there is no binding decisionthat it is acceptable, the Rambam rules as above, that one may not blot out God’s name insuch a situation.

Since it came from the basin— and was measured in a sacred vessel— it must be usedon the day on which it was taken. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin, ch. 3.

Mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachah 10.

Although in some halachic contexts (see Hilchot Shechitah 14:13) ash is considered tobe dust, in this instance, the phrase ‘‘from the dust that is on the earth of the Tabernacle’’implies a similarity between dust and earth (Sotah 16a).

Our translation follows Sotah 16b. The Meiri states that this refers to rotten wood.

I.e., that it existed there previously (Sotah 15b).

Although this deviates from the order stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 15, Sotah 19astates that this order is also acceptable, after the fact.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 6:5. In such an instance, although the meal has beendesignated for use as a sacrifice, since it has not been placed in a sacred vessel, its actualsubstance has not become consecrated.

With the money received from redeeming the first one.

Since it was placed in a sacred vessel, it became consecrated. Consequently, once itbecame impure it must be burned, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei Hamukdashim 19:1.

The meal offering must be burned, because the offering of a sotah is acceptable only when it is being used to test the fidelity of a woman. Once she has admitted her guilt, that is unnecessary.

See Halachah 4.

In this instance as well, the question of the woman’s fidelity has been clarified.

As stated above, the purpose of the offering is to test the woman’s fidelity and thusallow her to resume relations with her husband. If that objective is no longer relevant, as inthe latter two instances mentioned in the halachah, the offering is not brought.

Many authorities maintain that a printer’s error has crept into the text and the textshould read ‘‘the remainder is eaten.’’ Nevertheless, the majority favor the version statedabove.

As stated in Leviticus 6:15, a meal offering brought by a priest should not be eaten, butinstead burned on the altar.

The meal offerings brought by priests are offered on the altar entirely, without a fistful of meal being separated. For a meal offering brought by a non-priest to be acceptable, by contrast, the fistful of meal must be separated and burned as a distinct entity. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:12.

The term used by the Rambam (and his source, Sotah 6b) refers to hazamah, when thetestimony of the witnesses is disqualified because others testify that they and the witnesseswere together in another place at the time the witnesses say the act took place. Seemingly, the same law would apply if the witnesses’ testimony was disqualified on other grounds.

It need not be redeemed. The rationale is that it was consecrated based on a falsepremise— that the woman had entered into privacy with the man in question. Wheneveran entity is consecrated on a false premise, the consecration is not binding.

The commentaries have questioned why the Rambam quotes the derivation of thisconcept from the Midrash (Sifre Zuta), instead of citing the Talmud (Keritot 9b), whichcites a different proof-text.

Gilgul Sh’vuah implies that when taking an oath on one claim, a person may be required to include a variety of related claims in that oath. See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:12.

For even if she did engage in relations with another man at that time, she would not beforbidden to her yavam (Hilchot Yibbum 2:20).

Sotah 3a records a difference of opinion regarding this matter between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva states, as the Rambam rules here, that a man is obligated toissue a warning, while Rabbi Yishmael maintains that the matter is optional. Other commentaries note that the first mishnah in the tractate of Sotah appears to indicate thatit is forbidden for a husband to issue a warning. (This concept is derived as follows: The mishnah begins: ‘‘When a man issued a warning....’’ From this wording, our Sages infer thatthe mishnah is speaking after the fact. At the outset, a warning should not be given.)
Significantly, Rabbi Akiva was noted for his love of his fellow man, as he stated: ‘‘‘Loveyour fellow man as yourself,’... this is a great general principle within the Torah.’’ Thisimplies — and so is evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s words — that thewarning is not an instrument of strife, but rather is intended to prompt love and closeness.

For this is likely to cause shame and embarrassment and prevent healthy communic-ation between husband and wife. If, however, a warning that was delivered gently and inprivate is not effective, then the husband should warn his wife in the presence of witnesses.

I.e., giving them gentle warnings, as mentioned in the first clause of this halachah.

One may infer that failing to invest oneself in such scrutiny is sinful.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 330-352) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 189-206, 209-211, 35, 207) include these in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 52-55) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 427, 561, 563-564 include these in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 354) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 560) include this in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 360-361) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 559, 291) include these in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 161-162) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 273-274) include these in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 38) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 272) include this in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 158-160) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 266-1268 include these in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 353) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 188) include this in the reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

In Hilchot Ishut 1:5, the Rambam defines the term arayot as “[Those women] with whom relations are forbidden by Scriptural Law and with whom relations are punishable by kareit as enumerated in Parshas Acharei Mot.

Literally, the soul's being cut off. This involves premature death in this world (before the age of 50, Mo'ed Kattan 28a) and the soul not meriting a portion in the world to come (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1).

The prohibition and the punishment is incumbent on them both equally.

This term is used to distinguish the sacrifice from the “adjustable guilt offering” (korban olah viyoreid) that is brought for certain transgressions. See Hilchot Shegagot ch. 1, and ch. 10.

See Halachot 4-6.

Even if they cannot be executed because the court cannot find two appropriate witnesses, they are punishable by karet.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2 which describes the obligation to give a warning and states: “How is a warning administered? We tell him: ‘Desist...” or ‘Do not do it. It is a transgression and you are liable to be executed by the court.... ‘ “

The Rambam’s ruling reflects a unique instance in which he uses the wording of a Talmudic passage for the opposite intent. Sanhedrin 8b quotes Rabbi Y ossi bar Rabbi Yehudah as coining the expression the Rambam employs: “A warning was instituted only to make a distinction between a person who transgresses inadvertently and one who transgresses intentionally.” Rabbi Yossi, however, used this concept as support for his contention that a Torah scholar does not need a warning. Since he is knowledgeable, we assume that he is familiar with the laws. If he is transgressing, we can conclude that he is doing so as a conscious act of rebellion. Hence, he is deserving of punishment.
The Rambam differs, maintaining that even a Torah scholar might not be aware that his act violates a particular prohibition. We do not suspect that he did know the law, it was however possible that he was aware of the prohibition, but did not know that it applied in this instance, e.g., he knew that adultery was forbidden, but did not know if the woman was married or related to him. The warning will clarify that for him (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Sanhedrin, Zoe. cit.).

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1-5 for a description of these different modes of execution.

Even if she is not his mother.

The wording of the Hebrew emphasizes that his son married the woman, not merely engaged in relations with her.

I.e., from a previous marriage.

After his wife’s death, her daughter is still prohibited to him and they are punishable by kareit. There is, however, no punishment to be administered by an earthly court. As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 8, this applies to any woman prohibited because they are closely related to the person’s wife.

Sanhedrin 52b explains the rationale for this statement as follows: Just as death at the hand of heaven does not leave a mark; so, too, unless another form of execution is explicitly stipulated, death at the hand of the court should not leave a sign. This alludes to strangulation in which the condemned’ s body is not marred at all.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

According to Jewish law, marriage is a two-staged process involving consecration (erusin or kiddushin) and marriage (nissuin). Consecration establishes the bond between a man and a woman. From that time onward, she is forbidden to engage in relations with other men. It is not until marriage, however, that the husband and wife relationship is consummated and the couple begin their life together. In the present era, both of these stages of marriage are completed at the same time. In the Biblical and Talmudic eras, it was customary to wait a year between these two stages.

I.e., between the age of twelve and twelve and a half and she is a virgin.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

Sanhedrin 53a derives this concept from the fact that this phrase is used with regard to a person who divines with a yidoni concerning whom Leviticus 20:27 explicitly states that he should be stoned to death.

I.e., the punishment of karet is not mentioned with regard to them. They include nine forbidden relationships, e.g., a mamzer or a mamzeret to an acceptable Jew or a divorcee to a priest. These nine are mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 1 :7.

Literally, “secondary.” In Hilchot Ishut 1:6, the Rambam explains that this term refers to “women with whom relations are forbidden according to the Oral Tradition. These prohibitions are Rabbinic in origin.” He continues listing 20 such women with whom our Sages forbade relations as a safeguard for the Scriptural prohibitions.

Lashes mandated by Rabbinic decree which are given as punishment for the violation of Rabbinic commandments.

Relationships which the Torah does not explicitly prohibit, but the prohibition can be derived from a positive commandment. For example, there is no prohibition against a High Priest marrying a non-virgin. Nevertheless, since he is commanded (Leviticus 21 : 13) to marry a virgin bride, we assume that it is forbidden for him to marry a woman who is not a virgin. There are two other such relationships: Egyptian and Edomite converts who cannot marry into the Jewish people until the third generation. See Hilchot Ishut 1 :8.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:4 which states that the court may administer punishment that is not required by Torah Law if they feel that this will lead to the moral development of the Jewish people.

The verse cited speaks of the rape of a consecrated maiden in a field where even if she had called for help, there would have been no one to save her. Since she was compelled to perfonn the transgression, she is not held responsible.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on this point, explaining that if a man develops an erection with the intent of having relations with his wife and while he is still erect, he is compelled to engage in forbidden relations, he is considered to have acted against his will. The Maggid Mishneh states that even the Rambam would accept such a ruling.
The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that there are authorities who maintain that if a man is compelled to engage in relations at the pain of death, he is considered to have been compelled to act against his will. Yevamot 53b, the source for the Rambam’s ruling, is speaking about a situation when a person is not compelled by forces beyond his control. Other authorities maintain that he is liable, even in such a situation. It is, however, unlikely that the Rambam would maintain that the court should actually carry out capital punishment. For in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:4, the Rambam writes that a person who is compelled by gentiles to engage in adulterous or incestuous sexual relations should sacrifice his life rather than do so. If, however, he fails to chose martyrdom and transgresses, he should not be punished by the court. It would be difficult to explain that ruling applies only in a situation when he had already developed an erection for a woman with whom he was permitted to engage in relations and was then compelled to engage in forbidden relations. Thus it would appear that the man is not held responsible for capital punishment engaging in relations at the threat of death. [See Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De’ah 20)].
See also the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:2 who states that since developing an erection comes as a result of the man’s own pleasure and desire, he is considered to have acted willingly even though he was compelled to engage in the relations.

Ketubot 51 a states that even if the woman says: “Let him continue, for had he not taken me by force, I would have hired him,” she is considered as acting under duress and freed of liability. For it was not until after she was overcome by desire that she consented.

This expression is used with regard to relations with a woman in the niddah state. From that instance, Yevamot 54a derives a connection to the entire Torah.

If, however, the man merely touches the entrance to the vaginal channel with his organ, he is not liable (see Beit Shmuel 20:3).

Based on Leviticus 19:13, Sanhedrin 54a states that both forms of intercourse are equally forbidden.

Or Sameach notes that Leviticus 18:23 explicitly mentions a woman standing while engaged in forbidden relations.

I.e., if a priest’s daughter or a priest’s wife is involved in such a sexual act, she is forbidden to partake of terumah just as if she would be forbidden to do so had she engaged in ordinary relations (see Hilchot Terumah 6:6).

“Stripes for rebellious conduct” is a punishment which is not dependent on the Torah’s binding laws, but rather is left to the court’s jurisdiction based on its conception of what is appropriate for the moral standards of the persons involved and the community. Although such an act is not formally considered as sexual relations, chastisement is necessary to prevent such behavior from continuing.

The Hebrew term kimitasek literally means “as one was going about his business,” i.e., he was performing other actions and without any intent, the forbidden act was performed.

Since he derived pleasure from the physical act, he is liable even though originally he had no intent (Yevamot 62b).
This refers only to liability for a sin offering for inadvertent transgression. Needless to say, he is not liable for punishment by the court, because in such instances, he must acknowledge a warning (Maggid Mishneh).
The commentaries question how sexual relations can be performed “as one was going about his business.” With regard to the Sabbath prohibitions, we can appreciate the use of such a tenn. For example, a person intended to cut produce that was not connected to the ground and in the course of doing so also cut produce that was connected to the ground. But with regard to sexual relations, how is it possible to say that a man performed the act without intention? As stated above, “an erection is always a willful act.”
Based on Hilchot Shegagot 2:7, the Maggid Mishneh interprets this as referring to an instance in which a person intended to engage in relations with his wife, but accidentally engaged in relations with his sister.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s statements and the Maggid Mishneh states that this clause is a printing error, for there is no sacrifice associated with these transgressions. The Kessef Mishneh offers a resolution, explaining that although he is not punished by an earthly court, nor is he obligated to bring a sacrifice, the transgressor is liable to God. He will reckon with the transgression on His scales of judgment. Rav David Arameah states that this teaches that the person has an obligation to confess his sin.

Yevamot 55b derives this concept through the techniques of Biblical exegesis.

An animal or a person that is sick or wounded and will die within a year.

I.e., the esophagus and the windpipe were cut.

I.e., she reaches the date of her third birthday.

For a minor is never liable for punishment. Even though she consented to the transgression, she is not subjected to punishment, because she is not considered as responsible for her actions (Nidah 44b). Despite the fact that the woman is not punished, the man receives the punishment mandated by the transgression.

For until that age, her signs of virginity will regenerate and hence, relations are not of consequence. Nevertheless, even when the girl is below that age, it is forbidden to enter into such relations (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:4).

In his commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam states that the punishment of karet is not given until the violator is 20 years of age. Until that age, the person is considered immature and hence, not held liable by the heavenly court.

For below that age, relations are not of consequence.

For sexual relations with a male below the age of nine are not of consequence. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to enter into such relations (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:4).

Although he is not liable according to Scriptural Law, his act certainly warrants punishment that will discourage him from continuing this pattern of conduct.

A person with male and female sexual characteristics.

For there is a doubt regarding the halachic status of such an individual.

A person whose genital are covered with a mass of flesh and whose gender is impossible to detect. With regard to an androgynus, the doubt concerns the individual’s halachic status. With regard to the tumtum, the doubt concerns the actual facts: Which gender is covered by the mass of flesh?

Since there is a possibility that such relations are prohibited, this punishment should be given to discourage them.

I.e., although there is a question regarding the status of the androgynus, relations between him and her are permitted (Maggid Mishneh).

Since the animal was the direct cause for the person’s death, the animal is also executed. Alternatively, since the person was engaged in an unseemly transgression due to the animal, it is executed (Sanhedrin 54a).

And it is forbidden to benefit from that animal (Hilchot lssurei Mizbeach 4:2).

For a minor is never liable for punishment. Sanhedrin 55b explains that based on the first rationale mentioned in the previous note, one might think that the. animal should not be executed. Nevertheless, the person is worthy of execution because of his deed, it is only that the Torah has pity on him. And the Torah has pity on the person and not on the animal.

For she is not of age.

For this is not considered relations.

The question how such acts can be considered inadvertent has been raised by the commentaries. Among the answers given is that the person was not aware that the act which he performed was forbidden.

Since the person is not executed, according to the first of the rationales mentioned above, the animal should not be executed. Since our Sages did not conclude which of the rationales should prevail, the matter is left undecided and therefore the animal is allowed to live.

The person sleeping is considered as if he performed the forbidden act under duress.

For punishment by the court or at the hand of heaven.

Halachah 13.

This and the following halachot are based on the principle that a chazzakah, a presumption that is firmly established, is binding and considered as actual fact.

I.e., as long as it is the popular conception that two individuals are related, we judge accordingly. It is not necessary for the court to bring testimony from the midwife that in fact this-and-this woman bore this-and-this child.

The punishment given for relations between a mother and her son.

Exodus 21:15, 17.

For we have no way of establishing the fact that his father conceived him.

By living together as husband and wife in a way obvious to all.

We see the concept of 30 days used to establish a person’s identity in another context: After that period of time, his name may be mentioned in a legal document without fear of deception (Chelkat Mechokek 19:3; see Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 24:4).
Although capital punishment is not enforced in the present age, there are certain aspects of this halachah which are relevant, for there are several halachic contexts in which it is necessary to determine whether or not a woman is married. Today, with the advances in recording keeping and communication, it is customary for the Jewish community - particularly, in Eretz Yisrael and in a partial way, in certain places in the Diaspora - to keep records and to be able to verify whether or not a couple are married.

The transgressors are given “stripes for rebellious conduct” for certainly there is at least a possibility that the couple who claim to be husband and wife are married (Rabbi Akiva Eiger to Halachah 15).

I.e., she wore clothes that she set aside to wear while she is in her niddah state. See Turei Zahav 185:2 who states that even if the woman later gives an explanation for her conduct, her explanation is not accepted and we consider her status to have changed. The Siftei Cohen and others, however, differ. See Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

A man is forbidden to have relations with a woman while she is in the niddah state. In this instance, although we do not know for certain that she was in the niddah state, we act according to the presumption created by her conduct.

When a man issues such a warning to his wife and she violates it, he is forbidden to engage in relations with her until she drinks the sotah waters (Hilchot Sotah 1 :2).

In which instance, she is not given the sotah waters to drink. Instead, her husband is required to divorce her (ibid.: 14).

The term zonah is halachicly defined as any woman who engages in relations with a man forbidden to her. The term literally means "a prostitute" or "a promiscuous woman." Here, however, the term is given the specific halachic meaning mentioned above. Whether she willingly or unwillingly engages in such relations, she is placed in this category. A priest is forbidden to engage in relations with such a woman. See Chapter 18, Halachah 12.

One might think that it was necessary for the change in the status of the woman to be established through the testimony of two witnesses.

I.e., since she violated the warning her husband gave her, we assume that she acted unfaithfully. Hence, the testimony of one witness is sufficient to bring about a change in her status.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the man is given lashes for violating a different prohibition, the prohibition against relations with a wife who has been unfaithful. The Ra’avad, however, speaks of the woman being raped and maintains that a woman is not placed in the category of a zonah when only one person observes her being raped.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Ra’avad’s statements, noting that the Rambam does not mention rape at all. The Maggid Mishneh also states that the Rambam does not require lashes when a man engages in relations with his wife after she was unfaithful. The Kessef Mishneh questions that statement, noting that in Hilchot Gerushin 11:14, the Kessef Mishneh questions that statement, noting that in Hilchot Gerushin 11:14, the Rambam specifically rules that a man is given lashes in such a situation. See also the notes to Chapter 18, Halachah 7.

We are speaking about a girl who is a na‘arah between the age of twelve and twelve and a half. Her father has the right to consecrate her to whoever he desires. Therefore we accept his word when he states that he consecrated her, as Deuteronomy 22:16 states: “I gave my daughter to this man” (Kiddushin 64a).
(A father’s word is also accepted with regard to consecrating his daughter if she is younger. We are, nevertheless, compelled to say that here we are speaking about a na‘arah, because punishment is mentioned and a girl below the age of twelve is never punished by the court.)

Or undergo formal divorce proceedings before marrying another man.

The punishment given for relations with a consecrated maiden.

Although the father's statement is given a certain amount of legal credibility, it is not considered as sufficient basis for capital punishment (Kiddushin 63b).

The singular of the term arayot mentioned in the first chapter.

When a man dies childless, one of the brothers of the deceased is obligated to marry his widow to propagate his name. This obligation, yibbum in Hebrew, is described in Deuteronomy, ch. 25, and in Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah.

I.e., if he transgresses inadvertently. If he transgresses intentionally, he is liable for execution, by stoning for relations with his father’s wife and his son’s wife, and by strangulation for relations with his brother’s wife and the wife of his father’s brother.

See Chapter 17, Halachah 8, and notes where this concept is explained.

Since the Rambam speaks of laws that apply after the father’s death, he mentions only two prohibitions. During the father’s lifetime, he is liable. for a third prohibition: relations with a married woman.

For the prohibition against relations with all blood relatives applies regardless of whether the person was conceived within marriage or outside of it.

Hilchot Ishut 1 :5. This is merely a Rabbinical prohibition.

Even if they were raised in the same household like a brother and a sister, marriage between them is permitted. We are not concerned with the possible impression such a union might create [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 15:11)].

And thus be required to bring two sin offerings.

This applies even if afterwards, the father marries the woman whom he raped or seduced (Minchat Chinuch, mitzvah 196).

The fact that her mother was not married to him is not significant.

The Rambam’s statements touch on an involved issue. In his Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2), he writes that every concept derived through the principles of Biblical exegesis has the power of Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, commandments derived through these principles are not considered as part of the 613 mitzvot, but are instead “from the words of our Sages.”
The prohibition against relations with one’s daughter, the Rambam states, is not in that category. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah and Sanhedrin 76a uses different principles of exegesis to derive it, it is not “from the words of our Sages.” Instead, it is as if it were explicitly stated in the Torah. From Hilchot Ma ‘achalot Assurot 9:2, it appears that the Rambam’s intent is that since the Torah mentions the prohibition against relations with the daughter of one’s daughter, the prohibition against relations with one’s daughter is obvious. There is no need for the Torah to mention it. It must be mentioned that many other authorities do not follow the same understanding as. the Rambam and consider concepts derived through the principles of Biblical exegesis as fully binding Scriptural Law. According to their understanding, there is no difficulty with the prohibition against relations with one’s daughter being considered of Scriptural origin.

From the Ra’avad’s statements, it appears that he does not require a sin offering for relations with one’s daughter. The parenthesis are based on the understanding of the Maggid Mishneh.

As stated in the following halachah.

When stating this law, Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 15:13) emphasizes that if a man rapes a woman, after her death, he may marry her daughter who was conceived by another man. The Ramah adds that even if the rapist marries her daughter during her lifetime, he is not compelled to divorce her.

This is based on the Rambam’s understanding of Sanhedrin 76b. Rashi, the Ramban, and the Rashba differ and maintain that after the death of the man’s wife, he is prohibited against having relations with her close relatives, but is not liable for karet.

The use of the plural term”them” should not be interpreted to mean that the man’s wife should be executed by being burnt to death. For what evil has she committed? Instead, the intent is that only in her lifetime is the death penalty applied (Rashi, Sanhedrin 76b).

Sanhedrin, loc. cit., speaks about relations with one’s mother-in-law, stating that only when one’s wife is alive are these relations punishable by death. Since, however, the prohibition against relations with all the other five women mentioned above is derived from the prohibition against relations with one’s mother-in-law, they are bound by the same laws {Maggid Mishneh).

For Leviticus, 18:18 explicitly states that the prohibition against relations with the sister of one’s wife is “in her lifetime.” While the wife is alive, even if she is divorced, the man is forbidden to engage in relations with her sister [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 15:26). After his wife’s death, however, he may marry her sister.

For his wife has not transgressed and there is no reason that she should become forbidden.

The Rambam is referring to Hilchot Gerushin 10:8-10 which states:
A man consecrated a woman, she journeyed to another country, the husband heard she died, and [then] married her sister. [If,] afterwards, it was discovered that she had not died, he must divorce both women.... Why did they requires that the sister of the woman whom the man consecrated be divorced? Lest people say that the [first] kiddushin were given conditionally, [the condition was not fulfilled,] and thus the law would allow marriage to her sister. Since the [first) woman’s sister was divorced... the man’s first wife is also forbidden to him lest people think that he married his divorcee’s sister.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam maintains that a divorce is required only in such an instance. If, by contrast, he enters into promiscuous relations with the sister of the woman he consecrated, he may still marry her if she consents. This explanation resolves the protests made by the Ra’avad to the Rambam’s statements.

For the verses (Leviticus 18:18, 20:14) on which these prohibitions are based mention ‘’taking,” i.e., marriage.

See Yevamot 97a.

After her death, however, there are no restrictions on marrying her relatives (ibid.), for the reason for the decree no longer applies.

For since he is married to one of her close relatives, she is an. ervah for him.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 11:1), the Rambam states that this applies when the suspicion is verified.

This ruling is derived from the law stated in the following clause of the halachah. The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s deduction, stating that extra stringency is appropriate with regard to one’s mother-in-law, but otherwise, there is no need to enforce such a restriction. The Maggid Mishneh states that for that reason, lashes were given only with regard to one’s mother-in-law, but agrees with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that curbs should be placed on any conduct that may lead to promiscuity. See also Chapter 21, Halachah 27.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:5 which states that a judge has the power to subject a person to lashes even if he is not liable according to Torah Law.

Halachah 3.

After she was widowed or divorced.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that a person has a natural affection for his close relatives. Those positive feelings provide a fertile ground of support for the marriage relationship to flourish.

Other Rishonim [Rashi, Rabbenu Tam (Sanhedrin 76)] differ and maintain that the mitzvah applies only with regard to one’s sister’s daughter.