Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Between the ages of three and twelve and a half, as evident from Halachah 8. See Rama (Even HaEzer 177:1).

See Hilchot Eruvin 1:12 and Hilchot Shekalim 1:2, where the Rambam describes the weight of this coin. According to the figures he gives in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot8:8), in contemporary measure a sela is 19.2 grams. According to the Piskei Siddur of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, it is 20.4 grams.

See Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 220), which describes this mitzvah as "the commandment we have been given with regard to a man who seduces [a virgin]." (See also Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 61.)
Both in the Mishneh Torah and in Sefer HaMitzvot, the payment of the fine by a seducer, a rapist and one who issues a slanderous report appears to be included in the same mitzvah (Nachalat Efrayim).
Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:8 states that the cases involving laws governing a seducer and a rapist are to be tried by judges with semichah, a qualification that is not possessed by Rabbinical judges in the post-Talmudic period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 177:2) states that in the present age, a seducer and a rapist should be compelled to satisfy the girl’s father for the damage they have caused.

As mentioned in the following halachah, a rapist must marry the woman he raped, while a seducer need not. And, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 1, a rapist must also reimburse the woman for the pain and embarrassment he caused her.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that unless there are witnesses to the relations, the woman has no way of proving her claim against the man. The Migdal Oz explains that this refers to an instance where witnesses saw the man and the woman engage in relations from afar and were not able to determine whether she was seduced or raped.
The assumptions mentioned by the Rambam are based on the passage (stated with regard to a consecrated maiden, Deuteronomy 23:24-27): "This is the law when a virgin maiden was consecrated to one man and another man meets her in the city and has relations with her. Both of them should be executed, [i.e., we assume the girl consented]... because she did not cry out in the city... If the man encountered the maiden who was consecrated in the field..., the girl has not committed a sin... for the man attacked her in the field..., where there was no one to come to her aid."

Exodus 22:16 states: "If her father refuses to allow him to marry her...," and Ketubot 39b explains that the girl is also given the option of rejecting the man.

The simple meaning of the passage from Exodus implies that the seducer should marry the girl, but Ketubot 40a explains that this is not a binding obligation.

He does, however, pay damages, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 7.

I.e., she is given a ketubah of 200 zuzim, as is given to other virgin maidens (Hilchot Ishut 11:4), despite the fact that she was not a virgin at the time of the marriage (Ma’aseh Roke’ach).

See Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 218). See also Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 557).

In this halachah, the Rambam uses the Biblical term tzara’at, although generally he uses the Rabbinic term mukeh sh’chin. See Chapter 3, Halachah 4, and the conclusion of Hilchot Ishut.

If, however, the woman wants to be divorced, the rapist may divorce her [Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 177:3)].

See Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 358). See also Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 558).

The Torah does not require him to marry a woman with whom there is any prohibition whatsoever.

For all Rabbinic prohibitions have the source in the Torah’s commandment to observe the rulings of our Sages.

For a husband is forbidden to engage in marital relations with an adulterous wife, As stated in Hilchot Ishut 24:17. See the Beit Shmuel 177:4, who emphasizes that the intent is that witnesses observed the actual commission of adultery, not merely immodest behavior that suggests adultery. See also Chapter 3, Halachah 5.

See Leviticus 21:13; Hilchot Ishut 1:8.

Although her lack of virginity is a result of his deed, she is still forbidden to him. See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:16.

Chapter 18, Halachah 2.

At which point her husband is forbidden to remarry her, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:12.

Although he did not personally prevent the positive commandment from being observed, since he is no longer able to observe it, he must bear the consequences of his violation of the prohibition.

I.e., vaginal and not anal intercourse. The Rambam’s ruling is not accepted by the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher, who cite Kiddushin 9b-10a in support of their conception.
The Kiryat Sefer supports the Rambam’s ruling, based on Sanhedrin 73b, which states that the man is not liable until he inserts his entire penis into the vagina, explaining that it is only then that the woman will lose her virginity. Since she will never lose her virginity through anal intercourse, the man is not held liable.

For a person who admits his culpability in matters punishable by a fine is not liable. See Chapter 2, Halachah 12 and notes.

For a warning is necessary only before infliction of the punishments of execution or lashing.

Although there are times when the Hebrew term na’arah, translated as "maiden," has a more specific meaning (see Hilchot Ishut 2:1), Ketubot 40b explains that in this instance the intent is also a girl below the age of twelve. Although most Rishonim agree with the Rambam, there are, however, significant authorities who rule that a fine need not be paid until the girl reaches the age of na’arut.

Generally, this refers to a girl of the age of twelve and a half who has manifested signs of physical maturity. If a girl does not manifest signs of physical maturity, she is not considered a bogeret until the age of 20 or 35. See Hilchot Ishut 2:1-4.

For her hymen will grow back, as implied by Hilchot Ishut 3:11.

Since the Torah states that the fine should be paid to the father, it is necessary to clarify that the fine must be paid even if the father is not alive.

As mentioned in Hilchot Gerushin 11:1, when a girl below the age of majority marries without being consecrated by her father, she can nullify the marriage without a formal divorce. This is called mi’un. When she takes this option, even if we know that she is still a virgin, she is not entitled to receive the fine because she has been married previously.

A woman who does not manifest female sexual characteristics.

Since they are not mentally competent, we fear that they were raped previously without their knowing about it. Compare to Hilchot Ishut 11:4, 8. Note the Ra’avad, who states that a person who rapes or seduces a deaf-mute is liable for a fine.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 17.

Even if we are certain that she and her husband never engaged in intimate relations, she is not paid a fine. Compare to Hilchot Ishut 11:1.

We do not assume that she entered into relations with her husband before the stage of nisu’in.

Although Deuteronomy 22:28 speaks of the fine being paid to the girl’s father, from the fact that the verse mentions "a maiden who was not consecrated," Ketubot 38a derives that when a maiden has been consecrated, the fine should be paid to the woman who was raped.

Since she consented to relations, she waives the payment of the fine. See Chapter 2, Halachot 10-11.
Note Rav David Arameah, who states that this applies only when she is a na’arah. If she is still a minor, her father receives the fine, and she does not have the potential to waive it through her consent.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Ishut 11:2, we operate under the presumption that these women have engaged in relations previously: a convert and a Canaanite maidservant because non-Jews’ morals are considered to be weak, and a woman held captive because she is at the mercy of her captors.

Even if she engaged in relations before the age of three, her hymen will grow back, As stated in the notes on Halachah 8.

As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2 and 16:4, a person receives corporal punishment for the commission of a transgression only when he has been warned previously.

This refers to a girl who was divorced after consecration. If she was divorced after nisu’in, the second stage of the marriage, she is not entitled to a fine as stated in Halachah 9.

The verse speaks of the woman’s miscarrying. If she herself does not die, the man who caused her to miscarry must pay her damages.

I.e., if the woman dies, her heirs need not be reimbursed. Since the man is liable for a sin of a more severe nature, he is not held liable for damages (Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:5).

Although the general principle stated in this halachah is accepted without dispute, the particular case of the pregnant woman is a matter of question. The Rambam himself states (Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:5-6) that if the man did not intend to strike the woman, he is liable to pay damages to her heirs.
In that source, he explains that the leniency granted by the verse applies when the man intended to strike the woman, but did not intend to kill her.

In contrast, with regard to a transgression punishable by lashes: if it is performed unintentionally, one is still held liable for the financial repercussions.

Once, however, the case is heard before the court, the rapist is held liable if proven guilty, even if the maiden dies. The fine is given to the girl’s heirs (Kessef Mishneh).

As explained in the following halachot.

Inah, the word translated as "violated," more specifically means "oppressed." Significantly, Exodus 22:15, which describes the fine of the seducer, does not use this term.

The Rambam is employing the instance of the daughter of a bastard primarily as a figure of speech. The commentaries have noted that if in fact one has relations with the daughter of a bastard, in most instances the transgression of a negative commandment is involved, and the violator should be lashed rather than fined, unless a warning was not given.

Obviously, the penalty to be paid to the former exceeds that to be paid to the latter.

Rav David Arameah explains that the intent is that the embarrassment suffered at the hands of a person of stature is more significant. The commentaries note, however, that in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:1, the Rambam states that the embarrassment suffered at the hands of a base person is more severe.

The younger and smaller a girl, the more painful is the experience. Similarly, the older and larger the rapist, the more painful the experience is.

The Rambam mentions the divorce as being dependent on the woman, because therapist cannot initiate divorce, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

In contrast to other women, who would receive payment for their marriage contracts.

The girl’s value is reduced even through anal intercourse, albeit less than through vaginal intercourse. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 8, a fine is not required for anal inter-course.

Chapter 1, Halachot 9 and 10.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 177) differs with the Rambam and maintains that these women are entitled to damages. The fact that they are not granted a fine has no bearing on this manner.

In a case of rape, a fine is not required for a bogeret, because the verse mentions a na’arah, a younger maiden, excluding one above that age. If one seduces a bogeret, no fine is required, nor are payments required for damages, pain, and embarrassment, because she willingly engaged in this relationship. Thus for the rape of a bogeret, compensation for these three matters is required.
With regard to a minor who has dissolved her marriage through mi’un, we are obviously speaking of a girl who did not engage in sexual relations as a minor and was still a virgin. Although she is not entitled to a fine, she does receive compensation for the three matters mentioned above, for she was a virgin The commentaries have questioned why a distinction is made between such a woman and a woman who is divorced after nisu’in, but is still virgin.

He is not liable to make compensation for the embarrassment and damages because these women are not entitled to damages, because they have no financial worth; they would not be purchased if sold as slaves. (See Ketubot 32a, Bava Metzia 80a.) And with regard to embarrassment, since they are mentally and/or emotionally challenged, they suffer no embarrassment.
(Compare, however, to Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:4, which states that a mentally and/or emotionally challenged person is not reimbursed for embarrassment, but a deaf-mute is.)

For, as mentioned previously, a girl who is seduced does not suffer pain, and she either forgoes or need not be reimbursed for damages and embarrassment.

This is a principle that applies not only with regard to the fine in question, but with regard to all k’nasot levied by the Torah.
To explain: There are two types of monetary penalties levied by the Torah: a) nezek, damages — i.e., compensation for personal injury and/or loss of property — and b) k’nas, a fine, payment required by the Torah over and above what a person would be held liable for damages. Although a person is liable for nezek when he makes an admission of guilt, he is not held liable for a k’nas unless his guilt is established by witnesses. (See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8 and Hilchot Geneivah 3:7.) Moreover, even if he admits his guilt and then witnesses come, he is not liable for payment of the k’nas.

As mentioned in the Kessef Mishneh, the Rambam’s statements here are in direct contradiction to his statements in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:6, where he states that when apers on admits injuring a colleague, but there are no witnesses who testify to the matter, he is not liable for the damages and the pain, but is liable for the injured’s unemployment, embarrassment and medical treatment. (As reflected by the commentaries on Hilchot Chovel UMazik, this ruling is contested by many authorities.)
The Rambam’s descendant, Rav Yehoshua, attempts to reconcile the Rambam’s rulings, explaining that the laws governing the injuries suffered by a raped or seduced maiden differ from those governing other types of injury.

More precisely, the term used is sh’vuat hesset, a Rabbinic oath of lesser severity. See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:13 and Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:3.

The Rambam is emphasizing that if the only issue were the k’nas, the man would not beheld liable for an oath, because this oath was instituted to encourage the defendant to admit his guilt. With regard to the k’nas, this admission would be of no significance, because his liability is dependent only on the testimony of witnesses. Nevertheless, since there is also a claim for damages, and on that matter his admission would make him liable, he is required to take an oath.

As explained in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:1, whenever a person admits a portion of the claim against him, he is required by Scriptural Law to take an oath stating his lack of liability to the remaining portion of the claim.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, because, as mentioned in the following halachah, the payment for these damages goes to the girl’s father and not to her herself. Hence, the situation resembles the case (Sh’vuot 38b) where a person claims "You owe my father 100 zuzim," and the defendant states, "I owe him only 50," in which instance the defendant is not required to take an oath, because the person making the claim is not the one to whom the money is paid. It is possible, the Ra’avad continues, for the father to make a definite claim that his daughter was raped. But it must be established that this indeed was the case.
The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that this instance is unique. Although the money goes to the girl’s father, she and not her father is considered to be the plaintiff.

When the girl manifests physical signs of maturity at the ordinary times, the period of "youth" mentioned here continues until she is twelve and a half. During that time, as mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 3:11, the father is entitled to consecrate his daughter and receive the money given for consecration, and to receive any benefits from her labor.

And not to any other heirs of her father’s estate. With regard to the k’nas, the money is not considered to be owed the father until the defendant denies the debt in court (for if he agreed to the claim, he would not be obligated to pay the fine). Therefore, the money owed because of the fine is not considered part of the father’s estate. See Or Sameach.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this point, stating that this money is considered part of the father’s estate, and belongs to his heirs. The Kessef Mishneh and others, however, question the reason for the difference, noting that the Rambam’s opinion is based on an explicit mishnah.

In all the instances mentioned, she leaves her father’s domain and assumes independent responsibility for her own financial concerns. Although the event for which the person becomes liable took place before the girl has assumed financial independence, since a claim was not issued at that time, she and not her father (or his heirs) is entitled to the money.

But not to the payment for damages; that is awarded to her father. As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 9, our Sages derived from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 22:29 that when a girl has been consecrated, she is entitled to the fine. But that applies only to the fine and not to the damages (Kessef Mishneh). Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that she is also entitled to the damages, for she is no longer within her father’s domain.

The Rambam is referring to the wording of the verse in Leviticus cited previously.

The Ra’avad differs and maintains that a woman is not considered to be a harlot unless she is a professional prostitute. See the discussion of this issue in Hilchot Ishut 1:4.

Chapter 1, Halachah 9.

As is the case with regard to several other mitzvot, the passage in Deuteronomy obviously indicates that the transgression of a negative commandment is involved in making such slanderous remarks about one’s wife. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the punishment of lashes to be given. There is, however, no explicit statement in that passage saying, "Do not make such statements." Therefore, it is necessary to find another verse that has a specific statement forbidding slander.

As is the case with regard to several other mitzvot, the passage in Deuteronomy obviously indicates that the transgression of a negative commandment is involved in making such slanderous remarks about one’s wife. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the punishment of lashes to be given. There is, however, no explicit statement in that passage saying, "Do not make such statements." Therefore, it is necessary to find another verse that has a specific statement forbidding slander.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 1. This is the only instance in the Torah when a person who violates a prohibition is given corporal punishment and is also required to make financial restitution.

And not to her father’s heirs.

As mentioned previously, the term na’arah implies a specific time frame: the six months after a girl’s manifestation of physical signs of maturity once she has reached the age of twelve.

Generally, the word נַעֲרָה, maiden, is written in the Torah without the final heh. The inclusion of the heh is obviously purposeful and intended to teach a concept.

Cases involving capital punishment are judged by a court of 23 judges. These cases can be judged only when the Sanhedrin holds sessions in the Courtyard of Hewn Stone next to the Temple, as stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 14:11-14. (Once the Sanhedrin ceased holding sessions in that place, even a court of judges with semichah cannot try capital cases.)

As stated in Deuteronomy 22:20.

Chapter 5, Halachah 5:3. Based on Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:17 and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 177:2), it would appear that in the present age, the court should hold a person who makes such statements responsible and compel him to reach a settlement with the father of the girl whose reputation he maligned.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 219) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 553) regard this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Sefer HaMitzvot states that this commandment also includes lashing him.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 359) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 554) regard this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

In which instance, her first husband is forbidden to remarry her.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 5, and notes.

Ketubot 40a explains that in such an instance the woman is taught to say that she does not desire to remain married to the man, so that there is no obstacle presented to the divorce.

There is a difference of opinion among our Sages whether or not all the following laws apply if the husband did not engage in marital relations with his wife. The Rambam follows the opinion that it is necessary for the couple to have engaged in marital relations. See the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Halachah 12.

I.e., the husband’s claim is twofold: a) that contrary to his supposition, his bride was nota virgin; b) that she had committed adultery between the time he consecrated her and the time he consummated the marriage. The latter dimension of the claim is more significant, because if substantiated, it involves the death penalty. The issue of a groom’s claim that a bride presumed to be a virgin was not — without any knowledge of an adulterous relation-ship — is discussed in Hilchot Ishut 11:8-17. See Halachah 11.

For no punishment will be administered by the court unless two witnesses testify to the wrongdoing.

The punishment given for adultery committed by a consecrated maiden (Deuteronomy 22:23).

The term used for nullify here, hazamah, has a very specific meaning. It refers to witnesses who testify that it was impossible for the husband’s witnesses to testify with regard to the alleged adultery, because the two witnesses were together in a different place at the time the first witnesses testified that the adultery took place. If the second pair of witnesses state that they were in the same place as the first pair and did not witness the commission of adultery, the testimony of the first pair is nullified, but the first pair of witnesses is not punished. This is referred to as hakchashah. See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 18.

As stated in Deuteronomy 19:19, when the testimony of witnesses is nullified in the above fashion, the lying witnesses are giving the punishment they desired to have imposed upon the defendant.

Note the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 553), who quotes opinions that maintain that if the girl’s father brings witnesses who nullify the husband’s witnesses through hakashah, the husband’s witnesses are not punished, but the husband himself is required to pay the fine.

Here again the intent is hazamah.

Moreover, the witnesses must pay a fine of 100 sela’im to the husband.

The husband incurs these penalties at the time he makes his statements in court. At that time, the woman has already become a bogeret.

Generally, when a bogeret commits adultery she is executed by strangulation, a less severe means of execution. In this case, the woman is still given the penalty designated fora na’arah, as the Rambam explains.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
The rationale for this ruling can be explained as follows: Most of the women mentioned in that halachah are not granted a fine, because we assume that they are non-virgins. For this reason, the husband should not have presumed that she was a virgin. With regard to anaylonit, she is never considered to be a na’arah. Until the age of twenty, she is considered to be a k’tanah, and after twenty, she is considered to be a bogeret.

In which case, she is entitled to a fine in the event of seduction or rape.

Ketubot 46a leaves this issue unresolved. As such, we follow the more lenient ruling and free the man of punishment.

Ketubot, loc. cit., explains that relations with a yevamah are excluded from these laws, because the relevant passage quotes the girl’s father as saying (Deuteronomy 22:16): "I gave my daughter to this man as a wife." This does not apply to the relationship between a yavam and a yevamah, for they are destined for each other by Divine decree.

The Mishneh LaMelech states that this statement applies with regard to the relation-ship between a yavam and a yevamah and similar instances, but does not apply with regard to the first law stated in this halachah. In that instance, the husband is not held liable because we are in doubt with regard to the law. For that same reason, he should be enjoined against divorcing his wife.

I.e., if he issues a slanderous report that she had engaged in anal intercourse previously, he is not held liable (Ketubot 46a, b).

I.e., he claims that witnesses supplied him with this information.

Although the Scriptural penalty is not imposed, our Sages required that he receive punishment for slandering his wife.

See Hilchot Ishut 11:8-17.

For they desired to have someone stoned, and thus should receive the appropriate penalty.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that this is a matter of debate in Ketubot 46a. Although the Sages advance the opinion quoted by the Rambam, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov states that the intent is that the girl’s parents produce the sheet on which the couple engaged in relations. Since the Rambam follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov’s opinion as reflected in Halachah 8, it is difficult to understand why he uses the Sages’ explanation in this halachah. The commentaries explain that the two opinions in the Talmud are not mutually exclusive, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov would also accept the Sages’ view.
Note also the gloss of Rav David Arameah, who states that when a husband brings witnesses who testify that the girl committed adultery, it is not sufficient for the parents to bring a blood-stained garment, for we fear that perhaps the blood came from another source. The testimony of witnesses, he explains, can be nullified only by other witnesses.

More particulars about the execution are mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:8.

It is when she is consecrated, but not married, that there is the possibility that she will "act immorally in her father’s house," for that is where she lives.

Even if engaged.