Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In both these instances, there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition against moving the articles. As mentioned in the notes on the following halachah, Rashi and the Rashba state that this leniency applies only with regard to articles the person does not require in the domain in which he is standing. If he needs them, the Rabbis decreed that they may not be moved, lest the person forget and bring the articles into the domain where he is standing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1) appears to favor the view of these authorities.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s decision, noting that Eruvin 99a would appear to hold a person liable in such a situation. The difficulty with the Rambam’s statements is compounded by the fact that the passage cited above associates the law in question with the following decision, “A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head.” Since the Rambam holds one liable in the latter instance (see Chapter 12, Halachah 14), it would seem that he would hold one- liable with regard to the law under discussion. The Ra’avad’s arguments are so powerful that the Maggid Mishneh suggests amending the text of the Mishneh Torah accordingly.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1527) notes the Ra’avad’s question, and states that he checked all the ancient manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah available to him, and they all state that the person is not liable. Therefore, he explains that a person is not liable for. transferring an article unless he is standing in one of the domains involved in the transfer. This concept is derived from. the transfer of the articles in the construction of the Sanctuary. In this instance, the people were not standing in a domain other than those involved in the transfer. Based on this foundation, he offers an interpretation—albeit a slightly strained one—for the passage in Eruvin.

This and the following law refer to situations where the key is located in the domain where the door is located.

The Maggid Misfmeh mentions the possibility of placing the key in the door as a forbidden transfer. In the present day, almost every keyhole would be considered to be a makom patur.

I.e., we are not worried that perhaps the animal will withdraw its neck and the person will carry the food outside the stall. Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 17, Halachah 29.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, in their commentary on Eruvin 99a, the source for these halachot, Rashi and the Rashba maintain that if the person requires the vessels, the above restrictions apply even if the vessels are not attractive. The Maggid Mishneh states that although the Rambam’s ruling appears most appropriate within the context of the Talmudic passage, in practice the more stringent ruling should be followed. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch also rules accordingly.

This relects a significant leniency. We are requiring the person to drink while bent over. Even so, the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to forbid the person from drinking, lest he forget, stand upright, and thus bring the drinking vessel- into the other domain.

The prohibition against transferring an article from a carmelit is Rabbinic in nature. Hence, even if the person were to forget and transfer the drinking vessels · to his domain, he would not violate Torah law. Accordingly, there is no need to prohibit him from drinking as a further safeguard.
This represents the opinion of Ravvah (Eruvin 99a) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1). Significantly, however, the Talmud also records the opinion of Abbaye, who differs and maintains that since the forbidden labor of transferring articles is a matter that may be taken lightly, the Sages instituted safeguards with regard to Rabbinic decrees as well.

As long as he takes the water from the air, there is no difficulty. If he takes the water from ten handbreadths or more above the ground, he has taken it from a makom patur. If he takes it from less than ten handbreadths, he has moved an article less than four cubits in the public domain.

Based on the principle of l’vud, since the pipe is within three handbreadths of a private domain, it is considered to be an extension of that domain.
From the Rambam›s wording, it appears that if the roof is less than thirteen handbreadths above the ground, the principle of l’vud does not apply. This is so because the principle of l’vud cannot cause a space that is part of the public domain to be considered an extension of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).

In this instance, the pipe would be considered to be a carmelit. Transferring from a carmelit to a public domain is forbidden.

In this instance, the drainpipe is considered to be a private domain in its own right.

Note the distinction between this ruling and Chapter 13, Halachah 4, which describes removing water that is at rest.

I.e., to place articles upon it, transferring them from the building. Note, however, the restrictions mentioned in Halachah 7.

The space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is a makom patur. Hence, one may transfer articles to and from it (Chapter 14, Halachah 12).

This applies even if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area and directly below an open window. Since it is low enough to be used by the passersby in the public domain, it is considered to be a carmelit.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, these restrictions apply even when the two projections are not directly above each other.

As the Rambam explains, the difficulty is that people from different properties cannot both use a third property which adjoins them—for example (Hilchot Eruvin 3:16), a wall that is four handbreadths wide that separates between two different properties. In particular, there are two conceptions of the Rambam’s statements:
a) that of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:2), which explains that the two projections extend from two windows belonging to two different individuals who have not made an eruv. Since these individuals are forbidden to transfer articles from one projection to the other by Rabbinical decree, certain restrictions were also placed on using the projections themselves.
b) that of the Ritba, who explains that we are speaking of a wall that possesses only a single window. Nevertheless, the lower projection may be used by the passersby in the public domain. (Although the public domain extends only to ten handbreadths, the people in the public domain have the right to use projections and holes in the wall that are above that height.) When there is only one projection, they refrain from using it, because it will be used by the inhabitants of the house. When, however, there are two projections, the passersby feel free to use the lower one. This in turn causes there to be certain restrictions with regard to the use of both projections on the Sabbath. See the diagram on the opposite page.
Although the Merkevet HaMishneh and others explain that the Ritba’s interpretation is more appropriate to the wording chosen by the Rambam, our notes will follow the approach of the Shulchan Aruch, for it is accepted by the subsequent halachic authorities. It also must be noted that Rashi’s version of the text of Eruvin 98b differs from that of the Rambam. Accordingly, he and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities have a different conception of these rulings.

Note that Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 353:11 explain that this refers to articles that were kept inside the house. Articles that were left on the projection before the Sabbath may be moved on it. See Hilchot Eruvin 3:18-19.

This applies even if the lower projection is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:4; Mishnah Berurah 353:12).

Note the Mishnah Berurah 353:12, which cites opinions that allow the people whose window opens up to the lower projection to use it when it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths.

There are no restrictions whatsoever, for neither projection is a domain in its own right.

This is permitted, because the projection is considered to be an extension of the window, like a hole in the wall of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).

Since the lower projection is a domain in its own right, it includes the space above it until the heavens, and the entire wall is considered as a part of it. In this instance, since the upper projection is not considered to be a domain in its own right, it is divided into portions. The portion directly opposite the window is considered an extension of the window as in the previous note, but the portion on either side is considered part of the lower projection.

If the projection extends over a carmelit and is ten handbreadths high, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 353:3).

Bringing the articles from the public domain to the home constitutes a forbidden activity. Hence, our Sages instituted this safeguard.
Note the Rashba, who states that if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:3) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah states that on a roof or balcony on which a person stands comfortably, all articles may be carried.

Our translation follows the version of the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. Many early printings and manuscripts of the text state “one is permitted.... “From the context, the latter version appears more appropriate.
One is forbidden to transfer from one private domain to another private domain when they are separated by a public domain. Nevertheless, since the public domain extends for only ten handbreadths above the ground, the transfer is not being made through a public domain, but rather through a makom patur (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:1).

See Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-4, which explains that although according to the Torah itself, one may transfer from one private domain to another, our Sages forbade this unless an eruv was constructed.

These articles are not breakable. Nevertheless, since the houses are on the same level, it is not difficult to throw from one to the other. Accordingly, our Sages did not feel the need for a safeguard, lest the article fall and the person descend to the public domain and bring them into his home, a private domain.

Even if the articles fall, they will break. Hence, there is no need to worry that the person may bring them home.

A cistern that is ten handbreadths deep is considered as a private domain. Were the sand piled around the cistem to be ten handbreadths high, the enclosure would be considered a private domain. Eruvin 99b teaches us a new concept, that the sum of ten handbreadths can be reached by combining the two together.
Hence, there is no difficulty in drawing water from the enclosure to the house, since one is transferring from one private domain to another. Needless to say, it is forbidden to transfer from such an enclosure to the public domain.

Since there is no room for a person to pass comfortably between the sand pile and the wall of the house, the space between them is not considered as part of the public domain, but rather as a carmelit (compare to Chapter 14, Halachah 6). Therefore, the space above it is also considered as a carmelit. Thus, one would be transferring from a private domain to a private domain via a carmelit. In this instance (in contrast to Chapter 14, Halachah 14), our Sages allowed such a transfer.

When there is room for people to pass between the cistem and the house in a normal manner, the space between them is considered as part of the public domain. Therefore, a person who draws water through the opening to his home would be considered to be transferring from a private domain—the cistern—through a public domain—the area above the space between the sand pile and the home—to one’s home—a private domain. See Chapter 13, Halachah 16.

Here, the importance of the height of ten handbreadths is not significant because it creates a private domain, but because, as explained in the following note, this will cause the bucket to be more than ten handbreadths above the ground as it passes over the sand pile.

1. e., as the bucket is transferred from the enclosure to the home, it passes above the public domain. In this instance, since the sand pile is ten handbreadths high, there is no difficulty, because the space ten handbreadths above the public domain is a makom patur.

Since the garbage heap is ten handbreadths high, it constitutes a private domain. Thus, when water is poured from the house, the water will pass from a private domain through a mekom petur—the space more than ten handbreadths above the public domain—to another private domain. This is permitted.

This is a Rabbinic decree, instituted for the reason to be explained. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 354:3 states that this restriction applies even if the garbage heap is located in a carmelit.

Eruvin 99b cites an example where the Sages considered such a possibility.

1. e., we suspect that without looking, the person will follow his usual habit and pour water onto the place where the garbage heap was located previously without noticing that it had been removed.

The Rambam (based on Eruvin 16b) interprets this as referring to a situation in which the wall around the courtyard has been broken where the conduit passes, but there are portions of the wall remaining on both sides of the conduit. Note, however, the objections of the Ra’avad who interprets this Talmudic passage as referring to a situation where the conduit passes below the wall of the courtyard.

Almost all commentaries interpret the word “high” as meaning “deep.”

Since the water conduit passes through the courtyard on both sides, and it is of sufficient size to constitute a domain of its own, it is considered to be a carmelit unless the partitions are constructed. Since there is a portion of the wall remaining on either side of the conduit, the courtyard is still considered as a private domain. Nevertheless, the conduit itself is considered as a separate domain and unless a partition is constructed it is forbidden to carry to and from it.

Even were the conduit to pass beneath the wall of the courtyard, since that wall was not erected for the sake of the water, it is not of consequence. Instead, a separate partition must be erected for the sake of the conduit itself (Rashi, Eruvin 87a).

The laws concerning the construction of a partition of this nature are described in Halachah 13.

It is not large enough to be considered to be a domain in its own right. Hence, it is considered as part of the courtyard and we are permitted to draw water from it on Sabbath.

In this halachah as well, most commentaries maintain that the Rambam is referring to a water conduit that passes through a place where a portion of the wall of the courtyard has been taken down. As mentioned above, the Ra’avad interprets Eruvin 12b, the source for this halachah, differently, and therefore objects to the Rambam’s ruling.
Significantly, the Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the second clause of the halachah appears to indicate that the conduit breaks through the wall entirely, and it therefore offers a different interpretation of the Rambam’s words.

Since the conduit is not deep enough to constitute a domain of its own, it would normally be considered part of the domain through which it passes. (See Chapter 14, Halachah 24.) Nevertheless, since this conduit is so wide, it is no longer considered part of the private domain.

I.e., does the conduit nullify the courtyard’s distinction as a private domain? Significantly, this question is asked in this halachah and not in the previous one. In the previous halachah, although the conduit itself was considered a separate domain, since the opening was less than ten handbreadths, it is considered as an entrance and the enclosure is not nullified. This halachah, however, mentions an opening of more than ten cubits, an aperture which ordinarily nullifies an enclosure.

Several explanations have been offered for the Rambam’s ruling. Among them: the small portion of the wall which remains juts out over the water. Therefore, the opening to the courtyard is less than ten cubits (Rabbenu Yonason, commenting on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The portions of the wall which remain on either side are considered like poles. As stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 7, it is permitted to carry in a courtyard with poles on either edges of the entrance to the fourth side (an ancient commentary on the Mishneh Torah from Egypt). See also the Or Sameach.

For the reasons mentioned above, the wall of the courtyard is an acceptable divider, and thus the courtyard as a whole is still considered to be a private domain. Nevertheless, since the wall was not made for the purpose of distinguishing the water that is outside the courtyard from that which is within the courtyard, a separate partition is required for that purpose (ibid.)

When there are no portions jutting out over the water (according to the first interpretation in note 49) or when the entire wall is destroyed (according to the second), the courtyard is considered as enclosed on three sides alone and it 1s forbidden to carry within.

For the entire intent of this partition is to make a distinct separation between the water in the courtyard and the water in the public domain outside of it. [See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishneh (Eruvin 8:6). See also Hilchot Eruvin 3:21-22 where the Rambam mentions a similar requirement.]

Generally, a partition must descend within three handbreadths of the ground.

For, as mentioned above, the courtyard is a private domain, and carrying within it is permitted. Furthermore, even the water conduit is considered as a private domain according to the T orah itself and its designation as a carmelit is Rabbinic in origin.

In contrast to the conduit mentioned in the previous halachot, this conduit does not pass through the courtyards, but merely by their side. Hence, it cannot be considered as part of the courtyard itself.

I.e., ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide.

The conduit is considered to be a carmelit; the windows, the holes adjacent to a carmelit.

Since the opening is more than three handbreadths away, it is no longer considered to be a hole adjacent to the carmelit, but rather a separate entity. Hence, it is forbidden to transfer from the carmelit to it.

I.e., the projections cause the courtyard to be considered as extending beyond its wall, into the space of the conduit. Therefore, taking water from the conduit would be considered as moving an article within a single private domain.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains that just as it is customary to erect balconies over the public domain, it is also customary to erect balconies over bodies of water.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:l) states that the aperture must be four handbreadths states that the aperture must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths.

Since the body of water is considered to be a carmelit. It is forbidden to transfer from a carmelit to a private domain.

The partition need not reach the water itself. Because of the principle gud acheit mechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends into the water, even though it actually ends above its surface. This leniency is granted, because the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
Thus it is considered as if the hole extends into the water itself. Accordingly, we are allowed to draw water through it, because the portion of the body of water beneath it is considered to be an extension of the private domain [the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid)].

The partition need not reach the balcony. Because of the principle gud asikcmechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends to the balcony, even though it actually ends below it (ibid.). See also Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:1).

Eruvin 88a explains that the leniency of pouring into the body of water has an added dimension of severity. The current of the water will cause the water that has been poured to flow beyond the periphery of the aperture and into the portion of the body of water that is a carmelit. Nevertheless, since the person does not perform this transfer himself, there is no restriction.

Since the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, the construction of such a partition is sufficient (Ma’aseh Rokeach).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam›s wording is intended to negate an opinion mentioned in Eruvin 88a, which states that even if a courtyard is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths, if its total area is 16 square handbreadths (e.g., it is is eight cubits by two), the restrictions mentioned in this halachah do not apply. Significantly, the Rashba accepts the more lenient view and, in this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 357:1) follows his ruling.

Pouring the water into the courtyard does not violate a Torah prohibition, because the courtyard itself is an extension of the home. Although the water flows into the public domain, this is due to the forces of gravity and inertia. Thus, the person’s pouring of the water is considered as merely a cause; it is not considered as if he poured the water into the public domain directly. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade pouring the water in this manner.

A seah is approximately 8.25 liters according to Shiurei Torah and 14.4 liters according to the Chazon Ish. The Sages chose this measure because they considered this to be the average quantity of water used by a person every day (the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 8:9).

Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which differs and mentions a covering of boards, which most likely is flat.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (op. cit.), the Rambam explains that the covering will cause the pit to be separated from the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 357:1 and the Be’ur Halachah, which explain that because of its dome-like cover, people will not walk over it easily. Hence, since its opening faces the private domain, it is considered to be a hole adjacent to the private domain or a makom patur.)
Note the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 357) who explains that the reason for the cover is to prevent people’s suspicions from being aroused.

Since this prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin, as long as a distinction is made, one is allowed to pour as much water as he desires. We do not suspect that a person will err and come to pour water directly into the public domain.
It must be emphasized that if a person pours water at the border of the public domain and it flows into that domain as a result of his force, he is liable and it is as if he poured it in the public domain itself (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 357:2).

Thus, according to the Rambam, there are two difficulties with pouring water into such a courtyard: that the person himself may err and pour the water into the public domain, and that the onlookers in the public domain might develop a misconception and think that the person is pouring the water into the public domain.

In the summer, water that is poured in the courtyard will attract attention and it will be much more apparent that it is being poured there so that it will flow into the public domain.

According to the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.), the above restrictions apply only in a public domain. If the courtyard is located adjacent to a carmelit, there are no restrictions. The Ramah, however, differs, and maintains that in both instances there is a Rabbinic prohibition. (See the notes on the following halachot.)

Eruvin 8:10 records a difference of opinion regarding this matter between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya›akov and the other Sages. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya›akov maintains that as long as the drain runs below the ground in a space that is four cubits by four cubits, the person is not liable, for it is possible for the water to be absorbed in such an area. The Sages, by contrast, maintain that this is forbidden, since the water ultimately flows into the public domain, because of the person›s power (Rambam›s Commentary on the Mishnah).

It must be emphasized that these restrictions apply only when \ultimately the water emerges above ground in the public domain. There is no difficulty using our household toilets and drains when the water flows into sewage pipes or septic tanks.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 357:3) follows Rabbenu Asher and others, who accept Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov’s ruling. This leniency applies only when the drainage pipe is made of a substance that absorbs water. If not, even these authorities agree that it is forbidden to pour directly into the drain.

At this time of year, a person’s courtyard will be filled with mud regardless. Therefore, he is not suspected of desiring to pour water into the public domain and no restriction are imposed (Eruvin 88b)

Transferring articles into a carmelit is forbidden only according to Rabbinic decree. The prohibition against causing water to flow into another domain because of one’s power is also a Rabbinic decree instituted as a safeguard. Hence, we follow the principle that a Rabbinic decree should not be instituted as a safeguard to protect the observance of a Rabbinic decree. This opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch 357:3. The Ramah, however, differs, and states that the leniency applies only in a carmelit—like a sea or a desert—that is clearly distinct from · a public domain. Within a carmelit in a town or city, we must observe the same restrictions that apply in a public domain.

Note. the ruling of the Mishnah Berurah 355;14, which allows seamen to dispose of other refuse by similar means.

When the protrusion is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is considered

Eruvin 98a explains that this refers to a scroll of sacred writings.

The Turei Zahav 326:2 mention two distinctions between this instance and a situation when rain descends upon a person in the public domain: a) when bathing, one is likely to be covered with greater quantity of water, b) there is no way one can protect oneself from a sudden rain.

This is the laws pertaining to a karpef, a large area that is enclosed by four walls, but these walls were not constructed for the purpose of habitation. Since this area is enclosed by four walls, it is considered a private domain according to Torah law. Nevertheless, as the Rambam continues, the Rabbis imposed certain restrictions on carrying within this space for the reasons mentioned below. We are, however, allowed to carry within an area enclosed for the purpose of habitation regardless of how large it is (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 2:5).

The size of this space is defined in Halachah 3.

Since this is a large space in which there are no inhabitants, it appears to resemble a public domain or a carmelit. Accordingly, the Sages placed certain restrictions on carrying within it, lest one err and carry in the public domain as well (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 358:1).

A surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths that is elevated ten handbreadths above the ground is considered to be a private domain.

I.e., although it is a private domain according to Torah law, our Sages forbade carrying upon it for the reasons explained in the previous halachah.

Although one is allowed to carry from one carmelit to another, one may not carry more than a total of four cubits.

If it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is a makom patur, and there is no difficulty in carrying from it to the sea or from the sea to it.

A rock that is this high above the sea and this size is considered to be a private domain.

Although our Sages generally forbade transferring an article from a private domain to a carmelit, since this is a very unusual circumstance they did not include it in their decree.

Eruvin 23b identifies the area in which two seah o [grain can be sown with the courtyard of the Sanctuary in the desert, which was 100 cubits by 50 cubits.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav explains the significance of this concept. All of the prohibitions against labor on the Sabbath are derived from the Sanctuary. The courtyard of the Sanctuary was a large area which was enclosed for purposes other than habitation. Nevertheless, it was permitted to carry within it. Therefore, when the Sages prohibited carrying in large areas that were enclosed for purposes other than habitation, they used the size of the courtyard of the Sanctuary as the lower limit.

Here we see a contrast to the measures offour handbreadths by four handbreadths or four cubits by four cubits, where the intent is a square or a larger area in which such a square could be inscribed.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 2:5), the Rambam states that the square is approximately 70 cubits and five sevenths of a cubit by 70 cubits and five sevenths of a cubit, but that there is no perfect square root for the number 5000.

This is obvious from the connection to the courtyard of the Sanctuary, which, as mentioned, was a rectangle and not a square.

Note the Rambam›s explanation of the difference in opinion between Rabbi Yosse and Rabbi Eliezer, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 2:5). On the basis of this explanation, it would appear that his conception of the Mishnah is closer to that of Tosafot, Eruvin 23b than to that of Rashi (loc. cit.).

As in a carmelit.

Hence, when such an open area does not resemble the courtyard of the Sanctuary, the leniency does not apply.

Once this extent of a wall has been broken down, it is considered as if the entire wall is no longer of significance as indicated in Halachah 16.

When one re-encloses the wall, it is considered as if the entire enclosure has been made for the purpose of habitation. Therefore, the area is considered to be an ordinary private domain, and one is allowed to carry within without restriction.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements on the basis of those of Rashi, Eruvin 24a, which state that the intent to use the enclosure for habitation is not sufficient. There must be a house that opens up to the enclosure.
The Merkevet HaMishneh states that, according to the Rambam, “habitation” does not necessarily mean “human habitation.” Therefore, the intent could be to use the enclosure as a corral for animals or the like. Rav Kapach cites the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 2:5), from which it appears that as long as there is a storage vat in the enclosure, it is considered as “enclosed for the purpose of habitation,” although it does not contain a house or lead to a house.
Thus according to the Rambam, “everything depends on the person’s intention.” If he encloses the area for the sake of habitation, he is allowed to carry freely within it. Why is this leniency granted? Because the prohibition against carrying within such an area is Rabbinic in origin, and the Sages enforced this stringency only when a person’s intent was not for the sake of habitation, for then the enclosure resembles a public domain. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:2), however, follows Rashi’s view, that a house is required within the enclosure or the enclosure must lead to a home.

Since the entire enclosure was never opened up for ten cubits at one time, one might assume that the original enclosure was never nullified. Nevertheless, since ultimately a span of ten cubits was constructed, the enclosure is considered as פנים חדשות “a new entity” (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 358:8). Note a parallel ruling in Hilchot Kellim 6:2.

A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.

Although the area was enclosed for the purpose of habitation originally, since it is large and the person sowed produce within the majority of its space, it is clear that he considers it to be a commercial field or garden. It is not common for people to dwell in such a place (Rashi, Eruvin 23b).

I.e., one may carry only within a square of four cubits even in the portion of the enclosure where the produce was not sown, because there is no barrier enclosing the area on the side that faces the portion where the produce has been sown (Maggid Mishneh). Alternatively, the portion in which the produce was not sown is considered to be a secondary part of the entire field in which it is forbidden to carry (Rashi, Eruvin 24a).

Obviously, if produce was sown in a smaller portion of the enclosure, the same leniency applies. The portion of a field necessary to sow two seah of grain is the upper limit.

In such an instance, the portion of the enclosure in which produce was sown is considered like a private garden a person has in his yard.

Since the produce was planted in such a large area, it is considered like a commercial garden or field.

In this instance, the commentaries quote the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh mentioned above: that the portion of the enclosure facing the side where the produce has been sown is not considered to be enclosed.
The Turei Zahav 358:6 is more lenient and explains that since according to the Torah, one could carry within the entire enclosure, even according to Rabbinic law one should be allowed to carry within the portion where produce was not sown. His opinion is not, however, accepted by the later authorities.

The Mishnah Berurah 358:63 states that this ruling applies even when one planted trees throughout the entire enclosure.

It is a common practice to plant trees in one’s yard for shade. Hence, planting them is not considered to be a sign that one rio longer considers the enclosure to be intended for the purpose of habitation.

The Rashba states that this applies when the water is ten handbreadths or more deep. If it is shallower than that, there are no restrictions on carrying within the enclosure. Although Sefer HaBatim differs with this interpretation, the Rashba’s ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:11).

Rashi (Eruvin, loc. cit.) states that the water must be fit to drink. The Rashba and other Sephardic authorities state that it is sufficient that the water be fit for laundry and the like. This appears to be the Rambam’s view. Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes Rashi’s view, Sha’ar HaTziyun 358:81 states that one may rely on the Rashba’s ruling.

For, indeed, it is an advantage to have a source of water near one’s home. Hence, the water does not nullify the enclosure (Rashi, loc. cit.).

From the gloss of the Magen Avraham 358:15, it appears that if the area in which the water is collected is set off from the enclosure as a whole because its height descends abruptly, we may carry within the remainder of the enclosure.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam’s interpretation of Eruvin 25a, this refers to a roof that is open on all sides, which the watchmen in a garden construct for shade. The Rashba interprets that passage as referring to a roof with two proper walls that are joined at one corner. Rabbenu Chanan’el’s interpretation of that passage also indicates that the sides of the covered area are entirely open.

Note the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:12), where Rabbi Yosef Karo states that this principle applies even when the roof is sloped. Generally, the principle, “The edge of the roof is considered to descend and close off,” does not apply with regard to a sloped roof. Nevertheless, since according to the Torah itself, it is permitted to carry within this enclosure, leniency is allowed. (Compare also to Chapter 17, Halachah 35.)
It must be emphasized that according to the Maggid Mishneh’s understanding of the Rambam’s rulings (see note 33), this entire matter is extraneous.

Thus, the remainder of the enclosure is not larger than the space necessary to sow two seah of grain. Hence, there are no restrictions against carrying within it.

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of a passage in Eruvin 25b. Although Rabbenu Chanan’el and Rav Zerachiah HaLevi interpret the passage in this manner, the Ra’avad, Rashi, the Rashba and others follow a slightly different version of the text, and therefore interpret the passage differently. Their interpretation is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:13).

According to the (and seemingly, also according to Rabbenu Chanan’el), both openings are no more than ten cubits wide. Otherwise, it would be forbidden to carry within the courtyard.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to a T-shaped area in which the enclosure opens up to the courtyard, which extends on either side. The enclosure is not considered part of the courtyard, nor is the courtyard considered part of the enclosure, and the laws that originally applied to both areas continue to apply.

I.e., we do not say that the enclosure becomes considered as an extension of the courtyard.

So that one will be able to carry within it.

Since it is common to plant trees in such enclosures, even when the trees are ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area (at which point they are considered to be a separate domain in certain contexts), they do not reduce the size of the enclosure (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba).

Rashi interprets Eruvin 25a, the source for this halachah, as referring to a pillar of this size, whether it is in the middle of the enclosure or next to the wall. Rashi’s interpretation is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:5).

Thus, if the area of the enclosure minus the area of the pillar is less than 5000 square cubits, one is allowed to carry within it.

Based on the principle of l'vud, the pillar is not considered to be an independent entity, but rather an extension of the wall. Therefore, although in practice, the open space within the enclosure has been reduced in size, this reduction is not considered as halachically significant.

1. e., the size of the enclosure is calculated from the new partitions. If it is less than 5000 square cubits, one may carry within. It must be noted that, with regard to this clause as well, Rashi interprets the Talmudic passage differently, explaining that the new partition is erected to enclose the area for the purpose of habitation. His interpretation is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. :6).

Because of the principle of l’vud.
The Maggid Mishneh questions this ruling on the basis of the first clause of the following halachah, which states, “If one applies cement to the wall, one reduces [the size of the enclosure].” Since the cement reduces the size of the enclosure, even though it actually becomes part of the wall, one could surely assume that a new partition would reduce the size of the wall although it is considered part of the wall because of the principle of l’vud.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that since the partition is halachically insignificant, it cannot take the place of the previous wall. Hence, it is not considered to reduce the size of the enclosure. In contrast, the cement adds on to the size of the previous wall, and the space it takes up is subtracted from the open space of the enclosure.

I.e., if the entire space taken up by the cement that is added to the wall is sufficient to reduce the size of the enclosure to less than 5000 square cubits, one may carry within the enclosure.

In this instance as well, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam. Based on his interpretation of Eruvin 25a, the cement is counted only when it is substantial enough to stand on it is own if the original wall was removed. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:7) follows the Ra’avad’s view, the Mishnah Berurah 358:55 states that the Rambam’s opinion may be relied upon in time of need.

We are speaking about a mound ten handbreadths high which is considered as set apart as a separate domain. Since the area is being surrounded by a partition that is constructed for the purpose of dwelling, one might think that it would be permissible to carry within the enclosure. Nevertheless, this is forbidden for the reason stated by the Rambam.

Since the mound, the original dividing point for the enclosure, is still standing, the new walls built are not considered significant.

As mentioned in the previous clause, as long as the original wall is visible, the new wall is of no consequence.

And less than ten handbreadths of the original wall extends above the ground (Mishneh Berurah 358:57).

Our translation is based on the Mishnah Berurah 359:1, which states that in Talmudic times there would be yards both in front and behind the homes. A yard in front of a home was referred to as a. חצר These were frequently used by the people of that era and mentioned often in the Talmud. A yard behind a home was referred to as a, רחבה a term used comparatively rarely in the Talmud. These yards were used infrequently by people of that era.

As apparent from the following clause, this applies when the yard was enclosed before an entrance leading to one of the homes was opened.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 359:1) rules that the restriction mentioned in this law does not apply at present, since it has become customary to use our back yards. Hence, we assume that they were enclosed for the purpose of habitation.

Eruvin 24a states that this leniency applies even when a portion of the yard is used as a threshing floor. Since the person enclosed the area after opening an entrance to his home, we assume that the yard’s primary purpose is to serve the home.

The yard is larger than 5000 square meters and was enclosed for purposes other than habitation (Rashi, Eruvin 24b).

The Rambam›s decision is based on the description of such a yard in Eruvin 24b.

Using a post, a lechi, as a divider is discussed in Chapter 17, Halachot 2 and 9.
As the Rambam mentions there, the post is considered as a fourth wall. In this instance, by erecting the post, one will be considered as erecting a new wall to enclose the yard for the sake of habitation (Rashi, loc. cit.).

This refers to a city surrounded by a wall, which is considered to be a private domain.

This refers even to an inferior partition, such as those mentioned in Halachah 18. Rashi (Eruvin 16b, the source for this› halachah) states that the restrictions of this law apply only when the enclosure uses such an inferior partition. If a proper partition is erected, one may carry within the entire enclosure, since the enclosure was erected for the purpose of habitation. Note the Merkevet HaMishneh, who emphasizes that the Rambam does not accept this leniency.
The wording of the Shulchan Aruch and the Beit Yosef(Orach Chayim 360:1) appears to concur with Rashi›s view. The later authorities also accept his ruling.

Since the area is so large and it is enclosed only for a temporary period, the Sages placed restrictions on carrying within it.
It must, however, be emphasized that according to Torah law, the enclosure is considered a private domain. Accordingly, a person who carries from it to a public domain or from a public domain to it is liable (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 360:1; Mishnah Berurah 360:5).

With this term, the Rambam excludes a gentile. The Ramah (loc. cit.) also rules that a gentile may not be included in a caravan.

According to Torah law, such an area is a private domain. The Rabbis did not place any restrictions upon it, because it has—albeit temporarily—been enclosed for the purpose of habitation.

See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 360:2, which mentions that it is acceptable if the land is used for pasture.

Since the enclosure includes such a large empty space, our Sages forbade carrying within it.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Eruvin 1:10) does not resolve the question whether or not to count a child as a member of the caravan. In his Beit Yosef (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo questions the Rambam’s decision, for generally we follow the rule that when a doubt exists pertaining to a question of Rabbinic law, the more lenient view should be followed. Accordingly, he does not mention the matter in his Shulchan Aruch. The Ramah cites the Rambam’s view, but prefaces it with the phrase “There are those who maintain,” which implies that the opinion cited is not accepted universally.

I.e., greater than 5000 square cubits.

This leniency applies only on the Sabbath on which the person dies. On the following Sabbath, they are forbidden to carry unless they are joined by a third individual.

See a further expression of this principle in Hilchot Eruvin 3:25.

I.e., the middle enclosure does not have a wall, but is totally open on either side (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 360:3). The Shulchan Aruch, however, follows the interpretation of the Ritba, who requires the walls of the narrow courtyard to enter into the space of the wider courtyard. The Rambam, however, does not appear to make such a requirement.

Since the individuals in each of the outer courtyards are considered as sharing the space of the middle courtyard.

I.e., they may carry freely from one enclosure to another. Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that they must make an eruv to join their respective enclosures together. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch mentions a more restrictive opinion, which allows the individuals to carry freely only when the outer enclosures are less than 5000 square cubits in size.

I.e., the outer enclosures are considered to be distinct entities without any connection to each other. Thus it is not considered as if three people are spending the Sabbath in the same place.

The bracketed additions are based on the commentary of Rashi (Eruvin 93a, the source for this halachah) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

In both of these instances, three individuals share a single portion of space. Therefore, they are allowed to carry freely from one enclosure to another.

In this halachah, the Rambam begins to describe the rules that govern the walls that enclose a private domain.

I.e., it is as if the partition were not there. See notes below.
Rashi, Sukkah 24b, states that this applies not only when the wall will fall because of the wind, but also to a cloth wall that will blow back and forth. From Halachah 24, it appears that this ruling is also accepted by the Rambam. It is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:1 and 630:10).

Our translation follows Rabbenu Chanan’el’s text of Eruvin 26a. According to this interpretation, our Sages are teaching us that a partition must be constructed in a firm and sturdy fashion. (See also the interpretation of the term in the Aruch.) See also Halachah 12 and notes.
The Ra’avad, Rashi, and others follow a different text of the Talmud, which reads כל מחיצה העשויה לנחת According to this interpretation, this refers to a partition erected for storage purposes and not for people to dwell within. This latter view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:1).

The commentaries on Eruvin interpret this as a temporary partition that builders construct for shade. (Rav Kapach, however, cites interpretations of the Geonim that interpret the term "for the sake of modesty" literally, to change one's clothes behind.)

The Maggid Mishneh interprets the phrase “it is not a complete partition” to mean: It is not a partition significant enough to cause an enclosure to be considered to be a private domain. It may, however, cause an enclosure to be considered to be a carmelit.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:2).
See also the interpretation of Rabbenu Chanan’el to Eruvin 93b, which interprets it as a “rock.” From a halachic perspective, these interpretations are not mutually exclusive. See Chapter 15, Halachah 9.

1. e., if a wall includes open spaces, the area that is open may not exceed the area that is enclosed. As mentioned in the following halachah, this refers to open spaces that are larger than three handbreadths wide. As the Rambam states in Halachah 18, this refers to spaces in the horizontal as well as the vertical portion of the wall.

I.e., when there is an open space larger than ten cubits wide, the entire partition is nullified.

As long as the opening is ten cubits wide or less, there is no need to enclose it with a frame of an entrance. It is commonplace for a wall to have an entrance that is less than ten cubits wide without a frame.

The Rambam explains the structure of a frame of an entrance (tzurat hapetach) in Halachah 19.

I.e., by erecting the frame of an entrance, one enables a partition to be considered acceptable despite the fact that it has an opening that is larger than ten cubits.

This ruling represents a point of difference between the Rambam and most other authorities. According to the Rambam, although the frame of an entrance enables an opening larger than ten cubits to be accepted, the opening is still considered an open space. Accordingly, if the total amount of open space on any one side of a partition exceeds the closed space, the partition is unacceptable, even though portions of the open space possess a frame of an entrance.
Many authorities (e.g., the Rashba and Tosafot, Eruvin 11a) differ and maintain that once a frame of an entrance is constructed, the space below it is deemed closed and should be considered as such when calculating whether the enclosed portion of a partition exceeds its open area. The opinion of these authorities is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:10). Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 362:19 and the Mishnah Berurah 362:59 state that it is proper to be stringent and follow the Rambam’s ruling.
Rabbenu Asher cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Eruvin 1:9) and Kilayim 4:2 as the source for the Rambam’s ruling. (See also Hilchot Shofar V’Sukkah V’Lulav 4:12, where the Rambam accepts a more lenient view regarding the walls of a sukkah. Note also the glosses of the Kessef Mishneh and the Maggid Mishneh there.)
See also the commentary of Rav Kapach, who advances an interpretation of the Rambam’s statements here and in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:8) that maintains that the Rambam follows the view advanced by the Rashba. Even those who reject this interpretation in most instances are forced to accept it with regard to the third side of an alley, as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 3. (Note also Chapter 17, Halachah 27.)
The difference between the Rambam’s ruling and that of the other authorities is particularly relevant in contemporary communities that permit carrying because of an eruv. Most of these communities are enclosed, not by a proper wall, but by a series of “frames of an entrance” coristructed using telephone poles and the like. According to the Rambam, these enclosures are not acceptable. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the carefully observant refrain from carrying in these communities.

More precisely, the same ruling applies if some of the spaces are wider than three handbreadths, as long as the size of the total of the open spaces wider than three handbreadths does not exceed the remainder of the partition.

As the Rambam continues, a partition of reeds will generally be constructed by implanting them upright in the ground, one near the other. As long as the reeds are not three handbreadths apart, the partition is acceptable even if there are no reeds that run horizontally.

Generally, a partition of ropes will be constructed by stretching them from one post to another. As long as the ropes are not three handbreadths apart, the partition is acceptable, even if there are no ropes that run vertically.

In the Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam defines the Hebrew term halachah l’ Mosheh miSinai as referring to laws that have no obvious source in the Written Torah, yet have been accepted throughout the centuries as an integral part of the Torah tradition.

As the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:11) emphasizes, the reed must be placed exactly above the two side posts. It is not acceptable for it to be attached to their sides, for then it does not resemble the lintel of a doorway.

In his gloss on this halachah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that this is acceptable because of the principle gud asik—i.e., the posts at the side are considered to be extended until they reach the crossbar. Based on this rationale, it follows that the two posts need not be of the same height. Even if one is higher than the other, they may still be considered as part of the same frame of an entrance. (Note also the application of this principle in Hilchot Sukkah 4:2.)

According to the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), this refers to the posts on the side. The crossbar above need not be sturdy at all.

The Rambam›s decision is based on Eruvin 11b. His ruling, however, has aroused questions. The passage cited also mentions opinions that require the post to have a hinge for the door on at least one side. Although there are authorities who also accept the latter requirement, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the Rambam›s view.

I.e., the circular portion of the arch is not counted in the calculation of the entrance’s height.

I.e., there is an opening of more than ten cubits at the corner where two walls would merge if they were continued. Even if one constructs a frame of an entrance at this opening, it is not acceptable.

Note Chapter 17, Halachah 35, which mentions another law based on this same principle.

See parallels in Chapter 17, Halachah 12, and Hilchot Sukkah 4:16.

Unlike the animals that the Rambam proceeds to mention, a human being need not be bound, as is obvious from Halachah 23.

If the animal is standing and there are three handbreadths between the animal’s body and the ground, that space must be filled with other substances (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 362:12).

Note that in Hilchot Sukkot (loc. cit.), the Rambam does not require that animals be bound when they serve as part of a wall. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 630:11) states that the animals must be bound even when used for the purpose of a sukkah’s wall.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:3) explains this as referring to a structure that was not built with the intent of enclosing an area, but accomplished that purpose nonetheless.

I.e., in all instances, the partition is considered valid, and the enclosure is considered a private domain. Therefore, a person who transfers an article into this enclosure from the public domain is liable. Our Sages, however, placed certain restrictions on carrying within such an enclosure, as the Rambam continues to explain.

I.e., the person who constructed the partition did so without knowing that it was the Sabbath or without knowing that it is forbidden to build on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 362:18).

According to the Chemed Mosheh, this refers to a situation in which one person had another construct an enclosure for the former to carry within on the Sabbath. Although the person who actually constructed the enclosure did not intend to violate the Sabbath laws, the person for whom he performed the labor desired that such a violation take place. Hence, that person is prohibited from carrying within. This explanation resolves the question raised by the Rashba that is quoted by the Maggid Mishneh.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 6, Halachah 23, when a Jew intentionally performs a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, it is forbidden for other Jews to benefit from that labor on that Sabbath itself. The person who performed the labor, by contrast, is never permitted to benefit from it. Thus, in this instance, he would be forbidden from ever carrying within this enclosure on the Sabbath. (See Or Sameach.)
Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that if a partition had been standing before the Sabbath, it was removed on the Sabbath and then reconstructed on the Sabbath, it is permitted to carry within the enclosure. This applies even if the partition was rebuilt intentionally on the Sabbath. The Mishnah Berurah 362:26, however, cites authorities that do not accept this leniency.

I.e., within three handbreadths of each other (ShulchanAruch, Orach Chayim 362:5). Note the Bayit Chadash (Orach Chayim 362) and the Be’ur Halachah 362, which question why the people may not be even further separated.

Although constructing a partition of this nature is not considered as building, it is still forbidden for the people who stand there to have in mind that their bodies serve as an enclosure, lest they come to treat the Sabbath prohibitions lightly (Mishnah Berurah 362:39).

The Rashba differs with this ruling and maintains that there is no difficulty if the person who desires to use the enclosure has the people stand there. According to his opinion, the only difficulty is when the people forming the partition have such an intent. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:7) prefaces the quotation of the Rambam’s ruling with the words, “There is one who says,” which implies that it is not accepted by all. Similarly, the later authorities do not obligate compliance with this stringency.
Significantly, when discussing the use of human beings as part of the wall of a sukkah on the holiday, the Rambam (Hilchot Sukkah 4:16) states that the people serving as the wall may not know that their bodies are being used in that capacity, but the person sitting in the sukkah may have that intent.

Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 362:7), who states that the leniency of using human beings to form an enclosure on the Sabbath should be employed only in a very extreme situation. He maintains that it is preferable to have a child bring in an article from the public domain without making an enclosure, rather than to have an adult carry the article in within an enclosure consisting of human beings. Although the later authorities raise questions regarding employing a child for this purpose, they accept the Ramah’s hesitation about using an enclosure of human bodies.

For this rule to apply, there must be a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area and ten handbreadths high beneath the tree. Otherwise, the space is considered as a carmelit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 362:2; Mishnah Berurah 362:5).

See Halachah 15. (See also Hilchot Sukkah 4:5, where the Rambam mentions similar concepts with regard to using a tree as a wall for a sukkah.)

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, when an area was enclosed for purposes other than habitation, one may not carry within it, if it is larger than the space necessary to sow two se’ah of grain—i.e., 5000 square cubits.

In Talmudic times, several homes would open up to a single courtyard. These courtyards would open up to paths or lanes that led to the public marketplaces and the thoroughfares of the towns. Sometimes, these paths or lanes would end in a cul-de-sac, and on other occasions they would lead from one thoroughfare to another.

This refers to a lane leading from one marketplace or thoroughfare to another. Needless to say, the lane must be less than sixteen cubits wide. If it is sixteen cubits wide, it would be deemed as a public domain according to the Rambam, as mentioned in Chapter 14, Halachah 1.

A lane with three walls is considered to be a carmelit. Thus according to the Torah itself, such an area is regarded as a mekom petur, and one is permitted to carry within it. The Rabbis nevertheless forbade carrying within such an area, unless a person constructed either of the following structures: a lechi—a pole constructed at one of the corners of the fourth side—or a korah—a beam constructed across the entrance.

The dimensions required for a pole and a beam are mentioned in Halachot 12 and 13. When a pole is constructed at the corner of the fourth side of the lane, the lane is considered to be enclosed and thus is viewed as a private domain. (See Halachah 9 of this chapter and Chapter 14, Halachah 1.)

As explained in_Halachah 9, extending a beam over the lane is a Rabbinic measure that makes a distinction between such a lane and a lane that is not enclosed at all. Because of this distinction, the Rabbinic prohibition against carrying in such a lane is lifted.

This refers to the process of enclosing the area. In addition, as mentioned in Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-2, it is necessary for the people who share the lane to join together in an eruv, each contributing a certain measure of food.

The Rambam’s definition of a lane follows the conception of Rabbenu Chanan’el in his commentary on Eruvin 12a. Most other Rishonim [including Rashi (Eruvin, loc. cit.), Tosafot, the Rashba, and the Ra’avad] differ, and maintain that as long as a lane has three walls (or two walls and a pole on the third side), it is considered a private domain according to the Torah. (See Be’ur Halachah 363:1.)
The difference between the Rambam’s view and that of these other authorities does not concern the license to carry, for all agree that it is forbidden to carry within the lane until a pole or a beam is constructed at the fourth side. Instead, the difference involves transferring an article into such a lane with three walls from the public domain. According to the Rambam, one is not liable from such a transfer, while according to the other authorities, one is.

As mentioned above, according to the Rambam, one may carry in this lane, because any enclosure with three walls or less is deemed as a carmelit. According to the Torah, there is no restriction against carrying in such a domain.

This ruling follows that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi in his Halachot. Nevertheless, there are many authorities who differ and maintain that this ruling applies only when the lane opens to a carmelit on at least one side. If it opens up to a public domain on both sides, it is not sufficient to erect a frame of an entrance, and a proper gate must be erected (Maggid Mishneh). The Rambam’s ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 364:1).

Our translation is based on the gloss and drawings of the Maggid Mishneh.

The Rambam rules that all that is necessary is a frame of an entrance at one opening of the lane, and a pole or a beam at the other end. Nothing is necessary at the bend of the lane. This follows the opinion of Rav (Eruvin 6a, 8b).
Rashi and Rabbenu Asher, however, interpret Rav’s ruling differently and require that a frame of an entrance be constructed at the lane’s bend, and a pole or a beam be constructed at both the lane’s openings. They explain that this is necessary because, unless the frame of an entrance is constructed at the bend, a person who does not walk through the entire lane will not be aware of the pole or the beam at the other entrance to the lane. This is the view accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3).

Based on Shabbat 100a and the Tosefta, Shabbat 11:4, the Ra›avad and the Rashba define this as referring to an incline of ten handbreadths within four cubits. If the incline is gentler than that, this leniency does not apply. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:36) accepts this definition.

According to the Torah, one is allowed to carry within the lane, and the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin. Thus, since the steep incline makes the lane distinct from the public domain (and distinct from other lanes), there is no need for any further measures to permit carrying.
From the wording chosen by the Rambam, however, it appears that he does not consider the incline as a wall enclosing the lane (see the Ramah, Orach Chayim, loc. cit.), but rather as a distinguishing factor similar to a beam. Accordingly, a person who transfers an article into this lane from the public domain would not be held liable.

This refers to a lane that has walls on either side. Thus, it is considered as if the lane had barriers on all four sides. For the garbage dump can be assumed to be ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. Thus, it is considered to be an added wall, and the sea itself can be assumed to be ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is also considered to be a wall (Mishnah Berurah 363:118).

This law does not apply regarding a private garbage dump, because the possibility exists that such a dump will be removed at any time.

Our translation follows the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan’el and Rashi on Eruvin 8a. Although both these authorities agree on the definition of the word, שרטון they quote different versions of that Talmudic passage. Rabbenu Chanan’el follows the version quoted here by the Rambam, which states that “we do not suspect that the sea will wash up a “. שרטון The version of the passage quoted by Rashi (and printed in our texts of the Talmud today) states, “we suspect that the sea will wash up a. שרטון “
Significantly, this difference in approach to this passage has been preserved. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:29) follows the ruling of the Rambam, while subsequent Ashkenazic authorities and the Ramah follow that of Rashi which forbids carrying in such a lane. According to this view, it is impossible to enclose it with an eruv.

See the definition of the term רחבה in Chapter 16, Halachah 10.

Were the lane to end directly opposite the entrance from the yard to the public domain, a more stringent ruling would be applied and it would be necessary to construct a frame of an entrance. See Halachot 3 and 18.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that were the lane to end at the side of the yard, it would resemble an L-shaped lane. Hence, the laws mentioned in Halachah 3 would apply. When, however, the lane does not end at the side of the yard, it has no resemblance to an L-shaped lane. Therefore, the entrance to the yard is itself considerd a distinguishing factor. (Note, however, Rabbenu Asher and the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 365:3, which require that the people whose homes open up to the lane and the yard join together in an eruv.)
Significantly, according to the Maggid Mishneh, the word “forbidden” used by the Rambam, appears to mean “requires an eruv.” This would concur with the Ra’avad’s interpretation of Eruvin 7b which states that if the people whose homes open to the yard join in an eruv together with the people whose homes open to the lane, it is permitted to carry in the lane even if it ends in the side of the yard.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) which mentions that an eruv can never be effective for such a lane. See the explanation of this ruling in the Mishnah Berurah 365:23.

The fundamental principle behind these conditions is that an enclosure that is used by a private person will afford greater privacy than an enclosure used by many people. Therefore, it is necessary that the enclosure be more substantial (the Rashba as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh).

When only a single house or courtyard opens to a lane, it bears a far closer resemblance to private property.

If a lane is not more than four cubits or if it is square shaped, it appears like a courtyard.

I.e., the distance from one entrance to the other.

The distance between the two walls on either side.

A barrier of this length is considered to be a wall, and thus a portion of this side of the lane is also considered to be enclosed.

Although the requirement to construct two poles or a barrier is more stringent than the norm for a lane, it still represents a leniency. There is no need to construct the frame of an entrance as in a courtyard.
The Rambam’s ruling (with several additions) is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26). In his gloss, the Ramah adds that it has become customary to enclose all lanes with the frame of an entrance—i.e., two poles, and a cord above them.

The length of a courtyard refers to the space from its entrance to the opposite wall (Maggid Mishneh). Although there are other interpretations, this is the definition accepted as halachah (Mishnah Berurah 363:116).

Our translation is based on the second interpretation of the Rambam›s words offered by the Maggid Mishneh, which is supported by the Rambam›s statements in Hilchot Eruvin 5:15. From that source, it appears that the Rambam conceives of a lane as having several courtyards and several houses open up to it. If, however, there is only one house opening up to it, although it contains several courtyards, or one courtyard although it contains several houses, it is not sufficient.
Rashi (Eruvin 12b), however, offers a different interpretation, explaining that to be considered a lane, an enclosure must have two courtyards open up to it, and each of the courtyards must have two houses open up to it. This view is accepted by the Rashba and by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26).

Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that when a lane is less than four cubits long, the frame of an entrance is required to enclose it. Significantly, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:27 quotes the Rambam’s ruling and not that of the Shulchan Aruch. (See also Mishnah Berurah 363:93.)

In the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, the word, וּמַשֶּׁהוּ (lit. “and something”) is added in parentheses. Rav David Arameah and the Shulchan Aruch interpret this to mean that the four handbreadths must be “ample.”

The Kessef Mishneh (and his view is quoted by the Magen Avraham 363:29) explains that even if the majority of the lane is wider than three handbreadths, since its entrance is less than three handbreadths it is considered to be closed, and no further measures are necessary.

I.e., based on the principle of l’vud, the lane is considered to be a closed space and not open (Kessef Mishneh). Although there are more lenient opinions, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:28) accepts the Rambam’s ruling.

As mentioned in the notes on the first halachah of this chapter, the Rambam differs with many of the other Rishonim and maintains that, according to Torah law, an area enclosed by three partitions is a makom patur and not a private domain. Therefore, a person who transfers an article to it from the public domain or vice versa is not liable.
As mentioned in several places throughout the first chapter of the tractate of Eruvin, there is a difference of opinion among the Sages regarding why one is permitted to carry within a lane when a beam is erected over its fourth side. The opinion quoted by the Rambam maintains that although the Sages forbade carrying in such a domain, their prohibition is lifted because the beam serves as a distinction, setting this lane apart, physically and conceptually, from the public domain.
The other opinion maintains that the beam is considered to be a wall (i.e., it is considered as if there were a wall descending from the beam downward enclosing the lane). Hence, the lane is considered to be enclosed on all four sides and therefore, as a private domain.

In the first chapter of the tractate of Eruvin, our Sages also differ regarding why permission is granted to carry in a lane when a pole is erected at its fourth side. According to the opinion quoted by the Rambam, it is considered as if a wall emerges from the pole, and thus the lane is considered to be enclosed by a wall on all of its sides.
There is, however, another opinion, which states that the pole is erected merely to create a distinction and it is not considered to be a wall.

Some of the authorities who maintain that an enclosure with three walls is considered to be a private domain according to Torah law, permit carrying within a public domain if gates are erected on one side and a frame of an entrance, pole, or beam is erected on the other. (See the Mishnah Berurah 364:6.)

The definition of a public domain is taken from the encampment of the Jewish people in the desert, and there the public domain did not have gates (Mishnah Berurah 364:7). The gates enclose the domain on all four sides. Hence, even though many people walk through it, it is still considered as “private.”

Based on Eruvin 6a-b, many Rishonim differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that not only must the gates be fit to be closed at night, they must actually be closed, in order for carrying to be permitted in a public domain. Gates that can be closed, but are not actually closed, are effective only in an open lane. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 364:2) mentions the Rambam’s view, the more stringent opinion is favored by the subsequent authorities.
It must be emphasized that from Chapter 14, Halachah 1, and Hilchot Eruvin 1:1, it appears that the Rambam also requires doors that are actually closed. Several explanations are offered by the commentaries in resolution of this difficulty.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 364:4, which states that a frame of an entrance is considered to be a wall. Therefore, if one erected poles on each corner of a square and connected them with a string above, one creates a private domain. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade carrying within an area fit to be considered a public domain unless it has a proper gate at its entrance. The Rambam, however, could not accept this ruling, because as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 16, if the open portions of a barrier exceed the enclosed portions, it is not acceptable.

Herein lies one of the points of controversy regarding the eruvim that are constructed around communities today. For few modern cities or villages are enclosed by actual walls with gates, and in practice, most of these eruvim employ a frame of an entrance, using telephone wires and the like.
As mentioned in Chapter 14, Halachah 1, and its notes, the Rambam does not subscribe to the opinion that a public domain must contain 600,000 people passing through it. Although the later Ashkenazic authorities accept this more lenient view, they also suggest that those who are careful in their observance accept the Rambam’s ruling.
Whether this principle is to be applied with regard to great metropolises like Manhattan, Brooklyn, London, and the like which have more than 600,000 passersby or with regard to smaller communities which are considered a public domain only according to the more stringent view, the public domain must be enclosed by proper walls. The use of a frame of an entrance employing telephone or electric wires and the like is not sufficient.

Although the inner portion of the beam or the pole is of most importance, it is, nevertheless, permitted to carry under the beam or opposite the pole, because that area is considered to be a makom patur (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 365:6).

The Rambam›s ruling is based on Rabbenu Chanan›el›s interpretation of Eruvin 8b,9a. The Ra’avad and most Ashkenazic authorities (among them Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher) interpret that passage differently and maintain that we are permitted to carry beneath a beam when it opens up to a carmelit.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:4) follows the Rambam›s ruling. The Mishnah Berurah 365:27, however, mentions the more lenient views. Furthermore, many authorities (e.g., Maggid Mishnah, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 365:6) agree that if a beam is four handbreadths wide and is strong enough to support a roof, it is permitted to carry beneath it. In that instance, the outer end of the beam is considered to descend and serve as a fourth wall.

In that instance, the area between the poles is considered to be a distinct entity, with walls on either side.

Generally, one is allowed to carry within a makom patur. Nevertheless, our Sages forbade carrying in a carmelit, a makom patur which resembles a public domain. In the situation at hand, since one makom patur (the carmelit) is adjacent to another makom patur (the area opposite the pole or beneath the beam), the two are combined and form a single entity. Therefore, carrying is forbidden, not only in the carmelit, but also between the poles.

The Maggid Mishneh states that an animal used as a pole must be bound and may not be free to move. This concept can be derived from Chapter 16, Halachah 21, which states that an animal used for a partition may be bound. As mentioned in Halachah 9, a pole is considered to be a partition.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:10-15 and 8:3 with regard to the different laws pertaining to an asherah, a tree that is worshiped.

The leniency mentioned represents a novel concept, for seemingly it applies even when the pole is associated with the idol worship of a Jew. (A pole worshiped by gentiles can be used if the gentiles nullify its connection with idol worship before it comes into the possession of a Jew. If, however, it is owned by a Jew, the connection with idol worship can never be nullified.)
Generally, since we are obligated to destroy objects that are associated with idol worship, from a halachic perspective, they are considered as if they have already been burnt to ashes. For example, Hilchot Shofar 1:3 states that it is forbidden to use a shofar belonging to an עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת (“an apostate city”) and Hilchot Lulav 8:1 states that a palm branch used for idol worship is unacceptable for use as a lulav. Since both a shofar and lulav have a minimum requirement for their length, an object that must be destroyed because of its connection with idol worship is unacceptable. In the case at hand, however, since there is no minimum requirement for the width or breadth of a pole, there is no difficulty in using a tree that has been worshiped.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s explanation, for although there is no minimum width or breadth required for a pole, there is a minimum requirement for its height. Since the wood of the tree that has been worshiped is considered as though it had been burned to ash already, it lacks this minimum height.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:6), the Rambam explains that this height is required for a pole, because the minimum height of a lane is ten handbreadths. Thus, the pole would extend for the entire height of the lane. Even if the lane is higher, the pole is not required to be more than ten handbreadths high.

Based on Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:9, it can be inferred that this refers to a tree that was worshiped by a Jew or a tree that was worshiped by a gentile, but which was cut down before the gentile nullified its connection with idol worship.

Even though the beam must be sturdy enough to support a brick that is one and a half handbreadths wide, it is possible for there to be a portion of the brick extending on either side of the beam (Eruvin 14a, Kessef Mishneh).

When a beam is built in such a sturdy fashion, it is obviously placed there as a permanent part of the lane, and thus will serve as a distinction for the people inside of it.

Based on the Jerusalem Talmud, the Maggid Mishneh states that it is not enough for the beam to support a single brick. It must be sturdy enough to support an entire row of bricks of this size. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:17) quotes the Rambam’s wording, the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:19, Mishnah Berurah 363:59) quote the Maggid Mishneh’s view.
Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.: 18) also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher that if the beam is more than four handbreadths wide, it does not have to be sturdy enough to hold a brick.

Literally “half of three handbreadths by three handbreadths.”

1. e., the supports that are attached to the walls on which the beam is placed.

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the supports need not be that sturdy. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:18) quotes both opinions without coming to a final decision. Similarly, there is a difference of opinion among the later authorities concerning this issue.

If the walls of the lane are not ten handbreadths high, they are not significant and it is considered as if the lane lacks enclosures on either side.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this restriction applies only when a beam is being used, for the passersby will not notice a beam that is more than twenty cubits high. If, however, a pole is used, there is no limitation on the height of the lane. This interpretation is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26).

As mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 16, an opening that is larger than ten cubits is too large to be considered to be an entrance.

I.e., the entrance to the lane is an open space without a doorway or gate.

The Ra’avad and others object to this ruling, stating that if the walls of a lane are not ten handbreadths high, the fact that the opening is constructed in the form of a frame of an entrance is of no significance. Since the walls of the lane are not high enough to be considered significant entities, of what value is the fact that the opening is constructed in the form of a frame of an entrance?
The Meiri explains that since the frame of the entrance is at least ten handbreadths high, the fact that the walls of the lane themselves are lower is insignificant. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s opinion. Note the explanation of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:27, which explains that this applies in a situation when the walls of the lane are not ten handbreadths high. Nevertheless, the lane is considered a private domain because of the walls of houses and courtyards that adjoin it.
See also the Mishnah Berurah 363:93, which mentions that many later authorities accept the Ra›avad›s objection and allow people to carry in such a lane only when the walls are ten handbreadths high. These authorities, however, explain that if the walls of the lane are ten. handbreadths throughout the lane, with the exception of its opening, the construction of a frame of an entrance at the opening makes it permissible for people to carry within.

When the frame of an entrance is constructed, there is no need for a post or a beam. For the construction of a frame of an entrance causes an entrance to be considered as if it were enclosed, as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 16.

From the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:1), it is clear that he is speaking about designs and ornaments on the beam itself. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 363:26, based on Rabbenu Asher›s interpretation of Eruvin 3a), states that it is sufficient for there to be designs on the wall next to the beam. For when people look at the designs, their attention will also be drawn to the beam.

Note the Kessef Mishneh’s statements that permission is not granted to carry in a lane that is more than ten handbreadths wide, despite the fact that the beam placed above it has designs.

The principle that objects above 20 cubits high will not be noticed easily by the human eye is also applied with reference to a sukkah (the s’chach may not be more than 20 cubits high) and with regard to a Chanukah candelabra (which may not be placed 20 cubits above the ground).

We have translated the Rambam’s words in the most simple fashion, following Rav Kapach ‘s interpretation. The Maggid Mishneh (based on Eruvin 4b) offers a much more complicated interpretation, explaining that if originally a beam was erected more than 20 cubits above the ground and then a second beam was erected above the floor to reduce its height, there may not be more than 20 cubits between the first beam and the second. This approach is also followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26).

Rashi (Eruvin 5a) explains that a smaller area is not sufficient. A lane is not considered significant unless it is more than four cubits by four cubits, as explained in Halachah 7. Thus, there must be a portion of the lane with walls that are ten handbreadths high, with at least this area.

Leading to a public domain or a carmelit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 365:1).

I.e., the opening is made in the side wall of the lane. Nevertheless, it is very close to the opening of the lane where the pole or the beam erected to permit carrying was placed.

Although generally the walls of a lane must be four cubits long, as mentioned in Halachah 7, leniency is allowed in this instance, since the lane existed previously (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.; Mishnah Berurah 365:2).

As mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 16, an opening that is larger than ten cubits causes the entire side to be considered to be unenclosed, unless a frame of an entrance is constructed above it.

Although the opening is not too large to nullify the enclosure, since the people will be going in and out through the new opening, they will not notice the beam or the pole erected at the original entrance (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.).

When the walls of the lane open to the courtyard and there is an opening to the public domain on the opposite side, it appears as if the lane leads directly into the public domain. If, however, there are projections remaining at the side of the entrance from the lane to the courtyard, they are considered to be equivalent to a pole, and it is permitted to carry within the lane. (See Mishnah Berurah 365:12- 13.)

See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:3), which states that the question of whether the opening to the public domain must be directly opposite the opening to the lane for the restriction to apply depends on whether or not an eruv has been made between the inhabitants of the lane and the inhabitants of the courtyard. See the notes to Halachah 1.

This clarifies the definition of “private domain” given at the beginning of Chapter 14—i.e., private property belonging to a single individual, a group, or a collective.

Eruvin 8b describes this situation as “a lane structured like a centipede”—i.e., that has different paths leading into it like the legs of a centipede.

See Halachah 3 with regard to an L-shaped lane,

The frame of an entrance is to be constructed at the entrance on one side. On the other side of the path, at the entrances that lead to the public domain, a pole or a beam is sufficient (Maggid Mishneh).

At one side of the lane the wall protrudes further than the other, so that the opening to the lane is a diagonal.

Placing the beam at a diagonal is not acceptable, because a beam is intended to create a distinction between the lane and the public domain. When the beam is positioned at a diagonal, a person carrying in the extension of the lane will not differentiate between it and the public domain.
The Rashba (quoted in the Maggid Mishneh) states that one may carry in the extended portion of the lane only by erecting the frame of an entrance across the diagonal. This ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:30). If, however, one erects a pole at both sides of the entrance to the lane, it is not acceptable. One may, however, carry in the area behind the inner pole (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:36; Mishnah Berurah 363:125).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as saying that the same laws apply if one erected a beam over the midst of a lane. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:32).

Eruvin 14b explains that this law is seemingly self-evident. Nevertheless, it was necessary to ment1on it, for one might think that carrying would be forbidden within the inner half lest one carry in the outer half.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that the inner portion must meet all the criteria for a lane mentioned in Halachah 7.

As mentioned in Halachah 14, it is possible to enable people to carry within a lane by erecting a beam or a pole only when the opening to a lane is ten cubits or less wide. If the opening is wider, a frame of an entrance is necessary.

The fact that the two lanes merge is not significant, for it is the width at the entrance that is the determining factor. In this instance as well, the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:33) follow the rationale mentioned in the notes to the previous halachah and emphasize that both the new lanes created by the erection of the wall must meet all the conditions for a lane mentioned in Halachah 7.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. :34) states that the measures cited by the Rambam are not arbitrary figures. As long as the walls erected exceed the size of the empty space between them and the wall, and the opening is ten cubits wide or less, it is possible to allow people to carry within the lane by erecting a pole or a beam.
Eruvin 10a mentions that generally as long as the enclosed portion of a side is equal to the open portion, it is acceptable. (See Chapter 16, Halachah 16.) In this instance, however, since a majority of the side is left open for the entrance, the enclosed portion of the remainder must exceed the open portion.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) underscores that the leniency mentioned in this halachah applies only when people do not enter and leave through the spaces on the sides. It is, nevertheless, unlikely that they would do so unless there is a clear indication that this is the common practice (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:40; Mishnah Berurah 363:148). See Halachah 17.

Based on Eruvin 5 a-b, the Maggid Mishneh interprets this as referring to a portion of the wall that projects into the lane, but which was not constructed for the purpose of serving as a pole. It is, nevertheless, acceptable.

E. g., a tree that is growing at the side of the lane.

The Maggid Mishneh interprets Eruvin 15a, the source for this halachah, as referring to a situation where a tree was growing near a pole at the side of the lane, and the pole was removed. If it was removed before the Sabbath, we can assume that the people relied on the tree to use as a pole. Hence, it is acceptable. If, however, the pole was removed on the Sabbath itself, the tree is not acceptable, for there was no intent to use it for this purpose before the commencement of the Sabbath. This conception is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Joc. cit.: 11).

This refers to a pole which projects out from the side of the lane. Those standing within the lane see the pole as a distinct entity. Those standing outside the lane see merely a straight wall.

The definition of this situation a matter of controversy among the commentaries. See the accompanying diagrams.

The Mishnah Berurah 363:35 explains that even when the pole is ten handbreadths high, it is not acceptable if it is more than three handbreadths above the ground. The rationale for this ruling is that a pole is considered like a wall, and a wall must reach within three handbreadths of the ground.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 363:22, which states that this restriction applies regardless of the size of the pole.

As mentioned in the notes on the beginning of the halachah, the Rambam’s ruling is not accepted by all the authorities.

As mentioned in Halachah 9, a beam that is placed over the entrance of a lane differentiates between the lane and the public domain. When, however, this beam is covered by a mat, it appears that it was placed there to hang objects on it and thus no longer serves its original function.

Although the beam is no longer considered significant for its original purpose. If the mat reaches the ground—or because of the principle of l'vud, within three handbreadths of the ground—it is considered to be a wall, provided it is tied so that it will not be moved by the wind. (See Chapter 16, Halachah 24.)

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:25) mentions that these spikes are implanted at an angle, inclined toward the inside of the lane. Thus, there are two difficulties with the beam: a) It is placed on the spikes and not on the walls of the lane itself, b) Its span is shorter than the width of the lane itself.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions that if the pole is within three handbreadths of the wall of the lane, it is acceptable, based on the principle of l’vud.

The Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:23, and the Mishnah Berurah 363:67 explain that even if the beam does not reach either wall (e.g., it is placed atop a pillar, in the midst of the lane), it is acceptable as long as it is within three handbreadths of both walls.

For they are considered as though they are connected, based on the principle of l’vud.

See Halachah 13.

Based on Eruvin 14a, the Ra’avad explains that the beams must be close enough to each other actually to support the brick if placed there. The Rambam (see the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh) explains that as long as the beams are within three handbreadths of each other, and their combined width is a handbreadth, theoretically, they would be strong enough to support a brick placed upon them. Hence, it is sufficient even though in their present position, the beams are unable to support a brick.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:22) mentions both interpretations, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:24, which states that one should be stringent and follow the Ra’avad’s view.

This is based on the principle of chavot rami, literally, “cast it down.”

The maximum acceptable height for a beam (Halachah 14).

The minimum acceptable height for a beam (ibid).

As explained in the opening clause of this halachah. With regard to this clause as well, the objection raised by the Ra’avad with regard to the first clause is also relevant. Indeed, it is far more applicable in this instance, for when the boards are not on the same plane, it is impossible for them to hold a brick.
As in the first clause, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. :23) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor the Rambam’s view. In this instance, however, most of the later authorities suggest accepting the stringency suggested by the Ra’avad.

The Mishnah Berurah 363:63 explains that this law involves a further leniency: Since the beam is rounded, it will not be able to support a brick. Nevertheless, since it would be strong enough to accept a brick if it were straight, it is acceptable.

The Rambam’s words are a direct quote from the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:5). In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam notes that the relation mentioned here is merely an approximation, and the ratio of the diameter of a circle to its circumference is pi.

I.e., the portion of the beam that extends beyond its place is considered as if it did not exist, and we calculate the distance—on a straight line—between the two points of the beam on the extremity of the permitted area. If that distance is less than three handbreadths, it is acceptable, because of the principle of l'vud. If not, a new beam is required.

Wells are generally ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide, thus constituting a private domain. Accordingly, if the area around them is not enclosed, it is forbidden to draw water and drink, since by doing so one will be removing an article from a private domain to a carmelit or to a public domain.
As mentioned in Halachah 30, our Sages granted the leniency mentioned in this halachah as a specific dispensation to the pilgrims journeying to Jerusalem for the festivals. Rather than require the well to be surrounded by a proper wall, they allowed the use of such a structure.

See the accompanying diagram. Note the Mishnah, Eruvin 2:1, which uses the term d’yomdin, which literally means “two pillars” to describe the structure positioned at each of the corners of the square.

This is the minimum length of the walls placed at each side of the corner. Although a wall of four handbreadths is considered significant in many instances, in the case at hand a larger measure is required, because the majority of the enclosure remains open.

This is the maximum size of the space allowed between walls. As obvious from Halachah 29, it may be smaller.

See the accompanying diagram.

See the accompanying diagram.

Based on the principle of l’vud.

If the enclosure was any smaller, it is likely that an animal may turn and its owner would carry the bucket out of the enclosure. Eruvin 19a states that this distance is two cubits in length on each side.

A camel is much larger than a cow and its head and the majority of its body cannot fit into the space for the head and the majority of the body of a cow.

I.e., the further the distance from the well, the larger the distance between the corners becomes. Rather than make the corner walls larger, it is proper to add a third (or more) wall to each side, to maintain the distance between each wall at thirteen and one third cubits or less (Eruvin 18a). See the accompanying diagram.

As the halachah mentions below, this leniency was generally allowed for animals; only when the well was very wide were men also allowed to benefit from it.

I.e., a well—which is itself a source of water—but not a reservoir or cistern in which water was stored. See the following halachah.

I.e., in contrast to one belonging to a private individual. See the following halachah.

This distinguishes the area as a private domain. In regard to descending to drink from the well see Chapter 24, Halachah 4.

This interpretation of the Hebrew חגורה follows the commentary of Tosafot, rather than Rashi (Eruvin 22b).

Although there is no transgression in performing such an activity, since the stall projects within the enclosure, our Sages forbade this for the reasons stated by the Rambam.

The Rambam’s statements are based on Eruvin 20b, which explains that while attempting to fix the broken stall, the person may carry the bucket to the public domain. Nevertheless, as the Merkevet HaMishneh notes, the Rambam slightly changes the description of the situation mentioned in the Talmud to allow for a shorter, more concise text.

Note the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim, Responsum 265), who question how large an area may be included with such walls for the area to be considered a private domain according to the Torah. From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that even if there are more than thirteen and one third handbreadths between the walls, it is still considered a private domain.

Thus, the restrictions against drawing water from such a well mentioned in Halachah 30 and 31 are Rabbinic in origin. When our Sages instituted these restrictions, they considered the difficulties that might be caused to the festive pilgrims and did not impose them in regard to their animals.

Eruvin 22a explains that even if a public thoroughfare passes through such a structure, it is still considered to be a private domain, because it has the abovementioned walls. Note the statements of the Baal HaHashlamah, who differs with the Rambam’s ruling.

See Halachah 18.

For it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another. Since there are no people dwelling in the enclosure, an eruv is not required (Rashi, Eruvin 20a).

Since people from two different courtyards are using the area, an eruv is required. Nevertheless, once an eruv is made, there is no difficulty in carrying from the courtyards to the enclosure.

We do not say that since it was permitted to carry in the enclosure for a portion of the Sabbath, we are able to continue carrying within (Rashi, loc. cit.).

According to the Torah itself, however, the enclosure is a private domain, as reflected in the previous halachah.

From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that this leniency applies regardless of whether the well had dried up on the Sabbath or was dry even before the Sabbath commenced. If it begins to flow with water, one may carry within the enclosure. Note, however, Rashi (loc. cit.) and the Baal HaHashlamah, who maintain that the leniency applies only when originally there was water in the well at the commencement of the Sabbath. Since the walls of the enclosure were not considered to be an acceptable partition at the commencement of the Sabbath, they cannot become acceptable on that Sabbath.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 22.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:3), the Rambam differentiates between this instance and others (e.g., Chapter 16, Halachah 13), where, since permission is granted to carry within an area at the commencement of the Sabbath, that permission is continued throughout the Sabbath. These leniencies are granted when the difficulties arise because of the restrictions involved in making an eruv.
A more stringent ruling is applied in this situation, because if the pole or beam is removed, it is as if the area is open entirely. The difficulty is not in the status of the people within the enclosure, but in the enclosure itself. It no longer fits the standards required by the Sages.

And there is thus no possibility of one of the Torah’s prohibitions being violated. Nevertheless, carrying in such a lane is forbidden because of Rabbinic decree.

A Greek architectural structure with three (and sometimes two) walls and a roof with an aperture for sunlight in the center. Often translated as “a porch.”

Generally, as reflected by his statements in Halachah 2, the Rambam prohibits carrying in a structure with only three walls unless an additional measure is taken—e.g., the construction of a pole or a beam. In this instance, as he explains, that function is served by the edge of the roof, which is considered to descend and form the fourth wall. (See Chapter 16, Halachah 7.)

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 361:2), which states that this applies even when the opening is more than ten cubits wide. See also the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions that there are opinions that require a portion of the wall to remain at either comer An Excedra for this principle to apply. Note also the Ramah (Orach Chayim 361:2), who applies the principle, “the edge of the roof is considered to descend,” even with regard to a structure of two walls, provided the walls are built as an L.

The Ra’avad and others object to this ruling, for as mentioned in the notes on Halachot 2 and 9, they maintain that a structure with three walls is considered to be a private domain according to the Torah.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 16.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 20.

I.e., were there to be a beam of the roof of the house extending over the portion that was open, we can apply the principle stated in the above portion of the halachah, “the edge of the roof is considered to descend,” and on this basis allow one to carry within.

This clause—which significantly is lacking in some authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah—has created discussion among the commentaries. In his commentary on Eruvin 94a, Rashi explains that the word “angle” mentioned in the Talmud refers to roofs which, like most of the roofs in Europe, descend at a slant. When a roof is flat, the principle “the edge of the roof is considered to descend” applies. If the roof descends at an angle, the principle does not. This interpretation is quoted by Rav Yosef Karo, both in his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) as a different interpretation than that of the Rambam.
The Rambam’s conception is clearly expressed in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:3), where he interprets the term “angle” to mean that the beams of the roof were built on a slant, as in the accompanying diagram. Since the beams do not end in the place where the opening was made—but were rather broken off abruptly—the principle “the edge of the roof is considered to descend” does not apply.

This measure is not particularly relevant with regard to the laws of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, it is mentioned here, because the measures of a handbreadth and a cubit, which are extremely relevant, are dependent on it. See Hilchot Sefer Torah 9:9, which defines a fingerbreadth as the length of two barley corns. In modern measure, it is 2 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 2.4 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

Thus, 8 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 9.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Jsh.

Note Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:6, which explains that some of the cubits used for the altar›s dimensions contained only five handbreadths.

I.e., when a more stringent approach would call for a larger measure, it is the larger measure that is required. When a more stringent approach would call for a smaller measure, it is the smaller measure that is required.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that the difference between these two measurements is half a fingerbreadth.