Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Kinah usually has the connotation of jealousy. There are, however, instances where it has the meaning "warning," as in Joel 2:18.

The intent in all these examples is that it is unlikely that the woman would engage in adultery with such a man: the father and the brother because of the family connection, the gentile or the servant because we assume that a modest Jewish woman would not associate with such people, and the impotent man because of his physical condition. By citing such examples, the Rambam implies that surely such a warning can be given with regard to any ordinary man.

These can be the same two witnesses in whose presence the warning was administered (Hilchot Edut 21:5).

We suspect that she committed adultery.

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:14, a woman who commits adultery is forbidden to her husband. Since we suspect that this woman committed adultery, she is forbidden until her faithfulness is proven.

For it is her immodest behavior that caused her to become forbidden (Hilchot Ishut 24:24).

Even though in general a woman is allowed to enter into privacy with two men of established moral standing, in this instance, since the husband expressed his disapproval, such an act warrants drinking the bitter water.

Entering into privacy (yichud) with another man is forbidden (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, ch. 22). Nevertheless, Kiddushin 81a states that as long as a warning was not given, such an act is not sufficient cause for a woman to be forbidden to her husband.

Implied is that the warning is effective after a boy reaches the age of nine, for a boy is fit to engage in sexual relations from the age of nine, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 11:3. Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro (Sotah 4:4) differs and maintains that a youth must attain majority before a warning is effective. There are several Midrashic sources for the Rambam’s ruling.

And she must drink the bitter water. The rationale for this ruling is that as long as the woman has not entered into privacy with the other man, the husband’s warning has not been reinforced by her conduct. Accordingly, since he has authority over his warning, he can withdraw it. When, however, she has already entered into privacy with the other man, she is already required by the Torah to drink the bitter water. Her husband has no authority over the Torah’s requirement, and thus, he can no longer withdraw his warning (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. IV). See also the gloss of the Tzafnat Paneach to this halachah.

In this instance, the husband is required to pay his wife the money due her by virtue of her ketubah because, although he is bound by the evidence of his own eyes, it is not sufficient to require his wife to drink the bitter water. For that, the testimony of two witnesses is necessary.

The Rambam is speaking about an instance when, despite the gossip generated about the woman, there is no (or only one) witness who can testify about her entering into privacy with the man involved. Hence, because of her immodest conduct, he must divorce her. He must, however, pay the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, because, as stated in Sotah 6b, the bitter water will not test the chastity of a woman whose immodest conduct has become public knowledge.

Since the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to require her to drink the bitter water, and yet the husband relies on the testimony of the witness, she is forbidden to the husband, but he must bear the financial burden of the prohibition. (See Hilchot Ishut 24:17.)

For a woman does not become forbidden until two witnesses testify that she entered into privacy with the man in question.

For that is possible only when a warning was administered by the husband, as stated in the following halachah.

Since the men in question are incapable of acting on their own, the court takes the initiative on their behalf. The court’s action has two objectives: to maintain the moral standard of the Jewish people, and if that fails, to protect the husband’s interest and cause a woman who acts immodestly to pay the penalty for her conduct.

From the commentaries, it appears that he is required to do so; he does not have an option.

In this instance as well, entering into privacy with the man is considered an immodest act, sufficient cause for the woman to forfeit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

Even if she desires to in an attempt to prove her innocence.

If, however, the other witness who saw the man and the woman enter into privacy says that they did not engage in relations, the woman does not forfeit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Beit Shmuel 178:12).

Implied is that even if there is one witness, she is not to be tested by the bitter water. Generally, the Torah requires two witnesses. In this case, an exception was made because there is an indication of immodesty.

All the individuals mentioned are normally not accepted as witnesses. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, as the Rambam explains. The testimony of witnesses who have violated prohibitions of Scriptural origin is not accepted, because we suspect that they will lie.

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 12:16, these women are the woman’s mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her husband’s other wife, her yevamah and her husband’s daughter from another marriage.

The Rambam’s wording refers to the following concept. Generally, because of the bad feelings that characterize the relationship between these pairs, testimony is also disqualified in the reverse of the above situations. For example, if the husband of the daughter of a woman’s husband is missing, the woman may not testify about the matter, although she has no natural reason to hate the other woman.

The testimony of these women is accepted because through it, the woman is granted the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. We assume that these women would desire to discredit her entirely and cause her to forfeit this money. Since without their testimony, the woman is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the bitter water and forfeits the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, their testimony abets her position rather than harms it. (Indeed, note the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who questions why the testimony of these women is accepted at all.)

In most instances, when the statements of one witness are countered by the statements of another, the two are considered to be of equal weight, and thus the statements of the first witness are no longer considered.

This principle applies not only with regard to a sotah, but with regard to all instances in which one witness’s testimony is considered equivalent to that of two witnesses (Sotah 31b) — e.g., testimony regarding the death of a woman’s husband (Hilchot Gerushin 12:18).

I.e., one testified directly after the other.

Since the testimony of the first witness was never established, it is not given more weight than it would ordinarily. Since the woman’s fidelity is in doubt, she is required to drink the bitter water. The principles in this and the following halachot are paralleled in Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 12.

In this instance, the testimony of the pair of witnesses balances the testimony of the witness who said that she committed adultery, even if that witness’s testimony had already been established in court.

Compare to Hilchot Rotzeach USh’mirat HaNefesh 9:16.

Since the woman’s fidelity remains in doubt, she must drink the waters to clarify the situation.

See Halachah 14.

Although she claims innocence, she is still afraid of drinking the waters. See Chapter 4, Halachah 3.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 2, from the time the woman enters into privacy with the man in question, her husband is forbidden to enter into relations with her. As such, if they engaged in relations, the bitter water will not show her guilt, as indicated by Halachah 8.

Because it is her husband’s actions that prevent her from drinking the waters that can establish her innocence, he must bear the financial responsibility.

The commentaries raise a question based on Hilchot Yibbum 2:20, which states that when a yevamah engages in relations with another man, she does not become forbidden to her yavam. They explain that an exception is made when the yavam issues a warning and forbids the yevamah to enter into privacy with a particular man.

A person who has both male and female sexual organs.

If they violate a warning given by their husbands and enter into privacy with the man in question, they are to be divorced without receiving the money due them by virtue of their ketubah.

When a girl below majority was not consecrated by her father, the consecration is not effective by Scriptural Law. Even when she was consecrated by her father, she is not required to drink the bitter water unless she is warned after attaining majority. (See Halachah 4.) Note the Kessef Mishneh, who quotes a different source from that mentioned by the Rambam.

A woman consecrated by a minor is not considered consecrated at all (Hilchot Ishut 4:7).

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 4:11, when an androgynous consecrates a woman, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

Who could not see, even when the two did not act in secrecy (Sotah 27a).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that a minor is never forbid-den to her husband because of adultery unless he is a priest, basing his opinion on Yevamot 33b, which states: "The seduction of a minor is always considered equivalent to rape."
In his gloss on Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:2, the Maggid Mishneh substantiates the Rambam’s ruling, citing Ketubot 9a, which states that the statements of a husband who claims that his wife is not a virgin are accepted and cause her to be forbidden to him. According to the Rambam, this applies even when the girl is a minor. (See also the Kessef Mishneh.)

I.e., an orphan who was married off by someone other than her father. See Hilchot Ishut 4:8; Hilchot Gerushin 11:1.

Since according to Scriptural Law, her marriage is not binding, relations with another man are not considered adulterous. Even a priest who may not marry a woman who engaged in a forbidden intimate relationship may remain married to this girl.

Although these women are not required to drink if they enter into privacy with the man in question before the marriage is consummated, after its consummation the warning issued beforehand is effective.

I.e., the husband and the wife entered into a chuppah, effecting the stage of nisu’in. They did not, however, consummate the marriage. Before they did so, the wife entered into privacy with the man in question.

The words "who are permitted to remain married" are fundamental to the understanding of this halachah. All these women and/or their husbands mentioned are bound by different laws with regard to marriage from the Jewish people as a whole. Nevertheless, if they are permitted to their husbands or to their wives, the laws of a sotah apply.
As such, an illegitimate man or woman must be married either to another illegitimate man or woman or to a convert, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 15. With regard to an impotent man, the laws regarding whom he is permitted to marry and whom he is forbidden to marry are stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 16.

We do not wait for her to give birth or for her to wean her child. Note Tosafot, Sotah 26a, who differ and maintain that we should wait for a pregnant woman to give birth before requiring her to drink.

For her husband is no longer alive.

For she did not prove her innocence by drinking the waters.

The term is taken from Numbers 5:18.

See Hilchot Ishut 10:1. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding this point, maintaining that Sotah 24b appears to indicate that the wife of a man who had relations with the woman he consecrated while she was living in her father’s house must still drink the bitter water. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling.

For by engaging in relations with his wife, the man has transgressed a prohibition, and hence the waters will not test his wife’s fidelity.

It is forbidden to marry such women, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:25. Nevertheless, since the prohibition is not inherent to the couple’s relationship — as reflected in the fact that after the 24 months of nursing have passed, the couple may marry — but rather a result of the child’s presence, it is not considered a sinful relationship. See the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh and the Mishneh LaMelech.

Every Jew is commanded to be fruitful and multiply. For this reason, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Ishut 15:7, the husband is obligated to divorce this woman. Therefore, she is not given the opportunity to demonstrate her fidelity by drinking the bitter water.

Significantly, the Rambam’s ruling here reflects a change of mind from his ruling in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 4:3) where he rules that such women may not drink the bitter water even when the husband has fathered children already.

It is not, however, an exclusion preventing a woman who is not capable of bearing children from drinking the waters. See Sotah 25b.

I.e., he was married to an aylonit and a woman capable of bearing children. The woman capable of bearing children became pregnant, he divorced her and then issued a warning to the aylonit.

See Halachah 2.

See Chapter 1, Halachot 10-11.

I.e., if her husband divorces her, it is forbidden for her to marry the man concerning whom she was warned.

This principle applies not only with regard to a sotah, but with regard to every adulterous relationship. The passage in the Torah mentions the word v’nitma’ah ("and she became defiled") twice, once in reference to the husband and once in reference to the adulterer. See Hilchot Gerushin 5:4-5. See also Halachah 15.

This indicates that someone was lying face up on the bed and could not turn to either side (Rashi, Yevamot 24a). See Hilchot Ishut 24:15 and notes, where these concepts are discussed in greater detail.

He is not, however, compelled to divorce her. The matter is left to his initiative (Kessef Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 11:6).

Since there is no conclusive evidence that she is forbidden, she is allowed to remain married, so that the reputation of her children will not be sullied.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 11:1) differs and maintains that if there are both a rumor that continues spreading throughout the city and witnesses who saw unsavory behavior, the husband is required to divorce his wife if she has not borne him children [Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 11:2)].

If, however, two witnesses testify to adultery, the adulterer is compelled to divorce her, as stated above.

Although the couple are forbidden to marry, since there were no witnesses to the act of adultery, and the second marriage interposed, a more lenient ruling is given than that stated in Halachah 13.

The Chelkat Mechokek 11:10 emphasizes that this law applies only when the woman willingly committed adultery. If she was raped while married to her first husband, she does not become forbidden to him. Moreover, she also does not become forbidden to the rapist, and if she is widowed or divorced, she is permitted to marry him.

For it is her immodest conduct that caused her to be forbidden.

For they know that she is forbidden to him and will warn him against engaging in relations with her (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sotah 1:3).

And if he engages in relations with her, the bitter water will not test her fidelity, as reflected by Chapter 2, Halachah 5.

This refers to the Sanhedrin, the highest Jewish court. The obligation for a case involving sotah to be tried before this body is derived from an association between this case and rebellious elder (Sotah 7b).

More precisely, the Sanhedrin would hold session in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, which was located half within the Temple Courtyard and half outside the Temple Courtyard.
Note the responsum of the Chida, Chayim Sha’al, (Volume II, section 4), which states that the High Court can try a sotah even when it does not hold session in the Temple Courtyard. Rather, according to his interpretation, the words "in the Temple" refer to the process of testing a sotah. Every aspect of the test is carried out in the Temple.

Some commentaries explain that if her husband is present, she will be motivated to uphold her previous statements and will not admit her guilt. Others explain that if her husband is present, she might be embarrassed to admit that she committed adultery.

And thus cause God’s name to be blotted out.

I.e., a candid admission of guilt is nothing to be ashamed of, because we understand the extenuating circumstances.

I.e., you are not the first woman to have committed adultery. Many women have done so and they have been swept away from the world in punishment via the medium of the bitter water. Why follow in the same pattern? Admit your guilt.

Genesis, Chapter 38. The Bible relates how Tamar dressed up like a prostitute and seduced Judah. The story is significant not only because it shows how a person can be lured into sexual misconduct, but it also relates how Judah was not embarrassed to admit his guilt publicly.

Genesis 35:22 states that Reuben had relations with Bilhah, his father’s concubine.
According to Shabbat 55b, the verse is not meant to be interpreted literally, for actually he did not commit a sin of this nature. Nevertheless, to encourage the woman to admit her guilt, she is told the simple meaning of the narrative.

II Samuel, Chapter 13, describes how Amnon, King David’s firstborn, raped his half-sister Tamar.

I.e., hearing the example of these distinguished individuals’ conduct will motivate her to admit her own shortcomings.

Although she does not admit her guilt explicitly, this statement is equivalent to an admission of guilt.

This gate is referred to as the Gate of Nicanor.

The presence of the onlookers serves two purposes: It embarrasses the woman being tested, and it spurs the onlookers themselves to higher moral practice.

See Hilchot Ishut 13:11 and 24:12, which describe these garments.

Seeing familiar faces will encourage her to persist in her position, rather than admit her guilt.

Although the process that follows is a ritual, it is necessary that the woman understand the oath and her response to it, for the oath to be binding upon her. Therefore, there is no necessity for it to be administered in Biblical Hebrew; any language that the woman understands is sufficient.

As the above passage concludes. Repeating Amen after an oath is equivalent to taking that oath oneself (Hilchot Sh’vuot 2:1).

Since the passage mentions both orders, the priest mentions that the order of retribution will be from the belly to the thigh, lest people say that the waters did not bring about the curse in the manner in which the Torah said they would (Sotah 9b).

See Hilchot Tefillin 1:10. See Chapter 4, Halachah 8, which mentions several factors in which an equivalence is made between the scroll used for a sotah and a Torah scroll. As stated in that halachah, the equivalence is based on Numbers 5:23, which refers to the scroll used for a sotah as a sefer, the same term used for a Torah scroll.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Sotah 2:4) states that the parchment must be made from the hide of a kosher animal, lest the woman refuse to drink and the passage be required to be entombed. It would not be fitting for God’s name to remain on parchment from a non-kosher animal.

Originally, the passage would be copied from a Torah scroll. In the Second Temple era, Queen Heleni had fashioned a golden tablet with the words of this passage written on it (Yoma 37a).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:3, the Rambam defines this term with an Arabic word explained by Rav Kapach as referring to a green powder that when mixed with gallnut juice produces a black substance. Ink made with this substance cannot be rubbed out. See Chapter 4, Halachah 9.

See Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 3.

The Zohar, Volume III, page 124b, interprets this as meaning that chronologically the first letter of God’s name must be written first; the second, second; etc. Perhaps this is the Rambam’s intent as well. Alternatively, it is possible to explain that God’s name is written with the letters yud-hei-vav-hei, and not in another form.

Sotah 9a states: She prepared wine for the adulterer in attractive goblets. As consequence, the priest shall make her drink bitter water from a clay cup.

Sotah 15b establishes an equivalence between the vessel that contains the water used for a sotah and the vessel that contains the water used to purify a person afflicted with tzara’at, a Biblical ailment somewhat like leprosy. And that vessel cannot have been used for any task previously (Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at 11:1).

172.8 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, 298.5 cubic centimeters according to Chazon Ish.

Numbers 5:17 states that "holy water must be taken." The Sifre interprets this as referring to "water that has been consecrated in a utensil, the water of the basin."

The ring enables the tile to be lifted easily.

Note the Kessef Mishneh, who questions the Rambam’s source for the fact that the writing of the scroll would be dissolved before the woman’s clothes were torn open.

The Tosefta (Sotah 1:5) states that the priest would be chosen by a lottery. Chasdei David explains that a priest would be selected in this manner so that no one would think that one desired the task in order to view the woman’s nakedness.

This is cited by the Rabbis as proof that a Jewish woman’s hair must always be covered. Otherwise, she is considered immodest. See Hilchot Ishut 24:11-12.

I.e., a rope made of palm bast.

As implied by Leviticus 18:3, the Egyptians were known for their immodest behavior. Thus, the imagery evoked by the rope also served to chastise the woman for her conduct (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 1:6).

An isaron is considered the size of 43.2 eggs.

Sotah 15b notes that, in contrast to wheat, which is used as food for humans, barley is employed primarily as animal fodder. Since the woman acted like an animal, betraying her fidelity to her husband, the sacrifice she brings consists of grains used for beasts.

I.e., a wicker basket made of palm leaves.

See Hilchot Shekalim 2:4, which explains that this term refers to money collected from the half-shekalim donated by the entire Jewish people, which remains after the purchase of communal sacrifices. As stated in Hilchot Shekalim 4:8, these funds were used for various communal purposes.

This is intended to motivate her to admit her guilt. Until the meal offering is sacrificed, she may admit her guilt and thus free herself of the obligation to drink the bitter water and suffer the severe penalty involved (Sotah 14a).

As befits a sacrificial offering.

Note the commentary of Rashi on Numbers 5:15, which explains the rationale for these prohibitions. Adding frankincense and oil adorns the sacrifices, making them more attractive. More specifically, there are allegorical connotations to the above. Oil is a metaphor for light, and this woman acted in darkness. Frankincense is used as an allusion to the Matriarchs, who were the epitome of modesty, and this woman departed from their ways.

I.e., each one is considered as a separate negative commandment. See Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 104-105) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 366-367).

To frighten her and to encourage her to confess (Bemidbar Rabbah 9:33).

The meal offering had to be waved by both the woman bringing it and the priest. The Jerusalem Talmud (Sotah 3:1) states that "the evil inclination does not operate at that time," and hence there is no danger that the physical contact will stir the priest to sexual desire.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 9:6-7.

Sukkah 37b interprets this as acknowledgement of God’s dominion over the entire universe. Menachot 62a explains that this is a measure to check undesirable winds.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 13:12, which describes the offering of meal offerings brought by private individuals.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:9, which describes the consumption of the meal offerings.

Sotah 20b states that the terror of death might provoke menstruation.

The Rambam’s wording, based on that of the Mishnah (Sotah 3:3), requires some clarification. The intent appears to be, not that the Women’s Courtyard becomes impure, but that the woman becomes impure, and in that state she is forbidden to be in the Women’s Courtyard. See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:3.

Sotah 47a states that this took place in the time of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, shortly before the destruction of the Second Temple.

Sotah 21a says that this refers to the woman’s efforts in assisting her husband and her sons in their studies

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:1,13.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 3:3). Others render the term as "she deteriorates."

Who is forbidden to engage in relations with a woman who took part in forbidden sexual relations.

The Mishneh LaMelech (in the gloss on Halachah 24) explains that in this halachah, the Rambam’s intent is that one might think that the fact that she becomes afflicted by sickness indicates that she was raped — i.e., the bitter water had an effect, but because she did not willfully engage in the transgression, she did not die. To negate this hypothesis, the Rambam states that even a priest is allowed to continue married life with such a woman.

For this is a sign of adulterous relationships.

The bracketed additions are based on the commentary of the Meiri.

When there are witnesses, there is no need for the miraculous activity of the water. For ultimately the witnesses will testify in court and cause the woman to be forbidden to her husband (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sotah 1:1).

See Halachah 17.

I.e., had the witness testified before she drank the bitter water, she would not have been allowed to drink them, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 14. Nevertheless, once she drank the waters, the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to cause her to be considered guilty.

. See Hilchot Ishut 24:20.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:1) for a more specific definition of the Hebrew term derech evarim.