Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The very word onah — and its translation as ‘‘conjugal rights’’ — conveys a fundamental conception with regard to the Torah’s conception of marital intimacy. Marital intimacy is not for the husband’s sake, but rather for his wife’s. Onah also means ‘‘respond.’’ A man should be responding to his wife’s desires and satisfying her wishes for closeness.

See Hilchot Shabbat 30:14, where the Rambam states that marital relations are one of the expressions of oneg Shabbat, ‘‘Sabbath delight.’’ (See also Hilchot De’ot 4:19, 5:4.)

Ketubot 62b states that even if the other profession is more profitable, the prerogative is granted to the woman, for a woman values intimacy with her husband more than financial advancement.

Yevamot 65a states that if it is the local custom for a man to have only one wife, a man may not deviate from that custom. In the Ashkenazic community, as ordained by the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, it is forbidden for a man to marry more than one wife. (See Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:9-10).)

The commentaries draw support for this law from the Biblical narrative (Genesis 31:33), which mentions that Jacob had separate tents for Leah, Rachel, Bilhah and Zilpah. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 14.)

Yevamot 65a.

From this, it appears that the custom of engaging in intimate relations once a week was not the practice of Torah scholars alone.

To fill up pitchers of water and dump them down the drain (Ketubot 7:3; Even HaEzer 76:12).

In this time, it is hoped that he will change his mind and retract his vow.

As mentioned in Chapter 12, a husband is obligated by Scriptural Law to give his wife conjugal rights. Once an obligation is imposed on a person by Scriptural Law, he may not free himself of it by taking a vow or an oath.

Since this vow does not forbid anything to the woman, but states instead, that her husband is prohibited from appreciating pleasure that results from relations with her, it can be effective.

Rav Kapach notes that although this prohibition involves three rights, the Rambam mentions its violation only with regard to the denial of conjugal rights. He explains that with regard to her sustenance and garments, a woman can take legal recourse and sue for the money due. This, however, is not possible with regard to conjugal rights.

The later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 76:18; Beit Shmuel 76:17) quote the opinion in the Shiltei HaGiborim that states that if a man is afflicted with an ailment that will heal, his wife is required to remain married to him, despite the fact that the treatment will last longer than six months.

The Maggid Mishneh and many other authorities differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that a man should not be forced to divorce his wife even in such a situation. This view is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2). Even those opinions that favor the Rambam’s ruling emphasize that the court should seek to clarify that the woman is not making her statements because she fell in love with another man and seeks to end her previous marriage because of him.

For, as implied by the Rambam’s statements below, this money was promised to her only on the condition that she maintain the marriage relationship.

Those authorities who differ with the Rambam regarding whether the husband is compelled to divorce his wife also differ with regard to this point. They maintain that even with regard to the possessions for which her husband accepted responsibility, the woman is granted only what she takes possession of. (See Maggid Mishneh; Rama (Even HaEzer, loc. cit.).

I.e., she is not necessarily interested in terminating the marriage, but rather in withholding marital relations as a means to communicate her position to her husband.

A maneh is equivalent to 100 dinarim.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:2) quotes the Rambam’s wording. The Rama, however, differs, stating that the announcement need be made only on four consecutive Sabbaths.

The purpose of these announcements is obviously to shame her and to cause her to reconsider her course of behavior.

I.e., she does not receive the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, nor any additional amount that her husband promised her (tos’fot ketubah).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that, as a favor, the court requests the husband not to divorce his wife until this time has passed, for it is disgraceful for a Jewish couple to part because of strife. It is hoped that during the twelve months they are required to wait, they will resolve their differences.

In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the governing principle is that the fact that a woman makes a categorical statement refusing to engage in marital relations in the future is sufficient to warrant her being placed in this category, despite the fact that her conduct is of no immediate consequence.

One year for a na’arah, one month for a bogeret, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 17.

Yibbum refers to the marriage of the widow (the yevamah) of a childless man by his brother (the yavam). The Rambam’s ruling is dependent on his decision that even in the present age, the mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over the mitzvah of chalitzah (Hilchot Yibbum 1:2).

I.e., the laws governing a woman who rebels against her husband differ from those governing a woman who claims that she is repulsed by her husband, as described in Halachah 8.

In both his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:3), Rav Yosef Caro states that the husband does not have to take physical possession of this property. As long as the wife does not take possession of it, it is considered to be his.

This refers to nichsei tzon barzel, property whose full value must ordinarily be returned to the woman. In contrast, nichsei m’log — property for which the husband did not accept responsibility and is returned to the woman in whatever condition it is, regardless of its worth — must be returned to her, even if she rebels against him. (See Rama, Even HaEzer 77:2.) The rationale for this distinction is that since he takes responsibility for the nichsei tzon barzel, these articles are considered to be possessed by him unless she takes physical possession of them. With regard to the nichsei m’log, by contrast, since the husband does not take responsibility, they are not considered to be in his possession.

The customs of these geonim are quoted in the Halachot of Rav Yitzchak Alfasi. They are far more considerate of the woman’s position and interests. The Rama (Even HaEzer 77:3) states that if the woman gives a reasonable explanation for her conduct, these customs should be followed.

I.e., three dinarim of the currency employed during the Talmudic period.

If she does not desire to remain married, she may ask the court to compel him to grant her a divorce, as stated in Halachah 7.

And lashes are given only for a transgression that involves a deed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2).

Although the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 77:4).

As mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, there are authorities who maintain that there is an explicit prohibition preventing a husband from divorcing a wife who is too ill to care for herself. The later authorities, however, follow the Rambam’s view.
In the Ashkenazic community, there is a question if the Rambam’s ruling applies in the present age, after the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, which prevents divorcing a woman against her will. (See the Chelkat Mechokek 79:3, which quotes an opinion that states that as long as the husband is prepared to meet all the financial obligations of the divorce, he has the prerogative to divorce a woman against her will, even when she is ill.)

As mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 21, a priest is forbidden to have relations with a woman who engaged in intimate relations with a gentile, even when she was raped. Our Sages assumed that women taken captive by gentiles were raped by them, and therefore prohibited a priest from remaining married to such a woman. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:17-30.)

The Rama (Even HaEzer 78:6) notes that even an Israelite is forbidden to remain married to a woman who is held captive by gentiles if she willingly engaged in relations with one of them. In such instances, he is not obligated to redeem her.

I.e., he may not merely redeem her and send her a divorce.

I.e., out of suspicion that she willingly engaged in relations with her captors, or because he does not want to live with a woman who had relations with others (Ma’aseh Rokeach).

As explained in Hilchot Matnot Ani’yim 8:12, our Sages decreed that captives should not be redeemed for more than their worth, so that the gentiles will not be overwhelmingly encouraged to seize Jews as captives.

In both the Kessef Mishneh and in the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 78), Rav Yosef Caro states that the husband is not obligated to redeem his wife a second time. If he desires, he may remain married to her without redeeming her. Many, however, differ with this as the interpretation of the Rambam’s words. (See Chelkat Mechokek 78:4; Beit Shmuel 78:4.)

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 12:8-11, which states that an announcement is made regarding the sale of the person’s property so that he will receive the best price.

E. g., the vows mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 8ff.

The obligation for a husband to redeem his wife stems from her ketubah, which states: ‘‘If you are taken captive, I will redeem you and take you back as my wife.’’ Since he is already obligated to divorce her, he is not bound by this clause.

The rationale for this ruling is that the obligation to redeem one’s wife involves returning her to her status as a wife, and this is forbidden in this instance. Nevertheless, although this is the rationale, the same ruling applies with regard to a High Priest who married a widow, or an ordinary priest who married a divorcee.
In these instances, the obligation of the woman’s ketubah - that she be redeemed and returned to her native land — could be fulfilled without transgressing a Scriptural prohibition. Nevertheless, since relations with her were forbidden previously, her husband is not obligated to redeem her (Ketubot 52a).

With regard to a woman forbidden to her husband by virtue of a Scriptural prohibition, by contrast, the prohibition existed before she was taken captive.

Flutes have a mournful tone that arouses tears (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Shabbat 23:4).

This principle applies to many aspects of the financial relationship of the marriage bond — e.g., the woman’s subsistence, her garments and her lodging. It is curious that this instance is the first time the Rambam mentions it explicitly.

Although the Rambam makes a distinction between this instance and a similar situation mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 19, the Rashba and others do not. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 89:2) quotes the Rambam’s view, but the Beit Shmuel 89:2 states that because of the other views, the husband’s property may not be expropriated against his will.

Although usually announcements are made for 30 days prior to the sale of property by the court, an exception is made in this instance, so that the woman’s burial will not be delayed (Ketubot 100b).

Conjugal rights are a privilege granted to a wife, and she has the right to forego them if she and her husband consent. Fathering children, by contrast, is one of the Torah’s commandments, and a woman may not prevent her husband from fulfilling his obligation. See Yevamot 65b.
The Turei Zahav (Even HaEzer 1:1) and the Beit Shmuel 1:1 question the Rambam’s decision. For, as stated in Halachah 16, even after the person has fulfilled the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying, he is obligated by Rabbinic Law to continue to father children. Seemingly, just as a man’s wife may not prevent him from fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by the Torah, so too, she may not prevent him from fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by our Sages.
The Pitchei Teshuvah 1:1 resolves this difficulty by quoting the Chidah, who explains that our Sages did not equate the obligation to continue to father children with the Torah’s obligation to be fruitful and multiply. As long as a man endeavors to continue to father children from time to time, it is acceptable. There is no need to persist with the same perseverance as one who has not yet fulfilled this mitzvah. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)

Rabbenu Nissim explains that although the mitzvah is incumbent on the man, since the woman takes an active part in its fulfillment, she receives a portion of the reward.

The Mishnah (Avot 5:22; according to the Rambam, this is a baraita) states: ‘‘At eighteen, to the wedding chamber.’’ The Rambam interprets this to mean: in one’s eighteenth year of life.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:3), which states that the optimum way of performing the mitzvah is to marry earlier.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) states that the Jewish court should compel a Jewish male to marry at twenty if he is not devoting his time to the study of Torah. The Rama, however, states that this is not the custom in the present age.

See Yevamot 63b.

The Turei Zahav 1:6 interprets this expression as meaning that, at the outset, this is not a desirable course of action to follow.

This condition applies also to the license to delay marriage mentioned in the previous halachah.

In connection with this law, the commentaries cite Yoma 29a, which states: ‘‘Thoughts of sin are more damaging than sin itself.’’ Instead of pointing his life to spiritual refinement, the individual is directing himself to sinful thoughts.

But if a man has only several sons or only several daughters, he is not considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah.

See Chapter 2 for a definition of these terms. Since this child is incapable of conceiving children, the child’s father is not considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah.

Tosafot (Yevamot 62b) states that even if the grandchildren are two males or two females, one is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:6), however, quotes the Rambam’s view.

Tosafot states that even if the convert’s children did not themselves convert, the convert is considered to have fulfilled this mitzvah. (See Beit Shmuel 1:12.)

From the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 23:1), one can infer that intimate relations with a minor are considered as emitting wasted seed, one of the more severe prohibitions of the Torah. The Rama (loc. cit.:5) and other authorities, however, differ and explain that as long as relations are carried out in an ordinary manner, having relations with a minor or an aylonit does not violate this prohibition.

Rav Moshe Cohen states that since, as mentioned in Halachah 16, a person is obligated to continue fathering children, a man is obligated to marry a woman who can bear children even after fulfilling the mitzvah. The Maggid Mishneh states that in principle the Rambam also accepts this ruling, as indicated by his wording in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:26. In this instance, he was merely stating the Scriptural Law.
The Rama (Even HaEzer 1:3) states although it would be proper to rebuke a person for marrying such a woman, this is not done in the present age.

As mentioned previously, in the Ashkenazic community it is customary not to marry more than one wife. All the laws mentioned in this halachah must be viewed with that principle in mind.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:7), the Rambam writes that the source for this practice is Sarah’s giving Hagar to Abraham: ‘‘After ten years in which Abram had lived in the Land of Canaan’’ (Genesis 16:3). Since this period passed without her bearing children, she provided him with another wife who could.

The Rivash (Responsum 15, quoted by the Rama 154:10) explains that if after having one child together, a couple do not have children for ten years, they are not forced to divorce.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 1:3) states that in his time, it was no longer customary to compel a man to divorce a woman who has not borne children to her husband.

I.e., rather than bear the expense of paying her ketubah immediately, the man desires to remain married; or from the woman’s perspective, rather than have to earn her own subsistence, she desires to remain married.

Chaggigah 15a states that unless a man releases semen as one shoots an arrow, he will not be able to father children.

As reflected in the following halachah, the Rambam maintains that unless the man’s wife explicitly claims that he does not release semen as one shoots an arrow, it is assumed that the affliction is the woman’s. Therefore, she is not entitled to the essential requirement of the ketubah.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that for the responsibility to be placed on the woman, she must have been married to two other men previously, and in both instances, divorced after ten years for not bearing children. TheRama (Even HaEzer 154:6) accepts this opinion.

See Chapter 23, Halachot 2 and 3.

The husband keeps possession of the money he is required to pay his wife by virtue of her ketubah. Although our Sages accepted her word when she issues a claimagainst her husband, they did so only when that claim was definite. If she is in doubt, the money should remain in the possession of its immediate owner.

The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 154) states that as long as a woman has given birth to one child, whether a son or a daughter, she is not given the prerogative of making such a claim.
The Ma’aseh Rokeach explains that this refers to an instance in which the man fathered children before marrying this woman, but then his physical condition deteriorated, and, according to the woman’s claim, he is no longer able to release semen in an ordinary way. Were this not the case, he would be compelled to divorce her in order to fulfill the mitzvah of having children. Since he has, however, fulfilled that mitzvah, he is not compelled to divorce his wife. Therefore, it is the woman who must take the initiative.

As reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:6), other authorities emphasize that the woman’s request must be made solely for this reason. If the court feels that she desires [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah or to marry another man (Be’urei HaGra 154:25), her request is not accepted.

Yevamot 65b states ‘‘she needs a staff for support and a spade for burial’’ — i.e., sons to support her in her old age and to take care of her funeral arrangements.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:11) follows the understanding of Rabbenu Asher, who interprets this ruling as applying even when it was possible for the couple to engage in marital relations during the situations mentioned. It is possible that just as their conduct aroused negative spiritual influences resulting in illness or imprisonment, those negative influences — and not the physical condition of the man or woman — prevented them from having children. From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Yevamot 6:7), it does not appear that he shares this understanding.

Even within a period shorter than ten years (Rabbenu Asher).

She is, however, permitted to marry another man (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154:12).

The Beit Shmuel 154:29 emphasizes that this law and the following law apply only when the court does not suspect that the woman desires to marry another man. This is also reflected in the Rambam’s wording, which indicates that her claim comes as a response to the court’s initiative.

Although the Ra’avad differs and does not require an oath in this situation, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s position. It is the Rambam’s position that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:15).

It is possible that the woman is not barren. It was merely that the two did not merit to conceive children together (Yevamot 64a).

Although a factor must normally repeat itself three times for a chazakah (a presumption that can be relied on) to be established, an exception is made with regard to the laws of marriage. In this context, the opinion that considers a twofold occurrence to be a chazakah is followed.

This ruling applies only if the husband had been unaware of the woman’s condition previously (Chapter 24:1-2).

As reflected in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (the conclusion of Nedarim), the Rambam does not interpret this as referring to an instance where the husband is sexually impotent entirely. Instead, it refers to a situation in which he can function, but it is the woman’s belief that he will never conceive children. See the Lechem Mishneh and the interpretation of the Ralbach (Responsum 32). If, however, the woman were to claim that her husband is impotent, her word would be accepted.
Note, however, the Rashba (Vol. I, Responsum 628) and K’nesset HaGedolah (Even HaEzer 154:60), which interpret this halachah as speaking about an instance where the husband is sexually impotent.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that, in theory, it would be proper to compel the husband to grant his wife a divorce immediately. This is not done, however, out of fear that her claim is untrue and she merely desires to marry another man.
He continues, stating that the court should try to develop communication between the couple. If those efforts fail, a compromise should be negotiated — e.g., in return for not compelling the woman to wait ten years for the divorce, the amount of money the husband is required to pay because of the ketubah should be reduced.

Yevamot 62a states: ‘‘[Although a man] fathers children in his youth, he should continue to do so at an advanced age, as implied by [Ecclesiastes 11:6]: ‘In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not withhold your hand.’’’
As mentioned above, the Chidah explains that as long as a man endeavors to continue fathering children from time to time, it is acceptable. One need not attempt to conceive children at every opportunity. Based on this decision, there are authorities who permit the limited use of certain birth control devices. The matter is not, however, entirely clear cut and should be discussed with a competent Rabbinic authority with regard to one’s actual conduct.

Similarly, having children leads to the coming of the Redemption. Yevamot 63b states that the Mashiach will not come until all the souls destined to be conceived are born.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:8) explains that this commandment applies when the husband cannot support a wife who can bear children and increase the size of his family.

See Yevamot 62b, which states: ‘‘Any man who is unmarried is left without happiness, without good and without blessing.’’ Rav David Cohen quotes Rav Yitzchak Alfasi as maintaining that the requirement to marry stems from Scriptural Law and not from our Sages, as the Rambam maintains.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:26, which states that it is permissible for a woman never to marry.

Here the term likanot, translated as ‘‘admonish,’’ has a specific meaning: to warn one’s wife not to enter into privacy with another man. If this warning is disobeyed, the woman must undergo the rites of a sotah.

Sotah 3a. Although this is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, the Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

See the conclusion of Hilchot Sotah for a more detailed treatment of this subject.

See Hilchot De’ot 5:4-5.

Eruvin 100b states that a woman requests intimacy with her heart.

See Chapter 24, Halachah 15ff.

I.e., the article or land that the woman brings to the household is evaluated, and the husband takes responsibility for the value of the article. From this time onward, it is as if the article were his, and he is obligated to pay his wife a fixed amount if he divorces her or she is widowed.

This term literally means ‘‘property [that is like] iron sheep.’’ The term ‘‘iron’’ is used to indicate that the husband’s obligation is unchanging, like iron. The reference to sheep stems from the fact that during the Talmudic period in Eretz Yisrael, a similar agreement was frequently made with a shepherd with regard to the sheep entrusted to him. He was given a herd that was evaluated at a given price, and he was obligated to return either sheep of that value, or payment for them to their owner. (See the commentary of Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Yevamot 7:1.)

With this statement, the Rambam indicates that — in contrast to the opinion of certain authorities — the property belonging to a woman does not automatically become nichsei tzon barzel. For it to be placed in that category, the husband must explicitly accept responsibility for it (Maggid Mishneh).

With regard to this type of property as well, the husband has the privilege to manage the use of the property and reap its benefits during the time he remains married to the woman, but the property itself belongs to her.

The term m’log means ‘‘to pull out hairs’’ (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 7:1). Just as a person pulls out the hairs from a head, leaving it uncovered, so too, the husband continues to use his wife’s property even though its value depreciates.

By making a distinction between the money due a woman by virtue of her ketubah and her nedunyah, the Rambam is emphasizing that they are governed by different laws. With regard to the money of the ketubah, the husband or his estate is granted certain leniencies. But with regard to the nedunyah, by contrast, the woman is considered the same as any other of her husband’s creditors (Maggid Mishneh).

See Chapter 10, Halachah 7.

Although a creditor has the right to collect his due from the properties of intermediate value, the woman is given this disadvantage. The rationale is that a woman desires to marry and therefore is willing to accept this stipulation (Gittin 50a).

The Aruch HaShalem interprets this term as being derived from an Arab word meaning ‘‘a rocky field.’’ The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 101:5) states that it refers to a bee that stings and is therefore considered one of the lower forms of life.

I.e., a Torah scroll, as mentioned in Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:8. An oath is required because the woman is seeking to collect money from an estate bequeathed to heirs, and whenever payment is to be collected from an estate, an oath is necessary (Ketubot 87a; Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:1).

The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) states that the woman must also take an oath that she did not seize any of her husband’s property. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:2) quotes this view.

In contrast to the opinion of the Tur (loc. cit.) and the Hagahot Maimoniot, the Rambam maintains that even if a woman is in possession of her ketubah, she is required to take these oaths. (See Halachah 21.) The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rambam’s view, but appears to favor that of the Tur.

This refers to a trousseau given to the woman by her husband. Although the husband gave his wife these clothes as a gift, he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and leave his household (Ketubot 54a).

In the first half of this halachah, the oath is instituted by the court to protect the interests of the heirs. In this instance, however, unless the husband himself issues a claim requiring an oath (see Halachah 19), no oath is required.

From Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 1:5, it appears that this does not apply to a woman’s Sabbath and festival clothing, or to her jewelry. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 99:1) states that those articles should be evaluated and deducted from the sum due her by virtue of her ketubah.

If, however, the husband is compelled to divorce his wife, her wardrobe should be evaluated and deducted from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; see Ketubot 77a).

This restriction applies to a widow, but not to a divorcee. The Rashba and other authorities differ and maintain that the same ruling applies to a divorcee. It appears that it is their opinion that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:1).

I.e., and not from movable property. This ruling also applies to other creditors, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:11. (See, however, Halachah 7 below.)

E. g., a woman was owed 200 zuz by virtue of her ketubah. Her husband’s property was worth 150 zuz at the time of his death. Although its value rose afterwards to 200, the woman is entitled to only 150, because that was its value at the time of her husband’s death.

This is one of the conditions of a woman’s ketubah.

Landed property that was owned by a man at the time of his marriage or acceptance of a financial obligation is considered to be on lien to his wife or to his creditor. Even if it is sold to another person, the debt can be collected from it, if the person or his estate has no other property, as stated in Halachah 10. (See also Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, Chapter 19.) As mentioned in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 21:1, a creditor is entitled to collect not only the property itself, but also any increment in its value, whether an increment that comes naturally, or even one that results because of effort on the part of the purchaser. A woman is not, however, given this privilege with regard to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

I.e., the woman’s ketubah mentioned 200 silver coins without specifying the type of coin, and there was a difference between the value of the silver coins used in the country where the ketubah was written and those used in the country where the divorce takes place. If this were a loan contract, we would say that the intent is the coins of the country in which the loan was given. As a leniency to the husband, however, the law is different with regard to a ketubah, and he is obligated to pay only the lesser of the two values.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:5) state that this law applies only when the value of the money the woman receives is not less than 100 zuz of the Talmudic period for a non-virgin, and 200 zuz for a virgin.

Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 4:11.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period, and hence a woman would not feel secure unless the obligation of her ketubah were supported by land. In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property, thus, rose in importance, and a woman would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:12.

Since it was accepted by the majority of the Jewish people, it should be adhered to. See, however, the following halachot.

I.e., in certain places this practice was not followed. Although the Rambam maintains that the sons should be granted that privilege, their rights should not be extended beyond their original scope.

The Rambam’s opinion is accepted by many authorities. Nevertheless, there are dissenting views. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:14) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one.

See the Rambam’s text of the ketubah, Hilchot Yibbum 4:33.

A person has the license to bind his estate to a particular obligation, although he would not be required to pay it by law. Once he makes such a commitment, his estate is bound by it.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that in the Rambam’s era, the observance of this ordinance had not spread throughout the entire Jewish world. Note the introduction to the Mishneh Torah which states that, in contrast to the ordinances of the Sages of the Talmud, an ordinance instituted by the geonim is not binding unless its observance has spread throughout the entire Jewish people.
The Chelkat Mechokek 100:2 and the Beit Shmuel 100:2 emphasize that the observance of this ordinance spread in the subsequent generations, and it is now universal Jewish practice. Therefore, it is binding even when it was not explicitly stated in the ketubah, and the husband’s heirs claim that he was unaware of it.

If, however, the husband or his estate possesses property that has not been sold, neither the woman nor another creditor may expropriate property that has already been sold (Gittin 5:2).

Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba state that when an oath is made outside the court, God’s name is not mentioned, and a Torah scroll is not held. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:19) quotes this view. The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that the fact that the Rambam does not mention such a distinction indicates that he does not accept this concept.

Gittin 35a explains that since a widow carries out certain activities on behalf of the heirs of her deceased husband’s estate (who are, in most instances, her children), she feels free to take certain articles belonging to the estate, without taking this into consideration. Hence, she might be ready to take an oath that she did not benefit from the estate, when in fact she did. Since the sin of — and the punishment for — taking a false oath is very harsh, our Sages wished to reduce this severity by having the oath administered outside the court.

I.e., the woman will vow never to eat bread on the condition that she benefited from property belonging to the estate. Breaking a vow is considered a less severe transgression than taking a false oath.

Since the woman’s second husband has the option of annulling any vows made by his wife, it is possible that she will take a false vow, relying on her husband to nullify it (Gittin 35b).

Our Sages required the woman to take an oath because they were not sure that she made a complete account of the money she received. Requiring her to take an oath insures that she will, in fact, be careful regarding this account (Ketubot 87b).

The fact that witnesses were made to observe payment of one portion of the ketubah is no proof that a second payment was not made without being observed by witnesses.

The fact that she appears precise in reporting what she admits to having received is not proof that she has made a totally precise accounting (Ketubot, loc. cit.).
Similar laws apply to a creditor who states that he is actually owed a lesser amount than is stated in the contract of loan (Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:1).

Since the husband has only one witness to support his claim, and the woman’s claim is supported by her ketubah, she is entitled to collect her full claim. Nevertheless, because of the witness, an oath is required.

In contrast to a woman who diminishes the amount of money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Halachah 14), this woman does not admit receiving any funds. Hence, there is no need to require an oath so that she will make a careful account (Bayit Chadash, Even HaEzer 96).

Unless a specific statement was made to that effect, the stipulation that her husband accepted at the time of the composition of the ketubah applies only to himself and not to his heirs.

The Ra’avad maintains that the woman’s claim should be accepted without an oath. Since the husband made such a stipulation, it would have become public knowledge. Any person who purchased the property knew about the matter and accepted the risk. It is, however, the Rambam’s ruling that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

The fact that she maintained possession of her ketubah indicates that her delay in presenting her claim does not indicate a willingness to forego it.

This distinction is, however, relevant in Halachah 23.

For perhaps she has already received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or she has waived payment of this debt.

In the Talmudic period, there were places where it was not customary to compose a written document spelling out the marriage contract. Nevertheless, it was understood by both the husband and the wife that the financial dimensions of their marriage would be governed by the rules expressed in our Sages’ requirements for the ketubah.

When the husband claims to have paid the woman her due, he must prove his assertion. Otherwise, the woman’s claim is accepted (Maggid Mishneh).

This amount is granted the woman voluntarily by her husband and is not required by Jewish law. Therefore, unless the woman has proof that the commitment was made, she is not entitled to collect anything from her husband (Maggid Mishneh).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 100) states that even if a woman can prove that her husband made a commitment for an additional amount to her at the time of the marriage, she must also prove that this commitment was not met.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 101) maintains that the Rambam’s wording indicates that even if she remains silent, she foregoes only the essential requirement of the ketubah, but not the additional commitment that her husband made. However, Rav Yosef Caro dismisses this interpretation in the Kessef Mishneh and does not mention it in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 101).

As reflected in the conclusion of this halachah, although a widow has the right to continue dwelling in her deceased husband’s home, the heirs also have the right to dwell there. Since she is deriving her subsistence from them, she is ashamed to demand payment of her due from them.

Or she remarries (Rama, Even HaEzer 101:1).

Objections to this statement are raised by the Ra’avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen and others. The claim for which the husband is required to take an oath involves a liability for which landed property is under lien. In such instances, a Scriptural oath is never administered. The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) and others, therefore, maintain that a Rabbinic oath (sh’vuat hesset) is administered.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to an instance in his time, when, as stated in Halachot 8-9, the lien of the ketubah applies to movable as well as landed property. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh’s explanation is challenged by other authorities, and even the Maggid Mishneh himself raises questions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16) mentions both opinions.

As in all cases of Torah law, the testimony of two witnesses is required in this instance. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, both of these witnesses may have witnessed the events under consideration when they were minors. In both the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Caro differs and states that it is acceptable if one of these witnesses observed the events as a minor, but the other must have been past majority at that time.

Generally, a witness’s testimony is not accepted unless he is past majority — not only at the time he testifies in court, but also at the time he sees the event under discussion. In this instance, however, leniency is granted, because we rely on the fact that, by and large, most women are virgins when they marry. Moreover, the obligation of the ketubah is a point of Rabbinic Law (Ketubot 28a; Hilchot Edut 14:3).

For if a ketubah was composed, the text of the ketubah will clarify the matter. There is, however, an instance where this ruling would be applicable in a place where it is customary to compose a ketubah: an instance where the woman brings witnesses who testify that her ketubah was lost (Maggid Mishneh).

The simple meaning of the Rambam’s words is that if a woman makes such a statement, she is free to marry another person. As in Chapter 4, Halachah 13, the Ra’avad differs, explaining that the woman’s statements are accepted only after the fact — i.e., after she has already married another person — and only insomuch as to require that other person to divorce her.

The Ra’avad and the Rama differ, as above.

The essential requirement of the ketubah is an obligation imposed by our Sages, granted so that she would have the means to marry another person in the case of divorce or widowhood. Hence, since she is granted the opportunity of remarrying in this instance, she is also entitled to the money due her by virtue of the ketubah. The additional amount, by contrast, is not an obligation, but rather a present promised by her husband. It is self-understood that he did not make this promise to enable her to marry another man, when he does not admit that a divorce took place (Maggid Mishneh).

The authorities who free the husband of obligation in the previous halachah also free him of all liability in this instance (Chelkat Mechokek 100:40; Beit Shmuel 100:40).

Halachot 21-22.

We assume that the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, the couple remarried, and the husband subsequently divorced her a second time, without paying her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

The laws that follow apply when the dates of both the ketubot precede the date of the bill of divorce, and thus it is apparent that the woman was divorced only once.

As mentioned previously, all of a husband’s property is under lien to the ketubah. Therefore, if he sells his landed property to others and he does not possess sufficient property after the divorce to give his wife her due, she may collect that money by expropriating property that was sold. In this instance, we say that the woman waived payment of her ketubah originally to free from the lien property that was sold. Afterwards, her husband wrote her a second ketubah for the same amount.

In this instance, we assume that the husband wrote the woman a second ketubah that would preempt the first one. In this instance, the woman has the choice of selecting which ketubah she desires — the one with the greater sum, or the one that is dated first and thus gives her greater power with regard to the expropriation of property that has been sold.

As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam’s statements, this refers to a situation in which the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her without composing a second ketubah.

We assume that her husband divorced her and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her and composed a ketubah.

As explained in Halachah 28.

We assume that her husband remarried her and incurred an obligation to pay her a second ketubah. The fact that he wrote a new ketubah after they remarried shows that he did not rely on the first ketubah.

Chapter 12, Halachah 15. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:2.)

I.e., the oath made by all widows before collecting the money due them by virtue of their ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh), in contrast to the opinion of the Tur (Even HaEzer 100), who requires the woman to take an oath that her husband died. (See Chelkat Mechokek 17:83.)

This is a question that is left unresolved by the Talmud (Yevamot 117a). The Rambam rules that since the matter is very severe — if the woman remarries, and it is discovered that she lied, she will be prohibited to remain married to both her first or second husbands, and her children from her second husband will be considered illegitimate — and if her first husband is alive, it is likely that the fact will be discovered — in theory, the woman should be allowed to remarry. Because she mentions her ketubah, however, there is a doubt, and because of the doubt, the money in question is allowed to remain in the hands of the party in whose possession it is at the time the question is raised — i.e., the heirs. That doubt, however, applies only to the financial dimension of the relationship, and not to the permission to remarry (Kessef Mishneh).
Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the doubt raised by the Talmud also applies with regard to the woman’s permission to remarry. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:44), although it appears that the Rambam’s approach is favored.