Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)
The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities-even those that are not forbidden labors-which would disrupt this tranquility.
From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah. Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular.

Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

i.e., without being forced by others

and not inadvertently.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, the Rambam merely states "as a conscious act of defiance."
The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary.

Karet means cut off. Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for karet would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah13 8:1) emphasizes that being cut off in this world is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come.

As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed.

See Numbers 15:35. Our Sages explained that stoning is the most severe form of execution.

This term includes both, the accidental performance of a forbidden labor or the willful performance of such an act without awareness of the transgression involved.

The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required in this instance from another type of offering, the adjustable guilt offering in which instance the offering required of the person seeking atonement varies depending on his financial status. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.

Shabbat 3a makes a similar statement of principle, but states that there are three exceptions to this rule. When discussing these exceptions, the Rambam deviates from the terminology used in the Talmud and states that these three acts are "permitted."

Our translation retlects the usual interpretation of the Hebrew expression מדברי סופרים There are commentaries (e.g., the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot lshut 2:1) who cite the Rambam's statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2) and explain that this expression can refer to a prohibition of the Torah which is derived through the accepted traditions of Biblical exegesis. In this instance, however, the Rambam's intent is clear; the term refers to prohibitions that the Rabbis instituted on their own initiative as safeguards.

In Hilchot Edut (18:6) the Rambam explains that the person is flogged to the extent of the court's discretion (in contrast to the number of lashes received for the violation of a Torah command, which is fixed at 39).

Shoshanat Ha'amakim states that this expression implies that a person must be given a warning before such a punishment is administered.

I.e., there is no prohibition whatsoever for performing the act in question.

This expression implies that, at the outset, it is improper to perform such an act. Nevertheless, doing so does not warrant punishment (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh).

If, however, it is certain that the forbidden labor will be performed, it is prohibited to perform the permitted act, as explained in the following halachah.

Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 9), explains that by using the term "forbidden labor" in this and the following halachah, the Rambam implies that there is a difficulty only if a prohibition from the Torah is involved. If merely a Rabbinic prohibition is concerned, it is permitted without question. This question is also discussed by the Mishneh L'Melech.

The Rambam's decision is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (See Beitzah 23b and other sources.) Rabbi Shimon maintains that although a forbidden labor results from a person's activity, since he did not desire that this labor be performed, he is not held liable. Rabbi Yehudah, in contrast, holds the person liable, for his actions brought about the performance of
a forbidden labor.
The commentaries explain Rabbi Shimon's opinion based on the principle (Chaggigah 10b) that "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." A deed is forbidden only when it is associated with a purposeful intent. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
The concept discussed in this halachah, אינו מתכוין differs from an ordinary example of a labor performed unintentionally. When we speak of a labor performed unintentionally (בשוגג), the person had no thought whatsoever of performing a forbidden activity. In the case of אינו מתכוין by contrast, the person performs an act consciously with the knowledge that there is a possibility that it may lead to a forbidden act. Nevertheless, since there is no certainty that the transgression will be committed, he is not held liable.
Although this principle is applicable to the Sabbath laws in particular, the difference of opinion between these two sages on this issue is relevant, not only to the Sabbath laws, but to all other prohibitions in the Torah as well.
Based on Pesachim 25b-26b, it appears that one is allowed to perform an activity that may result in the incidental performance of a forbidden labor even when one has an alternative manner of accomplishing one's objective, which does not involve any risk of a forbidden labor being performed. See Hilchot Kilayim 10:16.

Our text follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, which quotes the text of Shabbat 22b. The original manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute מגדל "cabinet," instead of, ספסל, "bench."

Digging a groove is forbidden because it is included in the category of forbidden labor, plowing. Nevertheless, since one did not intend to perform this labor, the fact that it was performed is of no consequence. Similarly, all the subsequent activities mentioned by the Rambam involve the performance of a forbidden labor without the intent to do so.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 13.

As mentioned in Halachah 2, the use of this term implies that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham). Although some authorities have explained that since the person had no intent for the labor itself, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature, from the Rambam's perspective it appears that since he knows that the labor will be performed, it is considered as if he performed it intentionally.

The addition of the word "merely" implies that the person has a desire to slaughter the fowl. Albeit, his desire may not be to kill the fowl for food, but even for use as a toy it is preferable that the fowl be dead than alive.

This also represents a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as evident from Shabbat 29b-30a, 73b, and other sources.
As in the laws mentioned in Halachah 7, the source of their difference of opinion is Rabbi Shimon's principle, "the Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]."To explain: The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is derived from the labors performed to construct the Sanctuary (see the commentary on Chapter 7, Law 1), and with regard to the construction of the Sanctuary, the Torah uses the expression, מלאכת מחשבת "contemplative work." Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the Torah's prohibition against labor is related to thought. Only when one's actions are purposeful can they be forbidden.
For this reason, Rabbi Shimon maintains-as explained in Halachah 5-that when a person performs a forbidden labor without the intention to do so אינו מתכוין he is not liable. Although a forbidden activity results from his conduct, since his thought was not involved in the matter, his work does not resemble the labor that was necessary to construct the Sanctuary. Hence, one is not held liable for such labor on the Sabbath.
In the situation at hand, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה the person performing the forbidden Iabor is doing so intentionally. Nevertheless, since his intent is not the same as that ordinarily associated-or according to some authorities, associated at the time of the construction of the Sanctuary-with this labor, he is not held liable. (See the comments of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh.)
Rabbi Yehudah differs on both issues, maintaining that since the performance of a forbidden labor results from this person's conscious activity, he is held liable. The Rambam (following the opinion of Shemuel, Zevachim 92a) accepts Rabbi Shimon's view with regard to אינו מתכוין but follows Rabbi Yehudah's view with regard to a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
The difference between these opinions can be explained based on the interpretation of the command תשבות "rest," on which basis we observe the Sabbath laws. We find another difference of opinion between Rabbi Y ehudah and the other Sages (Pesachim 27a) concerning a word with a similar root. With regard to the command (Exodus 12:15), תשביתו שאור "destroy leaven," Rabbi Yehudah maintains that leaven must be burned. The other Sages (including Rabbi Shimon) maintain that leaven may be destroyed be other means.
What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the destruction of leaven must be utter and complete as possible, while the Sages maintain that all that is necessary is to negate its usefulness (potential for purposeful use). Similarly, in the present instance, Rabbi Yehudah explains that all semblances of labor are forbidden on the Sabbath. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that only purposeful labor is forbidden; only when both the activity and the intent for which it is performed are analogous to the activities performed to construct the Sanctuary is a transgression committed. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 7, p. 190-191.)
Shemuel and the Rambam take an intermediate position. They agree with Rabbi Shimon that an activity must be coupled with a purposeful intent, but maintain that since a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is an intentional act, it is forbidden as such a combination.
It must be noted that the Rambam's view is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra'avad, Tosafot (Zevachim, ibid.) and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities state that Rabbi Shimon's opinion is accepted in both these instances. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1, 334:12) accepts Tosafot's decision. Nevertheless, even the authorities who accept Rabbi Shimon's view maintain that, if there is no danger to the community involved, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree.

I.e., his intent in extinguishing the lamp was not to produce coals to use for kindling an even flame, the purpose for which extinguishing was performed in constructing the Sanctuary.

I.e., when constructing the Sanctuary, articles were transported because they were desired, and coals were extinguished to use for kindling an even flame.

Although the instance stated by the Rambam is not found in the Talmud, it is a logical extension of the principle stated in Keritot 19b and Shabbat 97b (and expressed in the following halachah), "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." Since the labor ultimately performed was not the one originally intended, this is not considered to be "purposeful work."

As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, a carmelit is a domain in which the Sages applied the prohibitions against transporting and throwing articles which apply in the public domain by virtue of Torah law. Thus, the person had the intent of violating merely a Rabbinic law.

The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Chapter 13, Halachah 21, which states that even when a person intended to throw an object four cubits in the public domain and instead the object traveled eight cubits, he is not held liable, because he did not accomplish his intent. Hence, he explains that the intent is not that the public domain is beyond the carmelit and the object did not rest in the carmelit as intended, but rather continued to the public domain.
Instead, the Rambam is referring to an instance where a person is standing in a private domain with both a public domain and a carmelit before him. Although he intended to throw the object into the carmelit, it traveled into the public domain.

See Hilchot Shegagot 7:11. This halachah represents a progressive sequence. In the first instance mentioned, the forbidden activity the person intended to perform was not performed at all. In the second instance, he intended to perform the forbidden activity-removing an object from his property-but his intent was not to transgress a Torah prohibition. In this third instance, the person had the intent of performing the activity that he performed for the sake of the result that activity produced. Nevertheless, since he desired to perform this activity with a permitted entity and that aspect of the desire was not fulfilled, he is not held liable (Rav Kapach).

The Maggid Mishneh offers two different interpretations of the Rambam's words: one that the person cut a different plant from the one he intended to cut, and one that he thought the plant he intended to cut had been detached from the earth, and discovered that it was attached. Although, both interpretations are halachically acceptable, the Maggid Mishneh favors the second one. The Kovetz and other authorities, however, favor the first.

This halachah develops the theme stated in the previous halachah, giving a further example of a case where a person is not held liable for a forbidden activity he performed, because of the principle, "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]."

The difference in the color of the figs causes them to be regarded as two different types of fruit. This is significant, as is obvious from the contrast to the following halachah.

The Ra'avad takes issue with this point, arguing that since the person picking the fruit accomplished his objective, he should be held liable. It is insignificant that the order in which he picked them differed from that which he originally intended.
It can be explained, based on Keritot 19b, that the Rambam's understanding is that for a person to be held liable, not only must he accomplish his ultimate intent, but also, while he is performing the labor, his actions must be controlled by his thoughts.
Commenting on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh notes that there is no difference regarding practical halachah at present. The only difference will be in the Era of the Redemption, at which time there will be a question whether it is necessary for such a person to bring a sin offering or not, and in that era, "the righteous instructor (Mashiach) will come" and render a decision.

This is the text of Keritot 20a according to the Rambam and others. Our text of Keritot differs and frees a person of liability in such an instance. On this basis, the Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's position.

In contrast to the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person does not derive any advantage from kindling or extinguishing either candle; he merely wants to kindle or distinguish a candle. The same effect results from kindling or extinguishing one as the other. Hence he is liable, for he performed a forbidden labor, and he is considered to have performed it willfully. Were there to be an advantage to kindling or extinguishing one of the two candles, the situation would resemble that described in Halachah 11.

The intent does not appear to be that he desired to kill a person, for it is highly unlikely that there would be no difference killing one person or the other. Rather, the Rambam appears to be referring to the killing of an insect or an animal, an act that is also forbidden on the Sabbath.

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Keritot 20a.

As in Halachah 9, the fact that the person did not perform the tasks in the order in which he originally intended indicates that, at the time he performed them, he was not in control of his deeds. Hence, this is not considered to be "purposeful work." In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs and holds the person liable.
The new concept this halachah teaches is that even when the tasks which the person intended to perform involve two separate labors (as opposed to Halachah 9 when only a single forbidden labor is involved), he is held liable only when he performs the tasks in the order he originally intended.

Since the order in which the person desired to perform the activity was not reversed, his actions are "purposeful work."

Rashi, Keritot 19b, differentiates between this type of behavior, referred to as מתעסק, and an inadvertent transgression of a commandment (שוגג) as follows: When a person transgresses בשוגג, he willfully performs the forbidden activity, but is unaware of the prohibition involved. In all the situations described as מתעסק, the person may be aware of the prohibition, but is not consciously controlling his behavior.

Although he accepts the Rambam's premise, the Ra'avad objects to the wording the Rambam chose, explaining that there is an instance-a person who desired to write the name שמעון and instead, wrote the name שם-where a person does not fulfill his intention and is still liable.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, the person also had the intent to write the letters of the name שם and is therefore held liable, as implied by Halachah 14. By putting the focus on intent, the Rambam emphasizes that the leniency stated in this halachah is also an outgrowth of the principle that "The Torah prohibited purposeful work."

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the expression "he is not liable," means that a person should not be punished-nor is he liable to bring a sin offering-for his deed. Nevertheless, performing such a deed constitutes the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. As mentioned, this concept is applicable throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the Mishneh Torah as a whole.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:4. Rashi and others offer alternate definitions of the term.

The intent here is that since it is usual for the article to shift position in such an instance, this is considered to be part of the person's original intent.
Although this law is more specific than most mentioned in this chapter, it is still worthy of mention, because it illustrates how a person's intention can be general in nature and include several different possible ways in which a forbidden labor could be performed.

Here the Rambam introduces a new concept, שיעור, the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. When the Torah forbade the performance of labor on the Sabbath, it also specified that a person is not held liable unless his activities are sufficient to bring about a significant result. Thus, a particular שיעור was established for every specific labor.
A similar concept applies with regard to other prohibitions. For example, with regard to most forbidden foods one is not held liable unless one eats an amount equivalent to the size of an olive.
[Yoma 74 discusses whether a person who performs a forbidden activity, but does so involving less than a שיעור is considered to have violated a prohibition from the Torah (although he is not liable for punishment or a sin offering) or whether he is considered to have violated merely a Rabbinic commandment.]

One might think that since the person did not complete his intended objective, his activity is not considered "purposeful labor." The Rambam explains, however, that since the work the person did complete was performed "purposefully," and since he completed a significant amount of work (a,) שיעור he is held liable.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 18.

A situation in which a forbidden labor requires the efforts of more than one individual is discussed in the following halachah.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the same applies when a forbidden labor is performed by three or more individuals and the performance of the forbidden labor requires the efforts of all the individuals involved. Nevertheless, if three individuals perform a forbidden labor and it requires only the efforts of two, none of the individuals is held liable, for no one is capable of performing the task alone.

Tosafot, Shabbat 93a emphasizes that the matter is not dependent on strength alone. Even when a person has sufficient strength to carry an object alone, but requires a second person's assistance because of the object's bulk, neither is liable. In practice, the transfer of the object requires both their efforts.

This principle is also applied in other contexts aside from the laws of the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Tum'at Mishkav UMoshav 7:6 and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 5:18. See also the commentary to the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.)

As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.
(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.)

However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion.

The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (see Halachah 7), for the digger has no desire for the pit, the object of the work. As mentioned, other authorities free a person in such an instance; the Rambam, however, would normally hold one liable.

Indeed, several of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath-e.g., tearing, erasing, and demolishing-involve activities that are essentially destructive in nature. Nevertheless, when one performs these activities for an ultimate constructive intent, one is held liable.

The commentaries note the contrast between the Rambam›s wording in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 15, where he omits the expression, "in its place." Accordingly, the commentaries question whether one is liable for demolishing a building for the sake of building another, when the other building will not be built in the place of the first. (See the gloss of the Or Sameach on Chapter 10, Halachah 12.)

For example, the minimum measure (שיעור) for which one is liable for the constructive act of writing is two letters. Therefore, one is liable for erasing two letters. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 9, a person is liable when he erases one letter which is large enough for two to be written in its place.

The definition of "unintentionally" is that one is unaware that the activity is forbidden, or one is unaware that the day is the Sabbath. The situation described by the Rambam would involve, for example, writing one letter knowing that it is the Sabbath and that it is forbidden to do so, and writing a second letter having forgotten these factors.

See Halachah 1.

See Halachah 1.

The Rambam uses the expression דחויה, which, as evident from Pesachim 77a and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:15, implies that although a prohibition is not enforced, it has not been lifted entirely. In contrast, the term הותרה would imply that no trace of the prohibition remains.
The Kessef Mishneh and other authorities question the implications and the appropriateness of the Rambam's choice of terms. [In a responsum (Vol. 1, 689), the Rashba illustrates the difference between these terms. A person was in need of meat on the Sabbath and there was non-kosher meat available. If the Sabbath laws are דחויה, it would be proper to eat the non-kosher meat. If the Sabbath laws are הותרה, it would be preferable to slaughter a kosher animal on the sick person's behalf. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:14) states that, in such a situation, one should slaughter a kosher animal, implying that the laws are הותרה. (Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:16 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:39.)]
See the Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim, Responsa 455, which explains the concept of הותרה as meaning that, with regard to this person, it is as if the laws of the Sabbath were never commanded. (See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which explains that although the Rambam stated that a threat to Jewish life overrides the observance of all the mitzvot of the Torah in Hilchot Yesodei Torah, Chapter 5, he emphasizes this concept with regard to the Sabbath laws for the following reason. The other prohibitions are דחויה in the face of a threat to life, while the Sabbath laws are הותרה.

Yoma 85b uses the expression, "Violate one Sabbath on his behalf, so that he will be able to observe many Sabbaths [in the future]." This expression, however, is not halachically exact. Even when one knows that the person will not live to observe many other Sabbaths, as long as he is alive we are obligated to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. See Halachah 18.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:10), which cites an opinion that states that we may rely on the evaluation of experienced God-fearing individuals, even if they are not physicians.

Rav Kapach explains that, with this expression, the Rambam implies that we may rely on a local physician and need not seek the advice of a greater expert who lives further away.

See Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:8, which gives further details regarding a difference of opinion between physicians.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:13 states that this applies even if there is no danger that the person will die immediately. Since there is a danger that he may die later if the treatment is not administered at this time, the Sabbath laws may be violated.

Note that the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:5, specifies that the leniency to extinguish a lamp is granted only. when it is impossible to move it-or, alternatively, the sick person-to anutl1er place or veil the lamp's light.

There is a question among the Rabbis if this statement is to be interpreted literally or not. As mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, there is a difference of opinion if the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life. According to the opinion that they are merely, דחויה an attempt should be made to minimize the violation of the Sabbath laws if doing so does not constitute a threat to the person's life. (See Tzafenat Paneach, Shulchan Aruch HaRav, ibid. and the Mishnah Berurah 328:14.)

Gentiles are not obligated to observe the Sabbath, and thus having them administer the treatment would not involve the violation of a Torah commandment. Nevertheless, they should not be entrusted with the care of the sick for the reason stated by the Rambam.

Since they are below the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah, according to the Torah itself the observance of the mitzvot is not incumbent upon them, and only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.

Although women and servants are obligated to observe the Sabbath laws, since in many areas of Torah and mitzvot, their obligations are less than men, having them violate the Sabbath laws in this instance could cause the Sabbath to be regarded flippantly, as explained in the next note.

When people see that the Sabbath laws are violated by the gentiles for Jews or by women or children, they may get the impression that the observance of these laws is not very crucial, and leniencies may be taken on other occasions-even when there is no valid reason. If, however, it is Torah Sages who violate the laws, the common people will realize that it is only the seriousness of the situation that allowed for this leniency (Merkevat HaMishneh).

This also is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Yoma, ibid. Others (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:12) understand the phrase גדולי ישראל in that passage as meaning simply "adult males."

The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 8:5) states, "A person who [administers treatment] quickly is praiseworthy, and one who raises questions is considered as if he shed blood.

The Rambam is referring to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and others who do not accept the oral tradition.

The Rambam seems to be interpreting the verse as meaning that since these individuals purposefully misinterpret the Torah, God causes their misinterpretations to be cruel and harsh so that they will not live and spread such an approach.

Significantly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state קדח, "piercing pain" (the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Avodah Zarah 28b), rather than קדחת, "fever."

Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., explains that there is a connection between the eyes and the heart, and such a person is therefore considered to be dangerously ill.

From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:9), it appears that once an eye ailment is nearly healed, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. See also Hilchot Milah 16.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:3) states that this can also apply to an infection. Disquiet and pain are not, however, considered sufficient cause to violate the Sabbath laws.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) substitutes "teeth" for "lips," and explains that a toothache can also be considered cause to violate the Sabbath laws. The Ramah and subsequent cornmentaries, however, qualify this statement, explaining which types of toothaches can be treated by Jews and which can be treated only by gentiles. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:3 and Mishneh Berurah 328:8.)

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ramban as explaining that this applies only when we are unsure if the wound is dangerous or not. In such a situation, we are not required to wait for a physician's assessment and may treat the wound immediately. If, however, we know-or a physician says-that a wound is not dangerous, a Jew may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. It may, however, be treated by a gentile. This ruling is also quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. :4).

This phrase is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Avodah Zarah 28a and refers to an extremely high fever. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. :7) appears to interpret it as referring to a type of malaria that causes fever and chills simultaneously.

From the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. :5), it would appear that if the sick person himself says that the Sabbath laws should be violated on his behalf, his word should be heeded.

See Yoma 10:4 and the Rambam›s commentary on that mishnah.

Either they brought the figs from the public domain or picked them from the tree. Both of these activities involve the performance of labors forbidden on the Sabbath.

This situation refers to an instance where none of the ten know of the others' activities. Alternatively, each one thought that he would be able to bring the fig before the other person (Mishnah Berurah 328:42).

I.e., they need not bring a sin offering, nor do their actions cause them any spiritual blemishes. Indeed, to quote the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:15), "all of them receive a bountiful reward from God" for their actions.

If, however, there are two figs on a single stem, it would be preferable to pick them so as not to bring any additional figs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:16). (See also Halachah 9.)

The Ramah (Orach Chayim, loc. cit.) emphasizes that if there is any danger of delay or difficulty, the threat to a Jew's life overrides all these considerations.

On Saturday night, however, a healthy person may eat from the remainder. Moreover, there is no need for him to wait the amount of time necessary to cook the food כדי שיעשו Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 318:2, and commentaries].

The meat need not be salted to remove the blood. Although this is generally done as a preparation for the cooking process, it is necessary only because blood will move from place to place within the meat during cooking. There is no prohibition against eating raw meat even though it has not been salted (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De' ah 67:1-2). The Kiryat Melech Rav notes that this explanation is appropriate according to the interpretation of the Tosafot (Chulin 14a). The Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot.6:12), however, requires even uncooked meat to be salted before one partakes of it. Several different explanations are offered for this difficulty. See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.

For this leniency to be granted, the Ra'avad requires that the sick person have been ill before the commencement of the Sabbath, and his attendants to have thought of slaughtering the animal for him at that time. Otherwise, the animal is considered muktzeh. Although the latter prohibition is waived on behalf of the sick person, it is still enforced as regards the healthy individual.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 218:2) explain that in this instance, the prohibition of muktzeh does not apply at all.

Slaughtering an animal is a single activity which will provide enough meat for both the sick person and the healthy individual. Allowing the healthy person to eat from the meat will not cause any increase in the violation of the Sabbath laws.

This refers to ailments which, although not threatening to a person's life, are after all serious, and cause him to be confined to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17) or which cause him to feel weakness throughout his entire body (Ramah, loc. cit.). In contrast, if the person merely feels ill or has a minor ailment in a particular limb, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against taking medication even when the performance of forbidden labors is not involved. (See Chapter 21, Halachah 31.)

As is explained in Chapter 6, the Rabbis forbade a Jew to tel1 a gentile to perform work on his behalf on the Sabbath. This prohibition is, however, relaxed because of the sick person's condition.

The Hebrew word נוחל refers to the application of powder or eye-paint to the area around the eyes. Although certain Talmudic passages appear to indicate that this was merely a cosmetic practice, in certain instances it had medical value. The leniency to treat the eyes is granted, because, as explained in the notes on Halachah 4, there is a connection between the eyes and the heart.

There is a question regarding activities in which a Rabbinic prohibition must be transgressed. Although asking a gentile to perform a forbidden labor is also prohibited by the Rabbis, some commentaries make a distinction between such a prohibition and a prohibition that involves the performance of an activity.

There are times when the cartilage around the heart becomes compressed against the body and it must be lifted up in order to facilitate breathing (Avodah Zarah 29a).

Our translation is based on the description of the techniques of midwifery used in Talmudic and post-Talmudic times. Others translate the term as a woman being bent over with labor pains. Compare to Halachah 13, which mentions the possibility of performing forbidden labors on a woman's behalf from the time "when there is a show of blood." See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:3), which mentions both these terms and also refers to the condition when a woman is overcome by labor pains to the point where she must be carried by her friends. Any one of these three conditions constitutes a danger to life for which the Sabbath laws may be broken.

The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:3) states that this leniency applies even when she lives beyond the Sabbath limits (see Chapter 27). Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:9, which state that a mid-wife may be called in the preliminary stages of labor.

She feels more secure knowing that she will be cared for properly in the light than if she were cared for in the dark (Tosafot, Shabbat 128b).

These rulings are based on Shabbat, ibid. In his commentary on that text, the Ramban explains that this principle applies regarding all instances when the Sabbath laws are violated because of a danger to life. If it is possible to reduce the extent to which they are violated, one should do so.
The Maggid Mishneh postulates that the Rambam would not require such stringencies at all times. Were that the case, the Rambam would have stated this principle earlier. Instead, this is a specific ruling applicable with regard to a woman in childbirth. Greater stringency is applied in this instance, because although there is a threat to the woman's life, the probability of a woman's actually dying is very low. (It can be explained that the difference of opinion between the Ramban and the Maggid Mishneh revolves around the question whether the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life, as explained in the notes on Halachot 1 and 2.)

Note Sefer HaChasidim, which states that it is preferable that a woman prepare everything necessary for childbirth from the ninth month onward, so that if she gives birth on the Sabbath, only a minimal amount of forbidden labor will have to be performed.

The term "idolatress" is used here to refer to a gentile who actually worships idols. In contrast, the term ger toshav refers to a gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:1-2 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.)
In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, the Rambam writes that it is forbidden to offer medical treatment to an idolater even for a fee. Accordingly, this halachah extends that principle to include a woman in childbirth. The question is raised, however, concerning the majority of the gentiles in the present age. Although the Rambam considers Christianity as idol worship, many authorities do not. According to the latter opinions, although these gentiles are not idolaters, they have not gone through the formal process of acceptance of the seven laws commanded to Noach and cannot therefore be considered as gerim toshavim.
Many authorities (see the commentary on the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim) maintain that it is permitted to treat such people during the week. On the Sabbath, however, one may not perform forbidden labors on their behalf. (See the Mishnah Berurah 330:8, which speaks very critically about physicians who violate the Sabbath laws on behalf of gentiles.) According to these authorities, one would be allowed to treat these gentiles on the Sabbath provided that there was not any forbidden labor involved. Note, however, Rav Kapach, who quotes Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state "gentile" instead of "idolatress."

According to the generally accepted interpretation of Avodah Zarah 26b, the intent is that the non-Jews will understand that the Sabbath is a sacred day for the Jews. Even when they see that the Sabbath laws are violated for the sake of saving a Jew's life, they will accept the rationalization that the Sabbath laws may be violated only on behalf of an individual who observes the Sabbath. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:8 mention that if a physician fears that ill-feeling will be generated by his refusal to care for gentiles, he may deliver their babies, provided that he does not perform labors that are forbidden by the Torah itself.

Based on Leviticus 25:35, Avodah Zarah 65a states that the Jews are required to maintain the well-being of such gentiles and, if necessary, the Jews should support the gentiles from their charitable funds.

The Rambam chooses the more lenient of the opinions mentioned in Shabbat 129a, for a woman can begin bleeding well before she gives birth.

Although the Lechem Mishneh states that the counting of the three days should begin from the time the uterus opens, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the three days start from birth. (See the Be'ur Halachah 330.)

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:12 explain that this refers to activities that a woman's friends will customarily perform on her behalf after she gives birth. A doctor need not be consulted about these matters. Nevertheless, if a doctor says that these activities are unnecessary, they should not be performed.

From the Rambam's wording (and indeed, this is the ruling of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:14), it appears that the woman is still considered to be dangerously ill. Hence, unless she protests to the contrary, it is assumed that this treatment is necessary.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Mishnah Berurah, loc. cit., state that the woman's word is accepted even against the opinions of many doctors.

According to the halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:21), there is one exception. A fire may be kindled for a woman within thirty days after she has given birth. See the notes on the following halachah.

Preferably, the fire should be kindled by a gentile. If, however, there is no gentile available, the fire may be kindled by a Jew (Mishnah Berurah 330:21).

The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears to him that the Rambam (and Shabbat 129b, upon which this halachah is based) is speaking about a woman who gave birth less than a week previously. Although weight is given to this view (see Be'ur Halachah 330), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:6) states that it refers to a woman within a month of childbirth.

The commentaries question whether this refers to a person who is dangerously ill or to a person who is merely seriously ill, but in no danger of dying. According to the latter view, a fire may be kindled on behalf of someone who is dangerously ill.

Sefer HaKovetz states that cutting the umbilical cord involves the violation of a forbidden labor and is permitted only because of the danger involved. Most authorities, however, maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.

As mentioned above, most authorities maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition may be waived on behalf of a new-born. Thus, this is interpreted as referring to water that was heated on the Sabbath by a gentile.

מלח is usually rendered as "salt." Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:3. (See also Mishnah Berurah 330:24.)

This is useful in straightening the child's limbs.

See Hilchot Milah 2:8. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 331:9) writes that although in Talmudic times, washing a baby at this time was considered as a matter of vital importance, it is no longer common practice. The Ramah (loc. cit.) explains that it is customary to wash the baby before the circumcision with water that was heated on Friday, and to wash him after the circumcision on Saturday night.

There is greater discomfort on the third day after the circumcision, as explained by the commentaries on Genesis 18:1 and 34:25.

At present, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if it appears necessary, the baby may be washed with water that was heated before the Sabbath. Needless to say, in all situations, should a doctor state that such a washing is necessary, his advice should be followed.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 330:5) states that it is no longer customary to follow this practice even during the week. We wait a considerable time after the woman loses consciousness, because we are afraid that she did not die, but merely fainted. Hence, by the time we are certain that she has died, we can assume that the fetus is also no longer alive.
Needless to say, at present, when our improved technology makes it possible to monitor the physical functioning of both the mother and the fetus, the physicians should decide on the basis of the information before them. Regardless of the practical application of this ruling today, the principles on which it is based are significant and should be applied in other circumstances.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:7, which adds that this ruling is granted despite the fact that the fetus will normally die in such a situation. Although probability (רוב in Hebrew) is a significant factor in halachah, the possibility of saving a life overweighs it.

Generally, a living person can be assumed to continue to live (chezkat chayim) until we are certain that he has died. Although such a presumption cannot be made with regard to this fetus, permission is, nevertheless, granted for the Sabbath laws to be violated on its behalf.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:13) rephrases the concepts stated in this halachah slightly, connecting the praise given a person for being zealous in saving a life with the situation concerning catching fish described afterwards. According to the Shulchan Aruch, this situation teaches us that a person is considered praiseworthy for saving a life on the Sabbath even if he accrues personal benefit through his actions-for example, in the case at hand, in addition to saving a life, the person also receives a catch of fish.

The Rambam adds the term "absolutely" to indicate that it is desirable to spread out and raise one's nets to try to save the child (Lechem Mishneh). Significantly, the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 13:6, states that the person is not held liable even if he intended to catch the fish together with the child.

The Or Sameach writes that he is given "stripes for rebelliousness" (the punishment usually given for the violation of a Rabbinic ordinance), since he intended to perform a forbidden activity. See a parallel ruling, Hilchot Nedarim 12:18.
Significantly, when mentioning this instance in Hilchot Shegagot 2:15, the Rambam states that the person acted בשוגג when catching the fish-i.e., he was unaware that it was the Sabbath or was unaware that it is forbidden to fish on the Sabbath.

This reflects the Rambam's decision regarding a difference of opinion between the Sages in Menachot 64a. One opinion holds the person liable for it considers his intent of primary importance, while the other frees him of liability for it views his actions as most significant.

These instances are cited by Yoma 84b as a continuation of the development of the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may perform an activity to save someone else's life, although in the process of doing so, one derives benefit. The Talmud explains why it is necessary to mention all these different instances.

The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam alters the text of the Talmud slightly to imply that the person breaking down the door did not do so with the intent of using the wood. Rav Kapach differs, noting that, as mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Rambam absolves the person of liability even when he has an intent to benefit from his actions. (See also the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.)

Yoma, ibid., explains that this leniency is granted even when the fire breaks out in a courtyard other than that in which the person was located. If the tire appears to pose a danger to his life, it may be extinguished.

I.e., a person was seen in the vicinity of the avalanche and we are unsure whether he was able to escape or not.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this leniency is granted even when there are several doubts involved: Perhaps the person was not trapped under the avalanche. Even if he was trapped, perhaps he is no longer alive and the performance of the labor of clearing will be to no avail.

This communicates a fundamental concept in Torah law: Even a fleeting moment of a Jew's life is precious enough for all possible efforts to be performed to save him even if it is necessary to violate Torah law.

Although we are commanded to show respect for a corpse and not to leave it exposed, we are not allowed to violate the Sabbath laws for such a purpose. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yoma 8:5.)

Based on Genesis 7:22, "all that has the breath of the spirit of life," Yoma 88b states that whether a person is breathing or not is the determining factor of whether he is considered alive or not. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:11 rule that even if we see that his heart is not beating, he is not considered dead until we are certain that he is not breathing.
The conception of breath as the determinant of life is significant in the present age, when it is possible that a person will continue to breathe despite brain death. The question of whether such a person is considered alive has been raised today within the context of many contemporary medical issues. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah, Vol. 11, Responsum 174) and other authorities of the present age have ruled that breath is still the fundamental determinant whether or not a person is alive.

This halachah is based on the following principles:
a) As mentioned in Halachah 12, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to save a gentile's life.
b) כָּל דְּפָּרִישׁ מֵרֻבָּא פָּרִישׁ-"Whenever there is a doubt concerning the identity of objects in a fixed position, we consider the probability as 50%." Since there is at least one Jew in this courtyard, until his body is located, it is considered as if there is a 50% probability that every body found is the Jew.

Even if several people departed, the same rule would apply, as long as the entire group did not leave its original place. See the following halachah.

The Rambam's decision depends on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's text of Yoma 84b. There the Talmud explains that although in general we follow the principle, כָּל דְּפָּרִישׁ מֵרֻבָּא פָּרִישׁ-"Whenever an entity separates itself from a group, we assume that it was part of the majority"-in this instance, since the matter involves a possible threat to a Jewish life, this principle is given a slightly different interpretation. Since the group remains in its place, its fixed nature (קביעות) is not disrupted.
It must be emphasized that the Ra'avad, Rashi, and the Ramban have a different approach to the passage in Yoma. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 329:2) follows the opinion quoted by the Rambam.

Again this ruling depends on Rav Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Yoma 84b. Other authorities differ, as mentioned above.

This implies that if a person of unknown origin is found buried under a landslide in a place whose population is primarily gentile, we are not allowed to remove the debris from him. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:26.) This is a matter of question on which there is a responsum attributed to the Rambam (although its origins are disputed). (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 4:34, which quotes the Rambam's opinion, and the Ramah, loc. cit., who allows the debris to be removed.)

He should start counting the six days immediately on the day on which he realizes that he has lost touch with the weekly calendar.

Similarly, in his daily prayers, he should recite the prayers of the Sabbath on that day. The recitation of these prayers was instituted so that the person should not lose consciousness of the observance of the Sabbath entirely.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 344:1) states that as long as the person has means, he is not allowed to work at all. Permission to work is granted only when it is a life and death matter. This explains why this halachah is included in this chapter.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that although there is a prohibition against walking beyond the Sabbath limits, it is not as serious as the prohibition against forbidden labors. Hence, it is waived in order to allow this person the opportunity to reach a settled area and observe the Sabbath in a proper manner.

If he earns enough on that day to support himself for several days, he must cease work until his means are exhausted (Mishnah Berurah 344:11).

Although these laws surely apply to Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael, these same laws are also relevant to Jewish communities in the diaspora.

Since their intent is only financial, the Sabbath laws may not be violated for this reason. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:17, which state that at present, even when gentiles initially come only for pillage and plunder, since they have no compunctions about killing Jews, particularly if one will defend his property, any gentile raid on a Jewish community is considered a question of life and death warranting the violation of the Sabbath laws.

The rationale is that if a border city is conquered, the enemies will have a vantage point from which to conquer the entire land. This concept has relevance beyond the Sabbath laws. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe has explained that these principles are relevant to the territorial disputes between Jews and gentiles in Eretz Yisrael today. Returning any territory to the Arabs would jeopardize the safety of the entire land.

War must be waged against them because it is possible that their intent is to kill. Hence, we follow the principle that the Sabbath Iaws may be violated even where there is merely a question of a threat to life.

I.e., an obligation. See Hilchot Rotze'ach UShemirat Nefesh 1:14, which describes the mitzvah (Leviticus 19:16): "Do not stand by idly while your neighbor's life is in danger."

Eruvin 45a relates that originally it was forbidden for the people to return with their weapons, and they would leave them in a home within the city's wall. Once the enemy forces saw that the Jews were returning unarmed and attacked them. More Jews were killed in the confused scramble for their weapons than by the enemy attack. After this event, the Sages allowed those who come to assist a besieged city to return with their weapons.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this applies only when one knows that there are Jews on the ship. If we do not have such information, it would appear that we should assume that the passengers of the ship are gentiles and should not endeavor to save their lives.

Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that it is a mitzvah to cry out to God for assistance in the event of any distressing situation that affects a Jewish community. On the Sabbath, however, it is only proper to make such requests when there is an immediate threat to human life. Just as such requests are made on behalf of a community, they should also be made on behalf of a single individual whose life is threatened (Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6, Hilchot Shabbat 30:12).

Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that, as part of the mitzvah of entreating God's mercy, trumpets should be sounded. Nevertheless, trumpets should be not be sounded for this purpose on the Sabbath, since sounding the trumpets violates a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Shofar 2:7). Here, however, the intent in sounding the trumpets is to alert the Jews in the surrounding area and to summon them. The prohibition is waived for this purpose. (See Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6.)

Just as one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew›s life, one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew who is being forced to adopt a gentile way of life (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:29 and the Mishnah Berurah 306:57).

See Ta'anit 22b.

In Chapter 30, Halachah 13, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted "so that the soldiers' minds will be settled and they will not be overly preoccupied on the Sabbath." Although the war will require violation of the Sabbath laws, efforts should be made to minimize the tension and anxiety experienced by the soldiers to the greatest degree possible.

Hilchot Melachim describes a voluntary war, a milchemet reshut, as a war fought "to expand the borders of Israel or magnify [the king's] greatness and reputation." In contrast, a war that is obligatory in nature, a milchemet mitzvah, refers to "the war against the seven nations [who occupied Eretz Yisrael], the war against Amalek, and [a war] fought to assist Israel against an enemy which attacks her."

Sifre on Deuteronomy (loc. cit.), Shabbat 19a.

According to the Kessef Mishneh (Hilchot Melachim 6:11), this refers to the leniency of waging war on the Sabbath. The restriction of laying siege to a city three days before the Sabbath, in contrast, applies only with regard to voluntary wars. In an obligatory war, we may lay siege to a city even on the Sabbath itself.

Rav Kapach notes that the citation of a historical event as proof of a law is extremely out of character for the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah. He explains that the Rambam's statements are directed against statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who writes that Jericho did not fall on the Sabbath.
It is possible to explain the Rambam's statements from another perspective. Joshua was instructed concerning the conquest of Jericho by Divine command. Indeed, according to human reason, there was no reason why Jericho should have been conquered on the Sabbath. Hence, the fact that God delivered such a command is a clear directive that one may begin a milchemet mitzvah on the Sabbath.