Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As reflected by the Rambam’s ruling, Hilchot Tum’at Meit 7:1, this is the minimum size that a human being can squeeze through. For this reason, it is necessary that it be at least four handbreadths on each side; a total area of 16 square handbreadths is not sufficient (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:5; Mishnah Berurah 372:30). (See also the following halachah.)

Since the window is of sufficient size and it is close to the ground, the inhabitants of the courtyards are granted the option of considering it an entrance. If this option is taken, it causes the two courtyards to be considered a single entity.

The Mishnah Berurah 372:27 emphasizes that this ruling applies only when the courtyards did not join together in a shituf to permit carrying in the entire lane.

The window cannot be considered to be an entrance. Hence, the courtyards are considered to be separate.

This refers to an instance when an eruv was not established in the courtyard. Were that the case, it would be possible to transfer articles from house to house through the window, even without a separate eruv.

Eruvin 76b explains that a house is considered as if it is full, and thus it is as if there were less than ten handbreadths between the window and the ground.

A divider that is less than ten handbreadths high is not significant. Therefore, the entire area is considered to be a single domain, and all the inhabitants must join in one eruv.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:8) states that the ladder must be at least four handbreadths wide and have four rungs. The commentaries question why the Rambam does not include these restrictions.

How close the ladders must be to each other is explained in the following halachah.

Based on the principle of l’vud, when there is a distance of less than three handbreadths between two entities, it is considered as though they were adjacent.

Since the wall is more than four handbreadths wide, it is possible to walk from one ladder to the other ladder.

Based on the principle of l’vud, it is considered as though the ladders were adjacent.

Because the ladders are distant from each other, the two courtyards are considered to be separate entities.

Our translation is based on Eruvin 77b, the apparent source for the halachah.

Since one can climb over the wall easily by ascending onto the bench, the wall is no longer considered an absolute division between the courtyards, and it is possible to establish an eruv, joining both courtyards.
This is the conception ofthe Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:9,11) follows the view of Rabbenu Asher which is more stringent and which maintains that a bench does not create the option of fusing the two courtyards into a single entity. The only leniency which is permitted is that the inhabitants of the courtyard where the bench is located may use the top of the wall.

The projection must be at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 372:12).

In this way, the inhabitants can easily cross over the wall by climbing from the ground to the projection and from the projection to the top of the wall.

When the ladder is leaning on the projection, they are considered to be a single unit. When, by contrast, the ladder is leaning against the wall, even if it is in within three handbreadths of the projection, they are not considered to be a single unit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:15; Mishnah Berurah 372:98-99).

Thus, they can climb over the wall easily in this fashion.

In this way, a ladder can be extended from one projection to another. Also, these projections must lie within ten handbreadths of each other. Thus, the people can climb from the earth to the first projection, from the first projection סt the second, and from the second to the top of the wall.
In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:12) follows the view of Rabbenu Asher which is more stringent and which maintains that the projections do not create the option of fusing ‘the two courtyards into a single entity. The only leniency which is permitted is that the inhabitants of the courtyard where the projections are located may use the top of the wall.

I.e., the date palm is considered to be a ladder, enabling people to climb across the wall.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that Eruvin 78a mentions a Babylonian ladder, for these ladders were large and heavy. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this concept is intimated by the Rambam’s words “the [very] weight of the ladder.... “These rules do not apply to a light ladder that is easily carried from place to place.

Our additions to the text are based on the commentary of the Meiri on Eruvin, loc. cit. A similar approach is also reflected in the gloss of the Maggid. Mishneh on this halachah. Rashi offers a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage, and his understanding is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:13).

1. e., the straw divider will not support the weight of a person climbing on the ladder.

They also have the option of establishing a single eruv, if they so desire. Certain commentaries suggest amending the text of the Mishneh Torah to include this concept.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 21:1, the Sages specified certain activities as forbidden as a safeguard to the observance of the Sabbath prohibitions. Each of the forbidden activities is referred to as a sh'vut.

For when a mitzvah is involved, we are not bound by the prohibitions in the category of sh’vut during beyn hash’mashot (Hilchot Shabbat 24:10), and that is when the eruv takes effect (Chapter 1, Halachah 21). Since the eruv was acceptable beyn hash’mashot, it is acceptable for the entire Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:18).

A tree that is worshiped. The Torah prohibits deriving any benefit from such a tree. Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:3.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:15) notes that Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Eruvin 78b) reverses the mlings and permits the establishment of a single eruv if an asherah is used as a ladder, but not if an ordinary tree is used for that purpose. The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.; Mishnah Berurah 372:116) favor the Rambam’s interpretation.

If the portion of the wall that was tom down is at least four handbreadths wide, it can be considered to be an opening.

The interpretation of the. passage in Eruvin 77a, the source for this halachah, is a matter of dispute among the commentaries. Our translation is based on the Lechem Mishneh’s gloss on the Mishneh Torah.

For the breach is not large enough to nullify the importance of the entire divider, provided the entire wall has not been destroyed.

An opening of that size causes the entire divider to be considered as having no significance. It is as if there were only one courtyard. (See Hilchot Shabbat 16:16.)

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Eruvin 78b. The Ra’avad and others conceive of this passage in a different light. lt is their view that is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:14).

This is sufficient, even though there is a portion of the wall that is higher than ten handbreadths.

Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh. Others explain this to mean the full height of the wall.
Making a breach of this height indicates that one desires to pass freely from one courtyard to another. If the breach is not this high, one might think that the opening was made solely for the purpose of transferring articles (Maggid Mishneh).

For a trench of this size is not easy to cross and hence is considered to be a divider. (See Hilchot Shabbat 14:23.)

A trench of this size can be crossed easily. Therefore, the entire area is considered to be a single courtyard.

This refers to a situation in which the depth of the trench is reduced across its entire length. If one reduces the portion in one area alone, that portion is considered to be an entrance from one courtyard to the other, and the inhabitants have the option of establishing either one or two eruvin (Mishnah Berurah 372:122).

Inside a dwelling, by contrast, different concepts apply. (See Hilchot Sukkah 4:13. Note, however, Hilchot Tum’at Meit 7:6.)

According to Shulchan Aruch HaRav 372:19, one must make an explicit statement, specifying one’s intent. The Mishnah Berurah 372:121 cites that view, but also quotes an opinion that maintains that it is sufficient to have such thoughts in one’s heart.

The width of the board or the reeds themselves is not significant; what is important is that they cause the width of the trench to be reduced (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., which is not forbidden to be carried, because of the prohibitions of muktzeh.

Based on the rulings of the Rashba, the Maggid Mishneh states that the same rules apply if there are less than four handbreadths between the two balconies, for it is easy to step from one balcony to the other as mentioned in Halachah 12. The Maggid Mishneh allows only one eruv to be established. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 373:1) gives the people the option of establishing one or two.

Because of the principle of l’vud.

They do not have the option of extending a board from one balcony to the other, because: a) as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 16:20, an entrance is not made in a corner; b) since the balconies are at different heights, a person will be afraid to walk from one to the other.

If it is less than four handbreadths wide, it is a makom patur, and may be used freely by the inhabitants of both courtyards, as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 14:7.

Rashi (Eruvin 77a), the Maggid Mishneh, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 372:6) explain that this does not mean precisely ground level, but rather less than ten handbreadths high. Similar concepts apply regarding the trench mentioned in the second clause of the halachah.

This describes a situation in which both courtyards are situated on an incline.

The inhabitants of both courtyards may, however, transfer articles that had been left in their courtyards to the wall as reflected by Halachot 18 and 19 (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., there is not an entrance on either side ofthe ruin, but the inhabitants can throw articles into the ruin through its windows.

This follows the principle stated in Halachah 15. The inhabitants of the other house may not use the ruin at all unless they establish an eruv.

Our Sages decreed that although a walled city is a private domain, an eruv is necessary before one may carry freely within. They, nevertheless, restricted the scope of that decree to carrying articles from the houses outside, and from the areas outside the houses to the houses. The rationale for this leniency is that one does not usually leave articles outside. Hence, the Sages did not include this possibility in their original decree (Rashi, Eruvin 89a).

See Hilchot Shabbat 16:1 for more particulars.

Eruvin 91a gives several examples of how these principles were applied by the Sages.

The rule that follows applies even when an eruv was established in this particular courtyard, and it was permitted to bring the article there from the house.

Which did not establish an eruv together. Note the accompanying diagram.

Separating a portion of the cistern for each individual courtyard. Although there is no prohibition from the Torah against drawing water from such a cistern, the Sages forbade using the cistern, just as they forbade using other property that is jointly owned.

A partition that is suspended in the air is not normally acceptable. ln this instance, however, additional leniency is granted, because the entire concept of forbidding carrying within water is Rabbinic in origin. (See also Hilchot Shabbat 15:13.)

This width is required so that one person will not be drawing water from his colleague’s side of the cistem. Eruvin 86b states that the Sages estimated that a bucket would not travel more than four handbreadths under water.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the word “path” implies a private walk and not a public thoroughfare. See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9. With this, he counters the objections of the Ra’avad, who maintains that it is necessary for the well to be surrounded by a partition ten handbreadths high in order to draw water from it.

See Hilchot Shabbat 15:14, where such projections are required.

I.e., the inhabitants are not carrying the water from the well, but lifting it up through windows that open to the path.

If, however, the wall is broken on the Sabbath itself, the inhabitants of the smaller courtyard may continue to carry since they were permitted to do so at the commencement of the Sabbath (the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 9:2).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 374:3) states that portions of the wall of the small courtyard must jut into the large courtyard. If that is not the case, it is permitted to carry in the small courtyard as well. From the Rambam’s wording and the drawings attributed to him that accompany his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:2), it does not appear that he considers this to be a necessity.

See also similar statements in Hilchot Tefillah 8:7 and Hilchot Kilayim 7:19.

This refers to a situation in which the window or the opening was buried under an avalanche or the like and could not be opened without violating the Sabbath laws (Rashi, Eruvin 93b).

The Ra’avad extends the leniency even further and maintains that the inhabitants of the courtyards may also pass articles from one courtyard to the other—e.g., by passing them over the wall. His opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 374:1).

We do not say that the entire area should now be considered a single courtyard, and since an eruv was not established before the Sabbath, carrying is forbidden.

When citing this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:2) makes a point of emphasizing that if the wall between a courtyard and a public domain or a carmelit falls on the Sabbath, carrying is no longer permitted within the courtyard.

In this instance, as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.: 1) mentions a further leniency. If an eruv has been established for an entire year between two courtyards, but the opening between them was closed during the week (and thus at the commencement of the Sabbath, it was not permitted to carry from one to the other), if an opening were made on the Sabbath, it would be permitted to carry from one to the other

The Rambam’s ruling is based on his interpretation of Eruvin 101b. Other authorities have different conceptions of that Talmudic passage.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s wording is not to be understood literally; if people eat in the same room, even if they eat at different tables—indeed, even if they eat their own food—they are not required to establish an eruv. These concepts are also reflected in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:7) and quoted as halachah by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 370:4).
The most common application of this concept today would be a hotel or a bungalow colony, where many people eat in the same dining room, and yet have their own private rooms or dwellings.

This highlights the principle that it is the place where a person eats, and not where he sleeps, that is most significant in defining his place of residence.

In Chapter 1, Halachah 15, the Rambam states that every household participating in the eruv is required to contribute a loaf of bread. Nevertheless, in this instance, since all the inhabitants of the courtyard are considered to be members of a single household, only one loaf is required.

Although they eat in separate places, joining together in the eruv causes them to be considered as if they share the same table.

I.e., they collected loaves of bread from each household in the courtyard.

The Shem Yosef explains that this latter phrase represents the new concept contributed in this halachah, as opposed to the previous one. Although the eruv was originally collected for the purpose of establishing an eruv with the inhabitants of another courtyard, the collection itself causes the inhabitants to be considered members of a single household.

Although the Rambam uses a singular term, the same law applies to many sons or many students.

The Rambam’s comparison of these individuals to hired workers reflects his interpretation of the expression סרפ ילבקמב in Eruvin 73a. The Ra’avad offers a different interpretation, and his view is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 370:5- 6).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s intent is not that the presence of a guest causes carrying to be forbidden when there are others living in the same courtyard. For as explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, and in Halachah 12 of this chapter, a guest’s presence makes no difference in this context. Rather, the point of the comparison above is to emphasize the intermediate status of these individuals. On one hand, like guests, they are at times considered to be members of the person’s household. On the other hand, since they have their own dwellings and often eat there, there is reason to consider them as having separate households.

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba, who explains that it is sufficient for the partitions to reach within three handbreadths of the ceiling, since, based on the principle of l’vud, when they are that close it is considered as if they reached the ceiling itself. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 370:3) quotes this ruling.

I.e., they must make an eruv. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) differs and (following the interpretation of Tosafot, Eruvin 72a and Rabbenu Asher) does not require an eruv at all unless they want to join with others living outside the hall in question.
The Shulchan Aruch, however, emphasizes that we are speaking about temporary partitions, either curtains or pieces of wood. If the partitions are permanent, they are considered as having separate dwellings, and an eruv is required.

All these structures have one thing in common—they are not ordinary dwellings where a person will eat his meals on a regular basis.

A Greek structure with two or three walls and a roof with a sky-light.

For these structures are not fit to serve as dwellings. In contrast, were a person to eat continually in a barn, a wood shed, or a shed for straw, these are considered to be dwellings, and an eruv is necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 370:1; see Chapter 1, Halachah 16).

I.e., to get to the inner dwellings, one must pass through the outer ones.

The Mishnah Berurah 370:52 extends this principle and applies it to people renting separate rooms in a single home. If the rooms lead through each other, the inhabitants of the outer rooms do not have to contribute to the eruv

But not the middle house. See the accompanying diagram.

And an eruv that was placed in a gatehouse is not acceptable, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 16.

This reflects a general principle in Torah law. Until a person actually stops breathing, he is considered to be alive. There is no difference in his status regarding any of the Torah’s laws.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

The rationale is that a dwelling without an owner is not considered to be a dwelling (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 371:1; Mishnah Berurah 371:1).

For it is unlikely that a Jew will return to his home on the Sabbath. Moreover, even if he did so, we apply the principle that since carrying was permitted for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh mentions a more lenient view, which states that if the gentile spends the Sabbath at a place that is more than a day’s journey from home, the inhabitants are allowed to carry, because it is impossible for him to arrive on the Sabbath. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:1).
The Ramah grants a further leniency and permits the inhabitants to carry when the gentile stays in another courtyard in the same city. If the gentile returns to his home on the Sabbath, the Turei Zahav 371:2 permits the inhabitants to continue to carry. The Mishnah Berurah 371:8, by contrast, rules that this is forbidden.

Note the ruling of the Ramah (Orach Chayim 370:2), which states that this decision applies only when there are no other inhabitants in the courtyard besides the owner and the persons to whom he rented dwellings, or the eruv was brought into the house of the owner.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) adds that this applies also when the articles are too heavy to be lifted on the Sabbath.

Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated.

Since this metal has not been fashioned into a useful article, it is forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath (loc. cit. :6).

See the Be’ur Halachah 312, which explains there are authorities who differ with regard to whether one is permitted to carry an article within a courtyard when an eruv has not been established—if that article had been placed in one of the homes at the commencement of the Sabbath, but was inadvertently taken from the home and placed in the courtyard. Although the Rambam would appear to forbid carrying the article entirely, Rashi (Shabbat 130b) and Tosafot (Eruvin 91b) maintain that it is permitted to carry it within the courtyard.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:3), the Rambam describes a porch as an intermediate level, at least ten handbreadths high, through which stairs lead to the courtyard.

I.e., the inhabitants of the porch or the upper storey descend through a stairwell into the courtyard, and from the courtyard they proceed to the public domain.

I.e., unless an eruv is established, the inhabitants of these domains are forbidden to carry within the others’ domains and within the property shared by both.

See Hilchot Shabbat 15:9.

I.e., since the cistern is filled with objects that are forbidden to be carried, it is not given any special importance, and instead is considered like any other large, distinct object in the courtyard.

It is, by nature, fit to be used by the inhabitants of both domains. Therefore, neither is entitled to do so, unless they establish an eruv.

The rationale for these rulings is obvious; the concept is mentioned primarily to show the contrast with the subsequent clauses of the halachah. Unlike the inhabitants of the inner courtyard, who can reach their own dwelling only by passing through the outer courtyard, there is no reason for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.

This ruling reflects the principle stated in Halachah 23, that when people are forbidden to carry within their own domain, they cause carrying to be forbidden in the domain through which they pass. Had the inhabitants of the inner courtyard established an eruv for themselves, they would not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as reflected in the following clause.

Similarly, if the single courtyard belongs to a single individual, or the owners are considered to be members of a single household—e.g., a father and his children, their presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh).

For their eruv is still intact and there is no necessity for the inhabitants of the outer courtyard to pass through the inner one.

The eruv is not acceptable for the inner courtyard, because it is not located within the courtyard itself, and it is not acceptable for the outer courtyard, because one of the inhabitants of the courtyard did not participate.

Chapter 2, Halachah 5.

For all the inhabitants of this courtyard have joined together in a single eruv. Although they had desired to join together with the inhabitants of the outer courtyard, the failure for this desire to be fulfilled does not cause them to forfeit their initial advantage as a domain joined by an eruv. (See Eruvin 75b.)

In this instance, the inhabitants of the inner courtyard are forbidden to carry because one of their number has failed to join in the eruv. This in turn causes carrying to be forbidden in the outer courtyard, as explained above.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:10), the Rambam explains that this can refer to members of an extended household—e.g., a father and his children.

Needless to say, to carry from one courtyard to the next, an eruv is necessary.

Our Sages explained that gentiles are less private about the details of their personal dwellings than the Jews. Thus many people will know of the gentile’s presence and the fact that his domain was not rented, but they may not know that only one Jew lives in the outer courtyard. Therefore, they might not realize that this is an exception, and generally, when one courtyard leads to another, an eruv is required (Eruvin 75b). Although when one Jew lives in a courtyard together with a gentile, he is generally not required to rent his domain (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), an exception is made in this instance.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 382:17) mentions this as a singular opinion, and the Mishnah Berurah 382:59 states that it is not shared by most authorities. Some have noted that the Rambam himself uses a plural form of the word “rent,” and they interpret this as referring to an instance where two Jews live in the outer courtyard.

I.e., the inhabitants of the inner courtyard have established two eruvin, one with each of the outer courtyards.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that these two clauses refer to different situations. The first clause refers to a situation in which all three courtyards have entrances to the public domain, while this clause refers to a situation where only the outermost courtyard has an entrance to the public domain, and the inhabitants of this courtyard must pass through it.
Based on the Hagahot Maimoniot, Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the fundamental aspect of this ruling is the interpretation of Rabbi Shimeon’s statements that the inhabitants of the middle courtyard are permitted to carry in either of the outer courtyards (Eruvin 45b, 48b). Although these statements were made regarding asituation in which only one courtyard opened up to the public domain, one can extrapolate that the same ruling would apply when all three open to the public domain.

See Hilchot Shabbat 15:15, which interprets this law as referring to a balcony with a hole in its floor, from which water is drawn and through which it is poured. The partition need not extend the full distance from the balcony to the water. As long as it extends either ten handbreadths below the balcony or ten handbreadths above the water, drawing water and pouring water through the hole in the balcony are permitted.

ln his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains this as referring to two balconies positioned one on top of the other. Each balcony has a hole in it, and these holes are also aligned one on top of the other.

The Ra’avad states that, based on Eruvin 88a, this ruling would appear to apply only when the two balconies are not directly above each other. The Ra’avad’s position is shared by Rashi and the Rashba, while the Rambam’s interpretation appears to be shared by Rabbenu Chanan’el. Although the Maggid Mishneh attempts to justify the Rambam’s position, most authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 355:5) follow the Ra’avad’s view.

I.e., the Rambam applies the principle stated in Halachah 23—about people passing from one domain to another—to the buckets used to draw water that pass from domain to domain. In this instance, as well, the Ra’avad, Rashi, and others interpret Eruvin (loc. cit.), the source for this halachah, differently, and their interpretation is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

The fact that their buckets pass through the area of the lower domain is of no consequence.

For they have no partition.

Since they both have a share in the partition, they are considered as full partners in a single domain. Hence, it is necessary that they be joined together in an eruv.

I.e., through a hole in the building.

E. g, from a porch to a porch.

As evident from Hilchot Shabbat 15:16-17, this refers to a courtyard larger than four cubits by four cubits. It is forbidden to pour water into a smaller courtyard unless one digs a pit, as reflected in the second clause of this halachah.

The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:11).

A shituf established by the inhabitants of a lane is mentioned because it can be established with other types of food besides bread. In contrast, an eruv for a courtyard may be established only with bread (Chapter 1, Halachah 8). The RaShba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) states that the same principle would apply if the inhabitants of a courtyard established a business partnership for the sale of bread.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 366) states that even if the partnership involves several types of produce, as long as it is stored in a single container, the inhabitants may rely on it for the sake of the Sabbath. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 386:3) quotes this ruling.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on Eruvin 68a. In his commentary on that passage, Rashi explains that this refers to the food set aside for the shituf If the person asks for some of this food and it is not given to him, the eruv is nullified.
Although this does not appear to be the Rambam‘s intent, the Kessef Mishneh explains that his words can be interpreted in this manner. [And in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:5), Rav Yosef Karo rules according to his explanation in the Kessef Mishneh]. The Ra’avad goes further and explains that this law applies only when one person has granted others a share in his produce for the purpose of establishing a shituf If, afterwards, he refuses to allow one of the members of the lane to take from the shituf, the shituf is nullified.

With the intent of nullifying the shituf

I.e., in contrast to the previous law, this person was not a regular participant in the shituf

l. e., the communal court may compel him to join the shituf. Nevertheless, in contrast to the previous law, the matter may not be dealt with by the inhabitants of the lane themselves (Maggid Mishneh). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 367:1).
The Noda BiY’hudah (Vol. 11, Choshen Mishpat, Responsum 39) points to Hilchot Sh’chenim 5:12 (quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 162:l), which appears to contradict this interpretation, for it states that the members of the lane may compel each other to build a pole or a beam for a courtyard. The Noda BiY’hudah explains, however, that there is a difference between the structure of a courtyard (i.e., the pole or the beam) and participation in an eruv.

According to most authorities, the inhabitants of such a courtyard have the right to establish a shituf with the inhabitants of both lanes, if they desire. lf they chose this option, they may bring articles to and from both lanes. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam accepts this view, as well.

In Chapter 1, Halachah 20, the Rambam states: “A person need not inform the inhabitants of a lane or a courtyard that he has granted them [a portion of food] and established an eruv for them, for these deeds are to their benefit, and a person may grant a colleague benefit without the latter’s knowledge.”
The rationale behind that ruling is that it is surely to the benefit of the inhabitants of a courtyard to be able to bring articles to and from areas outside their courtyard. In this instance, however, the establishment of a shituf is not necessarily to the benefit of the inhabitants of that courtyard, and they must therefore be notified beforehand.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the shituf is not necessarily to their benefit, because they have another altemative to transfer articles to and from the courtyard from outside. Hence, it is possible that the inhabitants of the courtyard do not desire to join in the shituf with this lane, lest doing so increase the amount of human traffic in their courtyard.
According to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s view, the question facing the inhabitants of this courtyard is: If they do not join in a shituf with either of the lanes, they are allowed to transfer articles left in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath to and from both the lanes. Should they join in a shituf with only one of the lanes, although their opportunities are greatly increased with regard to transferring articles to and from the lane with which they established the shituf, they lose the opportunity to transfer articles to and from the other lane. Perhaps they would desire to maintain the situation as it was originally rather than forfeit this opportunity.

In this ruling, the Rambam’s interpretation of Eruvin 80a (the source for this halachah) parallels that of Rabbenu Chanan’el. Rashi, the Ra’avad, and others offer a directly opposite interpretation of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 367:1) follows the latter view.
The Ra’avad’s objection to the Rambam’s ruling revolves around the interpretation of the passage cited above, which begins:
A [gentile] officer lived in Rabbi Zeira’s neighborhood. [The Jews] offered to rent his domain on the Sabbath, but he refused. They came to Rabbi Zeira and asked whether they could rent it from his wife. He told them, “... A person’s wife may establish an eruv on his behalf without his knowledge.”
According to the Rambam, the law Rabbi Zeira cites as support is not entirely analogous to the situation regarding which he was asked. A Jew’s wife may establish an eruv without his knowledge, but not against his will. A gentile’s wife, by contrast, may rent out his domain even when he has already refused (Sefer HaKovetz).

Since they agreed to join in the shituf previously, we assume that they desire to continue the arrangement (Levush, Orach Chayim 368:1).

Rashi (Eruvin 80b) explains that this refers to establishing the second shituf with a different type of produce, rather than establishing the first eruv with two types of produce. His approach is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 368:1).

Note Chapter 1, Halachah 11, where the Rambam states that a shituf can be established using two types of produce. The Ra’avad objects both there and here.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 9.

Merkevet HaMishneh explains that, even according to the Rambam, using two types of produce for a shituf is undesirable. Therefore, if the shituf must be established anew, it is necessary to check whether the inhabitants of the lane consent.

For perhaps they would desire to establish the shituf with the inhabitants of the other lane.

See the notes on Halachah 4.

Unless they join together in a shituf.

Since there is a courtyard in their lane that has not joined in the shituf, all the inhabitants of the lane are forbidden to carry.

Unless they join in a shituf

Even when they do not join in a shituf

Provided they establish an eruv for themselves.

Based on the principles stated in the previous halachah, it would seem that the fact that the inhabitants of this courtyard have not joined in the shituf of the lane through which they usually pass would cause carrying to be forbidden in this lane. Nevertheless, since the inhabitants of this courtyard have another alternative, they are considered part of the courtyard through which they do not usually pass. The rationale is that through this decision, one group of people (the inhabitants of the lane who established a shituf) benefits (for their shituf is considered acceptable), and another group (the inhabitants of the courtyard in question) does not lose (for they are forbidden to carry regardless) [Eruvin 49a].

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 16:3, this is an area of 5000 square cubits. The Sages forbade carrying in such an area, even when it is surrounded by a proper partition (loc. cit.:1-2).

I.e., we assume that the entrance that is more important to them is the entrance to the enclosed area and not the entrance to the lane. Hence, the fact that they have an entrance to the lane is of no significance.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 13.

See also Halachah 24 and Chapter 4, Halachah 16.

See Chapter 2, Halachot 1-5.

Chapter 4, Halachah l.

I.e., an eruv established within a courtyard will be seen by the children, and they will know that it is only because of this eruv that the restrictions against carrying are relaxed. If, however, there is only a shituf in the lane, it is unlikely to be noticed by the children, and they will not know about the restrictions established by our Sages (Eruvin 73b). (See, however, the notes on the following halachah.)

For the shituf requires the participation of all the inhabitants of the lane.

See Halachah 15.

I.e., if one person will give a colleague bread—other than the bread of the shituf—when asked (Ra'avad(.

Rav Moshe HaCohen notes an apparent contradiction between this halachah and Chapter 1, Halachah 19, which states that if a shituf was established with bread, there is no need for eruvin within the courtyards, because the children will be aware of the collection of loaves of bread. He maintains that this leniency may be accepted at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 387:1) accepts this view.
The Ramah mentions an even greater leniency. He maintains that we may rely on the shituf although eruvin were not established, even when the shituf was established with wine or other foods. His rationale is that in Talmudic times, the shituf was established by one member of each courtyard, who acted on behalf of all the inhabitants. At present, however, all the inhabitants of the lane contribute individually to the shituf.
This rationale is not accepted by the later authorities; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 387:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 387:12 suggest following the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on his conception [Hilchot Shabbat 17:8; Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 6:8)] that a lane must have several courtyards and several houses open to it.
The Ra’avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen, and others object to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that it follows the opinion of Rav (Shabbat l3la). Nevertheless, the halachah ultimately follows the view of Shmuel (Eruvin 74a), who maintains that the lane and the courtyards are considered to be a single entity. According to this view, when a shituf has not been established, there is no difference whether or not eruvin have been established within the courtyards. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 388:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 388:4 rule according to this view.
The Mishnah Berurah adds that the stringency suggested by the Rambam applies only when the open side of the lane is adjusted with a pole or a beam. If, however, the open side is adjusted with a frame of an entrance, even the Rambam would agree that one is permitted to carry articles that were left in the lane at the beginning of the Sabbath.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 18-19.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 10

See Chapter 2, Halachah 16.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.

See Chapter 4, Halachah l.

We have translated the Hebrew חתפ as “opening,” rather than “entrance,” in light of the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 389:1) that a window is sufficient.

As reflected by Halachah 10, when a person has one entrance that is semi-private and another that is more public, the entrance that is more private is considered to be the one he will prefer. Since the gentile has an alternative of this nature, his presence does not cause carrying to be forbidden within the lane.

Because of its small size.

Significantly, these laws are directly opposite to those applying to a Jew, as mentioned in Halachah 10.

I.e., one might think that since they are joined together as a single entity, the leniency mentioned in the final clause of Halachah 16 would apply. This, however, is not the case, as the Rambam proceeds to state.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 15.

This refers to a city surrounded by a wall that has gates, for in this way it is a private domain according to the Torah (Maggid Mishneh). Other authorities—and these are the views accepted by many today—accept the possibility of a city’s being encompassed by an eruv consisting of wires or string that forms an imaginary wall. The acceptability of such an enclosure is discussed in Hilchot Shabbat 16:16 and notes.

I.e., in contrast to the situation mentioned in the following halachah, there is no need to set a certain area outside the eruv.

Since the city has only one entrance, it does not resemble a public domain, and the chance that people will develop a misconception is far less. Hence, no additional measure is necessary (Mishnah Berurah 292:5).

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Eruvin 59a, b. The Rashba and the Ritba offer similar, but slightly different interpretations of the passage. Significantly, Rashi interprets the Hebrew םיבר לש ריע as referring to a city populated by more than 600,000. His view is cited in Shulchan Aruch HaRav 392:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 392:7 as an explanation for the reason that this law is not practiced at present.

For the reasons explained in the following halachah.

Since the city resembles a public domain, allowing people to carry might create a misconception. Unless a portion of the city were set aside, it is possible that some might entirely lose awareness of the prohibition against carrying.

Or even several ladders (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 392:2).

Although at times a ladder is considered to be an entrance (e.g., Chapter 3, Halachah 2), this instance is judged by different criteria.

These individuals are less likely to be upset about being excluded from the eruv of the city. (See Eruvin 60a.)

See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

The Maggid Mishneh (cited also by the Mishnah Berurah 392:34) notes that the Rambam’s wording implies that if only a portion of the inhabitants of a city join in the shituf, we do not automatically assume that a person would prefer to be part of them. Perhaps he would prefer to be associated with those who were not included.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 13.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 9; Chapter 4, Halachah 13; and Halachah 16 of the present chapter.

Today, when eruvin are made in cities where Jews and gentiles live together, the gentiles’ domains are usually rented through an arrangement negotiated with the municipal authorities. Since these authorities have a certain dimension of control over all land under their jurisdiction, and can enter all homes with a court order, they are entitled to rent the domain for all the gentiles living in this area.

Merkevet HaMishneh explains that the Rambam’s wording implies that the inhabitants must either join in the shituf or erect a pillar.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 16; and Halachah 11 of the present chapter.

The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss on Halachah 19) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim392:5) interpret this to be referring to a city that is surrounded by a wall with gates.