Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., the field is taken from him even if he brings witnesses who testify that it was his property (Maggid Mishneh).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 147:1 states that this applies even when Reuven, the seller, does not have witnesses who will substantiate his ownership of the field.

I.e., if the field did in fact belong to you, you should not have taken part in its sale.
Ketubot 109a mentions the opinion of Admon, one of the leading judges of Jerusalem in the era of the Mishnah, who explains that the protester/witness may have desired the sale to be concluded, because the purchaser was a more easy-going individual than the seller. (See Halachah 3.) Hence, he expected him to respond to his protest in a more accommodating fashion. The halachah, however, does not accept this rationalization.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 147:1) states that this applies only when he signs the deed of sale together with another witness. If he signed alone, he could always claim: “I signed because I know that the signature of one witness alone is worthless.”

See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which states that the Rambam favored the text of the Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 13:6) rather than the text in the Babylonian Talmud, which speaks about the protester’s selling of the adjacent field himself and referring to the field in question as “the field belonging to Reuven.”

I.e., when defining the boundaries of another field, he speaks of the field in question as “the field belonging to Reuven.”

I.e., if the field belonged to you, you should not have signed a document that referred to it as belonging to someone else. Ketubot, loc. cit., states that even Admon accepts this ruling.

I.e., a stretch of earth large enough to sow nine kabbim of grain. Nothing smaller than that could be referred to as a field (Maggid Mishneh, based on Hilchot Sch’chenim 1:4).

Even though Reuven was in possession of - and transferred to Shimon - the entire field (Maggid Mishneh).

If, however, he initiated legal action on behalf of the person mentioned in the bill of sale, he can no longer protest his ownership [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 147:4)].

For his responsibility is to authenticate the signature of the witnesses, making sure they are not forgeries - not to focus on the subject of their testimony.

For their purpose is to testify to the truth of the statements in the document.

Levi’s actions reflect a lack of moral integrity, for it is forbidden to save one’s own wealth at the expense of someone else (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:39). Nevertheless, there is no legal difficulty with his giving Shimon the advice.
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba as stating that this law applies only when the advisor/protester admits giving this advice. If, however, he denies giving the advice, and afterwards witnesses testify that he did, he is denied the right to protest. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:17) quotes this ruling.

I.e., he did not perform an act - e.g., signing the deed of sale - that has legal significance.

From whom it would be difficult to expropriate the field using legal process, and from whom I might suffer reprisals.

And he brings witnesses that Levi benefited from this field for at least one day, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.

At a minimal price.

Instead, the field is given to Reuven, the claimant. The fact that Shimon did not advance an alibi to resolve the statements of Reuven indicates that it belongs to him.

I.e., since the person in possession does not have witnesses who can substantiate his claim that he benefited from the field for the amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership, he is required to surrender the land. One might think that he would also be obligated to pay for the produce he consumed. For since the land is not his, the produce also is not. Nevertheless, he is not obligated to pay for the produce, for there are no witnesses who testify against him and maintain that he is obligated to do so.

I.e., if we believe his claim that he partook of the produce, we must also accept his claim of ownership of the property [Tur; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 145:3)].

I.e., one might think, as indeed is the case in the following halachah, that the testimony of the witness would obligate the person in possession. This is not so, for the reason explained by the Rambam.

The commentaries cite this law as an affirmation of the Rambam’s thesis that when a person is obligated to take an oath, that obligation remains in force despite the fact that he has a witness who testifies in favor of his position.

The wording of the oath must be chosen carefully so that he is not claiming the field as his, in the process of denying responsibility for the produce.

This applies even if the witnesses intended their testimony to benefit the person in possession of the field. Through their testimony, they established that he benefited from the field for two years. This is not sufficient to establish his claim of ownership, and hence, he must pay the owner for the benefit he derived from the field.

Whenever the testimony of two witnesses would obligate a person to make financial restitution, the testimony of a witness obligates him to take an oath to free himself from responsibility. Nevertheless, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain, the person is not able to take an oath in this situation.

I.e., a Scriptural oath that he did not benefit from the land.

For he agrees with rather than contradicts the witness’s testimony.

As explained in detail in Chapter 4, Halachah 8, and notes.

Moreover, since the owner does not have a definite claim, the person in possession is not required to take even a sh’vu’at hesset to support his statements. For a sh’vuat hesset is required only when the plaintiff issues a definite claim (Chapter 1, Halachah 7).

For there is no way of clarifying the amount he owes.

Note the repercussions of this ruling in Chapter 12, Halachah 2.

100 zuz.

The plaintiff will then lodge other claims against the defendant that would not ordinarily require an oath, but because of the principle of gilgul sh'vu'ah, could be included in the oath the defendant is required to take (Sh'vuot 31a).

Sh’vuot, loc. cit., quotes this as the proof-text prohibiting all the above and other similar ruses.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 248) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 400) consider inheritance to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

All of the laws in Hilchot Nachalot apply when a person dies without distributing his property through a will. The various halachic means through which to divide one’s property through a will are discussed in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapters 8-12.

Numbers 27:8 states: “When a man dies and he does not have a son, you should transfer his inheritance to his daughter.” Implied is that if he does have a son, the daughter does not receive anything.

I.e., even if the father has died, the child’s mother does not inherit the estate. Instead, it is given to the father’s sons.

I.e., both the concepts that the father inherits his son’s estate and that the mother does not are not stated in the Torah, but instead were conveyed by the Oral Tradition [Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 8:1)].

I.e., the daughter of the deceased’s son takes precedence over the deceased’s daughter. For the deceased’s son “inherits in the grave”- i.e., even though he has died, his right to the inheritance takes precedence over his sister’s. From this point on, the inheritance is considered to be his property and is given to his descendants, whether male or female.

I.e., his paternal brothers. His maternal brothers have no share in his inheritance, as stated in Halachah 6.

The Rambam’s words are taken from Bava Batra 115b. The Talmud asks: Why do we not say until Jacob, for he is Reuven’s father? And replies: “It is an accepted tradition that no tribe will ever be wiped out,” and thus although the line of inheritance may extend back to Jacob’s sons, it will never have to extend back to Jacob himself.

The son’s daughter takes her father’s place. Thus, it is as if both the son and the daughter are represented. In that instance, the daughter does not receive anything, as stated in Halachah 2.

Note Bava Batra 116b, which illustrates this concept using the example of Tzelofchad’s daughters.

When a woman’s husband is no longer alive, however, her children inherit her estate [Bava Batra Ill a; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 276:4)].

Who have different fathers.

A person born out of an adulterous or incestuous relationship.

Instead, the maid-servant’s son is considered to be a servant and the gentile woman’s son to be a gentile. Even if the maid-servant’s son is freed or the gentile woman’s son converts, he is not considered to have any connection to his father by blood.

She does receive the money she brought to the marriage, the money due by virtue of her ketubah (ante-nuptial contract), and any money her husband willingly gave to her. Moreover, she is allowed to continue living in her husband’s home until she remarries. She does not, however, receive any portion of the estate divided according to the laws of inheritance.
The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that the Rambam’s words should not be misinterpreted. A woman does not lose any right she has to her husband’s estate because she marries him. For example, if she is his brother’s daughter and she is his closest surviving relative, she inherits the estate.

Ketubot 83b records a difference of opinion among the Sages whether a husband’s right to inherit his wife’s estate is of Scriptural origin or merely a Rabbinic decree. The Rambam subscribes to the latter view. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 8.) The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam and maintains that his right is of Scriptural origin.
See the Kessef Mishneh, who states that sometimes, when the Rambam uses the expression midivrei sofrim, his intent is that the law has the strength of a Scriptural commandment and was merely not stated explicitly in a verse, but derived by the Rabbis through the principles of exegesis. In this instance, however, the Rambam’s subsequent rulings [Chapter 6, Halachah 8; see also his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bechorot 9:11)] indicate that this is not the case.

I.e., his rights supersede even those of her children.

The rite performed when a man dies without leaving children.

I.e., if a marriage was forbidden by a negative Scriptural commandment, a positive Scriptural commandment, or a Rabbinic commandment (see Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 1), the husband has the right to inherit his wife's estate. If, however, the marriage involves a union punishable by death (either execution by the court or by the hand of Heaven), it is as if there is no marriage (ibid.), and the man has no right to the woman’s estate.

Provided she was given in marriage by her father. The laws that apply with regard to the inheritance of a female minor who was not given in marriage by her father are described in Halachah 10.

A marriage of a deaf-mute is effective only according to Rabbinic decree (Hilchot Ishut 4:9). Nevertheless, as the Rambam states (ibid. 22:4), the woman is capable of understanding, and she married the deaf-mute willingly. By doing so, she endowed him with the right to her estate.

Chapter 22, Halachot 1-2.

In Talmudic times, Jewish marriage was a two-staged relationship. First, a husband would consecrate a woman as his wife (kiddushin or erusin in Hebrew), but they would not live together as a married couple. Sometime later, they would enter the chupah, which signifies the woman’s entering her husband’s home. Today, both these phases of marriage are performed together.

For that marriage is effective only according to Rabbinic decree and cannot supersede the rights to inheritance granted by Scriptural Law. Since she is not responsible for her own actions, she cannot transfer the right to her property.

If, however, the marriage bond is affirmed after she becomes aware, the husband does have the right to inherit her property.

Hilchot Ishut 22:4.

This addition was intended to clarify the distinction between the points mentioned in this halachah and those mentioned in Halachah 11.

Even though the husband did not have use of this property in his wife’s lifetime, he has the right to inherit it.

The Maggid Mishneh states that there is no explicit Talmudic source for this concept. Nevertheless, since Kiddushin 45b states that a husband does not inherit his wife’s estate if there is a question of the validity of his consecration of her, we assume that the same principles apply with regard to divorce. As long as there is even a possibility that the divorce may be valid, the husband does not inherit the woman’s estate.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that until a divorce is proven to be valid, a husband has the rights to his wife’s estate. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, but states that there is a long-standing difference of opinion regarding this matter among the Rabbinic authorities. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:5) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:7-8, our Sages ordained the possibility of the marriage of a fatherless girl below the age of majority. She or her relatives may arrange her marriage. Although the marriage may take effect immediately, the girl has the right to nullify it before she attains majority. That nullification is referred to as mi'un. Nevertheless, mi'un is necessary only when the girl has some conception of what marriage is. Thus, if she is below the age of six, or between six and ten and she was tested and it was obvious that she did not appreciate what marriage meant, mi'un is not necessary to annul the marriage; she may simply go home. This is the situation the Rambam is describing.

Even when she did not leave his home.

See Hilchot Ishut 11:6, 22:4.

In other cases of inheritance - and even in this instance with regard to the woman’s other heirs - an estate is transferred to a deceased person, and from him transferred to his living heirs. Hence, one might think that the estate would be transferred to the woman, and from her to her husband. This is not the case. Instead, our Sages gave a man the right to inherit only the property that is in her possession at the time of her death, but not what she would acquire afterwards.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the husband’s rights to his wife’s estate can be compared to those of a firstborn with regard to his double share of the inheritance. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 1.) According to that comparison, a husband would also not inherit a loan that is owed to his wife or the proceeds from investments she made. Based on the wording of this halachah and of Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 12:12, it appears that the Rambam maintains that the husband does not inherit that property. This opinion is also cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:1).

As we would say with regard to his inheritance of his father’s estate or that of his other relatives.

Needless to say, if the woman has children of her own, they inherit her estate.

I.e., if he has maternal brothers who are alive, they would inherit the estate, for they have the same right to it as he does. We are speaking about an instance where he has no maternal brothers (and no descendants). He does, however, have paternal brothers, sons born to his father by another woman.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the son also does not inherit his mother’s estate for the sake of his father. For example, in an instance where the couple is divorced and have a son. The father is the son’s heir. If the son dies before the father, the father does not acquire the rights to the mother’s estate because of the son.

Even if it is unlikely that he will survive. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that if it is unlikely that the premature baby will survive, it is not considered a viable birth, and he is not given the status of an heir. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 276:5) does not mention a premature birth, leading the authorities to assume that he accepts the Ra’avad’s view.

I.e., we consider it as if he had six sons, not five, and give two portions to the firstborn.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 277:3) states that if the son is born while his father is dying (goseis), the son is not given the right of the firstborn. This ruling requires a somewhat forced interpretation of the second clause of this halachah. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 277:7.

I.e., the father must at least have the possibility of recognizing his son “on the day when the inheritance is transferred” - i.e., the day of the father’s death.

There is a question among the Rabbis whether the baby’s entire forehead must emerge in his father’s lifetime, or merely the majority of his forehead (Bedek Habayit 277).

And thus his sex could not be determined. Such a person is called a tumtum in Talmudic terminology. See Hilchot Ishut 2:5.

Instead, the estate is divided equally among them.

See the illustration of this concept in the following halachah.

I.e., their manhood must be apparent.

Our translation is based on the gloss of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 277:11. This interpretation saves the two clauses from being redundant.
The share of the inheritance due the son who died is divided equally among his brothers, for they are his heirs. Nevertheless, the fact that he is theoretically given a share reduces the share of the firstborn. For example, if there is a firstborn, two brothers and the brother that died, the firstborn receives a fifth of the estate as the firstborn’s share rather than a fourth.

From Deuteronomy 21:15: “And she will bear him sons,” our Rabbis derived that the sons must be born in the father’s lifetime. In both the instances described in this halachah, the firstborn’s share is determined first and then, the remainder of the inheritance is divided in the ordinary manner.

A person had two wives who both gave birth at approximately the same time. At the time of birth, it was known which baby was born first. Afterwards, however, the babies became intermingled, and it was impossible to differentiate one from the other.

Since it was originally known which of the sons was the firstborn, an extra portion of the estate is allocated for that son. Nevertheless, since it is not known which of the sons is in fact the firstborn, he cannot be given his portion. If, however, both (all) of the sons whose identities were confused give each other power of attorney, the extra share will be given to them to share.

Where it was dark and thus it was never discerned which of the babies was in fact the firstborn.

Since the firstborn’s identity was never distinguished, the father never had the opportunity to “recognize” him. Hence he is not granted an extra share.

Bava Batra 117a states that this law represents the situation pertaining to the daughters of Tzelofchad. (See Numbers, Chapters 26, 27, 36.) Tzelofchad was the firstborn son of Chefer. Thus, Tzelofchad - and hence his daughters - deserved a double portion of Chefer’s share in Eretz Yisrael.
As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1, a firstborn receives a double share only of property in the deceased’s possession at the time of his death, but not of property that accrues to that estate after his death. Nevertheless, the estate of the firstborn is granted a double share even though the firstborn himself is no longer alive. Hence, in this instance, the son’s daughter receive her father’s firstborn share.

Since a firstborn does not receive a double portion of money that will accrue to the estate - i.e., money that the estate will acquire afterwards - we cannot say that we are speaking about a situation where a person died childless, but his brothers and father died before him, in which instance, his brother’s sons would be his heirs. For in this situation, there would be no firstborn’s (i.e., the firstborn among the deceased’s brothers) share. Even if that brother had been alive at the time of the deceased’s death, he would not have received a double share, because the inheritance was not part of his father’s estate at the time of his death.
Hence, we are speaking about a situation where a person died childless and his brothers died before him. His father inherited the estate and died afterwards. The sons of the deceased’s brothers inherit their grandfather’s estate. Hence, if one of the deceased brothers was a firstborn, his son would receive a double portion of the estate.
After explaining the Rambam’s words in this manner, the Maggid Mishneh questions why it was necessary to mention this situation. Seemingly, it would be self-apparent. He explains that perhaps the Rambam’s intent was to describe the situation with all of its details.

Bava Batra111b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 21:17: “To give him a double portion of everything that he possesses” - i.e., “that he possesses,” and not “that she possesses.”

Who is not necessarily regarded as the firstborn with regard to the mitzvah of redeeming the firstborn. See Halachot 9-10 and notes.

Who must be redeemed even though he is not necessarily the one who receives the firstborn’s share of his father’s estate - i.e., when the father had another wife whose son was his firstborn.

I.e., although this son did not have to be redeemed as the mother’s firstborn.

The term “stillborn” is not a totally appropriate translation, as reflected by the following clause. The intent is a child who was born prematurely, and it is obvious that from the outset the fetus was never viable.

Such a son would not be considered to be the firstborn with regard to the mitzvah of the redemption of the firstborn. Nevertheless, to be mentioned above, the two sets of laws operate on the basis of different sets of principles and are by no means analogous.

A firstborn must be “born” - i.e., emerge from the womb - as implied by the proof-text.

Even if the sons convert, the firstborn and his father are not considered to have any family ties. Nevertheless, since while he was a gentile, the firstborn was considered to be the convert’s son, even if the convert fathered children after he became Jewish, the first of those sons is not considered a firstborn.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 277:17 offers two interpretations of this term: a) a woman with whom marriage involves a transgression, b) a woman whose marriage is not binding because of the transgression involved.
The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Talmudic source for this law, Yevamot 23a, cannot be accepted by the Rambam, for he does not acknowledge other concepts that are derived from the same exegetical reference. Kin’at Eliyahu explains that this reflects a pattern found several times within the Mishneh Torah. The Rambam will quote a concept stated in the Talmud, but ignore the method of exegesis stated in the source, and at times suggest an original method of his own.

When such a woman marries a priest, relations with her are forbidden by Scriptural Law or Rabbinic Law, respectively.

On the eighth day, even before the child is circumcised, the father takes the baby from the mother for the circumcision. From this time onward, he pays more attention to him. Hence, it is his word that is significant. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 277:23; Kiddushin 74a.

This also appears to apply in a situation where the woman gave birth to twins.

Bava Batra127b derives this concept from Deuteronomy 21:17: “he shall recognize,” which is interpreted to mean that he shall cause others to recognize. The father must make known the identity of his firstborn son.

The father’s statement may cause his son to be considered illegitimate. For if we know that the son was borne by the man’s wife and we accept the father’s word, the only possible conclusion is that he was born out of adultery. Even when this is the outcome, the father’s word is accepted. If, however, the son has already married and has fathered children, the father’s word is no longer accepted with regard to his legitimacy (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 15:15-16). Nevertheless, even after the son has fathered children, his father has the potential to disqualify him from receiving a share of the inheritance, as the Rambam states in Chapter 4, Halachah 2.
If, however, the father once declared a son to be his firstborn, he can no longer retract his statements [Ramban, Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh; Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 277:12)]. See Chapter 4, which describes several examples of a father’s identifying a person as his heir, or alternatively, stating that a person assumed to be a heir is not.

See Hilchot Gerushin 2:16. That source explains that a bill of divorce must be given by a man while he is mentally sound, and when a man loses his ability to speak there is room for suspicion that he is no longer of sound mind. Hence, he is asked several questions, requiring both positive and negative answers. If the manner in which he answers demonstrates that he is of sound mind, he is able to initiate the divorce. Similarly, in the present instance, if through his gestures he indicates that he is of sound mind, his word is accepted and the person is accepted as his son.

And hence, had to be redeemed.