Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

For the house is the responsibility of its owner.

I.e., the court will issue an order to this effect and expropriate property belonging to the owner of the house, if necessary (Kessef Mishneh).

For otherwise his loft will fall.

Because the existence of the loft is not considered an advantage to the owner of the home. On the contrary, by and large it is considered preferable for the owner of a home that no one live in the loft.

The Maggid Mishneh points to Hilchot Sechirut 6:4, which appears to indicate that both the ceiling and the plaster above it are the responsibility of the owner of the house. The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that there is a difference between a rental arrangement as described in Hilchot Sechirut, and a relationship between two owners as described here.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 165:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that the owner of the loft bears the entire responsibility for the ceiling.

Provided that the two structures were originally of equal size. If not, the building materials should be divided proportionately [Maggid Mishneh; Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 164:3)].

This applies even if all the building materials are located in the property of one of the owners (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 164:10).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 164:4) add that if the owner of either of the stones claim to recognize the stones coming from his property, he is given those stones, and the other partner is given an equal number of the other stones.

The commentaries (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh and others) question: Why can’t the owner of the loft compel the owner of the house to rebuild the house, as mentioned in Halachah 1 with regard to the rebuilding of a room?
Two answers are given:
a) The owner of the house traveled overseas. In such a situation, the court does not have the right to expropriate his property.
b) While the house is standing, the owner of the loft can compel the owner of the house to build it. Once it has fallen, however, the option of building it or not belongs to the owner of the house. For if he chooses not to build it, the owner of the loft need not remain homeless. He can rebuild the house and dwell within.

He does not have to pay any rent to the owner of the house. Nevertheless, if ultimately the owner of the house reimburses him, the fact that he lived in the house rent-free is not considered to be interest, because the owner of the house is required to provide him with a place for the loft (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 164:14).

Because they are too poor, or because of government regulations.

I.e., they can use the land as a field or sell it to another person to build up on.
Bava Metzia 117b explains the rationale for the division as follow: The presence of the loft devalues the house by one third. (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 164:15 interprets that to mean that if the house would normally last 90 years, because the loft was built upon it the house will last only 60 years.) Since the owner of the house accepted a loss of one third of his house’s value when be originally granted permission to build the loft, he must give one third of the land to the owner of the loft.

For this is of benefit to the owner of the loft. Now the building will be sturdier, and there is less chance of the loft’s falling.

As Chapter 2, Halachah 18, states, a wall of stone is five or six handbreadths thick, while a wall of brick is three handbreadths thick.

For he is minimizing the sturdiness of the wall and creating a risk for the owner of the loft.

For this provides greater support for the loft.

For this provides less support for the loft.

For both these changes make the walls weaker and provide less support for the loft.

For both these changes make the walls stronger and provide more support for the loft.

Because this reduces the pressure on the lower wall.

As above, this reduces the pressure on the lower wall.

For this causes greater stress on the walls of the home.

For both these changes make the loft lighter and reduce the pressure on the walls of the house.

For both these changes make the walls heavier and increase the pressure on the walls of the house.

The Rambam appears to be explaining that the beams of the ceiling sank independently of the walls. Rashi (in his commentary on Bava Batra 6b, 7a, the source for this halachah) interprets this to be referring to an instance where the wall sank into the ground. Regardless of the interpretation, the result is the same; the ceiling of the home is lowered and its owner has less living space. [Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 164:2), who follow Rashi’s approach.]

Any distance lower than this is considered to be an unlivable space. (See Hilchot Sukkah 4:1.) It is as if the house had collapsed entirely.

For his loft is still intact. If, however, the owner rebuilds the home in the process, the owner of the loft will have to seek different accommodations.

I.e., as stated in Halachah 1, the restoration of the ceiling and the plaster above it is the responsibility of the owner of the house (Maggid Mishneh).

See a parallel in Chapter 7, Halachah 8.

I.e., the olive press has an opening to the side of the mountain, but the mountain continues above it, and on the slope of that mountain there is a vegetable garden.
An Olive Press Built Below an Overhanging Vegetable Garden
a) The Vegetable garden
b) The olive press

I.e., and grow horseradish or other plants that do not require rainfall (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 165:2).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 165:1 explains that the owner of the garden can sow the entire earth of the olive press, for we assume that he would desire to sow one continuous area, and not a little portion of the top and a little portion of the bottom.

Both of them claim the vegetables. The owner of the higher garden says: “They grew from my land.” The owner of the lower garden states: “They grew in my space.”
Two Vegetable Gardens on the Slope of a Mountain
a) The Upper Garden
b) The Property Line
c) The Lower Garden

For essentially, since the vegetables are rooted in his property, they should belong to him.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 118b) explains that, in such a situation, the owner of the upper property would have to ask permission from the owner of the lower property to enter his garden and pick the vegetables. It is embarrassing for him to do that, and so he forgoes his claim to these vegetable.

This situation reflects an unresolved question in Bava Metzia 119a. Since the question is unresolved, and the vegetables are in the space belonging to the owner of the lower property, the owner of the higher property should not take them. For his claim to them is not substantiated. If, however, he does take them, they should not be expropriated from him, because his claim has not been refuted either.

And all the fruit grows in his property.

Since the tree derived its nurture from both the neighbors’ properties, they both are entitled to a share of its fruit. By the same token, if the trunk of a tree is rooted in the property of one neighbor, he is entitled to all the fruit even though the tree’s branches extend into the other neighbor’s property [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 167:2)].

We have translated the Rambam’s words literally. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh [and similarly, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 168:1)] state that this applies only in Eretz Yisrael, our holy land, whose settlement is given special consideration. In the diaspora, when trees are uprooted together with the land around them, by contrast, the owner is granted permission to take back his trees.
Other commentaries (the Meiri and Rav Moshe Cohen) maintain that, according to the Rambam, this law also applies in the diaspora. The Or Sameach supports this contention, noting that in Chapter 6, Halachah 2, the Rambam explicitly mentions “the settlement of Eretz Yisrael,” while in Chapter 14, Halachah 1, when describing laws that apply also in the diaspora, the Rambam uses the same wording as in this halachah: “in order that the land be settled.”
The concept “in order that the land be settled,” is interpreted to mean that the land be used for productive purposes. If the trees were not left in the property of the person in whose domain they were transplanted by the river we fear that this person would not plant trees in his field, for he had not planted trees there before. The person who originally owned the trees will probably plant other – for he had planted them before.

And become the property of the owner of the field.
The Ra’avad protests the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the owner of the field must pay the owner of the trees the market value of his trees.
The Maggid Mishneh defends the Rambam’s ruling, citing Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 6:3, which states that when property – even property with a mark through which it can be identified – is washed away by a flooding river, the owner despairs of its recovery. Hence, when the trees are not washed away with earth, they become the property of the owner of the field. If they are washed away together with earth, by contrast, the owner will not think that they will be carried far, and he will not despair of their recovery. Hence, the trees would rightfully be able to be taken by their owner except for the special consideration due Eretz Yisrael.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo mentions the Maggid Mishneh’s approach. He also suggests that the Rambam might have shared the Ra’avad’s feelings, but was concise in his words and did not elaborate. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 168:1) he incorporates the Ra’avad’s view. He also adds that if the owner of the field does not desire the trees, he may compel their owner to take them.

I.e., enough earth so that the trees could derive nurture from it even if they were not replanted. In such an instance, the trees are considered as if they had not been uprooted, and the laws of orlah – in which the fruits of a tree are forbidden for the first three years after its planting or replanting – do not apply (Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 10:12).

Since the owner of the field benefits from the fact that the laws of orlah do not have to be observed, he shares that benefit with the owner of the trees.

But not the fruit, for the fruit is forbidden as orlah.

For the trees themselves are movable property, and movable property washed away by a river belongs to its finder, as explained above (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., in this situation as well, at times the owner of the land and the owner of the trees share in the olives, and at times all the olives are given to one party.

Because the olive grew from the nurture of his land (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 168:6).

Since the owner of the land allowed the trees to remain there for an undefined duration of time, we assume that he was willing to forgo the benefit from his land for this period (Kin’at Eliyahu).

Since the profit is so small, the owner of the land will not mind ceding it to the owner of the trees.

For each one has a just claim. The owner of the land asserts “Without my land, the olives would not have grown.” And the owner of the trees counters: “Without my trees, the olives would not have grown.”

I.e., if one of the partners refuses to contribute to the cost voluntarily, the other partner may call him to court and have the court compel him to participate in the expenses.

E. g., a lock and a bolt. (See the following halachah.)

For adherence to local custom is a fundamental principle of Jewish business law.
This ruling is important in another context. Bava Batra 1:5 records a difference of opinion among our Sage concerning this matter. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that the other partners may not necessarily be compelled to shoulder his portion of the costs. Now Bava Metzia 38b quotes Rabbi Yochanan as stating that whenever there is a difference of opinion between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and another sage, the halachah follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Despite that statement, in this ruling the Rambam accepts the view of the other sage. On that basis, the Kessef Mishneh states that the principle stated in Bava Metzia does not apply in all instances.

I.e., aesthetic touches, which while not an absolute necessity for the courtyard, make it a more desirable place to live in.

And at his own expense.

This can be derived from the law stated by the Rambam in Chapter 3, Halachah 1, with regard to adding to the minimum height of a wall (Maggid Mishneh). The Kessef Mishneh states that it can be derived from the law stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

These are necessary for the protection of the courtyard from thieves. Since he owns a home in this courtyard, it is in his interest that the courtyard be protected from theft. He is not, however, compelled to contribute to the gate-keeper’s room, for the gate-keeper’s function is to protect the privacy of the courtyard’s inhabitants (Netivot HaMishpat, Be’urim 161:1).

All these acts make the courtyard unpleasant for its inhabitants. The noise produced by the animals, the mill and the chickens, the filth the animals and the chicken produce and the damage they may cause make their presence in the courtyard undesirable.

See Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 21:21, from which it appears that a woman would appear immodest when doing laundry at the riverside.

Implied is that even if it is the local custom in a city for the women to do their laundry at the riverside, a woman may refuse to do so.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 161:5) states that in a locality where it is customary for men to do the laundry, this exception does not apply. He also states that if the water from the laundry flows into a portion of the courtyard belonging to another person, that person may prevent the others from doing laundry.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 8 and 11.

I.e., even if the animal or the mill has been there for an extended period, even for three years. the other partner can force the owner of the animal or the mill to remove it from the courtyard. We do not say that because he did not protest at the outset, the other partner established his right to have the animal or the mill there and he cannot be forced to remove it.
The rationale is that the inconvenience that these entities cause is considered so great that at any time the other partner can say: “Until now I could bear it, but now I can no longer bear it.”

The claim is established immediately, as soon as the partition is noticed by the other partner in the courtyard.

It would appear that even if the person who erected the partition does not claim that he purchased the right to bring the animal in, as long as the other partners in the courtyard do not protest immediately, they are considered to have granted him the right to maintain the partition and the animal.

And the owner of the courtyard can compel him to remove his animal at any time. Even if he granted him a favor for an extended period, he is under no obligation to continue to do so.
The Maggid Mishneh cite Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 12:14, which states that if a person makes use of land for three consecutive years and claims that the owner sold it to him, or that it is in fact his land, his claim is accepted. In this halachah, however, the owner of the animal does not claim to own the land, merely that his colleague allowed him to use it.

Certainly this principle applies if a person desires to open up a window that overlook a colleague’s private property [Bava Batra 59b, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 154:3)].

This applies provided the colleague protests immediately. If he does not protest immediately, he is considered to have waived his privilege and the colleague may keep his window open (Kessef Mishneh, based on Chapter 11, Halachah 4).

Since he can see what his colleague is doing in the courtyard, it is considered an invasion of privacy. It is true that before, the two could have seen each other when they were both together in the courtyard. Nevertheless, by opening a window from his home, a person is able to see his colleague’s conduct more frequently, and to watch him without necessarily being seen himself (Rashbam, Bava Batra, loc. cit.).

In such a situation, when the entrances to both homes are open, a person in one home can see into the other and compromise his neighbor’s privacy.
Bava Batra, loc. cit. explains that Bilaam’s prophecy (Numbers 24:2): “How goodly are your tents O Jacob, your dwelling places, O Israel,” was motivated by the fact that he saw that the openings of their tents did not face each other. “These people,” he said to himself, “are fit for the Divine presence to rest among them.”

There are opinions that state that it is permitted as long as the entrances or the windows are on a slight angle, while other require that the angle of the new window or entrance be large enough to prevent one from seeing into a colleague’s house under all circumstances (Maggid Mishneh). [See also the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 154:3), which follows a more lenient view with regard to a courtyard which is jointly owned.]

A lane that does not end in a cul-de-sac is considered like the public domain. If it does end in a cul-de-sac, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether it is considered like the public domain or not [Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.)].

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.) state that this applies only when the windows are less than four cubits high. If the windows are more than four cubits high, the person with the opposite window may protest, for the passersby in the public domain cannot see anything above four cubits.

And will not stand in one place to see what is going on in a person’s house.

In this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 164:3) states explicitly that one must structure his store in such a manner that he will not be able to see his colleague’s entrance at all.

I.e. the person owns a house in one courtyard and then buys a house in an adjacent courtyard from which he could open up a new entrance to the other courtyard.
A Home Located In One Courtyard Which Was Purchased By A Person Owning A Home In an Adjoining Courtyard
a) The courtyard in which the home is located
b) A home in an adjoining courtyard owned by the purchaser
c) The house purchased
He may, however, combine the two dwellings together, by allowing access from one building to the other. If he does this, however, he must close the entrance from the home he just purchased to. the courtyard to which it previously opened (Kessef Mishneh in the name of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi).
Rav Yosef Karo also cites this ruling in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 154:1). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that he may not even open an entrance to his own home.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 154:1) state that no one in a shared courtyard has the right to change the structure at all. As it was originally built, so must it remain, even if the different dwellings changed hands.

If he entered from his new house, more people would be walking through the courtyard, and that would create an inconvenience for the other partners.

I.e., adding an apartment on the second storey, to which the person must enter through one’s home. But, as the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh mention, we assume that - because the entrance to the second storey is through his own home - he will not rent that out to others, but instead will simply widen his own living space.

The division may not be made with the intent that two families will be living in the same space in which one lived previously. Instead, it must be made to ensure more privacy within one’s existing apartment.

As reflected in the previous halachah, the Rambam’s opinion is that a person may build additional structures within his property, but he may not bring other people to live with him. The Ra’avad and others differ, maintaining the opposite. He may increase the number of people living in his home, but may not build a new structure.
To clarify the Rambam’s view: A person may bring guests into his household at any time. If, however, he rents out his premises to others who are not his guests, the other people in the courtyard may protest (Maggid Mishneh).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 154:2) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Tur and the Ramah quote that of the Ra’avad.

For the owner of the house can protest that the rental agreement did not entitle the renter to invite many others to dwell with him. The Maggid Mishneh, nevertheless, postulates that the renter is allowed to bring another person to share the apartment with him, for it could be assumed that a person would dwell together with a comrade.
Even the Ra’avad and the others who differ with the Rambam concerning the first clause accept his ruling in this instance [Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 154:5; see Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 316:1)].

The Siftei Cohen 154:8 states that the same laws apply with regard to a window, for increasing its size is an invasion of the other person’s privacy.

One may, however, reduce the size of one’s entrance, provided one does not change its location [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 154:4)].

This applies even when one does not enlarge the total size of the entrance. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 154:15 explains that it is not common for a person to leave one large entrance open. Therefore, most of the time the other person will be able to conceal himself. If, however, there are two small entrances, one will frequently be left open, and it will be harder to conceal oneself.

Who would protest that these changes make it more difficult for him to act in privacy.

Since it is possible that there will be passersby in the public domain at all times, the fact that a door across the street is open will not represent a significant invasion of the other person’s privacy.
The enlargement of a door to a residence cannot be compared to the opening of an entrance to a store mentioned in Halachah 7, for in the Talmudic era, a storekeeper would sit in front of his store throughout the entire day. A homeowner, by contrast, will not constantly be sitting at the entrance to his home.

As explained in Hilchot Shabbat 17:2, when a lane ends in a cul-de-sac, the inhabitants can receive permission to carry within it on the Sabbath by erecting either a pole at the entrance to the open side or a beam across the lane at that side.

This is considered one of the necessary expenses towards which all the inhabitants of the lane must contribute.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 162:1 states that if a lane does not end in a cul-de-sac, and thus it is necessary to erect the frame of an entrance at one of the open sides to permit the inhabitants to carry within (Hilchot Shabbat 17:3), all the inhabitants must contribute toward the construction of such a structure.

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of the Tosefta, Bava Metzia 11:9. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 162:1) interpret that passage differently, stating that if all the inhabitants of the lane except for one desire to erect gates, he can protest because he wants to be able to carry his burden directly to his home. And even if all the inhabitants of the lane agree, the people in the public domain may protest for the reason mentioned by the Rambam.

It would appear that, as the Kessef Mishneh clarifies in his gloss on the following halachah, the intent here is not necessarily a public domain as stipulated by the laws of the Sabbath – i.e., a thoroughfare at least 16 cubits wide – but rather any public domain through which a large number of people pass.
Our translation follows the interpretation of Rabbeinu Asher and the Rashba cited in the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 162:4. Others interpret this as referring to a situation where there are entrances to the public domain at both ends.

To prevent people who do not live in the lane from passing through.

E. g., on a market day, when there is much traffic in the public domain.

For the lane is not considered to be their private property, but rather part of the city as a whole.

I.e., he increases the human traffic in the lane, for he and the members of his household did not use that lane previously.

As mentioned above, the Kessef Mishneh states that in this instance, the public domain need not be 16 cubits wide.

Since passersby from the public domain will be using the lane, its inhabitants cannot control the human traffic in the lane. Hence, no restrictions are placed on opening new entrances.
Based on the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 162:3) states that if the lane has gates that are closed at night, it is not considered to be open to the public domain, and its inhabitants have the right to protest against the opening of new entrances.

But which had been open at the time of the original construction of the lane.

Since he originally had the right to open the entrance, he has the right to open it at all times.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 162:14 states that the owner must have witnesses that the entrance was once open, and that he – and not another person – closed it.

For by removing the door frame, he indicates that he no longer desires to open the entrance; it is as if he waived his right to open it again.

This refers to a situation where the inhabitants of the other lane consent that he build an entrance, or the other lane opens to the public domain on both sides, in which instance their consent is not necessary.

Thus, he is prohibited from making the change, because of the loss he might cause his colleagues.

For there is no loss that the inhabitants of the lane can suffer from his actions.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 162:6) adds that if the person opens up an entrance to another lane, he must remove the door frame of his original entrance, so that he will not open it up afterwards and thus introduce traffic from the other lane.

For he has no right of passage through that courtyard.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 162:7) differs and maintains that it is acceptable for the owner of the outer courtyard to place a bench in from of his entrance, even though it inconveniences the others.
A Bench Blocking the Entrance to a Courtyard in a Lane
a) The Innermost Courtyard
b) The fourth courtyard
c) The third courtyard
d) The second courtyard
e) The first courtyard
f) The lane
g) The bench

The Tur and the Ramah (op. cit.) differ and maintain that a person has the right of veto with regard to entrances on either side of his courtyard.

I.e., any of those owners (Kessef Mishneh).

See Halachah 5 for a definition of this term.

I.e., even if the majority of the inhabitants do not desire to undertake this expense, the minority – even a small minority – can compel them to do so [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 163:1)].

For the protection of the city is a need shared by all of its inhabitants. This applies even if the city is not situated on the border of the land, for there is always the possibility of marauding brigands. As reflected by Halachah 5, the inhabitants must also pay the salaries of the guards. This halachah, however, speaks only of capital investments.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 163:2 states that at present, when books are printed, it is necessary for the community to purchase only a Torah scroll. Individual who own other texts of study should be compelled to lend them to each other.

So that the city will be connected to all the surrounding towns. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not quote this law, implying that this applies only to Eretz Yisrael, and not to other lands.

See Hilchot Mechirah 21:22, which states:
The purchaser agrees to make a place for a fence in his portion, including a small trench three handbreadths wide behind the fence, but close to it, and a larger trench, six handbreadths wide, outside the fence, and to leave the width of a handbreadth between the two trenches. All of this is necessary to prevent a marten or the like from jumping [from one field to the other).

The Tosefta (Bava Metzia 11:9) also mentions the city’s mikvaot. These and the above are considered the fundamental necessities of the city.

I.e., he is responsible for capital expenses, but not for the ongoing communal needs of the city.

The fact that he owns property in another city does not give him any right to refrain from undertaking the responsibilities incumbent on the inhabitants of the city in which he lives.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes other opinions, which maintain that the wealth of the homeowners should be taken into consideration. A rich man who lives further from the wall has more to lose – and therefore must contribute more – than a poor man who lives near the wall. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163:3) mentions this view with the preface: “There are those who say....”

For if the wall fell, those whose homes are closer to it would be attacked first.

I.e., even if he is merely renting property. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 163:2) mentions an opinion that states that if a renter signs a 12-month lease, he is liable immediately. Similarly, anyone who indicates that he desires to be a permanent resident of the city is liable immediately.
See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 9:12, which mentions other measures of time with regard to becoming responsible to participate in the charitable enterprises of a city.

With the intention of living there. When a person buys a home in a city, we assume that he intends to live there, and he is held responsible immediately. In contrast, a person who inherits a home, is given one as a gift or receives it in payment of a debt, is not held Liable until he lives there for a year [Ramah (op. cit.); Sefer Me’irat Einayim 163:6].

The intent is orphans below the age of majority, who are not able to take financial responsibility for their property according to Scriptural Law. For this reason, they are not held liable for levies for charity, the building of a synagogue or the like. Nevertheless, in this instance, the orphans are liable, for they also benefit from the city’s protection. Hence, the court acts as the guardian of their property and requires them to participate in the expense. See the following halachah.

Sefer Chassidim, Section 1013, states that this applies only to Torah scholars “whose study is their livelihood,” and have no other occupation. Scholars who both study and work, by contrast, are required to pay their share of these taxes. The Siftei Cohen 163:14, however, states that this is not the widely accepted view.
See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:10, which states that Torah scholars are freed from various taxes and levies.

For they derive a direct benefit from such improvements.

Instead of hiring workers.

The Rambam does not say whether they are exempt from working entirely or are required to hire laborers in their stead. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 163:33 quotes opinions that state that they are not held responsible at all.

The rationale is that the adults are considered to have waived their right to the money they paid. Minors, by contrast, are not halachically able to waive their right to property. Hence, their money must be returned to them.

I.e., each of the inhabitants has the right to protest.

This refers to a lane that ends in a cul-de-sac, for otherwise, there is no control over the human traffic in the lane. Although the lane opens up to several courtyards – and thus every homeowner has a certain degree of privacy – since it ends in a cul-de-sac, there is generally not a large amount of human traffic, and opening up a new concern will disturb the local residents.
Courtyards Opening Up Into a Lane Ending in a Cul-de-sac
a) A courtyard
b) The cul-de-sac
c) The lane
[As will be explained, there are authorities who differ with the Rambam’s conception of this halachah and maintain that the prohibition stems from a different rationale. According to these authorities. this ruling applies even in a lane with openings to the public domain on either side (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:16).]

This applies even if the craftsman lives in that lane. For, as stated in Halachah 11, this increase the human traffic in the lane. This reflects the halachic precedent for zoning regulations – i.e., when a lane or a courtyard is used for residential purposes, a person cannot open up a commercial establishment within it.

As reflected by Halachot 11-12 and by Chapter 11, Halachah 5, even if they agreed at the outset, the inhabitants of a lane can complain at any time that a store or a craftsman’s business creates too much noise and commotion in the lane, and they can compel him to close his business on this account. Nevertheless, if they do not compel the first store owner or craftsman to close his business, they cannot prevent a rival from opening a similar concern in that lane.

Nor any of the other inhabitants of the lane.

For, according to the Rambam, as long as the person lives in the same city and pays taxes, he has a right to open such a business.

Hence, we do not assume that the opening of a new establishment will increase the human traffic in the lane. It is important to note that other commentaries on Bava Batra 21b, the source of this halachah, operate under a different understanding and maintain that the issue of concern is not the human traffic in the lane, but the threat to the success of the businesses operating there. Hence, their rulings are diametrically opposite to those of the Rambam. The Rambam’s opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:5), while the dissenting views are voiced by the Tur and the Ramah.

Since a plural form of the verb is used, the implication is that either the craftsman or any of the other inhabitants of the lane can prevent the person from the other city from establishing his business. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:16, however, explains that the reason for the protest in this instance is not the increase in the human traffic in the lane, but the fact that the craftsman’s livelihood is being threatened. Therefore, only the craftsman himself, and not the others, may issue such a protest.

Since this person pays the head tax, he is considered as an inhabitant of the city and has all the privileges of the other inhabitants, including the right to open a business where he desires.

Nor can the inhabitants of the lane in which he stops to sell prevent him from doing so.

Even if they do not pay the local taxes.

Although, as reflected by the previous and following halachot, since the merchant does not pay the taxes, the local merchants should be able to prevent him from doing so. Nevertheless, because of Ezra’s enactment, they cannot. It is, however, only merchants of this profession and the like who are given such privileges [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 156:6)].

Or one who teaches Torah to young children (Ibid.).

This special measure of consideration is granted Torah scholars so that the need to travel will not cause them to lose time from their studies.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinion of the Ri Migash, that this applies only when they are selling merchandise of the same quality as the local merchants at the same price as the local merchants. If they are selling merchandise of lesser quality at a lower price, or merchandise of higher quality at the same price, if the inhabitants of the city are Jewish, the merchants cannot restrict them. For the benefit of the inhabitants at large overweighs the benefit of the merchants. Although the Maggid Mishneh mentions views that differ, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 156:7) quote the view of the Ri Migash.

For they do not pay the local taxes, and by selling their merchandise they restrict the income of the local merchants.

For then people from other locales come to purchase merchandise, and so they can sell to these people. Nevertheless, since they are permitted to sell to the people from outside the city, they are also permitted to sell to the local people (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:20). Note, however, the Hagahot Maimoniot who state that the outside merchants may not sell to any of the local townspeople. This view is cited by certain later authorities.

For that is where the people from outside the city will go to purchase merchandise.

For then their sales will be directed primarily to local people.

I.e., they are the borrowers. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 156) interprets Bava Batra 22a as implying that the merchants are the lenders, and they are granted permission to do business in the city until the loan is repaid.

I.e., enough for them to repay the loan, support themselves during the time they are repaying it and make some profit for their future expenses. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:21; Siftei Cohen 156:6.

This apparently reflects the version of Bava Batra 21a possessed by the Rambam. The standard published text of the Talmud states “one of the inhabitants of a courtyard,” implying that if there were several courtyards in a lane, the other inhabitants of the lane have no say in what goes on in a particular courtyard. The version chosen by the Rambam compounds the question raised by the Kessef Mishneh cited in note 47. Significantly, although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:1) quotes the Rambam’s wording, the Tur and the Ramah mention the prohibition only with regard to a courtyard, and not with regard to a separate courtyard in a lane.

If, however, the lane opened to the public domain on either side, there would be no room for a protest. For then the inhabitants would have no control over the human traffic in the lane.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:4) and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:2 state that even if the person has already established himself in this profession, his neighbors can compel him to close because of the human traffic. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 8, this also appears to be the Rambam’s position.

We have interpreted the term rofeh uman as referring to one profession, for this is the version in the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. There are, however, opinions (see Rashi, Bava Batra 21a and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:3), which interpret them as referring to two different professions: rofeh as referring to a doctor or a mohel (one who performs ritual circumcision), and uman as a blood letter. This version appears correct from the second portion of the halachah and is supported by some ancient texts of the Mishneh Torah.

In contrast to teaching Jewish children, as mentioned in the following halachah.
From that halachah, however, it is clear that leniency is granted only when teaching Jewish children Torah. If one teaches them other subjects, the same restrictions apply. This understanding is reflected in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 2:3), which explicitly states that if a person teaches children mathematics or engineering, his neighbors may protest. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:1) changes the wording the Rambam uses here and speaks of: “One who teaches young children any subject other than Torah.”

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch emphasizes that the prohibition applies even when all but one of the neighbors consent. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:6 however, quotes an opinion that requires the majority of the neighbors to protest before a professional is required to close his concern.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that commentaries have questioned the Rambam’s statements in this halachah. For in Halachah 8, the Rambam states that whenever any professional opens up a business in a residential area, the neighbors may protest because of the increase in human traffic. Why then must he state that concept again in this halachah? And why does he mention only a select few professions?

The Rambam’s wording implies that the restriction is not only on the professional – he may not open up his business – but also on the homeowner. Since he knows that this person desires to open such a concern, in consideration of his neighbors he should not rent premises to him.
The Ramah 156:1 states that one is nevertheless permitted to sell a property to such a professional, provided he is Jewish and will heed the rulings of a Rabbinic court.

From the Rambam’s wording, one could conclude that a scribe who writes Torah scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot would be allowed to open a business concern despite the fact that this would increase the human traffic in the lane (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 156:4). This interpretation is borne out by the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 156:3) that: “Whenever [a profession] involves a mitzvah, the neighbors may not protest [because of the increased human traffic].”

The contrast to the second clause of the halachah appears to imply that even though the store has been operating for some time, the neighbors have the right to demand that it be closed. Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 156:2, which quote a different view.

As explained in the notes on the previous halachah, according to the Rambam’s position, these laws would also apply in a lane that ends in a cul-de-sac. The Rambam mentions a courtyard only to teach that, with regard to the final clause, even the residents of a courtyard may not protest against teaching children Torah.

At the outset, the neighbor may protest when a person sets out to perform such an occupation in a shared residential area, for the noise is considered an unfair disturbance. If, however, the neighbors did not protest at the outset the person establishes the right to perform this profession in his home, and he may continue to practice this occupation (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 156:2) quotes opinions that differ and maintain that as long as the person performs these tasks in his home or his store, his neighbors cannot complain unless they are unhealthy and the noise presents a hazard to their well-being.

As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, this applies only when he teaches them the Torah, and not when he teaches them other subjects. The leniency is granted because of the mitzvah involved.

Similarly, as stated in Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:7, a teacher who already has a school operating cannot protect against another teacher opening a competing school.

This refers to a situation in which two brothers divided an estate and agreed to this condition at the outset or a situation when a person purchased the cistern from the homeowner and made such a condition at the time of the sale (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 169:1).

Only during the daytime [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 169:1)]. Although his colleague originally agreed to grant him passage through his home, it can be assumed that he granted that consent only with regard to ordinary hours. He cannot be expected to get out of bed at night to allow his colleague to draw water (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 169:2).

For this is definitely an imposition against the owner’s wishes. No one desires another person’s animal to tread through his home. Since it is possible to avoid that, the owner of the cistern must undertake the additional effort.

So that one will not be able to enter without the other knowing.

So that the owner of the house will not steal it.

Lest she enter together with the owner of the cistern for immoral purposes. Moreover, even if the owner of the house himself has no suspicions about his wife’s virtue, he may desire to install a lock to prevent the possibility of rumors spreading among people at large (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 169:3).

For he will have the key.

This also represents a situation in which, at the outset, the owner of the outer garden consented to allow the owner of the inner garden to pass through his property.

I.e., during the day [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 169:2).

Who desire to buy his produce.

I.e., to take a shortcut through his colleague’s garden to another field belonging to him. The rationale for these restrictions is that any extra traffic in the garden damages the crops.

Even though the crops make it slightly more difficult for the owner of the inner garden to proceed, as long as he can reach his garden, the owner of the outer field is not under any further obligation to him.

Since the path was moved to the side, passage on it does not disturb the owner of the outer garden.

This increases the human traffic in the garden. The owner of the outer garden never granted him wholesale freedom to pass through his property. He merely agreed to allow him to reach his garden (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Batra 6:6).

Moving the path to the side can be understood as an agreement not to sow vegetables on it.