Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 288) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 523) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Sifri to the above verse; Sh’vuot 40a.

If the plaintiff’s claim is supported by the testimony of one witness, the defendant is required to take an oath if he denies the claim.

Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

A woman suspected of adultery. See Numbers, ch. 5; Hilchot Sotah.

I.e., if one witness testifies that he observed her infidelity, she is forced to accept a divorce. She may not drink the waters to prove her innocence. The commentaries explain the rationale for this exception as follows: Since a warning was issued and disobeyed, there is a great likelihood that she was indeed guilty of infidelity. Therefore all testimony is acceptable.

To atone for a murder when the identity of the murderer is unknown. See Deuteronomy, ch. 21; Hilchot Rotzeach, ch. 9.

As Hilchot Rotzeach 9:12 states, if one witness says that he saw the murder, we do not bring this unique atonement offering. For that offering was ordained only when no one at all knew the identity of the murderer, as indicated by Deuteronomy 21:1 (Radbaz).

A woman may not remarry until it is established that her previous husband died. The testimony of one witness is acceptable regarding this matter. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Gerushin 12:15: “If one witness comes and testifies that a woman’s husband died, she is granted permission to marry by virtue of his testimony, because [the truth of] the matter will ultimately be revealed,” i.e., if the husband is alive, that fact will surface in the near future. Hence there is no fundamental need for testimony.
The Rambam’s statements here, however, appear to be slightly contradictory to his statements at the conclusion of Hilchot Gerushin (13:5):
Do not wonder at the fact that our Sages released the prohibition [against marriage to a married woman]... on the basis of the testimony of a woman, a servant or a maidservant.... [These leniencies were instituted] because the Torah requires the testimony of two witnesses... only with regard to matters that cannot be verified definitively except via witnesses and their testimony, e.g., one person killed another or one person lent money to another.
When, by contrast, the matter may be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true, e.g., in an instance such as this when one testifies that a person died, the Torah did not require [formal testimony].
For this reason, our Sages ruled leniently with regard to this matter and accepted the testimony of one witness that is based on the testimony of a maidservant, [testimony] from a written document, and [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation. [These leniencies were instituted] so that the daughters of Israel will not be forced to remain unmarried.
The Noda BiY’hudah (Even HaEzer, Vol. 1, Responsa 27 and 33) interprets the Rambam’s statements as meaning that according to Scriptural Law, the testimony of one witness is sufficient (as in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 3:14 and Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:31). Our Sages extended that leniency and also accepted the testimony of one witness based on the testimony of another witness and even one witness based on the testimony of a maid-servant. For as the Rambam states, in these instances, formal testimony is not necessary. His interpretation is, however, difficult to accept in the light of the Rambam’s statements here.

See Chapters 9-16 which describe the reasons why a person may be disqualified from testifying as a witness.

When the testimony of one witness is effective, the requirements of formal testimony are not enforced. Hence, even persons who are otherwise disqualified may offer that information. There are, however, restrictions. A person who is known to be a robber is not accepted as a witness even in these circumstances (Hilchot Gerushin 12:17).

For the obligation to take an oath mandated by the testimony of one witness is comparable to the financial obligation created by the testimony of two witnesses. Hence all the requirements of formal testimony are required.

In some manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this marks the beginning of Halachah 4.

I.e., related to the other witnesses or to one of the involved parties.

For the witnesses are considered as a single group.

I.e., certainly the fact that the brothers were both present should not prevent justice from being done and the offender from being prosecuted.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 36:2 states that according to the Rambam [and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 36:1)], this question is addressed to all the witnesses who come to testify, not only the relatives. In this way, the unacceptable witnesses will not feel that they are under suspicion and will answer genuinely. Rashi and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 36) differ and maintain that this question is asked only of the unacceptable witnesses.

Rabbenu Asher and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 36) follow a slightly different perspective and maintain that relatives are not disqualified unless they both observed the matter and came to court with the intent of testifying. If, however, they merely observed the matter with the intent of testifying, that is not sufficient to disqualify the testimony.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 36:1) states that if acceptable witnesses are set aside for that purpose by the involved parties, they are not disqualified even if there are non-acceptable witnesses who observed the event with the intent to testify.
According to all views, there is a difficulty, for seemingly, the relatives of a killer could protect him by coming to court with the acceptable witnesses and saying they observed the matter with the intent of serving as witnesses. In this way, they would disqualify the acceptable witnesses and enable the killer to be released.

I.e., even if the non-acceptable witnesses did not actually testify. Since they intended to testify, all of the witnesses are considered part of a single group. Hence they are all disqualified (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 36:4).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 36:1) states that this restriction applies even when the witnesses do not know of each other’s existence. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 36:5 questions if the Rambam would also accept this ruling.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2.

Thus according to the Rambam [and his opinion is accepted by. the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)], it is not necessary for a person who observes an event to watch with the intent of serving as a witness. Even if he decides to serve as a witness afterwards, as long as he can describe the particulars precisely, his testimony is acceptable.

Of either of the principles.

For as is evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, it is possible that the unacceptable witnesses signed merely to fill up the space on the legal document without intending to serve as witnesses. Hence if the witnesses say that they all signed together, the legal document is nullified. If they say that the unacceptable witness signed afterwards, the document is acceptable.
The Kessef Mishneh questions how the statements of the witnesses can be used to nullify the legal document. Seemingly, this contradicts the decision rendered previously in Chapter 3, Halachah 7, that once the validity of the signatures on a legal document have been verified, the witnesses cannot nullify the document through their testimony. The Kessef Mishneh explains that in this instance, the statements of the witnesses are accepted, because a question was already raised concerning the validity of the legal document.

Because the unacceptable witnesses signed with the intent of testifying.

After all, non-acceptable witnesses signed the document.

Hence the later signatures are not considered part of the original testimony and do not disqualify it. If all of the witnesses sit down together and sign, their signatures are considered as part of one testimony. If, by contrast, signatures were added afterwards, they do not have bearing on the status of the original signatures. See also the Kessef Mishneh who compares the Rambam’s ruling here to his ruling in Hilchot Gerushin 9:27.

For in actual fact, it is possible that another witness signed before him and the unacceptable witness signed merely to fill in the space.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 45:12) states that at the outset, relatives and unacceptable witnesses should never sign a legal document. Moreover, he also cites the opinion of the Tur who states that the document is not acceptable unless the signatures of the last two witnesses who appear are those of acceptable witnesses. Note the Siftei Cohen 45:23 who elaborates in disputing the conception that the last signatures are those of primary importance.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 291) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 411) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Rashi (Sanhedrin 34a) explains the rationale for this prohibition. It appears that he is trying either to support or to retract his original testimony with these statements. This is unnecessary and undesirable. Once a witness delivers testimony, he can no longer retract it or add to it.

The rationale is that all testimony must be able to be disqualified through hazomah. If the witness serves as the judge, he will never disqualify his own testimony [Tosafot (Bava Kama 90b); see also Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.]. The Rashbam (Bava Batra 114a) derives this concept from Deuteronomy 19:17: “And the two men will stand... before God.” “Before God” refers to the judges. The two witnesses must stand before the judges, they cannot become judges themselves.
As evident from Hilchot Sanhedrin 3:6 and Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 6:2, if there is no necessity to deliver testimony, the judges can execute the matter themselves, e.g., judges who saw the new moon can consecrate the coming month.

As the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 7:5) emphasizes, this applies when the person testifies as a witness. If, however, a person observes a matter - even if he had the intent to serve as a witness - but does not actually testify, he may serve as a judge.

As Hilchot Gerushin 7:5 states, a person who brings a bill of divorce from the diaspora is required to make this statement before presenting the woman with the document.

And from this time onward, the husband cannot protest that the bill of divorce was a forgery. Since the necessity to validate the signature of witnesses on a legal document is a Rabbinic requirement, our Sages did not prevent a witness from serving as a judge in such an instance.

See also Chapter 7, Halachah 6.

Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

According to Scriptural Law, witnesses who sign on a legal document are considered as if they gave testimony in court. Nevertheless, were we not to require the verification of the signatures of witnesses, there is the possibility that there would be forgeries and no one would rely on a legal document (Lechem Mishneh).
The Radbaz (in his gloss to Chapter 7, Halachah 1) questions how it’s possible that Scriptural Law would accept any signed legal document as valid. That would leave the possibility open for forgeries. He explains that the Torah does not suspect that a Jew will ever lie. It is only after our people became assimilated among the gentiles and learned dishonesty that there arose a need for such safeguards.

According to law, if only two judges presided over the verification of the authenticity of a legal document, their actions are of no consequence. Nevertheless, it has become customary to allow a leading local Rabbinic authority to verify the authenticity of legal documents alone [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 46:4)].

I.e., we _do not require the unique semichah necessary to take part in a formal court. Since the verification of the authenticity of a legal document is a Rabbinic requirement, our Sages sanctioned even a court that is acceptable only by Rabbinic decree to perform this process (Ketubot 28a).

I.e., since it is considered as a judgment.

Hilchot Sanhedrin 3:4. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:6 states that if both litigants agree, the verification may be made at night.

In this and the previous instance, since the judges have firsthand knowledge of the witnesses’ signature, there is no need for further testimony.
There is a debate among the commentaries with regard to the rationale for this concept. Some explain that with regard to questions of Rabbinic Law (and the verification of the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses is a question of Rabbinic Law), a witness can serve as a judge. Hence after seeing the signatures of the witnesses, the judges can serve as both witnesses and judges.
Others explain that the rationale for this law is that, when testimony is not required, as in this instance, the judges can act on their knowledge without the necessity for testimony.

In this instance, the witnesses are testifying that the event described in the legal document took place; we are not validating their signatures. What in fact the witnesses are saying is “By seeing the document and my signature, I recall that this event transpired” (Lechem Mishneh, based on Chapter 8, Halachah 1; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:15).
Accordingly, there is no necessity for another person to join the witness and testify concerning his signature. See also the notes to Chapter 7, Halachah 4. See also the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 46) who states that if the witnesses do not remember that the event took place, but can identify their signatures, each of them together with another witness may validate their signatures.

Based on Chapter 3, Halachah 6, it appears that this principle applies even if the witnesses are in the city and do not come to court for other reasons (Kessef Mishneh). The Rambam was mentioning the more likely situation. For if the witnesses were present, it would be probable that they would appear in court themselves. Moreover, it is preferable that if the witnesses are available, they testify in court themselves [Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 46)].

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 46:7) quotes a responsa of the Rivosh (Responsum 382) who states that the witnesses do not have to testify in the presence of the judges. It is sufficient for them to write a document acknowledging that they recognize the signatures in the original legal document.

Which had already been validated as authentic by the court [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:7)]. See also the following halachah.

For once a person benefits from property for three years, he has a chazzakah on that land; i.e., it is presumed that he is the legal owner unless a claimant presents proof to the contrary (Hilchot Toein ViNitan, Ch. 11).

A woman’s ante-nuptial contract. These ketubot must belong to women who are presently married. The Tur ((Choshen Mishpat 46) adds that they must have been married for at least three years.

Rashi (Ketubot 20a) gives a different rationale: Perhaps the possessor of the documents looked carefully at the signatures of the witnesses and learned to forge these signatures. According to this rationale, even if the signatures on one of the legal documents has been validated by a court of law, this suspicion still applies (Kessef Mishneh). The Rambam, by contrast, would not cast suspicion over such a legal document. See the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 46:7) who quotes both views.

For example, a promissory note which the debtor challenged, claiming it to be a forgery. To collect his debt, the creditor had the authenticity of the signatures to that promissory note verified. Obviously, the judges presiding over that case were careful in verifying the authenticity of the signatures. Hence that document can be used as a standard from which signatures on other documents can be verified.

When the signatures to those documents were not verified by the court.
The Ra’avad had a different version of Ketubot 20a (the standard published text follows the Rambam’s version). According to his version, two documents are always necessary even if they have been validated by a court of law. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:7) rules according to the Rambam’s view. The Ramah adds that even when the debtor did not challenge the authenticity of a promissory note, if for whatever reason, the creditor had the authenticity of the witnesses’ signatures verified, that document alone may be used to verify the witnesses’ signatures. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:23 and the Siftei Cohen 46:25 state that it is likely that the Rambam would also accept this ruling.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:27 explains that although we do not suspect the court erred, by stating how the court validated the signatures we give the other litigant the opportunity to argue his claim if he maintains that the document is a forgery. The Siftei Cohen 46:29, however, states that it is not customary to state how the document was validated.

Bava Batra 138b, the source for the Rambam’s ruling, states that if witnesses compose a record of a dying man’s statements, we suspect that they transcribed his words without checking the validity of his claims. Hence we investigate the matter before accepting their statements.

After validating the document, but before signing it.

In which case, the validation is not binding, as implied by Halachah 1.

And by stating “a court,” they are implying that three judges were present.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:29) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, but also the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who states that if the judges write that they sat in session with three judges, it is not necessary to mention that one no longer exists.

See Chapter 10 which explains the disqualification of witnesses because of the violation of transgressions. Similar principles apply with regard to a judge.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:61 states that, before they sign on the legal document, the other two judges may testify that the third judge has repented and is fit to serve in that capacity.

Before accepting the appointment and thus was fit to serve in that capacity.

If, however, they testify that he never robbed, the matter is considered unresolved and he is not acceptable as a judge (Kessef Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:62).

Even though he was not acceptable as a judge beforehand, since he became acceptable before the others signed, we do not say that the entire sitting was nullified.

When it is discovered that a person committed a transgression that disqualifies him as a judge, he is disqualified until witnesses testify that he repented. Even if he repented beforehand, until such testimony is delivered in court, he is unacceptable (Kessef Mishneh).
For this reason, even if he had already repented, if the judges signed the document before the witnesses testified to that effect, the validation is unacceptable. For at the time they signed, the third judge was unacceptable and their entire sitting was nullified. For the document to be validated, the judges must reconvene their sitting and discuss the matter again. Indeed, the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:63 suggests that it might even be necessary to rehear the testimony of the witnesses who authenticated the signatures of the witnesses on the legal document.
The Siftei Cohen 46:66 notes that Rashi differs with the interpretation advanced by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and accepted by the Rambam. According to Rashi, after signing the validation of the legal document, the two judges may not give testimony concerning the propriety of the third judge. Others may, however, give such testimony and if they do, that judge may sign the validation of the legal document. The Siftei Cohen 46:66 argues at length in favor of Rashi’s interpretation.

And thus unfit to serve as a judge.

I.e., it is revealed that, even during the time the judge was under suspicion, he was actually fit to serve in that capacity.

And the judges will not sign until it has in fact been validated.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:24) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, but also quotes other views which differ and forbid writing these statements before the testimony is actually given. The Siftei Cohen 46:60 elaborates in support of the Rambam’s position.

Witnesses, by contrast, must read the contents of a legal document and know them to be true before signing (Ketubot 109a, b).

See a practical application of this ruling in Hilchot Toein ViNitan 16:2.

For the judges are not testifying with regard to the contents of the legal document. Their statements concern only the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses. Nevertheless, they must know the identity of the principals involved so that they are not their relatives. For that would disqualify the validation (Rabbenu Nissim; see the notes to Chapter 7, Halachah 1)
In his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:20), Rav Yosef Karo quotes Rabbenu Nissim’s view, but in his Shulchan Aruch, he also cites the view of the Rambam which he interprets as implying that the judges need not read the legal document at all.

The two witnesses may not, however, be related to each other (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:46). They may, however, both be related to the witnesses to the legal document (Rabbenu Nissim, as quoted by the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:46). Needless to say, a relative’s testimony is not accepted with regard to the signatures of the principals to a legal document (Siftei Cohen 46:47).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:18) quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if it is acceptable for them to be related to the judges or not.

The rationale is that the two testimonies are considered to involve separate matters entirely. The father’s testimony concerns the subject mentioned in the promissory note, while the son’s testimony concerns his father’s signature and not the subject of the note. Hence one is not affected by the other.

For the testimony of two witnesses is necessary to validate each of the signatures, as stated in Halachah 3.

Alternatively, if each one is familiar with the signature of the other father, the document can be validated (Maharshal).

As Ketubot 28a explains, since the necessity for validating the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses is a Rabbinic requirement, our Sages showed leniency and accepted testimony which is otherwise inadmissible (Radbaz; Kessef Mishneh). When, by contrast, Scriptural Law requires testimony, a witness must be acceptable both when he observes and when he delivers his testimony (see Chapter 14, Halachah 3).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:17) quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if these concepts apply only with regard to the signatures of these three individuals - for these are the three signatures with which a person is most likely to be familiar, or if they apply with regard to any individual and the Rambam was merely citing the most likely examples.

If, however, both witnesses require this leniency, their testimony is unacceptable.

I.e., both witnesses testify to the validity of both signatures.

In which instance, his word is accepted, for he is testifying to the matters stated in the legal document, not validating his signature, as stated in the notes to Chapter 6, Halachah 2.

I.e., the effect of the witnesses’ testimony must be equally balanced, as implied by Deuteronomy 19:15: “The matter will be established on the basis of the testimony... of two witnesses.” Ketubot 21a states: “Half on the basis of one and half on the basis of the other.”

When the first witness testifies with regard to his own signature.

Or travels overseas (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:35).

The commentaries state that there is an advantage to signing on a shard, because afterwards, that shard could not be used for a legal document. If, however, he would sign on a piece of paper or parchment, that paper could be misappropriated and a legal document illicitly written on top of it. See Lechem Mishneh and others.

I.e., these witnesses will compare his signature on the shard to his signature on the legal document and on that basis, validate the signature on the legal document.

Since he is not testifying with regard to his own signature, that half of the money is not considered to be dependent upon his testimony.

Since the necessity for the validation of the signatures of the witnesses is a Rabbinic ordinance, our Sages were lenient and accepted the testimony even though it was delivered in the presence of only one judge (Kessef Mishneh).

Chapter 5, Halachah 9.

Thus they signed the validation in error. For at that time, the third judge was unable to validate the document.

If, however, the witnesses are alive, they certainly can be challenged. And if they are challenged and proven to be unacceptable as witnesses, the legal document is nullified and torn up [Ramah, (Choshen Mishpat 46:37)]. There are, however, other opinions which maintain that even if the witnesses are personally disqualified, their signatures on the legal document still have weight. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 46:96.

Because of transgressions they committed. I.e., they attempt to nullify the effectiveness of the legal document with their testimony.

If, however, there is no proof to the validity of their signatures except the witnesses who maintain that they were unacceptable, the legal document is nullified and is torn up by the court [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:37)].

See Chapter 6, Halachah 3.

Since there is a pair of witnesses who testify that the legal document is invalid, the matter is considered as deadlocked. For whenever the testimony of two sets of witnesses contradicts each other, we consider the matter as unresolved.

Since the question is unresolved, we follow the principle: “Whenever a person seeks to expropriate money, the burden of proof is on him.” The bearer of the legal document must prove that it is valid. Since he cannot do so, because of the unresolved doubt described above, the defendant is allowed to retain possession of the funds. Nevertheless, if the claim involves movable property and the bearer of the document seizes property belonging to the defendant, the bearer may keep that property. The rationale is that the property is now in his possession and the original owner must sue to expropriate it. And he also is unable to prove his claim definitively [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 46:37)].