Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As mentioned in Chapter 6, Halachah 7, this arrangement is prohibited by Rabbinic law. The Rambam is speaking after the fact, if that prohibition has already been violated.

Instead, we reduce the amount of the debt. The extent of that reduction should be determined by the court, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 2.
Rashi (Bava Metzia 67a), the Rashba and others maintain that no reduction should be made. Instead, the entire debt must be repaid to the lender. The rationale is that since the borrower knew that the lender would be consuming the produce and nevertheless gave the property as security, it is as if he willingly waived his rights to it.
This perspective is quoted by the Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 172:1). The Ramah, however, adds that once the borrower tells the lender not to consume the produce any longer, the lender is forbidden to do so. If he does, what he consumes is deducted from the debt.

For as explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 7, since it is possible that the lender will not profit from the field, taking the field as security is not included in the Scriptural prohibition against interest.

As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 1, interest forbidden by Rabbinic law may not be expropriated through legal process.

For this also is merely “the shade of interest.”

This is also to the borrower’s disadvantage, as will be explained.

In several situations, we find that restrictions imposed by Rabbinic law against taking interest are relaxed in favor of orphans.

For the court’s consideration of orphans is not extended to this degree.

Thus, it is as if both debts have been repaid. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ ah 172) do not quote this concept and do not grant this leniency to orphans.

As mentioned above, even according to the Rambam, this consideration is granted only with regard to property owned by orphans. If the properties are owned by others, we do not grant them such consideration. Instead, each debt is regarded as a separate entity, and an appropriate reckoning is made. This is to the disadvantage of the borrower, because the 50 dinarim from the field from which the renter consumed 150 dinarim will not be counted at all.

As stated in Halachah 5, although this arrangement is forbidden, it is possible that at the outset the community was unaware of the prohibition and over time a custom was established. Since only “the shade of interest” is involved, the custom must be respected.

According to the Rambam, there is no difference what the local custom is - whether the borrower has the right to redeem his field or not - such an arrangement is forbidden. Rashi and other Rishonim, however, make distinctions between the two situations. See Tur and Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 172:1).

I.e., if the borrower desires, he may redeem his field before the debt falls due.

The rationale is that it is an accepted principle in Jewish business law that all business arrangements are carried out according to the prevailing local custom. Unless stated otherwise, we take it for granted that both principals agreed to act accordingly.

I.e., in these places, the borrower is not given the right to pay the debt earlier and redeem his property. Instead, it must remain in the lender’s possession for the entire time stated.

I.e., we assume that the lender would not have given the loan unless he were allowed to maintain possession of the property for at least this amount of time.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh quote the opinions of the Rashba and the Ritva, who maintain that it refers to a place where there is no established local custom.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. Rashi (Bava Metzia 67b) states that this law applies only when the stipulation was made at the time the money was given. (He states that this appears to be the Rambam’s position.) The Ramban and the Rashba, however, maintain that the stipulation is binding even when made afterwards.

For he is bound by the terms of his agreement.

Here also, the Maggid Mishneh mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis when this law applies. Rashi maintains that even if the stipulation was made at the time the money was given, a kinyan must be made for the stipulation to be binding. The Ramban and the Rashba differ and maintain that a kinyan is necessary only when the stipulation is made after the money was given.

Otherwise, the lender’s commitment is considered an asmachta, a commitment he did not expect to keep, and is not binding. For as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 11:6, whenever a person agrees to a conditional agreement when many variables are involved, we assume that his commitment is not serious.

Since the original owner/borrower has the right to redeem his property at any time, it is not considered to be landed property belonging to the person who lent him money. Instead, it is considered to be equivalent to movable property that cannot be expropriated from the heirs by a creditor of the person whose estate the inherited.

A firstborn is granted a double portion of property belonging to his father, but not of money owed to the estate by debtors. (See Hilchot Nachalot 3:1,5.) Since the property given as security does not belong to the deceased - for it can be redeemed at any time - the firstborn does not receive an extra share in it.

All debts are annulled after the Sabbatical year. Had the property given as security been given without a condition, the debt would not be have been nullified by the Sabbatical year, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 5. Nevertheless, since that the property can be redeemed, different laws apply and the debt can be nullified.
The Rashba questions: When the term of a loan extends beyond the Sabbatical year - e.g., the money was given for 10 years - the debt is not nullified by the Sabbatical year. Why then in this situation is the debt nullified? Why does the fact that the borrower can redeem the security detract from the power of the lender’s position?
He explains that we are speaking of a situation where the loan has already failen due. Hence, the Sabbatical year would nullify the debt. The only protection the lender has is the security, and as stated above, since it was given conditionally, it is not effective (Maggid Mishneh)

For as soon as the borrower takes possession of the field all the produce it contains belongs to him.

I.e., it will remain in his possession until the original owner repays his own debt.

I.e., until the time the original owner pays the debt, it is divided among the heirs, and the firstborn receives a double share.

As other debts for which security was given, as stated above. See Kessef Mishneh (Hilchot Sh’mitah V’Yovel), which uses this law as proof that only land that has already been taken into the possession of the lender can prevent a debt from being nullified. If the lender has not taken possession of the land, even if a debt was confirmed by a promissory note and a field designated in that note, the Sabbatical year can nullify the debt.

Without deducting from the debt.

Chapter 6, Halachah 7.

In which instance, there is no prohibition against taking interest in this manner.

And the lender is allowed to keep the benefit he received.

The Maggid Mishneh, in apparent contrast to the Rambam’s view, states that this opinion should be given primacy.

Without paying the debt.

Needless to say, if, at the outset, he had made this arrangement with a Jew, he would have had to pay rent. The leniency is granted because at the beginning, the loan involved a gentile.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 73b) states that this law applies only when the purchaser does not agree to pay the gentile’s debt. If the Jewish purchaser accepts that responsibility, the lender must pay rent. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would also accept this principle. The Ramban and the Rashba free the lender of responsibility even in such a situation.

The Maggid Mishneh points to this as an indication that the Rambam accepts Rashi’s perspective, for he emphasizes that the repayment of the loan is dependent on the gentile. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 172:5), however, Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s ruling verbatim although in his Beit Yosef, it appears that he accepts the Ramban’s opinion.

For according to the secular law of that era, giving property as security was equivalent to selling it for a limited period of time.

There is no question that this element of the relationship is permitted entirely.

I.e., a price less than its true value.

For he is deriving a monetary benefit - the difference between the price he fixed and the property’s true value - for having given the loan.
The above follows the interpretation of Rashi (Bava Metzia 65b). The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 172) interprets the Maggid Mishneh as understanding the passage differently and forbidding the mention of a specific price, even if that is the true value of the property.

For he is not receiving any benefit for having given the loan. When the borrower desires to sell his property, he will receive its fair value.
The Ra’avad questions: Why is the owner compelled to sell the property to the lender? The agreement is an asmachta, a commitment that the borrower never intended to keep, and hence is not binding.
He explains that we are forced to say that this relates to a situation where a formal agreement was made between the lender and the borrower, with the borrower completing a sale made on the condition that when the borrower desires to sell the property, the transaction will become effective retroactively from the time the loan was given. See Hilchot Mechirah 8:7-8. The Maggid Mishneh states that this is also the Rambam’s intent.

Note the contrast to Halachah 10.

Although the owner is receiving an increase for the delay of payment, there is no prohibition involved. The rationale is that rent is not due until the end of the rental period, and it is ordinary business practice to charge a higher rent for a longer period. Thus, although the tenant is paying more, there is no interest involved, because he was never obligated to pay the owner. For that reason, when a sale and not a rental is involved, it is forbidden to have the purchaser pay more in return for extended credit. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.)
The Hagahot Maimoniot [quoted by the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 176:6)] emphasizes that if an agreement had already been made, altering it may be considered to be interest. For example, if the tenant had agreed to pay a lesser amount over a longer period of time, the terms cannot be changed to pay more over a shorter period.

By fertilizing it, weeding it, or the like.

Since the quality of the field will be improved, it is justifiable to ask a higher rent.

In this instance as well, the improvement in the value of the ship or the store justifies charging a higher rent.

For in this instance, he is using the money for the purpose of his business, and not for enhancing the value of the store or the ship. Hence, the increase in payment is considered to be interest on the loan.

The converse of increasing the rent for a courtyard in return for delayed payment is also acceptable with regard to delaying the payment for wages. For example, an employer may offer a worker 1 zuz a month or 15 zuz at the end of the year. The rationale is that wages for a worker, like rent for property, are not due until the end of the specified period [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 176:6)]. See also Halachah 12.

For the person is receiving a greater value for not receiving reciprocation immediately.

Digging at the roots of the trees. Our translation for this and the other terms in this halachah are taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 5:10).

In preparation for sowing.

For each one is receiving an equivalent value for his labor.

For depending on the time, the value of either of the tasks may be greater than the other. If the colleague reciprocates by performing the other task at more or less the same time as the first, there is no question of interest involved. If, however, he delays, there is the possibility that the value of the tasks will change and he will be receiving more in return for postponing the reciprocation.

The Hebrew term used by the Rambam means “the dry period” - i.e., the summer, when in Eretz Yisrael, it does not rain, and the land dries out.

Throughout the entire rainy season, there is no difference if one reciprocates on the next day or shortly thereafter. One may not, however, reciprocate in the summer. Similar principles apply in the summer.

I.e., instead of receiving reciprocation immediately, he will receive it later.

Plowing in the raining season is more difficult, because the ground is wet and the days are shorter [Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.)]. Thus, the person will receive something of greater value, plowing in the rainy season, for postponing payment.

Before he actually starts working.

Four dinarim.

For he has not actually begun to work.

Thus, the employer will be receiving benefit for having given money in advance.

And the employer gives him the money immediately.

And thus he is receiving benefit for paying the sum in advance. The rationale is that, since he has already begun to work, our Rabbis considered this as hiring oneself out for less (which is permitted - see Halachah 8), rather than accepting a loan.

I.e., this law serves as a contrast to the principles stated in Halachot 8 and 12 of the previous chapter. The rationale for the difference is that with regard to rent and wages, payment is not required until the term of rental or the work is completed. With regard to a sale, by contrast, the purchaser is obligated to pay for the purchase upon completion of the transaction. Hence, it is obvious that the increase is being granted because of the delay in payment.

And this is its fair market value.

Such arrangements were common in the Talmudic period and are still common today. For the immediate availability of cash is worth money.
The commentaries to the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:1) states that such a transaction is forbidden even if at the time the payment is due, the value of the article would have appreciated to the higher price.

It is not considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, because the basis of the transaction is a sale, and not a loan [Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 173)].

I.e., the purchaser did not pay immediately. Hence, the seller demanded the larger sum. The purchaser cannot be compelled to pay this amount, because “the shade of interest” is not expropriated by the court (Chapter 6, Halachah 1).

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba, who maintains that if the article does not have an established market price, it is permitted to make such an offer. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes this view, adding the proviso that the seller cannot explicitly say: “If you pay now you can buy it for this price, but if you pay later you must pay more.” The Shulchan Aruch, however, also quotes another view, that states that even if an explicit statement is not made, if it is obvious that he is charging more because he is accepting later payment, it is forbidden.

Provided that the seller is willing to take the article back. It is the seller’s prerogative, not the purchaser’s (Lechem Mishneh).

This principle does not apply with regard to landed property. For with regard to landed property, the laws of ona’ah (taking unfair advantage of a purchaser or seller) do not apply (Hilchot Mechirah 13:8). Moreover, every parcel of land is unique, and one cannot say what the market value of any particular parcel would be (Maggid Mishneh)

This law applies even if the seller did not explicitly say that the purchaser could pay a lower amount if he paid immediately.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 173) states that the original transaction must be completed before this stipulation is made.

Grapes are harvested in the summer, and wine made in the early fall. Thus, wine is plentiful in the fall, and hence inexpensive. In the summer, by contrast, supplies of the previous year’s wine are already scarce, and the new wine is not yet available. Hence, the price is higher. Thus, it is legitimate for a wholesaler to ask for a higher price in the summer, because the wine is worth more. Nevertheless, to prevent any question of interest, the seller must accept responsibility for losses caused by outside factors.
If, for some reason, the purchaser desires to use the wine before the summer, he must pay the entire fee [Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 173)].

In such a situation, since the wholesaler accepts a large portion of the risk, he is entitled to a share of the profits.

There are commentaries that suggest that it was due to a printer’s error that this sentence was included in this clause, and that it should be included in the conclusion of the following clause. For otherwise, a) the wholesaler is taking too much responsibility; b) the second clause would be obvious. The standard printed text of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:14) quotes the printed version and the Siftei Cohen 173:29 suggests making this correction.

Since the wholesaler accepts responsibility for the sale of the article, he does not have to accept responsibility for its loss. He is a partner in the sale, and there is no question of interest involved.

I.e., when the seller is anxious to sell the article, he will be willing to accept a slightly lesser price. Conversely, when the purchaser is anxious to buy the article, he will be willing to pay slightly more.

I.e., although the seller is taking the initiative, receiving the higher price is not considered to be taking interest, because there are circumstances where the purchaser would pay that price immediately.

And pay the funds immediately.

There is a certain element of risk involved, for the produce could become ruined. Nevertheless, once the produce is already in a developed state, the likelihood of that happening is small (in contrast to the second clause). Hence, it is not considered significant.
The commentaries note the contrast to Chapter 9, Halachah 10, and explain that in the latter instance, there is virtually no work involved; garden vegetables grow as if on their own accord. Caring for fruit in an orchard, by contrast, requires much more work. Hence, having the seller perform that work without receiving recompense resembles interest.

I.e., the purchaser receives a greater value because he waits until the later date for delivery of the produce. Although the increase in the value of the produce comes naturally, since it is in preliminary stages of growth, it also needs care and tending to. It is considered interest for the seller to perform those tasks. When, however, next to no work is necessary for produce to grow - e.g., squash - these restrictions do not apply [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:8)].
The Kessef Mishneh suggests a halachic mechanism to prevent the question of interest from arising. The purchaser can buy the trees of the orchard with regard to their fruit. In this manner, the produce itself is not the object of the sale. Hence, its increase in value is not significant.

And he accepts responsibility for it.

Hence, the original owner is receiving an additional amount, not only for delaying payment, but for accepting the risk that the animal will become weak or die.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s interpretation, but does not explain his point of contention. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s perspective, and it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:10) without any objections from the commentaries.

I.e., and receiving ownership at the time of the purchase.

Therefore, the branches are considered to have increased in value in his possession.

Because he is not receiving anything at the time he makes payment. Therefore, the money he gives is comparable to a loan that will not be repaid until the vines are pruned.

I.e., instead of receiving payment in cash, the watchmen are paid in produce from the field. They are, however, given a bonus, and the amount of produce they are given is calculated according to a lower price than the going market value.

E. g., in threshing and/or winnowing the grain.

A worker's wages are not due until he completes the task for which he is hired. Therefore, in this situation, the term of the workers' employment must continue until they collect their wages. Thus, there will be no question of interest involved, because their wages will be paid at the time their wages are due. Although the employer will be selling the grain lower than its market value, he is entitled to do so.

I.e., if they complete their task beforehand, their wages will fall due at that time. During the time between the completion of their tasks and their collection of the grain, the money owed them for their work will be considered as having been loaned by them to the employer.

A kor is equivalent to 30 se’ah.

This is considered to be extending the lease on the field for a higher rent, not as giving the owner an extra two se’ah for postponing the day of payment (Maggid Mishneh).

Thus, his gift was no more than a present and is not considered as interest.

Since there is no stipulation requiring him to pay an extra amount, there is no question of interest involved. As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 10, one may give a present to a person from whom one received a loan. Moreover, in this instance there is added room for leniency, because the basis of the transaction was a sale, and not a loan.

In contrast to the second clause, this clause is speaking about even a specific barrel of wine.

Since payment is made at the outset and the delivery is not until later, there is a certain resemblance to a loan at interest. Nevertheless, as the Rambam continues to explain, it should be seen as an investment by the purchaser, in which there is a possibility of loss.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 8, it is forbidden for a person to enter into a transaction where an investment is made and there is little possibility of loss, but a possibility of gain, for this resembles a loan at interest. Nevertheless, since there is the possibility that the value of the wine will depreciate, this transaction is not placed in that category. If, however, the purchaser does not accept this possibility, the transaction is forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:13)].

That was the terms of the original agreement.

So it was as if they were never really sold at the outset. It is like a transaction conducted under false premises, for the purchaser would not have desired to buy the jugs containing the vinegar.

Since the renter accepts responsibility for the ship, there is room to consider the relationship as a loan. For if it is damaged, the person who rents it becomes responsible for it from the time he took possession. In such a scenario, the fee that he pays could be considered comparable to interest paid on the loan. We do not follow this perspective. Instead, we consider this an ordinary rental agreement; the fact that the renter takes responsibility for the value of the article even when he is not obligated to do so is not significant. See Halachah 2:9 for related concepts.

Here also, the arrangement is considered to be a rental and not a loan at interest.

It is, however, permitted to enter into such a relationship with a gentile, either as an investor or as the shepherd, because there is no prohibition against receiving interest from or paying interest to such a person (Chapter 5, Halachah 2).

Although the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 70b) uses the term “interest,” and not “the shade of interest,” the Rambam’s interpretation is accepted by all, for the basis of the relationship is an investment, and not a loan.

Literally, "iron sheep." This term was used because the shepherd accepts responsibility for the sheep, so that their value - like iron - will remain intact, without ruin. See also Hilchot Ishut 16:1, which uses a similar term.

In other words, the owner of the sheep invests the capital - e.g., the sheep - while the shepherd invests the effort in caring for them, and they split the profits.

Investments of such nature are forbidden. Instead, when a person invests money, there must be a significant element of risk involved. Otherwise, the arrangement resembles a loan at interest, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 8.

I.e., the shepherd is not held responsible for the loss. The Rambam appears to be saying that the owner must undertake the risk both of the sheep's depreciation and of their being seized by predators. If he accepts only one of these risks, the arrangement is forbidden.
The above reflects the interpretation advanced by the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 177). The Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah, however, read: “accepts the condition that should the value of the sheep increase or decrease, they are considered within his domain, or should they be seized by predators, they are considered within his domain.” According to this version, the owner is required to accept one, but not both, of the risks.

I.e., a person has a cow that he seeks to hire out to a recipient. That person establishes a price for the cow to be paid in the event of its death, and a fee to be paid monthly for its hire.

Even if at the time of its death it was not worth that amount, since it was worth this amount at the time it was rented, the renter is obligated to pay this amount. The Ramban differs, and maintains that the renter can be required to pay only the value of the cow at the time of its death. (Maggid Mishneh). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 176:4) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah cites the other opinion.

Since the person who rents the cow for labor accepts responsibility for it, there is room to say that the transaction is comparable to a loan, and the fee comparable to interest. This, however, is not the conclusion accepted by our Sages. They follow the logic mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, considering this to be an ordinary rental with a stipulation attached.
Indeed, the commentaries raise questions: Bava Metzia 69b is the source for both this halachah and Halachah 11. Moreover, it considers Halachah 11 as logically contingent on this halachah. Why does the Rambam interrupt the two with another concept? And why does he mention Halachah 11 first? See, however, the conclusion of the following note.

I.e., he becomes responsible for the value of the animal only if it dies. If he returns the animal alive, he is not responsible if its value depreciated because of the work and when it is returned, it is not worth 30 dinarim. Since there is a certain amount of risk involved, our Sages did not consider this comparable to "the iron sheep" mentioned in the previous halachah and permitted the arrangement.

The owner of the chicken is not responsible for the eggs, but must perform certain tasks to protect them [Maggid Mishneh in the name of Rashi (Bava Metzia 68b)].

The arrangement is not considered a loan, and the fee (the chicks) as interest. Instead, this is also considered to be a rental (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., as interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, which can be expropriated through legal process.

I.e., an article that can no longer be singled out - e.g., produce - or was lost or destroyed. Otherwise, the article itself should be returned, as the Rambam proceeds to state.

I.e., the value of the article, not the amount that he owed. Although it was given as interest and thus a prohibition is involved, its full value must be paid.

Similar laws apply to any article that can be identified.

Bava Metzia 65a states the reason for this: So that people do not say: “The cloak he is wearing was acquired through taking interest.”

Although the Rambam spoke of movable property when stating the law regarding taking more than the amount owed as interest, and spoke of landed property when stating the law regarding taking less than the amount owed as interest, similar principles apply if the situations are reversed (Kessef Mishneh). Indeed, when citing this law in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:10), Rav Yosef Karo speaks of renting an article in lieu of the interest.

This was a common method for a farmer to raise funds if his harvest had not been brought to market. He would sell a portion of his harvest in advance and deliver the produce months later, when the price of the produce had already risen. There is a certain similarity to interest, because the purchaser pays a sum and then later collects produce that is worth more than the original sum. It is, nevertheless, permitted, for had the purchaser desired to procure produce at the time when he paid that sum, he could have; that was the going rate at the time. See also Halachah 4 and notes.

The Rambam’s wording is not precise. The intent is that the seller does not have the quantity of produce ordered. Even if he possesses a smaller quantity, the transaction is not acceptable unless a market price has been established [Maggid Mishneh, based on the rulings of Chapter 10, Halachah 2; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 175:4)].

Since the seller could easily have purchased the produce, it is considered as if he already made the purchase and transferred ownership to the person who purchased it from him. Thus, if the produce increases in value, it is considered as if it had been possessed by the final purchaser at the time of the increase. Although the purchaser has the right to retract his commitment, he would receive the adjuration mi shepara for doing so. (See Hilchot Mechirah 7:2.) Hence, we assume that his commitment will remain constant. See parallels in Hilchot Mechirah 22:3-4. The arrangements described in this chapter center around sales. In the following chapter, somewhat similar concepts are applied with regard to loans.

Since the seller did not own the produce, nor could he purchase it easily, it cannot be said that the produce was transferred to the possession of the purchaser. Hence, the money given is considered to be a loan, and the increase in value similar to interest.

See the following halachah.

For the grain is considered as having been acquired by the purchaser. Any increase in its value is therefore not comparable to interest.

To translate this in contemporary economic terms, he is selling a commodity future.

I.e., it has not been threshed or winnowed yet.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Tohorot 10:4). There, he describes the vat as a pit where the grapes are kept to soften before being crushed.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Ma’aserot 4:3). Here also, the olives are being kept to soften before being pressed.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Parah 5:6), the Rambam explains that potters would prepare balls of clay that they would set aside to dry, to use at a later time to fashion different types of utensils. When they received orders for them, they would moisten the clay and form the desired utensils. Making these balls is equivalent to reaping crops.

See the following halachah, where this concept is clarified.

Hence, even if the seller does not possess it himself, he may obtain it from others (Ra’avad).

Either produce or materials.

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 22.

The Rambam is speaking about a situation where the purchaser pays a lesser price - because he pays at the time the agreement is made - yet the product is not delivered until afterwards. Nevertheless, this arrangement is not considered to be interest, because the seller and the purchaser do not speak of a specific amount. Thus, if the quantity of milk, wool or honey is less than expected, the purchaser will suffer a loss. Since there is also an element of risk involved, the arrangement is permitted [Maggid Mishneh, quoting Rashi (Bava Metzia 64a)].

I.e., establishing a specific price for a specific amount. This is forbidden, because it is assumed that the purchaser will be paying less in return for the postponement of the delivery of the product.

But instead fluctuates radically because of the small number of buyers and sellers [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 175:1)].

Here the markets are far less volatile.
This is also the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.). Tosafot (Bava Metzia 72b) differs and maintains that as long as a market price has been established in villages, an order can be taken. This view is quoted by Rabbenu Asher, the Hagahot Maimoniot and the Tur. The Ramah states that since the basis for the transaction is a sale, the entire question is one of Rabbinic law. Hence, the more lenient opinion should be followed.

The fact that there is a different price for new grain and old grain indicates that the price has not yet become fixed and will still fluctuate. Hence, an order cannot be placed unless the person actually possesses grain (Maggid Mishneh).

This term refers to the poor, whom the Torah entitles to gather grain from fields in several situations: leket, grain that dropped, shich’chah, grain that has been forgotten and pe’ah, grain from the corners of the field. The grain gathered in this fashion is of lesser quality than the grain gathered by the owner of a field, because the poor gather from several fields and mix rye and other grains together with wheat [Rashi (Bava Metzia 72b)].

One may, however, place an order from the owner of a field at the price at which his grain would ordinarily be sold (Maggid Mishneh; Siftei Cohen 175:6).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 5:7), the Rambam interprets this to mean that the farmer may sell produce of the highest quality at the price being quoted for the least valuable crops of that type of produce, with the condition that he not deliver the produce until later.
This relates to a frequent problem in agricultural communities. The harvest has just started and so the price of produce is relatively high. Within several weeks or months, when the majority of the produce is reaped, it will be plentiful and the price will probably fall.
Now the farmers need money immediately. To raise funds, they will sell their crops in advance, knowing that they may receive far less than the present retail price of the produce. Although the purchaser will most probably make a profit, this is not forbidden, for if he had retained possession of his money, he would have been able to purchase the grain when the retail price fell to that level [Perishah (Yoreh De’ah 175)].

I.e., he gave him money for wheat without specifying the purchase price or how it would be calculated.

Either the seller (because the price rose) or the purchaser (because the price went down).

See Hilchot Mechirah 7:1-2. As mentioned in that source, either principal is entitled to retract his commitment, because the produce was not formally acquired through the kinyan of meshichah. Nevertheless, making such a retraction is not considered to be ethically proper.

Nor the agent [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 175:7)].

As stated in Hilchot Sh’luchin 1:2, when an agent makes an error that worsens the position of the principal who sent him, the transaction is nullified.

But it is inaccessible to him immediately; hence, he will not deliver it until later.

Since he has the wheat in his possession, it is as if he is reducing the selling price.

The Siftei Cohen 173:18 states that if the seller possesses grain, but has entrusted it to others for safekeeping, such a transaction is permitted.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 173) explains the rationale for this ruling as follows: According to Scriptural Law, a transaction is completed with the transfer of funds. Hence, with regard to the laws of interest, as long as the seller possesses the produce, the transaction is considered complete. We are not concerned with the fact that he willingly accepts a loss. When, however, the seller does not possess the produce, we fear that the buyer will profit by the delay. Hence, this transaction was forbidden by the Sages.

This addition is made based on the citation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:16). If there was no concept of delayed payment, there would be no difficulty at all, even if the merchant would accept responsibility, because the merchant would be no more than an agent of the purchaser [Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 173)].

The difficulty in this situation is that the purchaser gives the merchant the money in advance. Thus, the merchant will be using the purchaser’s money to buy the produce. Hence, if the produce were in the merchant’s possession, it would be as if he received a loan in order to buy the produce. Thus, it would appear that the purchaser received a profit - an extra se’ah of grain - for giving a loan and waiting for the delivery of the produce. If, however, the produce is considered to be in the possession of the purchaser, he is undertaking a certain degree of risk. Therefore, there is no question of interest.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ramban, who rules that if the purchasers pay the merchants’ expenses and wages, such an arrangement is permitted, even if the merchants accept responsibility for the produce. This view is quoted by the Ramah. The commentaries explain that the Rambam would also accept this ruling.

I.e., a person looked up to as an exemplar of moral conduct.

For he should go beyond the letter of the law. The Rivash (Responsum 307) writes that if the distinguished person also pays the merchant a wage, the arrangement is permitted.

This bracketed addition is found in many authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah.

Since produce is continuously found in villages, the merchant will receive a benefit from carrying out the transaction. For carrying out the transaction will establish him – or entrench his position - in this business. Hence, despite the fact that on the way to the villages he is caring for the purchaser's money without charge, the transaction is permitted (Turei Zahav 173:26-27).

E. g., they offer provisions for themselves and food for their donkeys at lower prices.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements, and the Maggid Mishneh states although the Rambam’s ruling is acceptable, it does not appear to be the correct interpretation of Bava Metzia 73a, the Talmudic passage that evidently served as the Rambam’s source.
To explain: The Rambam interprets that passage as follows: “In a place where grain is expensive, donkey-drivers may charge the price paid in a place where grain is inexpensive, [because]... [the purchasers] tell them the local price; alternatively, because they charge less [for supplies].” The Ramban and others, however, understand that passage as connected to the previous law and interpret it entirely differently. In this instance, the later authorities do not quote the Rambam’s ruling.

I.e., from a place where it is being sold at a lower price to a place where it is being sold at a higher price.

Immediately, without receiving payment for them at the present time.

Since the purchaser possesses the produce, the exchange is considered to be a sale and not a loan. The purchaser may have an abundance of produce at the destination, and hence would rather have some produce available at present, than the larger amount at the destination.

Since the purchaser possesses the produce, the exchange resembles a loan at interest and not a sale. He is taking a product that he does not have and returning it later.

I.e., in the future, and thus the transaction resembles a loan.

I.e., if it is lost or stolen, he suffers the loss. Hence, it is permitted, because its increase in value comes after the risk is over. Compare to Chapter 8, Halachah 3.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes certain opinions that state that this license is granted even when the seller does not pay the purchaser a wage for taking care of the merchandise. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:15) differs and requires that a wage be paid. The Turei Zahav 173:24 states, however, that all that is necessary is to pay a symbolic sum.

Since the purchaser takes the risk and the seller receives his profit regardless, the transaction resembles a loan at interest.

Even if the amount given is less than the usual price for fully grown cucumbers or watermelons.

The farmer must give the purchaser the cucumbers or the watermelons singled out at the outset (Siftei Cohen 173:20; Turei Zahav 173:13).

The Maggid Mishneh notes the contrast to Chapter 8, Halachah 5, which forbids taking prior payment for fruit growing in an orchard. The Maggid Mishneh distinguishes between the two instances, stating that in the present instance, there is virtually no work involved; garden vegetables grow as if on their own accord. Caring for fruit in an orchard, by contrast, requires much more work. Hence, having the seller perform that work without receiving recompense resembles interest.

With this phrase, the Rambam is making a distinction between these vegetables and the goats’ milk mentioned in Halachah 3. The goats’ milk to be delivered later is not the same as the goat is carrying at present, while in this instance, the cucumbers and the watermelons are the same.