Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

By the hand of heaven. See Hilchot Teshuvah 3:13 which includes leaders who cast fear upon the community unnecessarily among those who will not receive a portion in the world-to-come.

Elihu was rebuking Job, telling him that perhaps he suffered his misfortune, because as the leader of the community, he imposed fear upon the people (Rashi’s commentary to the verse).

See Nedarim 81a who mentions that Torah sages will be punished for referring to people at large in a derogatory manner.

I.e., when entering a room, he should not enter where the people are seated, so that it appears that he is stepping over their heads. Note the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 8:19 which states that in the present age when it is customary to sit on benches or chairs and not on the ground, this prohibition applies only when the judge walks on a table in front of the community. Only then would it appear that he is “stepping over their heads.” See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:7 which states that a Torah scholar should not enter the house of study last, so as not to inconvenience the people.

The Sifri to Numbers 11:12.

I.e., Moses relayed God's command to honor the judges to the people.

Rashi, Kiddushin 70a states that it is degrading for a community to have a leader who does not have anyone to perform ordinary tasks on his behalf.

See Hilchot De’ot 5:2; Hilchot Talmud Torah 4:5.

Our translation follows the interpretation of the Bayit Chadash who explains that it is forbidden for such a person to attend a feast of common people even if it is held in honor of a mitzvah, and it is forbidden for him to attend an ordinary friendly get-together even if Torah scholars will be in attendance.

I.e., the court pronounces a ban of ostracism on that basis.

Bava Kama 112b states that the testimony of witnesses is required, because the person against whom the ban is pronounced is required to pay the scribe's fee for the composition of the legal document (see Halachah 8). Since money is never expropriated from a person unless two witnesses testify to his obligation, witnesses must testify for that document to be composed.

I.e., negative statements the litigant made against him or against the judges.

See Chapter 18, Halachah 5. See also Hilchot Rotzeach 5:6 where the Rambam states that the agent of the court himself is allowed to administer blows. See also the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 8:5) which echoes these statements.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 11:2) states that if one of the judges is of exceptional renown, as a token of respect, the summons should always be conveyed in his name.

The Siftei Cohen 11:3 states that if the agent comes in the name of a judge of lower stature, the litigant is not judged as if he disobeyed the commandment of the entire court.

I.e., when he seeks to have the ban of ostracism annulled, he must pay for the composition of the document.

We do not wait until he actually pays the settlement imposed upon him. As long as he makes a commitment to do so, we lift the ban of ostracism (see Rashi, Bava Kama 113a). In Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:14, the Rambam writes that the ban is not lifted until the litigant pays. In his gloss to that halachah, the Kessef Mishneh states that in Hilchot Talmud Torah, the Rambam was speaking in more general terms.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 11:1) deviates from the Rambam’s ruling and states that the ban of ostracism is composed the following day. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 11:13 states that it is possible to explain that there is no contradiction between the two, because in the evening, the new day begins. The point of both rulings is that the ban of ostracism is not issued until the day of the summons passes.

Where the court was located. In such a situation, it is obvious that his refusal stems from stubbornness.

I.e., he is given three separate summonses [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 11:1)]. These are the days when the courts would hold session in the Talmudic era. If the courts hold sessions on other days, the times for the ban of ostracism should be adjusted accordingly. If the court has a fixed day on which they hold sessions, they do not have the authority to summon him on any other day.

Since he does not live in the city, he is give this additional measure of consideration.

Even on the ordinary weekdays of these months.
Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 7:12 states that the court may adjudicate a case during Chol HaMoed. This does not, however, necessarily represent a contradiction. The intent could be that when both litigants agree, the hearing may be held on Chol HaMoed - and needless to say, on the days before or after the festival. If, however, a litigant must be summoned against his will, he should not be summoned in these months.

Rashi, Bava Kama 113a, gives a different reason: During these months, the people are occupied with the harvest.
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 5:5 states that no restrictions are placed on the month of Sivan. Since the holiday of Shavuos is only one (or in the diaspora, two) day(s) and there are no unique mitzvot associated with its observance, extensive preparation is not necessary.
Similarly, after the festivals, the hustle and bustle of the holiday season still leaves its impression and it is not appropriate to summon a person to court (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).

Because he could excuse himself, saying: “Because of my preoccupation with the preparations for the Sabbath, I forgot about the summons” (Bava Kama 113a).

In this instance, the agent does not convey the message to the neighbors, relying on them to communicate it to the litigant. The rationale is that since the litigant is in the city, the neighbors will not feel responsible to communicate the message to him. They will feel that sooner or later, the court agent will meet the person and convey the message to him (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 11:12).

Although a woman is not accepted as a witness, we rely on her to communicate this message.

We assume that he received the message and willfully did not heed it. Hence, he is ostracized in punishment for refusing to obey the court’s summons.

Since it is possible that the message was not delivered, the person cannot be held responsible for failing to appear in court.

In this instance, as well, since it is possible that he did not receive the message, the person cannot be held responsible for failing to appear in court.

If, however, he refuses to accept the court’s judgment, he is placed under a ban of ostracism immediately [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 19:3)].

I.e., he does not brazenly refuse to uphold the court’s ruling, but procrastinates and does not pay.

I.e., placed under a more severe ban.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 315) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 69) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The verse uses the word Elohim which can also be interpreted as a reference to the Almighty. Nevertheless, Sanhedrin 66a states that in this instance, the reference is to a mortal judge.
In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 60), the Rambam notes that this verse is also used as one of the sources for the prohibition against cursing God. Nevertheless, the verse is not considered as a prohibition of a general nature, because a specific punishment is mentioned for the latter transgression. See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger which cites a similar issue.
The Tumim (Choshen Mishpat 2) states that the term Elohim refers to a judge possessing the unique semichah passed down from master to disciple originating with Moses. Hence this law does not apply in the present age when our judges no longer possess such a semichah.

The term nasi can have both these connotations. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 316) states that it refers to a person “in whom authority is vested and who is on the highest level, whether with regard to civic authority or Torah authority.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (Ibid.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 71) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Or even oneself (Halachah 3). One is, however, not liable for cursing a gentile (Sofrim 4:9). The Radbaz and the Hagahot Maimoniot also cite Bava Kama 94b which states that one is liable only for cursing an observant Jew.

The punishment given for the violation of a negative commandment (see Chapter 18, Halachah 2). Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 317) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 231) count the prohibition against cursing a fellow Jew as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

These transgressions are cumulative as stated in the following halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Ibid.) states that we take into consideration, “not only the situation of the person being cursed, but also that of the one pronouncing the curse. He was warned not to arouse his soul towards revenge or to habituate it towards anger.”

This expression introduces a law derived by the Rambam through his process of deduction for which he has no explicit prior source in the Rabbinic literature.

The Kessef Mishneh cites Bava Kama 86b which states that one is liable for shaming a minor. Accordingly, one is also liable for cursing him. The Kessef Mish11eh also notes that the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 27) quotes the Mishneh Torah as stating that a person who curses a person who is sleeping is liable. This, the Kessef Mishneh maintains, is the proper version of this halachah.

The Sifra derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus, loc. cit.. Although one is not liable for cursing a deceased person, it is forbidden to do so [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 27:2)].

Our translation follows the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. There is a printing error in the standard published text.

See Hilchot Mamrim 5:1-4 for a description of this prohibition.

The term “Take heed” is understood as implying a negative commandment (Sh’vuot 36b).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2 which lists the seven names of God.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that one is liable for punishment only when one issues a curse using God’s ineffable name, Y-H-V-H. Although his statements appear to be based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Sh’vuot 4:10), it is possible to explain that those statements refer to a son’s cursing of his parents. He is liable for execution, only when he uses God’s ineffable name (Radbaz).

Although lashes are not given, it is forbidden to curse a colleague even without using God's name [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 27:2)]. If the court desires, they may decree a suitable punishment (Halachah 5).

Thus if one utters a curse in English, using the name God, one is liable.

I.e., depending on the circumstance it is used.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 4. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since cursing is unique in that it is one of the few prohibitions for which one is liable for lashes although one does not perform a deed, one might think that a warning is also not required. Alternatively, since a person issues a curse in anger, one might think that a warning is not necessary, because it would go unheeded regardless.

Issuing such a curse is, however, forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].

I.e., he issues the curse in one of the ways that is not punishable by lashes.

I.e., in addition to the ban of ostracism; alternatively, if he would look at the ban of ostracism lightly, but would suffer from the beating, we give him the beating (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 27:9).

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:11-12 which states that a person who disgraces a sage is fined a litra of gold. Moreover, he will receive punishment in the afterlife, and will be denied a portion in the world-to-come. See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:5.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik, Ibid.

This refers to a nasi who is the head of the Talmudic academy (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:6). A king, by contrast, may not waive the respect due him and must zealously protect his honor. See Hilchot Melachim 2:5-6.

For it is not the person’s individual honor alone that is involved. What is of concern is the violation of the Torah’s commandments. And that, no mortal has the right to forgo (Kessef Mishneh). The Or Sameach brings support for this concept, noting that a person who curses himself is punished by lashes (Halachah 3). Now this person would surely forgo the affront to his honor rather than receive the lashes. Nevertheless, he is lashed, because he violated the Torah’s prohibitions. Similarly, when the curse is directed to another person, that person does not have the power to absolve him from punishment.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam’s wording implies that when a person is obligated to be placed under a ban of ostracism for offending a sage, if that sage does not forgive him, he must be placed under that ban even if he repents and expresses regret for his actions publicly.

Kiddushin 32b relates that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha summoned a person to him three times and that person did not come. He then sent him a message: “Were it not that I had never placed a person under a ban of ostracism, I certainly would have placed you under such a ban.”
See Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:13: “Although a sage has license to place a person under a ban of ostracism, because of [an affront to] his honor, it is not praiseworthy for a Torah scholar to act in this manner.... This was the practice of the pious men of the previous generations. They would hear their shame, but they would not reply. Moreover, they would pardon and forgive the person who insulted them.”

As Hilchot Talmud Torah, Ibid. continues: “When does the above apply? When [the person] disgraced or embarrassed [the sage] in private. If he disgraced or embarrassed the sage in public, it is forbidden for the sage to waive [the affront to] his honor... because the disrespect of the Torah is involved.”

For abandoning the Torah’s court system is a repudiation of God who structured it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 26:1) states that this applies even if both litigants are willing to have the case tried in the gentile court. The Ramah states that if a plaintiff brought a case against a fellow Jew to a gentile court, the Jewish court should place him under a ban of ostracism until he withdraws the claim from the gentile court.

Thus even in the present day when there are just gentile courts, complaints should be brought to a Rabbinic judge and not to them.

See the definition of this term in Chapter 18.

I.e., it is statements made in court that are significant. Statements made outside the court, by contrast, are of no consequence (Kessef Mishneh).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 178) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 122) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., one’s fellow Jew. If, however, one knows of testimony that will benefit a gentile, one is not obligated to testify in court (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 28:2). See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:3) which discusses the concept of testifying on behalf of a gentile at length.

If a person does not testify and as a result, his colleague loses money, the recalcitrant witness has a moral and spiritual obligation (chayav bidinei shamayim) to reimburse his colleague for his loss [Bava Kama 55b; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:1)].

With regard to testimony involving the Torah’s prohibitions and cases involving capital punishment or lashes, by contrast, a witness is obligated to testify even when he is not summoned (Kessef Mishneh).

If, however, the litigant does not summon him, he is not required to volunteer the information on his own initiative. Sh’vuot 35a derives this concept from the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus which the Rambam cites.

From the Rambam’s wording, it can be implied that even when there is only one witness, he is obligated to testify in court (Kessef Mishneh). Although his testimony does not have the power to cause money to be expropriated from the litigant, it may require him to take an oath or intimidate him into admitting his obligation. See also Chapter 21, Halachah 10.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 28:5) states that the court should send three representatives to him and he should testify in their presence. In that manner, the testimony is delivered in the presence of a court and the scholar’s honor is preserved.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:1 which describes the mitzvah to honor the Sages.

E. g., a woman who seeks permission from the court to remarry and the witness knows whether or not her husband is alive (Rashi, Sh’vuot 30b). The scholar is obligated to testify if the court wishes to grant leniency and he knows that there is a prohibition involved. If, however, the court seeks to rule stringently and he knows that there is no need for a prohibition, he is not required to testify (Kessef Mishneh). The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 28:28 explains that there are even times when the court seeks to be stringent that the person should testify, because the stringency may lead to leniency indirectly.

When there is only one witness, he is obligated to testify only when his testimony will prevent a person from transgressing (or continuing to transgress). If, however, the transgression has been performed and his testimony will be of no consequence, he should not testify. Indeed, doing so resembles malicious gossip (Hagahot Maimoniot to Chapter 5, Halachah 1).

He must testify regardless of whether his testimony will lead to conviction or acquittal (Kessef Mishneh).

And every transgression involves the desecration of God’s name.

For being forced to testify would represent a deprecation of his honor (see Sanhedrin 18b).

I.e., the kings of the House of David. The kings of the Kingdom of Israel and the like, by contrast, should not be brought to court (Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:5). Alternatively, it could refer also to the King of Israel and be referring to a case involving the king’s son (Radbaz).
Note the gloss of Rav Moshe HaCohen who asks why the Rambam does not mention an instance where the High Priest’s testimony is necessary to prevent a transgression, for in such an instance, even the High Priest is required to testify. For it appears that the Rambam would not require a High Priest to testify in such circumstances.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 179) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 463) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1, according to Scriptural Law, this obligation applies with regard to all matters brought to court, cases involving financial matters as well as those involving capital punishment.

Sanhedrin 40a derives the need for these seven fundamental questions from the exegesis of three verses (Deuteronomy 13:15, 17:4, and 19:18) which deal with the judges’ examination of the witnesses.

The reason for these questions is to divert the witnesses' attention and cause them to let down their guard, lest they have prepared false testimony (Rashi, Sanhedrin 32a).

I.e., did it have the minimum amount necessary for him to be liable (see Hilchot Sh’vitat Asor 2:1-5).

See the definition of this term in Chapter 18. As explained there, hazamah involves other witnesses stating that these witnesses were with them in another place at the time they claim to have observed the transgression taking place.

Sanhedrin 41 a states: “Whenever there is no possibility of refuting testimony through hazamah, the testimony is of no consequence.” For testimony must include the definition of the essential factors involved in a case. Otherwise, there is no way of proving its authenticity.

See the following chapter which elaborates on the differences between the bedikot and the chakirot.