Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The head of the Supreme Sanhedrin, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

I.e., the person receiving semichah. He is called a zekein, “elder,” for the Hebrew word zekein is interpreted as an allusion to the phrase zeh shekanah chochmah - “the one who acquired wisdom.”

Which refers to God, the supreme Judge, but which is also the term used by the Bible (Exodus 22:8) for a court.

When the Jews entered Eretz Yisrael after the exodus from Egypt, they conquered the Holy Land and settled within. After the Babylonian conquest, they were exiled and the holiness of the land was nullified. After conquering Babylon, Cyrus, King of Persia, gave the Jews the right to return to Eretz Yisrael and led by Ezra, they resettled and reconsecrated the land. The area which they resettled was, however, smaller than that originally possessed by the Jewish people. See Hilchot Terumot 1:6-7 for a description of the boundaries of the lands.

originally possessed by the Jewish people. See Hilchot Terumot 1:6-7 for a description of the boundaries of the lands.

To determine whether they render a woman ritually impure or not. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 9:36. As stated in the Jerusalem Talmud (Chagigah 1:8), special authority must be given to a sage to issue such rulings.

For as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 9, he may not serve in the Sanhedrin.

As Sanhedrin 14a relates the Romans tried to stamp out the Jewish court system by preventing the sages from conveying semichah on their students. They were almost successful, but Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava sacrificed his life and conveyed semichah on five students. They in tum conveyed semichah on others and were able to reconstruct the court system.

I.e., the Rambam was uncertain whether his ruling should be accepted or not. His equivocation on this matter represents somewhat of a change of thinking on this subject. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 1:3), the Rambam explains his rationale for this ruling and outlines similar ideas. In that source, however, he does not speak of the need for resolution. To quote: If you do not say [that semichah can be renewed in the above manner], there will never be the possibility for the Supreme Sanhedrin to exist [again], for it will be necessary that there be a judge who received semichah [and this is not so].... And God has promised [the Jewish people] on their return [to Eretz Yisrael] (Isaiah 1:26): “I will restore your judges as in the previous era.” This issue was debated not only by the Rambam, but by many other sages. Moreover, the debate was not merely theoretical. In the year 5298 (1538), Rav Ya’akov bei Rav, the Chief Rabbi of Tsfat, acted on the Rambam’s ruling. Convening his yeshivah which included such luminaries as Rav Yosef Karo and Rav Moshe of Turin, he desired to be granted semichah himself, then to convey semichah, and in this way, to renew the Sanhedrin.
The Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, the Ralbach, opposed this concept vehemently, composing a text Kuntres HaSemichah to explain his opposition to the concept. For resolution, the two sides turned to the Radbaz, Chief Rabbi of Egypt, who sided with the Ralbach. In his gloss to this halachah, the Radbaz reveals some of the thinking that motivated his decision. Firstly, he questions the Rambam’s statements about the difficulty of collecting all the judges together and suggests that the appointments could be done by correspondence. Alternatively, he notes that if one requires all the judges of Eretz Yisrael to gather together, that was not done in Tsfat. Secondly, he notes that to receive semichah, a sage must be able to rule with regard to the entire Torah, and questions whether such sages exist at present.
And with regard to the Rambam’s statements in his Commentary to the Mishnah, that in the Messianic era, there will be a Sanhedrin and that Sanhedrin must be made up of judges with semichah, the Radbaz answers that Elijah the prophet will arrive before Mashiach. He possesses semichah and he can grant that ordination to others.

I.e., the ruling authority.

The exiliarchs were descendants of King David, son after son. As such, they were granted authority over the Jewish people. As the Rambam states in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 4:4), their authority was not an outgrowth of their wisdom - indeed, not all of them were Torah sages - but rather of their lineage and the acceptance of them by people at large.

Although semichah can be given only by the judges of Eretz Yisrael and this empowers a judge to adjudicate a wider variety of cases, semichah does not carry with it the authority to compel a litigant to appear in court. In the Diaspora, that is dependent on the authority granted by the exiliarch alone.

See Hilchat Avodat Kochavim 5:8 which explains that we are referring to a person who claims to be communicating a prophecy from God, when he never received such a revelation.

See Hilchot Melachim 5:1 which distinguishes between a milchemet mitzvah; a war which we are obligated to fight, and a milchemet reshut, a voluntary war which a king may undertake to expand the territory of the Jewish people or to add its renown among the nations. Sanhedrin 16b derives the need for the Sanhedrin’s involvement from the description (I Chronicles 27:34) of David’s advisers.

In order to determine which city is required to bring a calf which is decapitated. I.e., a corpse is found between two cities and the one which is closest is required to bring the calf. Here it appears that the entire High Court should be involved in the measurement to determine which city is closest. In Hilchot Rotzeach 9:1, however, the Rambam states that five judges are appointed to supervise this task. See Halachah 5.

For goring a person to death, as stated in Exodus 21:29.

As stated in Deuteronomy, ch. 22, and explained in Hilchot Na'arah Betulah, ch. 3 this is speaking about a man who claimed that his wife was not a virgin on her wedding night. Now in that age, a woman was consecrated (erusin) before being married (nisuin). While consecrated, relations with any other man are considered adultery and punishable by death. Hence even though he is primarily suing to free himself from the obligation to pay the woman the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (ante-nuptial contract), the husband's claim could result in the execution of the woman if in fact it were proven that she committed adultery after being consecrated.

The Kessef Mishneh maintains that this refers to measuring which city is closest to the corpse. The Radbaz, however, maintains that the entire court of 71 must supervise the measurement as stated in Halachah 1. This refers to the actual sacrifice of the calf in the wadi.

I.e., the decision whether or not to add a day to the month or not. Three judges are sufficient.

The decision whether to add another month to the year or not, as described by ibid., ch. 4.

In Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, the Rambam defines a k'nas, financial penalty, as a situation where the person pays more or less than the actual monetary damage that he caused. This indicates that the monetary issues between one man and another are not the primary matters at stake, but rather the person's relationship with God. Therefore such cases must be adjudicated by a court of three judges possessing semichah.

I.e., the plaintiff brings witnesses who testify that the defendant acknowledged a debt in their presence.

Witnesses testify that they observed a loan being given.

E. g., property disputes, laws involving sales and presents, inheritances and wills divorce settlements.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:9.

Whenever damage is caused by an animal which deviates from its natural pattern, only half the damages are paid. Since the person is not required to pay the entire amount of the damages, this is considered a k’nas and cannot be levied by judges who do not possess semichah.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:7, this is a unique instance where although the person is required to pay only half the damages, it is considered as financial restitution and not as a k'nas.

I.e., in contrast to goring, which is considered against the animal's nature, these are the animal's natural tendencies. Hence it is not necessary for the court to warn its owner that it has caused damage, before he is held responsible for it. On the contrary, from the outset, the owner must take precautions.

I.e., different rules apply if an animal injures another by goring, as the Rambam proceeds to explain. He is seeking an example of one animal injuring another that is considered a derivative of eating. Now just as eating is an activity performed by the animal for its own comfort, so is rubbing. Hence, damages caused by rubbing against another object or animal-are considered a derivative of eating.

That the ox gored three times.

This halachah is intended to correct a misconception that might arise. Generally, we follow the conception that a person who admits that he is liable for a k'nas before witnesses testify is exonerated, as explained in Hilchot Na'arah Betulah 2:12. Since in these situations, a person is liable to pay on the basis of his own admission, one might think they are not k'nasot, and hence, payment may be expropriated by the judges of the Diaspora. This is not the case, as the Rambam continues to state (Kessef Mishneh).

Since the atonement fine causes the owner of the ox to be pardoned for the responsibility for the other person's death, he is required to pay even if it is his statements alone that create the liability.

A person who removes pillows from under an object thrown from a height, thus causing the object to be broken and a person who burns promissory notes belonging to a colleague. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:7, 9

Accordingly, there are certain leniencies involved. Among them, when a person admits liability before such a judge, he may retract his claim. Making statements before such a judge[s] is like making them before other witnesses.

One might ask: What is the difficulty? Since the judge was informed of the error, he could merely reverse his ruling? For this reason, the Sefer Me'irat Einayim 25:3 explains that we are speaking about a situation where the judge ruled that a substance that was in fact pure was impure, and because of that ruling, the owner placed it in a setting where actually became impure.

We have given an almost literal translation to the term shikul hadaat. The intent is a judgment call, rather than a decision for which there is an explicit Talmudic ruling. In the future, we will translate it as "logical deduction."

I.e., he is considered as a person who caused damages. With regard to an expert judge since he did not have the authority to call the litigants to judgment or their consent for judging them, he is held liable. For deciding to adjudicate a case in such a situation is equivalent to accepting responsibility in the event of error.
A judge who is not an expert has a more encompassing responsibility. Since he knows that he is not an expert, the very fact that he consents to judge involves accepting responsibility for his mistakes. For he is aware of his limitations and knows that he might err. Nevertheless, he is not held liable for a mistake regarding an explicit law. The rationale is that this is considered like an ones, a factor beyond his control. Since he would not be expected to make an error concerning such a matter, it is not taken for granted that he accepts responsibility (Lechem Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's ruling depends on the principle hefker beit din hefker, that the court has the right to expropriate property from an individual. When is that principle applied, however? When expert judges are empowered to act as a court or explicitly asked to do so by the litigants. Hence when they are not so empowered and when consent was not granted them by the litigants, they are personally responsible.

This is possible, because the exiliarchs were not necessarily paradigms of ethical excellence.

For because of the severity involved in taking an oath, many people would rather give in slightly and negotiate a compromise, rather than invoke God's name, even when their claim is justified.

The litigant may show the transcript to other authorities and if they discover an error, the judges' ruling may be reversed according to the principles stated in the previous halachot.

That one litigant can compel another to have a case adjudicated locally.

E. g., disputes concerning the ownership of property, or other instances where there is neither a plaintiff and a defendant, but two litigants with neither having established a claim of ownership with regard to a property or a privilege.

That we compel a defendant to ascend with the plaintiff.