Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., the court of 71 judges described in Hilchot Sanhedrin 1:3. Since this book of the Mishneh Torah contains the laws pertaining to the establishment of the Supreme Sanhedrin, the Rambam mentions the laws governing a person who rebels against that court in the same book (Radbaz).

As the Rambam explains in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, from the Written Law alone, it is impossible to know how to observe the mitzvot. Instead, the explanation of their particulars was conveyed by the Oral Tradition from one generation to another. In each generation, the Supreme Sanhedrin in Jerusalem was considered the repository of that tradition and given the authority to clarify any and all questions regarding Jewish observance. Moreover, using the accepted principles of Biblical exegesis, they could develop new laws and insights.

I.e., the Torah promises that there would be a High Court whose authority we are obligated to heed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 174) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 495) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
There are commentaries who maintain that this mitzvah (and the negative commandment in the following halachah) apply only to the High Court which holds sessions in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in Jerusalem. If it holds sessions elsewhere, even when sitting with 71 judges, these mitzvot do not apply. There are, however, other authorities who differ and maintain that they apply regardless of where the court holds session. The Sefer HaChinuch, loc. cit., goes even further and maintains that these mitzvot include even the obligation to heed the directives of courts in the present era.

I.e., any believing Jew.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 312) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 496) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

On this verse, the Sifri comments: “Follow them even if they tell you that left is right.”

I.e., in the case of a rebellious elder as stated in Chapter 3. See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2 which states that when a prohibition involves capital punishment, lashes are never given for its violation.

E. g., the thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis stated by Rabbi Yishmael at the beginning of the Sifra (and quoted in the daily prayers) or other principles of this nature.

E. g., the prohibition against eating chicken in milk. See Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

E. g., the mitzvah of eruvin; see Hilchot Eruvin 1:2.

E. g., the recitation of Hallel on Rosh Chodesh (Hilchot Chanukah 3:7).
More particularly, in his Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam defines “decrees” as referring to practices instituted to safeguard the observance of the mitzvot, and “edicts” and “customs” as referring to practices instituted on the basis of the sages’ understanding or because of mutual consent to regulate social norms or to bring people to a more complete Torah experience.

The Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 1) challenges the Rambam's ruling, stating that if so, anyone who violated a Rabbinic ordinance would be liable for lashing, for in effect he would be violating a Torah commandment. Similarly, the general principle - When there is doubt regarding to a question of Rabbinic Law, we follow the more lenient position, while when there is doubt with regard to a question of Scriptural Law, we follow the more severe position - would not apply. For all matters would involve Scriptural Law.
The Kiryat Sefer resolves the Rambam's ruling explaining that at the outset, the Sages established their ordinances with these leniencies in mind.
In Yayn Malchut, the Lubavitcher Rebbe explains the difference between the Scriptural commandments and the obligation to heed the rulings of the Rabbis as follows: Scriptural commandments can involve the cheftza (the physical substance of the article itself); the article is forbidden. Rabbinic commandments, by contrast, can involve only the gavra (the person observing the commandment); he is forbidden to perform the act (Tzafnat Paneach, Responsum 33). Hence since with regard to a Scriptural Commandment, the object itself becomes forbidden, we rule more stringently. With regards to a Rabbinic commandment, by contrast, since the object itself is not involved, there is room for leniency.

Extending back to Moses at Sinai.

Note the Rambam’s Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, where he elaborates on this subject explaining that there was never any difference of opinion among the Jewish people about which species to use on Sukkos. Although the descriptions of some of the four species in the Torah do not give clear indications which species to use, the Jewish people have always employed the same four. Similarly, in all courts throughout our people’s history, “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), has always been interpreted as referring to financial payment, not actually gouging a person’s eye out. These and other similar matters have always been universally accepted.

I.e., points derived through the accepted principles of Biblical exegesis.

As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 1:3-4, a court of 23 judges should be established for every city with at least 120 inhabitants. If there are less, a court of three judges is established.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 1:3 with regard to the description of the courts mentioned in this and the following clause.

I.e., the questioner, the judges of his local court, and the judges of the court on the Temple Mount.

I.e., within the Women’s Courtyard, before the Nikanor Gates that lead to the Temple Courtyard.

See Sanhedrin 88b which states: “When the students of the Schools of Shammai and Hillel who had not studied under their masters sufficiently multiplied, differences of opinion increased among the Jewish people and it became as if there were two Torahs.” See also the discussion of the matter in the Rambam’s Introduction to His Commentary on the Mishnah.

I.e., the Supreme Sanhedrin had not reached a decision, and an action had to be taken immediately (see Lechem Mishneh).
Our translation follows the version in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah. According to certain authoritative manuscripts and early printings, the version is “or the matter did not reach them,” i.e., the decision had to be made before the matter could be taken to the High Court.

From the Rambam's wording, one might think that if a later court comes to a decision based on their appreciation of the subject, the principles mentioned below are followed despite the fact that a previous court had ruled differently. Even if the former court was greater in wisdom and in the number of adherents (see Chapter 2, Halachot 1-2), the latter court's decision may be followed, as stated by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha in Avodah Zarah 7a (see Kessef Mishneh).
Rav Moshe HaCohen and the Lechem Mishneh differ and cite a responsum of the Rashba (Vol. 1, Responsum 253) which states that the ruling depends on which court is greater in wisdom and in the number of adherents. The Rashba does state there is room for leniency if the matter involves a major loss. This view is cited by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 25:2).

I.e., not only did they teach the matter in theory, they actually had their conception applied in practice.

It would appear that this would apply even if the later court was lesser in wisdom and in the number of adherents than the court that made the original ruling (Radbaz).

Rosh HaShanah 25b states: “Would you think that a person would go to a judge that was not in his age? Instead, the intent is that he should follow the judge in his age.... Yerubaal in his generation is like Moses in his generation. Yiftach in his generation is like Samuel in his generation.” Although Yerubaal and Yiftach represented - to make an understatement - less than the epitome of wisdom and righteousness, a person in their generation was enjoined to follow the rulings of their courts.
The concept that a lesser court can challenge the rulings of a previous court of greater stature appears to be supported by the Rambam’s statements in his Introduction to the Mishneh Torah where he states that after the conclusion of the Talmud, the Geonim of one generation can challenge the rulings of the Geonim who preceded them. Nevertheless, it appears to be contradicted by his statements there that no later sage can challenge the rulings made by the Sages of the Talmud. Similarly, in the Talmud itself, it appears that the Sages of the Gemorah (the Amoraim) would not challenge the rulings of the Sages of the Mishnah. Thus it would seem that there were cut-off points at which the Sages of one generation would not challenge the rulings of the Sages of previous generations.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that it is possible to explain that, after the conclusion of the Mishnah, all the Sages accepted the general principle not to challenge the rulings of the Mishnah, and similarly, after the conclusion of the Talmud, not to challenge the rulings of the Talmud. When, however, there are no general principles of this nature in effect, the principle stated by the Rambam in this halachah applies. See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 6:1.

The Or Sameach relates that this principle explains why the Rambam calls the laws derived through the principles of Biblical exegesis, divrei sofrim, “the words of the Sages.” For their interpretation is dependent upon the Sages of each generation.

The Supreme Sanhedrin as indicated by the following halachah.

I.e., instituted a halachic practice on their own authority.

See Halachot 5-7.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ediot 1:5), the Rambam interprets this term as meaning that the head of one court will be more renowned for his wisdom than the head of the other court.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s statements, maintaining that once a decree has gain widespread acceptance within the Jewish community, it may not be nullified even by the prophet Elijah and his court. The Ra’avad’s position is based on Avodah Zarah 36a which makes such a statement with regard to the 18 matters in which the School of Shammai’s opinion was accepted over that of the School of Hillel’s (see Shabbat 17a). The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh, however, explain that these 18 matters represent an exception to the rule (see also the notes to Halachah 3). With regard to other matters. The Rambam’s ruling is accepted.

Beitzah 5b derives this concept from God’s directives to the Jewish people before the Giving of the Torah. At first, He forbade sexual relations for three days in preparation for the Giving of the Torah. After the Giving of the Torah, there was a special command for the Jews to resume relations. Otherwise, although the reason for the safeguard had already been nullified - for the Torah had already been given - the original prohibition would have remained in effect.
The Ra’avad takes issue with this concept as well, stating that it. the rationale for an edict or decree has been nullified, the edict or decree can be nullified even if the court which does so is lesser than the court which instituted the decree. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh, however, support the Rambam’s ruling.

We have been translating biminyan, lit. “in number,” as “in the number of adherents,” including the Rambam’s resolution in the translation of the term from the outset. Others (the Ra’avad in his commentary to Ediot 1:5) interpret “in number,” as “in age.’’

This ruling depends on the passage from Avodah Zarah 36a cited above. The Rambam maintains that the reason these 18 matters were given such power is because they were instituted as safeguards (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

See the Chatam Sofer (Yoreh De’ah, Responsum 13) which states that this ruling applies only when the rationale for which the safeguard was originally instituted still applies. If, however, that rationale was nullified, a court that is of greater stature than the court which instituted the decree may nullify it.

I.e., although there are situations where we apply the principle (Ketubot 83b): “The words of the Sages are more severe than the words of the Torah,” this is not one of them (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., even capital punishment as indicated by the following note.

In that vein, the Rambam states (Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:4, quoting Sanhedrin 46a): “An incident occurred where they had a man lashed for engaging in relations with his wife under a tree. And an incident occurred concerning a person who rode on a horse on the Sabbath in the era of the Greeks and they brought him to the court and had him stoned to death.”

They must, however, clarify that their instructions are given only because of the immediate situation and should not be adopted as a permanent practice. The classic example of this is Elijah’s confrontation of the prophets of Baal at Mount Carmel (I Kings, ch. 18). Although there is both a positive and a negative commandment that requires all sacrifices to be offered in the Temple, Elijah offered a sacrifice on Mt. Carmel to prove God’s supremacy to the people. In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9:3, the Rambam discusses the issue within the context of the license granted a prophet to temporarily violate the Torah’s commandments, stating:
If [the people] would have asked Elijah: “How can we violate the Torah’s command,”... he would have told them: “... Anyone who offers a sacrifice outside [the Temple’s premises] is liable for karet... [The present instance,] however, [is an exception]. I am offering a sacrifice... at God’s command to disprove the prophets of Baal.”
Just as a prophet is empowered to take such license based on God’s command, a court may take such license based on their own perception of the situation.

In his gloss to this halachah, the Radbaz writes:
The analogy is not appropriate unless we see the entire Jewish people as one body. Although their bodies separate them, since their souls are hewn out from a single source, they are like one body, for the soul is of primary importance. Know this. From our master’s words, it appears that the analogy applies to the mitzvot. They are like one body and the court may nullify some [of the mitzvot] so [the people] observe the rest. Both interpretations are correct.
According to the first interpretation, the intent is that we may punish some Jews (as quoted from Hilchot Sanhedrin) so that the observance of the people at large will remain intact. See also Berachot 54a which interprets Psalms 119:126: “It is a time to act for God; they have nullified Your Torah,” as “They [i.e., the Sages] may ‘nullify Your Torah,’ because ‘it is a time to act for God.’” The intent is that the sages may violate certain Torah commandments temporarily if they feel that doing so will allow the body of the Torah to remain intact.

Yoma 85b. See the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Shabbat 2:1-3.

Avodah Zarah 36a derives this concept from the exegesis of a verse. It is, however, logically understood. Regardless of the Sages’ positive intent, instituting a practice which people at large cannot uphold will lead to a weakening - and not a strengthening – of Torah observance.

I.e., it is not necessary for a subsequent court to undertake a specific action to nullify the decree. If it was not accepted by the community, it is nullified automatically.
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 228:50, based on Piskei Mahari 292) rules that individuals also are not obligated to observe such decrees.

The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 228:50, based on Piskei Mahari 292) rules that individuals also are not obligated to observe such decrees.

See the Kessef Mishneh who debates whether the intent is that the decree never spread throughout the Jewish community (as is Rashi’s view) or that at his time, its observance was not widespread. The latter interpretation would lead to the conclusion that even when originally, the Jewish people had by and large observed a decree, if it is not observed in a later generation, it can be nullified. The Kessef Mishneh does not, however, conclusively accept either interpretation.

The Rambam's wording implies that since the original court was under the impression that the decree had spread throughout the Jewish community, the later court must nullify the decree. It is not automatically null and void.
One of the classic examples of this concept is the actions of Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah (the grandson of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, the author of the Mishnah). Rabbi Yehudah and his court permitted the use of oil made by gentiles although the decree forbidding it had been issued by the students of Hillel and Shammai, a court of far greater prestige. Rabbi Yehudah surveyed the Jewish community and saw that the decree had never been observed. Therefore, he had the authority to nullify it.

Avodah Zarah 37a relates that after Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah repealed two prohibitions, some of his colleagues pressed him to repeal a third. He refused, saying that this would cause his court to develop a reputation for leniency.

As stated in Halachot 2 and 3.

As stated in Halachah 4.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 313) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 454) count the prohibition against adding to the Torah as one of its 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 314) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 455) count the prohibition against detracting from the Torah as one of its 613 mitzvot.

I.e., the interpretation of the Written Law given to Moses at Sinai - "the mitzvah" to refer to the term used by the Rambam in his Introduction to the Mishneh Torah – is considered as equivalent to the Written Law itself. Just as it is forbidden to add or detract from a concept explicitly stated in the Torah; so, too, it is forbidden to add or detract from the explanation of a practice conveyed by the Oral Law. The Rambam reiterates these concepts in the ninth of his Thirteen Principles of Faith (Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin, ch. 10) stating:
The ninth principle is that the Torah of Moses will never be nullified.... There can be no additions to it, nor any deletions from it - neither in its text nor in its explanation. And thus we are commanded: "Do not add to it and do not detract it from it."
(Our translation is taken from the original manuscript versions of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah. The standard published text varies slightly.)
The Ra’avad harshly differs with the Rambam’s explanation, stating that the Rambam’s words are fit to be carried away by the wind. The Ra’avad states that any practice established as a safeguard for Scriptural Law is never considered as a prohibited addition to the Torah even if it is established as a permanent practice and an allusion to it from the Torah is found. According to him, addition and detractions from the Torah involve adding or detracting from the observance of certain mitzvot: e.g., wearing five or three tzitzit instead of the required four, or adding or subtracting a species to the four used on Sukkos. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s conception, while Rav Moshe HaCohen echoes the Ra’avad’s view.

E. g., a deer or a buffalo which are kosher animals. The Rambam’s statements have attracted the attention of the commentaries, for there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis in Chullin 116a, and the Rambam (Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 9:4) and many other Rishonim follow the view that the meat of a wild beast that is cooked in milk is not forbidden according to Scriptural Law. Why then does he state here that it is forbidden?
The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that here, the Rambam is speaking theoretically: Were the halachah to follow the opinion that the meat of a wild beast is forbidden according to Scriptural law, the ruling would be such and such. The Merkevat HaMishneh, however, maintains that a printing error crept into the text in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot and the text should be changed to fit the Rambam’s ruling here.

For the verse mentions “its mother’s milk,” and fowl do not have milk (Chulin 113a).

This and the subsequent conclusions the Rambam mentions are all forbidden by Scriptural Law.

For the verse mentions explicitly a "kid," i.e., a goat.

I.e., interpreting the term according to its most literal meaning.

Note the qualification of this matter in Halachah 3.

See Halachah 4 ff.

The Rambam defines the term epicurus (the term used here) in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8. It appears, however, that here, he is not referring to the precise definition of that term, but rather to a more general conception of heresy. It must be noted that many of the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah use the term min (see Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7).

As the Rambam continues to explain in the following halachah, a heretic should be slain. Any person may - and should - take the law into his own hands in this regard. There is no need to wait for judicial process.

Indeed, if the pit has a ladder, the ladder should be removed. Compare to Hilchot Rotzeach 4:10 which says that if it is possible, one should kill such individuals with a sword in public view.

I.e., there is no difference if the person denies the Oral Law or the Written Law.

People who seek to give gentile authorities control over the lives or the property of their fellow Jews. As stated in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 8:9-10, if possible, it is a mitzvah to kill such people, even in the era of exile.

As evident from the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 425:5), this terms refers to people who transgress with the intent of angering God. If, however, a person transgresses because he cannot control his desires, these severe measures do not apply.

Compare to Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:1 which states that these individuals “cause difficulty to the Jews and sway the people away from God.” See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 1:2) where he states that the progenitors of deviant approaches should be killed for corrupting the Torah.

These were two of the greatest students of Antigonus of Socho. As the Rambam states in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 1:3), after they heard Antigonus teach: “Do not be as servants who serve their master for the sake of receiving a reward,” they forsook Jewish practice, saying: “Is it just that we labor without receiving a reward?”
They began splinter sects with the intent of swaying the people after them. At first, they sought to abandon Jewish practice entirely. They saw, however, the people would not accept this and so they focused their complaints on the Oral Law, arguing that although the Written Law was of Divine origin, the Oral Law was not. Their intent, however, was to deny the entire Torah. Similarly, the individuals mentioned by the Rambam deny “the Oral Law first,” i.e., their intent is to deny the entire connection with God and the Torah.

The Karaites represented a sect of deviant Jews who followed the approach of Tzadok and Beitus, rejecting the observance of the Oral Law although maintaining a certain amount of deference to Jewish tradition. In the Rambam's era, they had won the allegiance of many of the Jews in Egypt and North Africa. Their belief, however, was not perpetuated and after a brief epoch in history, they ceased to exist in significant numbers.

The concept of a child captured and raised by gentiles is found in Shabbat 68b. It is explained that when such a child comes of age and later desires to atone for his conduct, he is required to bring only one sin offering for each transgression which he performed no matter how often he repeated it (in contrast to an ordinary person who must bring a sin offering for every act of transgression he performs). He is judged more leniently and not held fully responsible for his deeds, because he was raised in a non-Jewish environment. Similarly, the Rambam is postulating, the descendants of the Karaites should not be held responsible for their transgressions, for they were brought up in an environment that drew them away from the Torah and its mitzvot.

As reflected in the manuscript copies of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 1:2), these words of patience and forbearance reflected a change in the Rambam’s thinking. In his youth, he concluded his treatment of the subject without including them. When he rewrote his Commentary to the Mishnah in his later years and here in the Mishneh Torah, he felt it necessary to include them.
Contemporary Rabbinic experts have applied the Rambam’s statements here to the question of how to do deal with Reform and Conservative Jews today.

See the conclusion of the Rambam’s Iggeret HaShmad where he also urges a loving approach to sinners. themselves, stating: “It is not appropriate to ostracize and detest those who desecrate the Sabbath. Instead, one should draw them close and encourage them to perform mitzvot.... Even if a person transgresses intentionally, when he comes to the synagogue to pray, he should be accepted and should not be abused.”

Deuteronomy, ch. 17.

I.e., “the rebellious elder” must be a sage, as evident from the following halachah.

I.e., derives concepts using the accepted principles of Biblical exegesis.

As illustrated in the following halachot.

As is required of all those who are executed; see Hilchot Sanhedrin 13:1.

In contrast, those who deny the Oral Law are not granted a portion in the world to come (Kessef Mishneh, based on Hilchot Teshuvah, ch. 3).

Stating that we must follow the rulings of the majority and not deviate from them.

As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin, ch. 4.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 2. The Rambam’s ruling is dependent on his understanding of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Sanhedrin 86b, 87a).
Perhaps, tefillin are singled out, because “the entire Torah is equated to tefillin” (Yayin Malchut).

If, however, he maintains that theoretically, the other sages are wrong, but refrains from giving a directive to others to act on his instructions and does not act upon them himself, he is not liable, as stated in Halachot 6 and 8.

I.e., the chamber outside the Temple Courtyard where they would hold court. See Halachah 7.

I.e., it does not apply to a scholar who lacks knowledge of more fundamental issues.

The classic example of this principle is Akkavya ben Mahallel who received four teachings from his teachers which - though they represented the majority views at that time - were not accepted by the majority of the Sages in the following generation. Akkavya refused to change his conception of these laws, and yet, in deference to the majority, did not issue rulings for action according to his conception. Moreover, before his passing, he advised his son to accept the ruling of the majority (Ediot 5:6-7; Sanhedrin 88a).

See Hilchot Talmud Torah, chs. 6 and 7.

The Maharitz Chayot states that although this is a general guideline, in practice, the matter is left to the interpretation of every court. For that reason, Akkavya ben Mahallel was not ostracized or subjected to corporal punishment. Since Akkavya sought to minimize the discord and the lack of respect for the court that could result from different approaches being taught, he was not subjected to punishment.

I.e., as an abstract concept without telling people that they should conduct themselves in this manner.

In contrast to other cases where capital punishment is administered (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2). This ruling represents a change from the Rambam’s position in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 11:2) where he states that such a warning is required.

For a court of 23 judges has the authority to issue sentences of capital punishment.

When the entire Jewish people gather together in Jerusalem. There the announcement and the execution will attract the most attention.
As evident from Hilchot Sanhedrin, 11:2. 13:5, executions are not held on the sacred days of the festivals, but on Chol HaMoed.

The Radbaz explains that the execution of these four individuals is announced publicly, because in each instance, there is a rationale that might lead one to think that the transgression is not so severe: The rebellious elder did not actually commit a transgression; he merely instructed others to. The lying witnesses are not executed if the person was executed on the basis of their testimony, only when he has not yet been executed. Hence, one might think there is room for leniency. Similarly, as will be explained, the wayward and rebellious son is not executed because of the transgressions he performed, for stealing and eating gluttonously do not make him worthy to die. Instead, the Torah appreciates the ultimate outcome of his conduct. As such, there is room to argue that, at present, there is room for leniency. And the person who entices others to idol worship can argue that he himself did not commit the transgression. Hence, to make people aware that these transgressions are indeed severe, a public announcement is made.

The commentaries have noted that Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, ch. 5, where the Rambam discusses the laws pertaining to someone who entices others to worship idols, does not mention that the execution of such a person is announced publicly. They explain that perhaps he relied on his statements here.

The commentaries note that Hilchot Edut 18:17 (which speaks about the announcement of the execution of lying witnesses) and Chapter 7, Halachah 13, of these halachot (which speaks about the announcement of the execution of a wayward and rebellious son) do not mention that these individuals should be executed during a pilgrimage festival. Instead, they state that a proclamation concerning these individual’s execution should be circulated among the Jewish people. This has led the Kessef Mishneh to conclude that according to the Rambam, only the rebellious elder must be executed at that time. This view is supported by an opinion in the Tosefta (Sanhedrin 9:1). Others, however, point to another opinion in the Tosefta (ibid. 11:3) which states that all four individuals should be executed on a pilgrimage festival.