Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Although it is a custom to invite guests to a wedding celebration and for them to give gifts, the formal business arrangements of this practice are no longer popular custom. For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEt;er 60:1) does no more than mention the matter in brief, stating that it is no longer the custom to demand payment of shushvinut, and the later authorities do not pay any attention to it at all.

See Hilchot Ishut 10:12.

Our translation is based on the manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text has a slightly different version.

I.e., the shushvinut is thus like a loan to be repaid when the giver marries. See Halachah 13

As the Rambam proceeds to illustrate in the examples he provides, the giver may not marry in a better or a worse circumstance than the recipient.

In the following halachah, the original recipient of the shushvinut may deduct the value of the food that the origin al giver ate at his feast. This option is not given in this halachah, because the recipient had the alternative of going to the reception and partaking of the food.

The text of the following two halachot has been changed to fit that of the authoritative manuscript s of the Mishneh Torah, because there is an apparent typographical error in the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. The version that appears in those texts is difficult to understand.

Four dinarim.

When a person gives a larger present, he is also given more and better food and drink. Therefore, more than a dinar is deducted when he is not given the chance to eat and drink at his colleague’s wedding feast.

As reflected by the contrast to the following clause, here the intent of “prestigious” is generous and magnanimous.

We assume that such a person will not raise objections if he ends up receiving slightly less than he deserves.

I.e., the shushvinut is not considered a debt due the estate.

Implied is that since that is not possible, the recipient is not obligated.

For he was already obligated to return it to Shimon before his death.

Although ordinary loans are.

And since he may not demand payment for this debt before or during the Sabbatical year, the Sabbatical year does not nullify it. See Hilchot Shemitah V’Yovel 9:9.

See Hilchot Nachalot 3:1, which defines ra’ui as money that is not in the possession of the estate, even though it is owed to the estate - for example, a debt. The firstborn does not receive a double portion of such monies.

The Mishneh LaMelech states that this ruling applies only when the giver has to press the recipient to take the money. If, however, the recipient takes it without quibbling, the money is considered to be a loan.

The Ra’avad does not accept the Rambam’s ruling. It is, however, substantiated by the Maggid Mishneh.

The Ramah writes that garments and utensils are considered like money, while the Shitah Mekubetzet rules that they are not.

This is an Aramaic term literally meaning “lying down because of sickness.” Note the Targum of II Kings 13:14.

In Talmudic times, these laws carried great importance, because they represented the most common manner in which a dying man apportioned his estate. Rather than prepare a written will, most people would apportion their property orally in the manner that the Rambam proceeds to explain in the following chapters. In the present generation, for various reasons (see the commentary on Halachah 27), the concept of an oral will has fallen out of use, and property is generally apportioned through a written will.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:5) emphasizes that this convention applies even if the dying man does not explicitly state that he is apportioning his property in preparation for his death.

On the Sabbath, it is forbidden to draw up a legal record, and ordinarily transactions that would require such a record are also forbidden. See Hilclrot Slwbbat 23:12.

The dying man will most likely fear that if all the ordinary legal conventions for the transfer of property were required, he would not live long enough to apportion all his property. Therefore, in consideration of his feelings, our Sages did not require them.

Like landed property, which is acquired with a deed of transfer (Sefer Me’irat Eina yim 250:3).

Like movable property, which is acquired by meshichah (ibid.).

I.e., our Sages instituted this practice so that a person could apportion his property calmly, secure in the knowledge that his instructions would have all the weight of a binding legal convention (Bava Barra 147b).

Since it is unnecessary and is performed solely to appease the dying man, we allow it to be performed on the Sabbath. For it is only a Rabbinic decree, and it can thus be superseded out of concern for the dying man.

Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 6:6 explains that ordinarily a person may make certain statements about financial matters while speaking facetiously, without any intent that his words be taken seriously. To make certain that the defendant does not claim to have spoken in such a manner, ordinarily, his statements will not be accepted in a court of law unless he says “You are my witnesses.” An exception is made in this instance because of the rationale explained by the Rambam.

In Hilchot Mechirah 22:10, £he Rambam explains that this leniency is granted despite the fact that ordinarily a person cannot transfer property to a person who does not yet exist. In this halachah, as a preface to the laws which follow, he adds that this law also applies with regard to a sh’chiv me’ra.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, this law [derived from Bava Batra 140b] applies only with regard to a sh’chiv me’ra and not with regard to a healthy person. For a healthy per. on would have to confirm such statements with a kinyan, and this is not possible in this instance, for money cannot be acquired through a kinyan sudar (Hilchot Mechirah 5:6). Moreover, this is a n asmacfua, for since the person doe s not know the gender of the child his wife will bear, we assume that he did not make a serious commitment. (See also Siftei Cohen 253:35.)
The Rashba, however, differs with the Rambam and describes situations where this law could apply with regard to a healthy person as well. (The commentaries derive an important principle from this discussion: That an asmachta is binding for a sh’chiv me’ra.)

100 zuz.

This clause is necessary. Otherwise, one might think that the father did not necessarily realize that his wife was pregnant with twins and did not intend to give gifts to both his son and his daughter (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 253:58).

A person whose genital area is covered by skin and whose gender cannot be identified. If afterwards the Tumtum undergoes an operation and his genitals are revealed, he is considered to be of whichever gender is revealed.

A person who possesses both male and female sexual organs.

I.e., in this instance they receive as sons. If, however, the father desired to give a larger portion to his sons, they receive as if they were daughters.
The rationale is, as the Rambam rules in Hilchot Ishut 2:24, that there is an unresolved doubt with regard to the gender of these individuals. Hence, they are always given the lesser amount. See also Hilchot Nachalot 5:2.

The rationale is that it is clear from his statement that he desired that the money be given to his son. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 1.) Moreover, even if the son dies, since the gift did not take effect at the time that it was given, it does not take effect afterwards.

For the intent of the sh’chiv me’ra is that if he recovers, he will continue to own his property.

Not only do the intended recipients not acquire the property until the sh’chiv me’ra actually dies, but their acquisition takes effect at that time only. We do not say that retroactively the property becomes theirs from the time the sh’chiv me’ra apportioned it to them.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 252:1) explain that this does not refer to the money due the deceased’s wife by virtue of her ketubah. Certainly, that money is expropriated for her, for he would have the right to collect that money even if the property had been sold. Instead, the intent is ketubat benin dichrin - i.e., when a man has sons from two different wives, each of the sons has the right to collect the money due his mother by virtue of her ketubah from his father’s estate (Hilchot Ishut 19:13). Even this privilege takes precedence over the deceased’s apportionment of his property.

A husband’s estate is responsible to pay for his widow’s living expenses until she remarries or collects the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Similarly, it is liable for the living expenses of his daughters until they marry or attain majority.

Therefore, the sons and the widow and his daughters have a prior claim. Needless to say, a creditor of the deceased has a prior claim, and his debt must be settled before the gifts that were apportioned can be given out.

The Hagahot Maimoniot maintain that the same law applies when a legal document is not prepared, but the sh’chiv me’ra has his statements confirmed by a kinyan.

See Halachot 15-17, which describe when a kinyan is and is not necessary when a dying man apportions only part of his estate. This halachah is speaking about an instance when a kinyan is not necessary.

In which instance a kinyan is never necessary, as stated in Halachah 2.

Since the sh’chiv me’ra is rejecting the halachic convention our Sages offered him, he is not given its benefits.

For in this instance, the sh’chiv me’ra is not rejecting the convention granted him, but rather seeking to strengthen the recipient’s position.

We assume that he is peaking about landed property worth a maneh, for money itself cannot be transferred through the medium of a legal document.

The Ra’avad states that even if the legal document was written while the sh’chiv me’ra was alive, the gift should not be made after his death, because the witnesses who composed the document are considered to be the dying man’s agents, and with his death their agency ceases.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choslzen Mishpat 250:17) goes even further, stating that even if the legal document was transferred while the sh’clzlv me’ra was alive. the gift is not effective, because the intent of the sh’chiv me’ra was that the gift not take effect until after hi death.

This indicates that hi intent is that the gift be given as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra.

Similarly, if the le ga l document states: ‘May this legal document function in a manner that is effective,” the legal document is effective [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:17)].

I.e., without stating explicitly that he is giving it as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Ciwsh en Mishpat 250:2) emphasizes that the sh’chiv me’ra must “recuperate entirely.” See Halachot 25 and 26 and notes for clarification regarding this issue.

Automatically; the person who was ill need not perform any legal act to reclaim ownership of his property.

Although the Mishnah (Bava Batra 146b) mentions only landed property, the Gemara (ibid. 150b) clarifies that the intent is also movable property.

I.e., without explicitly stating that it is being given as part of the dying’s man apportionment of his property.

As reflected by the following halachah, the rationale is that by retaining property, the person indicates that he is considering the possibility that he will recover from his illness and wants to ensure that in that eventuality, something is left for him. If this were not so, why else would he give away part of his estate, but not the entire estate? Accordingly, any property that he did give away is considered to be like a gift given by a healthy person.
While accepting the basic concept, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:4) differ and state that this principle applies only when the person retains enough property to support himself. Otherwise, the retention of property is not considered sufficient indication that the person meant his gifts to be binding even if he recovered.

In Hilchot Mechirah 1:7, the Rambam writes that the transfer of property via a legal document is effective from the time the document reaches the hand of the recipient. This is probably the intent here as well.

Since it is like a gift given by a healthy man, it is not automatically retracted if the dying man recovers.

The intent is any valid kinyan - e.g., kinyan chalifin, meshichah or lifting the article up (Ramah, Ibid.).

Since it is like a gift given by a healthy man, it must be confirmed using the same legal conventions as a gift given by a healthy man.

Such a person is referred to as a ;, n•o ncno ;,1:;o, “one who apportions [his property] because of [his impending] death.”

Halachot 10-11.

Even though the person is dying, the wording he uses changes the halachic status of the gift that he is giving. For this reason, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:9) states that careful attention must be paid to the wording used by a dying man or written in a legal document on his behalf.

During the giver’s lifetime.

As the Rambam states in Chapter 12, Halachah 16 [quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 251:1)], if such a document is composed by a healthy person, we assume that the intent is that the gift take effect immediately. It states “in death” only as a figurative expression, indicating that the gift should continue forever.

I.e., the fact that it states “in life” is not interpreted as indicating that it takes effect from the time that the gift was made.

For, as stated in Halachah 17, when a gift involving only part of a person’s estate is given explicitly as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra, it is granted that status.

As is necessary when giving part of one’s estate (Halachah 15).

As would ordinarily apply with regard to such a gift (ibid.).
The Maggid Mishneh states that if the sh’chiv me’ra does in fact die, the person to whom the property is given may in fact take possession of it. The suspicion mentioned by the Rambam is not strong enough to refute that claim. It is only when the person recovers that a question arises.
Rabbenu Asher and the Tur do not accept the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh and maintain that this suspicion applies even if the sh’chiv me’ra dies. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 250:28.

And he has thus not apportioned all his property.

I.e., he specifically states that the property that he apportions is his entire estate.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:11) emphasizes that there is no difference whether a sh’chiv me’ra gives all his property to one per on or divides it among- many.

This is evidenced by his rapid announcement of the division of his estate, without pausing (Rashbam, Bava Batra 148b).

The pause indicates that he considered every gift to be an individual matter not necessarily connected with the gift that preceded or followed it.

Since the gifts are considered to be individual matters, each must be confirmed with a kinyan, except the last gift. Only then are. such gifts effective.
The last gift, since it includes all the person’s remaining property, is considered to be an ordinary matnat sh’chiv me’ra and a kinyan is not necessary. For this reason, the Ra’avad and the Maggid Mishneh emphasize that with regard to this last gift, the kinyan. must have been performed only to amplify the legal power of the recipient, as stated in Halachah 11.

The other recipients acquire the property given them. The rationale is that since he confirmed his gift with a kinyan, each is like a gift given by a healthy person, as stated in Halachah 15.

If, however the sh’chiv me’ra gives the servant only a portion of his property, the slave does not even acquire his own freedom, as stated in Hilchot Avadim 7:1.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining the rationale as follows: Once a s lave is freed, he can never be enslaved again. This is a point of common knowledge; certainly the master is aware of it. Therefore, we assume that the master’s intent when making this statement was to free him.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpar 250:15) states that if the master gives the lave the property “from today, if I die, ‘the slave is not granted his freedom if the master recovers. The rationale is that the gift was obviously conditional in nature.

To exemplify this concept, Bava Batra 151b speaks of a woman who says of herself: “Woe, this woman is dying.”

The fact that a kinyan was made would make the gift appear to resemble a gift given by a healthy person - in which instance, it is binding even if the dying man recovers (Halachah 15). Nevertheless, since it is obvious that his intent was that he was dividing his property because he thought his death was imminent. it is as if he made an explicit condition to that effect.
Based on this interpretation, we are forced to say that the kinyan was performed merely to amplify the legal power of the recipient, as explained in Halachah 11.

In the desert (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 6:5)].

This refers to a person who is being taken from jail before a judge to be sentenced (Ibid.). In Hilchot Gerushin 2:12, the Rambam states that this applies even if he is being judged for financial crimes.

In all these cases, particularly in Talmudic times, there was a real danger that the person would die. Rather than leave his estate intestate, a person might desire to make a will in such a situation. It is possible that he may not have the means at his disposal to draw up that will in a manner that would be effective according to the standard legal conventions. Because of the pressing nature of his situation, our Sages gave him the option of apportioning his property through an oral will, like a sh’chiv me’ra.
Although the Rambam’s decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:8) and the Ra’avad does not object, there are many authorities- e.g., Rabbenu Asher, Rabbenu Yonah and the Rashba - who do not accept this ruling with regard to a person who departs on the sea or who undertakes a caravan journey. Their opinion is mentioned by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 250:22.

I.e., the laws that apply to a sh’chiv me’ra apply to them.

Walking unsupported at home, by contrast, is not considered to be a sign that he has recovered [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:2)]. (Sec also Hilchot Rotzeach 4:4.)

Since he did not recover at all, the fact that he died from a different sickness is not significant, and the apportioning of his property that he made is binding.

In the marketplace; even walking unsupported at home is not considered to be proof that the person recovered.

If he did not die because of the first sickness, the fact that he was able to walk outside is considered a sign of his recovery. And this recovery, even though it was only temporary, is sufficient to have the property revert to his ownership.

The Kessej Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Gerushin 9:19, the Rambam writes that an evaluation must be mad e even if the dying person walked unsupported in the marketplace, because the laws regarding a hill of divorce are more severe than those applying to a gift.

For we assume that he recovered.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 251:2) writes that the witnesses do not have to be present at the person’s death to make such a statement. For this, they can rely on the people who are present at that time [even if they are not acceptable witnesses (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 251:7)].

If, however, the recipient seize the property before the dying man’s death, the burden of proof becomes the heirs’ [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 251:2)].

This is one of the reasons that the practice of an oral will has fallen into disuse. For if the heirs claim that the per on recovered - particularly if they bring physicians who testify that the cause of death cannot be determined- it becomes the recipients’ obligation to prove that the sh’chiv me’ra died from his original sickness. Since this is not always possible, the property remains in the possession of the heirs.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 1, which explains that a gift cannot be hidden, but rather must be publicized. It is not significant, however, that the publicity come a certain time after the gift was given. For at the time the gift is transferred, the matter is to be revealed.

As does a healthy person (Chapter 5, Halachah 2).
The Kessef Mishneh gives two reasons for this distinction:
a) Generally, the reason why a person would give a hidden gift would be to flatter the recipient and make it appear that he is giving him a gift, when in fact he is not. It is unlikely that a person would do such a thing at the time of his death.
b) We do not desire to tire the dying man and have him speak any more than is necessary.

If, however, the dying man specifically asks that the gift remain hidden after his death, it is nullified (Ketzot HaChoshen 242:4).

The forms of the verbs cited by the Rambam all employ the future tense. Although this would not be acceptable with regard to an ordinary transaction (Hilchot Mechirah 2:8), an exception is made with regard to a gift given by a sh’chiv me’ra (Maggid Mishneh). The rationale is that his gift does not take effect until afterwards (Bayit Chadash, Choshen Mishpat 253).

It is preferable that the dying man state explicitly that he is giving the portion as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra. This differentiates his allotments from gifts given by a healthy man.

For these expressions do not clearly indicate a desire to transfer the property. In order to expropriate the property from the heirs, the intended recipient must be able to demonstrate clearly that the deceased desired to transfer his property to him.

Instead, the dying man is considered to have died intestate, and the property is transferred to those who have priority according to the order of inheritance.

The difference between the status of these two gifts can be explained based on Chapter 12, Halachot 3-4, which explain that if a person states: “My property should be given to so and o, and afterwards, to so and so,’’ when the first person mentioned dies, the second is given the property. If, however, the first person is an heir, the second per on docs not receive the estate upon the first person’s death.
The rationale is that since the first person is fit to be an heir, the property is considered as having been inherited. Therefore, the dying man’s wishes are not considered, and it is given to the heirs of the first recipient when that recipient dies. We do not pay attention to the fact that originally the dying man used wording that indicated that he was giving the property as a gift. See Ra’avad; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:6).

See Chapter 6, Halachot 2-3.

I.e., we assume that his question is rhetorical, and it is considered as if he stated that his property should be given to the person named.

I.e., conceived after the person undergoes conversion.

For the conversion causes the convert to be considered a new entity with no connections to his previous relations. Therefore, the son is also considered a convert. This applies even if the mother of the son in question was Jewish and later married the non-Jew who fathered her child. See Bava Batra 149b, which describes such a situation concerning a convert named Isar.

Hilchot Nachalot 6:10.

Our Sages deemed that undesirable, for it would create the impression that the son who received the property is the dying man’s son according to Torah Law. Hence, had the dying man fathered another son after he converted, and if that son dies childless, one might think that the son who was not conceived before the father converted would have to perform either yibbum or chalitzah for the other son.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 256:1) differ with regard to this principle, and maintain that a convert cannot give a matnat sh’chiv me’ra either to another convert or to a native-born Jew. The rationale is that our Sages ordained that a matnat sh’chiv me’ra be considered an inheritance. Since the laws of inheritance do not apply to such a convert, for he has no heirs according to Jewish law, he is not able to give a matnat sh’chiv me’ra.

He must state that the obligation be met. If not, we suspect that perhaps he made these statements only so that his sons would not feel excessively secure and wealthy. (See Chapter 10, Halachot 3-4.)

For any time a person sincerely acknowledges an obligation, it is binding upon him.

This applies even when we have reason to suspect that the dying man did not actually have such a debt.

In this manner, the convert Isar was able to transfer his property to his son, who had been conceived before Isar converted (Bava Batra 149b).

For, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 11, and in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:4, it is forbidden to give a gift to a gentile without charge.

If the dying man had a legal document composed using either of the latter two expressions, the servant would be freed, as stated in Hilchot Avadim 6:2. Nevertheless, because he merely states that this should be done, his heirs must free the servant.

If the dying man used the first expression, the heirs are compelled, because it is a mitzvah to carry out the instructions of a deceased person. If he used either of the latter two expressions, his statements are effective in declaring the servant ownerless. In such a situation, the heirs must free the servant, as stated in Hilchot Avadim 8:13.

Hence, in contrast to a gentile, who cannot be given a gift, the servant can be granted his freedom.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting, as the Rambam himself states (Hilchot Avadim 9:6), that it is forbidden to free a servant. In resolution, the Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba, who explains that if the servant did a favor for his master, the master may - and in a certain sense, is obligated to - free his servant in appreciation.

Similar laws apply to male servants (Maggid Mishneh).

In Hilchot Avadim 6:4, the Rambam explains that this halachah is based on the principle that it is a mitzvah to carry out the will of the deceased. There he also states that the heirs are compelled to carry out these wishes.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 267:98) cite the opinion of Rashi, who maintains that the maidservant should be freed if this is the only thing that will generate satisfaction for her.

For a per on cannot be forced to acquire a gift against his will, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 1. If the sh’chiv me’ra did not apportion it to anyone else, it is given to the heirs.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Netivot HaMishpat 245:12 state that this applies when the recipient remains silent after the giver’s death. If, however, he protests during the giver’s lifetime, even if he remained silent when he initially heard of the gift, the gift does not take effect. For a gift given by a sh’chiv me’ra does not take effect until the sh’chiv me’ra dies. Until that time, the intended recipient may refuse to accept the gift.

For the property has already been transferred to the recipient’s possession.
The commentaries question why the property is not considered to be ownerless, a would be the case if such a scenario occurred when a healthy person gave someone a gift. Note the rulings of the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 245:11) and the commentaries on these texts.

I.e., his entire estate. Alternatively, a portion of his estate, but he specifically stated that he is giving that portion as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra, as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 7 (Kessef Mishneh).

We have translated this line according to the interpretation of most commentaries. According to the interpretation of the Kessef Mishneh mentioned in the previous note, the translation would be: “Whether [he desires to give] his entire estate or only a portion of it.”

In order to strengthen the legal power of the recipient.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:13) states that even if the first recipient seizes possession of the property, it should be expropriated from him.

If, however, he performs only one of the two, he may retract (Maggid Mishneh).

Since the sh’chiv me’ra performed two actions to confirm the intended recipient’s acquisition of the property, the transfer is considered to be a gift given by a healthy person. It takes effect immediately and cannot be retracted.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:14) states that if a person explicitly states that he is giving the gift because of his impending death, he still has the right to retract. If, however, that is merely obvious from his statements, there are opinions that maintain that he does not have that privilege.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:12) states that this law applies even if the dying man originally divided his estate between two people and retracted only the portion given to one of them.
The Ramah continues and states that if the dying man explicitly states that he is retracting only a portion of the gift, the initial recipient(s) acquire the remainder.

I.e., despite the fact that a kinyan was performed to bolster the recipient’s legal power, the giver still retains the right to retract (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., in the case where the entire estate was given, in which instance a kinyan could nullify the person’s acquisition unless it was carried out merely to bolster the recipient’s legal power (Chapter 8, Halachah 11).

I.e., neither the entire estate, nor even the portion that remained after the second gift, was taken away.

I.e., the nullification of the first gift. With regard to the second person’s acquisition of the property, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:12) states that if the sh’chiv me’ra dies the second recipient acquires the property even if a kinyan was not performed. If he recovers, the recipient does not receive the property even if a kinyan was performed.

Without explicitly stating that the kinyan was performed merely to bolster the recipient’s legal power. In this instance, the gift is considered to be a gift given by a healthy man (Chapter 8, Halachah 15).

Because it is considered to be a gift given by a healthy man.

According to the laws of a matnat sh’chiv me’ra.

Bava Batra 148b questions whether or not gifts of this nature or the disowning of one’s property are governed by the same laws as ordinary gifts. There is a rationale to explain why they should be placed in a different category, for we might assume that he consecrated the property or dedicated it to the poor so that the merit of that gift will help him recover. Nevertheless, it is possible that this is not so, and he did not desire that the gift take effect until after his death. Since the Talmud did not resolve the issue, we state that, because of the doubt, the property should remain in the possession of the heirs.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 250:3) writes that even if the poor take possession of the property, it should be expropriated from them. There are, however, authorities who dispute that ruling.

Unlike in the case of an oral will, the sale must be concluded using one of the accepted kinyanim (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 250:12).

Because the fact that he sold only a portion of his property indicates that his act was not solely intended to enable him to allocate his property before his death, but also had an ordinary business dimension.

The fact that he retained possession of the money indicates that his intent was to nullify the sale if he recovered.

The fact that he spent the money indicates that he considered it to be an ordinary business transaction.

The gift must have been confirmed by a kinyan, for otherwise it would not be binding if given by a healthy person. The question is whether the kinyan was conducted to effect the transaction (in which instance it would be considered to be a gift given by a healthy person), or whether the intent was merely to bolster the legal power of the recipient (in which instance it would be considered a matnat sh’chiv me’ra).

For the property is in the possession of the giver. Since the intended recipient desires to expropriate the property from him, we follow the principle: When a plaintiff desires to expropriate property from a defendant, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff (Maggid Mishneh).

The fact that the giver is now healthy is not significant.

As is required any time a person denies totally a claim made by a plaintiff.

This ruling is based on the principle of migo: that if the defendant had desired to lie, he could have used a more effective lie. In this instance, if the recipient had denied entirely that he had received the property as a gift, but instead claimed that it was his own, his claim would have been accepted. Therefore, his word is accepted when he claims that he received the property as a gift given when the giver was healthy.
There is a question whether this ruling also applies when there are witnesses who can testify that the recipient took possession of the property because of the gift, in which instance the principle of migo does not apply. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that even so, the Rambam’s ruling remains in effect, because since the property is now in the possession of the recipient, the giver is considered to be the one attempting to expropriate property, and the burden of proof is on him.
The Kessel Mishneh differs and maintains that the witnesses’ testimony nullifies the legal weight of the recipient‘s possession. Hence, the burden of proof lies on the recipient. The Siftei Cohen 251:6 substantiates the ruling of the Kessef Mishneh.

Since the giver is demanding that the property be returned to him, the recipient must support his claim with an oath.

The fact that it is tied to the deceased’s thigh indicates that it is not a forgery (Rashbam, Bava Batra 135b). Nevertheless, the document is not of legal consequence.

Such a statement indicates that the intent was to give the gift as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra and not as a gift given by a healthy person. With regard to a gift given by a healthy person, if the gift was confirmed by a kinyan, the property is transferred even though the legal document has not been given to the recipient.

As stated in Halachah 15. Indeed, the fact that the document remained in the possession of the deceased would appear to support that contention.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s intent was that if he transferred ownership of a certain portion of the property via the legal document, all the other gifts mentioned in the legal document are also binding.

I.e., all the other gifts are considered to be matnat sh’chiv me’ra. Since the document was binding with regard to the gifts transferred via the legal document, we do not assume that the sh’chiv me’ra retracted regarding the remaining gifts.

This refers to Halachah 24.

For the ruling stated by the Rambam to apply, the promissory note cannot state that a kinyan was enacted confirming the debt.

For his original statements - and subsequent failure to clarify what to do with the document - indicate that he had not made a final decision whether or not to commit himself.